Naval operations in restricted waters—those water areas in which the use of small craft is possible— and for some purposes essential—has a history as old as man’s use of the sea itself. It is not hard to visualize the first such operation: A log canoe paddling silently along the shore; the stealthy approach to the beach; the sudden descent on an unsuspecting enemy. Then quick withdrawal to the safety of the water and return in triumph to the home base bearing aloft the heads of the slain.
The more advanced naval tactician of today, immersed in carrier striking forces, logistic replenishment groups, guided missiles, and antisubmarine warfare, is apt to forget that striking blows at the enemy in the manner described is still part of his job if it can be done with profit to the over-all operation. (Though today a few prisoners would undoubtedly be more acceptable to the admiral than heads.) To a student of naval warfare casting about for methods and tactics not only to meet, but to break the Communist menace, it is quite apparent that the U. S. Navy is so preoccupied with “blue water” operations stemming in concept from our greatest successes in the last war that the possibilities of other approaches are being neglected. Without belaboring the point, that such an attitude is automatically suspect because it smacks of the standard criticism of the military—“planning to fight the next war like the last one”— history clearly shows such a narrow view is unsound.
Discussing this matter with other officers is a discouraging exercise. Most of them confuse it with amphibious warfare. This is restricted- water effort, of course. But the execution of amphibious invasions has become such a formalized art in itself that the terms “restricted- water operations” or “inshore operations” have come into use to cover all operations other than the “set piece” amphibious assault. The terms do include much contact with the shore, including raids and clandestine operations. Hardly any officers in the U. S. Navy are familiar with what has been done in the field of operations in restricted waters or has spent time considering whether this experience could be useful in the future. We need at the start, therefore, a summary of significant points of inshore operations history as a primer on the subject.
For instance, in the War of 1812, contrary to the general impression, our greatest battle successes were obtained upon lakes. In the Civil War, almost the entire naval effort was on rivers or in close blockade of the coast. In that campaign it is now clear that the Navy did not commence on the right tack in blockading the South. Until the Union procured vessels capable of closing with the shore and running up rivers to track down their quarry wherever it might be found, the situation remained as the Acting British Consul in Savannah wrote to his superiors: “ . . . Besides being too few . . . the vessels used by the U. S. Government seem to be too large for the purpose. They cannot prevent vessels of a small size from leaving or approaching.”
Those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it. This is the point of mentioning these events. There was plenty of past experience in our country to show what the Union forces needed to do a proper job. The contrast between British naval tactics during the Revolution and during the War of 1812 is striking. During the Revolution what blockade there was consisted largely of major vessels offshore engaged in a sea chase after merchantmen, a procedure that allowed much commerce to get through. In 1812, on the other hand, although our naval forces seemed to be planning to counter the same tactics as the Revolutionary period, the British showed a brand new approach. The large ships lay offshore as before. But under their cover, swarms of small craft harried the coast until no farmer’s market barge was safe anywhere along the Atlantic seaboard. The devastating effect of such a campaign in that day of dependence on water transportation for essential commodities left the infant United States hanging on the ropes in much worse shape than our standard histories admit.
Yet England herself learned this lesson the hard way. The pre-eminence of her blue- water navy culminated in the Battle of Trafalgar and left her with no effective opponent in sight. Until the British changed their tactics to carry land power into the Continent against Napoleon, the navy literally had little to do. It was these land campaigns, and particularly the pre-emptory demands of the Duke of Wellington during his Peninsular Campaign, that turned the Royal Navy toward the amphibious and restricted-water operation concept. This development was greeted with notable lack of enthusiasm by the majority of British officers. But they did, slowly and reluctantly, bring the power of ships directly against the land and thus hastened Napoleon’s downfall. It was these tactics, however imperfect, that stood the British in good stead in 1812 when they applied them in a theater much better adapted to their use than the storm-wracked shores of the Bay of Biscay. It is also worth noting that this tactic of closing with the shore caused surprise and consternation in American naval circles.
In World War I, the entrenched armies faced each other along a line that met the sea on the Channel coast. This water flank was a unique problem in naval warfare. From a historical viewpoint, it is sufficient to say that neither side showed imagination in exploiting the possibilities of this flank exposed to the sea. Hence this area, so well suited to restricted-water operations, remains an example of lost opportunity.
In World War II, the U. S. Navy engaged in blue water operations of such magnitude that our restricted-water work, other than amphibious, was a very small fraction of the whole. It is clear, however, that the mistake of entering the war unprepared in this field was repeated.
Our allies and opponents made much use of sea power in shoal waters. Faced with a situation analogous to the Napoleonic Wars, when the Continent was everywhere denied to them, the British made extraordinary efforts in the field of raiding and clandestine operations. When the Italians scored their notable successes with midget submarines against British capital ships, Royal Navy leaders made haste to emulate these exploits. Their haste was doubly spurred on by a particularly caustic example of the famous Churchillian memorandum:
Please report what is being done to emulate the exploits of the Italians in Alexandria. At the beginning of the war . . . ideas on this subject . . . received very little encouragement. Is there any reason why we should be incapable of the same kind of scientific aggressive action that the Italians have shown? One would have thought we would be in the lead! Please state the exact position.
Now it is quite true that much of this effort was that of inferior naval powers attempting to do what they could in using the sea against their antagonists. As our own operations proved, many of the tasks could be done better by a “blue water” navy holding command of the sea. But this should not blind us to the fact that many of the operations conducted in restricted waters were effective in prolonging World War II by feats of supply and evacuation that could have been blocked if our side had been in a position to oppose them effectively with proper forces. The list is long but a few examples can be cited.
In his History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Admiral Morison, with due apology to historical hindsight, is very critical of the Allied failure to prevent the evacuation of Sicily, which saved three German divisions to fight at Salerno. The evacuation of 30,000 more soldiers from Corsica and Sardinia is also pointed out as an Allied failure in restricted-water operations.
At the Siege of Leningrad, the Germans succeeded in putting some “Siebel Ferry” barges into Lake Ladoga and they attempted to break the summer supply line. They failed, due to inferiority of firepower; the Russian craft used 10.5-cm. guns against the 88’s of the Germans. In spite of appeals for larger guns to arm this potentially decisive operation, the Army refused to furnish them and continued to lob shells into the city, an enterprise that ultimately failed. Perhaps the Army’s attitude could be blamed in part on the fact that the vessels in the Lake were Air Force manned and commanded. It is unfortunate that the limits of this paper will not allow exploring that startling situation.
Elsewhere, the Germans did better, much better. Their operations down the Danube and into Russia and back are the classic of inshore operations. How many U. S. naval officers know about these operations? And how many realize that the Russians, impressed with the Germans’ success against seemingly insurmountable odds, made strenuous efforts to obtain the services of veterans of that force? One cannot help wondering if this is yet another occasion where the Russians perceived the obvious and outsmarted us by default.
This small portion of the long history of restricted-water operations should serve to give some indication of the successes and failures of this type of naval warfare. One must - face the fact that the U. S. Navy has not been obliged to engage in inshore operations, other than amphibious, since the advent of the age of steel ships. The effect of this on our thinking will be examined more fully later.
It cannot be argued, of course, that any of our failures to exploit the possibilities of restricted-water operations during World War II did more than prolong the war. They were not decisive. And the possibility exists that extensive diversion of our resources from the programs we did undertake might have had an equal or even more deleterious effect on the final victory. This is a nice calculation, one that must be made with care. In World War II, the U. S. solution was, except for the gesture of the Patrol Torpedo boat program, to ignore the problem. As the winners, it is hard to say this was not the correct course. But the extensive improvisation carried out during the war; the arming of PT boats with heavier guns and rockets and the removal of torpedo tubes; the conversion of Submarine Chasers (SC) to PC(G)’s; the Landing Craft—Infantry (LCI) gunboats and the like, showed that it was not a wholly satisfactory solution.
The fact must be faced—as it has not—that we cannot count again on fighting in theaters that make little demand for in-shore capability. The British handled the English Channel and the eastern Mediterranean. Germans and Russians never slackened their efforts alongshore as long as water was available. Our own army’s campaigns were by and large across rivers and did not give much opportunity for naval support except for some assistance in crossing the Rhine. The extensive inland waterways of Europe were never exploited. Had we gone into China, as was planned at one time, fighting among islands and along rivers would have been routine. A review of what planning was done for this contingency is mighty discouraging reading today.
All this is history; what of the future? Discussing in detail ways and means to use restricted water operations in forwarding the national interests of the United States is a subject that can very well remain classified. Such operations by their very nature in the presence of potentially superior forces on shore must rely in the main on stealth, trickery, and surprise. But if such a capability is found to be essential, two things are necessary to produce it: command leadership and money. Let us look at these problems.
Command Leadership and Money
Research makes it clear that the attitude of the Navy in general and higher commanders in particular will have to be considered in assessing the problem of generating an interest in restricted water operations. In writings on the subject, there is constant reference to the difficulties caused by the neglect of this phase of naval warfare in preference for more orthodox tactics. As has already been stated, this neglect may in the circumstances be quite justified. But there is ample room for suspicion that in not all cases was it the result of a clear-cut analysis of the situation, a consideration of all the possibilities of unorthodox tactics, a testing of all the invention and initiative of proponents.
Quotations on this subject that refer to leaders of World War II abound. But to save feelings, let us turn to a typical one of an earlier day. Rear Admiral R. H. S. Bacon, Royal Navy, in command of the Channel in 1914-1917 who had his own troubles in getting support from the Admiralty, felt impelled as part of his planning to study the history of Napoleon’s designs against England with the Boulogne Flotilla. In his book, The Concise Story of the Dover Patrol, he had this to say about Lord Nelson, that very paragon of the British Admiral:
Nelson was out of his element in work of this nature [attacks on French invasion ports]. So long as there was a chance of the enemy coming out and being fought at sea, ... he was eager and full of fire. But when confronted with the difficulties and disappointments inherent in inshore work, and called upon to exhibit the patience required to carry on such tiresome and acting operations, he appears to have lost interest.
Other incidents could be cited, but the net result would be the same. It boils down to this: the blue-water trained navy man, particularly in the United States, is inclined by his experience and preference for duty to neglect proper consideration of the possibilities of inshore operations. His experience in the U. S. Navy could hardly be otherwise from the scope of our World War II endeavors. The preference for duty reference is a bit more subtle. But it is a very real problem, something which has not yet been adequately discussed.
In general it can be said that the most desirable types of duty go to the most competent and efficient officers. While this may not be one hundred per cent true, it is obvious that senior officers in the most responsible and important positions are desirous of obtaining the services of the most efficient subordinates— and are in a position to demand them. When this is combined with the ambition of the junior to serve where his career will best be enhanced, a mutual attraction is created that can and certainly does result in fulfilling the theorem given. It should be noted that no comment has been made on what the most desirable type of duty is. Certainly it changes from time to time. But at present major combatant types can be ranked in this category, along with submarine and aircraft commands. None of these has responsibility for efficiency in inshore operations. Even if such a responsibility was fixed, the pressure against serving in this minor (under our present organization) field of naval endeavor would still exist.
It is a fact, amply supported by the files of the Naval War College, that the situation is as described, that strategic guidance and hence requirements is substantially inoperative in this field, that the service as a whole seems willing to limit its efforts to accepted and therefore professionally desirable fields of endeavor.
How can this cycle be broken? It is obvious that the only answer is vigorous intervention by senior naval officers. It is they who must determine the need, the form, and scale of the effort required. It is they who must balance the possession of a restricted waters capability against all the other demands of the Navy in this technological age. Such a capability is not something to be desired in itself; it must fill a definite need based on a careful estimate of the situation. There is ample reason to believe that this estimate has not yet been made.
An example of the type of thinking that impedes consideration of restricted water capability is the use in certain circles of the term “para-naval” for “unconventional” forms of naval warfare; such tactics as midget submarines, underwater swimmers, and the like. It is recommended that the use of this term be dropped. There is too much connotation, for instance, that sinking a cruiser by dive bombing or gunfire is the right thing to do, while sinking it at its mooring with a bomb attached by an underwater swimmer is, somehow, unusual or not exactly cricket. A case can be made for calling “para-naval” the use of boats by irregular or indigenous forces. But it is submitted that the officer who performs a feat like the Italians at Alexandria or the British against Tirpitz has a good deal more claim to the title seaman and naval fighter than many who follow a task force commander about the ocean. What is unconventional in one war may well be conventional in the next. Let us not be led by semantics into forgetting that.
As for money, if senior commanders truly desire an inshore capability, the money can be found somehow. What is discouraging about the situation at present is that the “workhorse” basis for a standby capability in the numbers which might be required is not the subject of even the most modest research and development effort. True, there are adaptable developments in underwater swimmers and small minecraft. But motor gunboats, fast shallow-draft transport and the like to at least match what the Germans found necessary in their prodigious efforts in the Black Sea are conspicuous by their absence from our naval arsenal, even in prototype form.
Restricted Waters and Limited War
The definition of “limited war” is a source of much argument around the Pentagon. For our purpose limited war can very well be defined as shooting with intent to kill with weapons other than nuclear. This is a field in which the Navy should be primarily interested because of its unique capability to apply force limited in this fashion in more than one medium.
Let there be no misunderstanding about what is being said. The interest is not in “defense,” or in responding to Soviet pressure. Rather it is in ways and means not only to protect but to advance the national interests. Although the nation is far from ready for this concept as shown by the public reaction to the abortive Cuban affair, analysis of the future shows how necessary such a capability may be. The fact that the nuclear stalemate, far from prohibiting lesser measures, may actually increase the use of force at levels below that calculated to produce a nuclear reaction is gradually being realized—perhaps more quickly on our opponent’s side than on ours. It is thinking about this situation that reveals the gap in our inshore capability.
For example, several times in the last few years it has been seriously suggested during the crisis-of-the-day that one action on our part might be a blockade of certain areas. There is no doubt that it could be effective. But one wonders if the Navy is really ready for this type of thing? If conditions made it possible for small craft to be used in blockade running, would we be any better off than we were in 1861? Such a blockade set up around some member of the Russian sphere of influence would directly engage the prestige of both major parties and undoubtedly lead to limited war at sea of major proportions. Our navy should have little difficulty suppressing seagoing commerce. But handling small runners would be another matter. This is something worth thinking about, for such a struggle would be largely a matter of prestige or “face.” It is easy to visualize a climate of opinion in which we could be compelled to attempt elimination of even the smallest violator.
We have been saved from these problems so far by the fact that blockade has not been ordered. It behooves the Navy not to be lulled into a false sense of complacency by this present political reluctance to use sea power. For one thing seems sure in the long run; the land- minded leaders of the Western World will eventually waken to the fact that their ability to assert absolute command of the seas, whenever they care to do so, is the biggest ace in the hole they have. As the Communist drive for world domination continues, one can hope for a positive reaction from the Western world before it is too late.
The cold war as it is being waged at the present time raises constant talk of “brush fire” wars of uncertain size. The most cursory review of the areas where such conflicts are likely to take place shows that the majority of them are well suited to the use of sea power in restricted waters in direct contrast to our major efforts in World War II. The effect of this prior experience in promoting gaps in our planning has already been deplored.
Looking even further into the future, there has been discussion lately of the “constabulary” theory of using armed forces to keep the peace. Although this concept is still nebulous, it is interesting and undoubtedly more will be heard on the subject. The Navy had better keep an eye on it for the enhanced restricted- water capability that would be required.
To sum up: let the Navy be sure that someone is keeping an eye on naval affairs that do not call for fleets of major ships. Our history of ignoring operations in restricted waters, together with our evident neglect of the field today, shows that some changes need to be made. It is the Navy that must lead national statesmen in the proper application of sea power. All uses of the sea must be presented, not just task forces, submarines, and guided missiles. As the importance of preparation for limited war increases, the usefulness of an inshore capability and the ways and means it can be used must be fully explored and explained. We in the West must face up to the fact—as so many of our land-minded leaders have not—that our opponents occupy the central land mass of the world. We, on the other hand, are absolute masters of the oceans whenever we so choose to declare ourselves. These oceans lead in many places into the enemy camp and we must exploit all the advantages this gives us. With fleets, yes; but also with minor vessels—even a log canoe.