Europe today has grown out of the common, vital Roman, French, and German origins. The development and continuity of Europe was secured—not only in the military, but in the cultural, political, and economic fields—by frontiers formed by the sea in the north, west, and south, and by land in the east. Europe was able to keep this eastern frontier intact, less by conquests and political control of the Slav peoples, than by the fact that European forces knew how to “divert to the east” tensions arising among the peoples in the eastern marches lying along the U.S.S.R.’s southeastern border between the Vistula and Urals, or to allow these tensions to abate in internal disputes among the Slavs.
In periods when these moderate methods did not succeed and when the Slav forces rose against it, Europe was in mortal danger. This first happened when Attila, in his struggle for Mongolian world domination, made himself master of the eastern peoples and, with Mongolian and Slav forces, penetrated deeply into Europe along the Danube valley.
In the battle of Chalons on the Catalaunian Plains, which took place in 451, the united Roman, French, and German armies under the European general, Aetius, the “last of the Romans,” finally confronted Attila with their backs to the wall and, facing annihilation, arose with the courage of despair and were victorious. The initial foundation was thus laid for ensuring Europe’s development.
With the October Revolution and the birth of the Soviet Union in November 1917, Communism immediately began to build up elements of strength which were to become the actual power behind the veil of Karl Marx’s dialectic and which, in the name of Socialist world revolution, proclaimed proletarian dictatorship for all countries. After Communism in Russia had successfully survived the chaos of civil war and the war of intervention, the Soviet Union grew to be a great power in Europe and in Asia. Under Stalin’s determined leadership, it became a great source of strength with which Communism could carry on its offensive war of conquest for world supremacy, according to the directives of Lenin. During the incessant and methodical struggle, Communism never deviated for an instant from the detailed directives of Lenin’s total strategy.
As the struggle between Communism and the Ax. Free World gradually became global, its main goal grew continually clearer. Communism was struggling to force upon mankind a world domination based upon the principle of an absolute state. Man exists for the State. The Free World was struggling to defend its principle of freedom in the State. The State exists for man. The all-out global struggle is between these two principles. Because of the problem it poses, it cannot cease until one or the other of the opponents is annihilated, or surrenders.
We have chosen freedom. The choice gave us no difficulty. Our opponent has always known this. We first became aware of difficulties when we saw ourselves faced with the demands for sacrifices and perseverance without which our choice would not have been an act of volition but a passing fancy. Our opponent has always known this, too.
After 1945 and the collapse of the Third Reich, Europe was finally liberated from the menace of Nazi despotism. With the Soviet advantages won at the Yalta Conference in their hands, however, the Slav and Mongol forces again pushed deeply into Europe if their struggle for a new Slav-Mongol world domination under International Communism and made themselves the masters of the peoples in the old European boundary areas. At this moment with all European boundary countries conquered by the Communists, old Europe—as it had been built up through thecenturies—ceased to exist, and was forced back to its original Roman-French-German nucleus.
The total strategy of the Communists in the struggle for world domination was developed by Stalin from Lenin’s directives. In an “indissoluble” fraternity of Russian and Chines Communists, world Communism was bound to a European and Asiatic empire as the starting point for the principal, and decisively final, action against the key states of theFree World, the United States and Canada. No starting point of less amplitude than thetotal domination over the forces and resource of United Eurasia could give the Soviets the necessary superiority. The conquest of Asia: including Indonesia, was to be the task of Chinese Communism, that of Europe and theMediterranean area, of Russian Communism. In accordance with this division of tasks, thegreat preparatory dispositions in battle array for total and global war—which we have been experiencing since the end of World War II—then began.
The continuation of the Russian Communist offensive in Europe has put the countries of Europe proper once again with their backs to the wall in an encounter, as decisive as it is relentless, with the old sworn enemy and his ambitions in new garb.
When Stalin died without an heir, suspicion and jealousy between Russia and China led to the outbreak of an internal Communist war of succession between the two great Communist powers. Each feared that the other would reduce it to a mere instrument of com' bat for selfish national purposes in the total war against the Free World and thus ensure for itself the final victory by depriving its former ally of its might. Russian and Chinese Communists continue to wage this internal war of succession for the position of absolute leadership originally held by Stalin in World Communism.
As long as the internal Communist war of succession continues to rage without reaching a decision, the Stalin strategy remains at a standstill. The threat of World Communism to the Free World, as all-encompassing and as lethal as it may be, is nevertheless no longer the original Russo-Chinese world-encompassing strategy of Stalin. It has now become a threat to the Free World through the sporadic invasions of the great competitors for World Communism who, in mutual envy and suspicion, are striving to create for themselves a superiority of their own, for their own ends, out of the piecemeal conquest of the Free World. These invasions, however, should not be considered as “small wars.” Although for the time being they are not global, the Russian Communists aim at the conquest of Europe through an offensive directed at the Mediterranean area, while those of the Chinese are turned across Indonesia against Australia.
Because of the clear inferiority of the Communist total potential compared to that of the Free World, the invasions have been carried out in the meantime as piecemeal conquests. The military conquests in particular have had to be conducted with limited action for, owing to the internal Communist war of succession, the Communist powers have always had to reckon on Communist betrayal and therefore have not been able to become involved in actions which cannot be broken off without a grievous defeat. The battle goes on, incorporating new tactics and technical progress, in accordance with Communist total strategy.
While China successfully carried out its task in Asia in the deployment of the forces of World Communism and created a great World Communist power in Asia equal to that of the Soviet Union, the Soviets were far from able to accomplish their task in Europe with equal success. Victories and defeats alternated in the renewed battle for Europe. Defended under the NATO shield of collective security by American atomic superiority, the Russian Communist attacks made no decisive progress in Europe.
In the Soviet Union the men who by accident succeeded Stalin found only one way to avoid a Russian defeat in the war of succession and secure for themselves a dependable superiority over China: Russia, in deploying its forces for total war against the Free World, must bring about as soon as possible the conquest of Europe, including the Mediterranean area. This would prove a very difficult task, because Soviet Communism with an unreliable China at its back faced NATO with a distinctly inferior total potential. Europe, therefore, could not, as anticipated, be conquered by military means. Only the use of psychological warfare and infiltration could be contemplated at first.
Soviet Communism tried to render Europe defenseless through a softening-up offensive of charm while the Soviet Communist infiltration was penetrating deeply into the Mediterranean area in order to rob Europe of its resources—primarily oil—envelop it in the south, and finally cut it off from America by means of Soviet Communist air and submarine bases to be set up on the North African coast and on Iceland. The offensive against Iceland and the Faroes was to coincide with the offensive in the Mediterranean.
From such a position it would perhaps have been possible for Soviet Communism to force Western Europe one way or another into a Satellite status similar to that of the Eastern European countries. This very clever offensive might have succeeded had it not broken down following the Soviet Communist defeats in the Suez crisis, in the Satellite states (principally Hungary), and later in the Turkish-Syrian crisis.
In the Western world it is often insufficiently understood that while the United States was denying its support to the Anglo- French descent on the Suez Canal, it had nevertheless met the Soviet threat with the greatest determination—“highest readiness” directives not only for the Fleet which was putting to sea, but also for the strategic air units which took to the air on the night of 4-5 November 1956. England and France, of course, did not find support in the West. For this, the Soviets suffered a set-back, because the execution of their total strategy plan was frustrated by the unmistakable determination of the United States and turned into a global reverse. This was the outcome of the Suez crisis—a decisive event in world politics.
Not only was the Soviet Communist defeat caused by the intervention of the Free World, but also by Titoism and finally by Chinese Communism. It was clear that an expansion of Russian Communist power through the conquest of the Mediterranean area, followed by the conquest of Europe, would mean a deadly threat to both of them.
The result of the various Soviet failures was that the Soviets, in the internal Communist war of succession, lost heavily to the advantage of China, while China’s power increased considerably and exerted its influence on the world of the colored peoples as well as inside the Soviet Union and its Eastern European Satellites. The Soviets, with their inferior total potential, caught between rapidly growing China and passive but superior NATO, felt that they were confronted with the danger of being reduced to nought. Alone, a successful resumption of the offensive against Europe and the Mediterranean area, which has failed thus far, could save Russia.
A powerful Russian Communist offensive was launched against Europe in 1958. Its goal was to split NATO apart and eliminate the atomic superiority of the Free World in order to render Europe defenseless and deliver it over to a cheap Soviet Communist conquest. The cold war continues, but the defense of Europe is weakened. We are now faced with the last decisive phases of the struggle for the future of Europe.
Should Europe succeed in stemming the Soviet Communist offensive, as it succeeded in 451 in halting the invasion of Attila on the Catalaunian Plains, Soviet Communism will be faced with the danger of having to make a decisive retreat. Then the Soviets will have to decide between two possibilities. Either they will have to submit to Chinese rule over World Communism and thereby become degraded into an instrument of Chinese strategy which will gradually develop into an aggressive movement of the colored peoples, or they will have to abandon the belligerent world of Communism, and, under some form of Titoist leadership, join the free white people in their continuing struggle against Chinese-led World Communism. There would be no other choices for Russia if confronted in the West by an unconquerable Europe, and in the East by an expanding, aggressive China.
Should Russia choose China, she would lose Siberia and far more. For while Russia’s population increase is 35 million annually to China’s 16 million, a declining Russian birth rate has cut the population increase from 18.1 per thousand in 1959 to 17.1 per thousand in 1961. Should they choose the Free World, they will have to renounce the Soviet dream of a Russian-led Communism and the domination of the world. The realization of this dream would only be possible after a Soviet Communist conquest of Europe and the Mediterranean.
“The first, most brilliant and most decisive act of judgement of the statesman or military leader,” said Clausewitz, “is that in which they recognize correctly the war they are about to undertake and in which they do not take it for, or try to make it into, something which by the nature of things it cannot be. This is the first and most comprehensive of all strategic problems.”
Will Europe understand this?
If Europe wants to win, the preliminary condition is the ability of a United Europe to oppose the aggressor with its entire defense forces under coherent leadership. The foremost and most decisive task, therefore, in the present, desperately serious situation—one in which the far inferior aggressor has succeeded, by the skillful use of psychological warfare and infiltration of our public opinion, in driving the wedge of confusion and discord into our front—is to set up a United Europe in the free American and European world.
As Europe was originally formed of the vital, common Roman, French, and German forces, so a united Europe today can also be created from those same forces. In their power politics and in all their economic and cultural activities, these forces have more or less consciously been inspired by a great common love—the love for a United Europe. But because European nations have fought each other short-sightedly for the domination of a Europe still not united, instead of contributing jointly to its development, they have sacrificed the unborn child again and again to the interests of the brother nation on the western border—England.
After the Hundred Years’ War with France, England paid less attention to the interests of a United Europe than it did to its own special British interest in maintaining a European balance of power, for it had directed its energies towards acquiring power and furthering its interests overseas. England won its colonial empire and its domination over backward peoples and their resources thanks to its world-wide sea power.
In this position as a world power, the British Empire was not interested in the idea of a United Europe. England’s power policy, therefore, set as its goal in regard to Europe the defensive maintenance of the status quo of “Balance of Power” and remained behind its “Splendid Isolation” across the Channel in an attitude of uninterested and unengaged tolerance. With the end of World War II, old Europe was forced back by Communism to its point of departure. The United States and Canada took over the deciding role as bastions of the Free World in the struggle against the Communist offensive for world domination. The basic principles of the power politics of the individual nations completely changed.
In the Europe of earlier days, French policy which aimed at uniting Europe under French leadership broke down completely as a result of Napoleon Ill’s defeat. Germany took over the role of the strong European central power with its traditional political goal of forming a United Europe.
Germany, because of its central position, became a great power. With its allies in World War I, as well as in World War II, Germany constituted a world power. German power politics were based on the self-centered national ambitions of a tremendously expanding nation. German military and economic means resided in an area sufficiently large to secure the necessary stability and initiative for command, supply, and administrative machinery.
Germany’s all-over strategy, because of its continental thinking, had completely ignored the existence and special nature of sea power. Germany did not understand that, in the total strategic potential of the powers having supremacy on the sea, time is always a positive factor, while in the total potential of the land-locked central powers, time is always a negative factor. This time factor gave the powers protected by the sea the opportunity to develop their superior potential to the full. Supremacy on the sea gave them freedom of action in choosing their time and place. In view of the air supremacy held by the surrounding powers in World War II, German territory was far too restricted in size to insure the undisturbed operation of command, supply, and administration organizations. The traditional strategy of the central power led to its traditional defeat.
The new Germany is once again about to become a factor, but the ingredients necessary to her becoming a dominant world power are lacking. She has understood her position in relation to total war and has remained a true and loyal ally to the United States. She has established her position in the Free World and can hold it. But Germany is no longer the independent central power of Europe. In the Free World, new Germany forms a unit in the defense system of the surrounding powers against the new aggressive central power of Soviet Communism.
Germany’s defense can only be insured within one of the great world power systems. However, within this system, the growing German factor will be of significance, at least in Europe. To leave West Germany to Russian Communism would mean abandoning Europe. To force West Germany out of NATO into a neutral status would also mean abandoning it to Communism because, from the standpoint of total strategy, West Germany is unable to stand alone. Soviet Communism has always known this. Apparently, however, some Western European public opinion does not sufficiently understand that the old Germany, in its position as a central power and with its old ambitions, has finally disappeared from the historical scene because the strategic basis for it has disappeared. Furthermore, this public opinion has not clearly recognized the fact that Nazism is not hibernating in West Germany, but rather in East Germany, because of Nazism’s close spiritual affinity with Soviet despotism.
Just as the conditions for the existence of Germany after World War II have changed basically, so has England’s position. The earlier British rule over backward people was lost and the center of the Empire was no longer in London, but in Ottawa. The dismemberment of British power deprived England of the strength necessary for a world power to stand alone. England’s ties with the Empire no longer sufficed. Already Canada was moving closer to the United States, drawn to it by its great strength. India belonged to the newly awakened world and, therefore, had to be assessed, from a military and political standpoint, only according to the interests of its colored populations. South Africa and Australia, together with England, could represent a considerable potential, a combination which, however, could hardly be a guarantee of the Empire today. Economically, England could hardly defend itself against growing South African and Australian industries. Militarily this empire could only be defended through combined sea and air power, the main forces of which England would scarcely be economically able to furnish. Only combined Anglo-American sea and air power would be equal to the task. England had to give up its century-old “isolation” because it was no longer “splendid.” Although England possessed a potential of considerable strength, alone she was no longer a great world power. She had to become a member of a larger association. In this situation, England had two choices.
England could either join America, e.g., the United States and Canada, or a United Europe. In the first alternative, the Anglo- American bloc would represent a huge, irresistible mass of power but England would become, economically as well as strategically, one of the European outposts of America. In the second alternative, a third power would arise within the American-European alliance of the Free World, alongside the American and confronting the might of World Communism. This new power would be capable, inside the American-European alliance, of defending European interests and of ensuring to the Free World an invincible superiority over world Communism.
For these reasons, England is now associating herself with a United Europe, and is already taking positive steps in that direction. In many British sectors it is objectively recognized what a problem this imposes. It corresponds to a human weakness, just as conceivable as it is natural, whereby concepts, long since superseded and out-dated by realities, are preserved in national life. Such a concept is the British slogan, “Right or wrong—my country!” In a healthy Europe, the foremost task of all the European partners is to learn to understand each other and to try to help each other overcome such outdated illusions.
Nothing can be taken for granted in this very serious complex of problems. Understanding grows far more from observation and a thorough knowledge of the history of other nations’ experiences and sufferings. It is a task for Europeans, therefore, to be patient and sympathetic with the British in recognition of the fact that Great Britain can no longer be the “Empire” but must now be a part of United Europe. But if it is necessary for England to adhere to Europe, it is also necessary for Europe to bring England into a strong Europe which—according to the law by which it came into being—must be developed from its original Roman, French, and German forces. Such efforts are moving ahead, but time presses, and Europe, at present, is far from being strong enough.
The cornerstone of a United Europe will have to be Franco-German friendship. This also becomes a postulate of existence for Germany as well as for France. France, like Germany and England, is no longer a great world power, but is an important great power with a large potential.
The French economy is in trouble, and a strong state cannot be built up without finances. If, within a required time, the necessary finances are obtained at the cost of imposing a lower standard of living, Communist infiltration will gain a free hand in the face of internal political dissatisfaction in France. There then would be only two alternatives: dictatorship or a popular front. Both would end with a Soviet Communist victory. Communism has always known this. Why should it pit French Communist subversive shock troops against the de Gaulle government and have them decimated by the far superior Gaullist votes and forces? Other tasks with far better prospects await them later when circumstances will perhaps be more favorable.
The formation of a strong United Europe—primary condition for a European victory—is again therefore a task of Germany and not for America. The task is to provide at the proper time the necessary economic security for the rehabilitation of a strong French contribution to a United Europe and thereby defeat the planned Russian-Communist infiltration of France. The fate of Germany, closely bound to that of France, will be decided there. To recognize this is the first, decisive task of a European total strategy.
A weak, divided Europe can never become a world power—at best only an American pawn in total war. Such pawns can at times be defended, brought into play or sacrificed. That America would ever abandon Europe to Russian Communism could only be conceivable if, as a result of European weakness and unreliability, the defense of Europe became an unbearable burden for the Free World. The present offensive of charm and attrition conducted by Soviet Communism is intended to bring about just such a situation in Europe. Domination of Europe will require decisive superiority in the total war. Europe alone can give the Free World the opportunity for defense against Russian Communism. There is no other possibility of avoiding total war. There is, indeed, only the certainty of losing it.
Should the original European forces succeed in building up a strong United Europe, then they must also understand that they must integrate Scandinavian and North African areas into this Europe. Without a closely-knit integration of these areas, Europe will be neither united nor strong.
The Scandinavian area forms the north flank of Europe. The northern and most important route of Soviet Communism to the seas of the world, around northern Norway as well as through the Baltic, can be closed from this area. The chief possibilities for supporting resistance, in case Soviet Communist forces should penetrate into Europe, are to be found in this area—especially in its center, southern Scandinavia.
The Scandinavian, and particularly the south Scandinavian area, in Soviet hands would constitute a solid protection for the Soviet flanks in its penetration of Western Europe without risk of the possibility of a European counterattack in the northern German territory.
At present, the Scandinavian nations, Norway and Denmark, entertain certain very dubious neutral attitudes and feelings. To win Scandinavian friendship, confidence and understanding for Europe is also an important German task. The prerequisite for a happy solution is that the Germans not only thoroughly know the characteristics of the Scandinavian people, but are also able to make clear to them, especially to the Danes, that there is no question of resuming a “German policy,” but only one of an active contribution to a common conception of a unified Europe.
The North African area forms the southern flank of the Mediterranean area which has a place in all strategic considerations, insolubly and indispensably connected with Europe. European solidarity with the North African area closes to Communism the route to a southern envelopment of Europe and to the Atlantic Ocean. This area provides the European total potential with indispensable resources, as for example the oil in the Sahara. A solid political and economic community of interests with satisfied North African populations, in the interest of European security, would also win the support of the policies and the sympathy of the people in the southeastern European border territory—the eastern Mediterranean area.
The North African area is showing sympathy at present for the “colored world” and interest in its strategic position. Hence this area is also under strong Communist influence. But this influence in the “colored world” has been more and more under growing Chinese leadership since the Cairo Conference. In fact, since the Soviet Communist defeats in the internal Communist war of succession, this Chinese leadership has been apparent everywhere in World Communism.
It will be an important European and American task to guarantee the North African people a satisfactory standard of living and political status of such a nature that they will prefer to belong to the Free World rather than to pass under Communist leadership and dependence on Communist strategy. The accomplishment of this task could be carried out by a strong and active France.
When, inside the European and American Free World, a strong United Europe (including England) from the North Cape to the Sahara has become a reality, the Communist conquest of West Europe, including the Mediterranean area, will be rendered impossible. Then the first defensive phase of the battle, which has continued since 1945, will have been fought through to a happy decision- Then Europe will be faced with the next phase—the psychological counteraction.
The determined attack of Soviet Communism, having as its goal the conquest of Europe, was launched in World War II by the Non-Aggression Pact with Hitler—just as had been planned in Stalin’s total strategy- The early skirmishes were won by Soviet Communism, with the advantages obtained at the Yalta Conference, the conquest of the eastern European border territory and the penetration of Soviet forces into Europe as fat as the River Elbe.
After these successes, the Soviet attack against West Europe was methodically pursued, primarily with very strong subversive forces which Europe was able to survive only because of the shield of NATO. Behind the constant aggressive action of the Soviet Communist advance forces, however, the decreasing force of the attack become noticeable in the decline of the Soviet Communist total potential.
The Soviet domination of the Eastern European Satellite states—an indispensable prerequisite-demanded great efforts. The losses, due to Soviet defeats in the battle over Berlin, in the Persian oil war, and with the defection of Yugoslavia, were irreplaceable. Stalin’s death and the end of continual terror led to a weakening of the Soviet Communist state apparatus and of its internal security, which to a high degree contributed to the unrest in the Satellite states. The actual weakening of the Soviet potential was made evident to the Free World by the reverses suffered in the Suez and the Turkish-Syrian crises, and to China by the internal Communist war of succession.
Against the background of its decreasing potential, Soviet Communism is now attempting—in a desperate struggle for its own life— to conquer Europe with its huge, but probably its last, advance forces by paralyzing and encircling Europe in the south in order to obtain a valuable hostage for negotiation with China as well as with America. Russian Communism requires a period of peace to prepare the final large-scale action in the battle for world domination.
Russian Communism, in this struggle over Europe, must use its armed forces. Should its offensive lead to peace, the goal of forcing Western Europe into a satellite system similar to that of the Eastern European Soviet Communist Satellite system will have been reached. Should the attack fail, however, and should Soviet Communist subversive shock troops be obliged finally to take the defensive without a decision having been attained, then the attack will have reached its culminating point.
The present Soviet Communist campaign against Western Europe is being conducted with strong subversive elements, whose pivotal effort is a psychological infiltration of Western European opinion and its internal political activity. These weapons are very adroitly supported by terrorist propaganda and threats of war, with the huge Soviet armed might and its progress in guided missile development in the background. Infiltration which is the political and psychological weapon of Soviet Communism is far superior to similar weapons of the Free World. It has made possible the waging of aggressive psychological warfare on the battlefields of Europe instead of defensively on those of Soviet Russia itself. The reality, however, behind these psychological and military threats is, that the total potential of the Soviets remains still inferior to that of the Free World.
In his message on the State of the Union to the American Congress on 9 January 1958, then President Eisenhower repeatedly emphasized the superiority of the Free World’s total potential over that of aggressive World Communism. But with great earnestness, he made the nation face the facts of total war in which the Free World would not be able to maintain its superiority without important sacrifices. “The real problem for us is not our present strength but the crucial need of taking steps today which will guarantee our strength tomorrow.”
The problem is not only of a technical but also of a strategic nature where the time factor is also to be reckoned with. In order to make it impossible for Communism, with its inferior total potential, to whittle down the Free World’s superior strength piece by piece in Western Europe and in the Mediterranean area, United Europe, under a unified leadership within the free, American-European world, must counter the Soviet Communist attack.
A purely military conquest of Europe, collectively defended by NATO, is denied Soviet Communism. The Soviets can indeed, at any time, start a war in Europe. They can also, with their tremendous military might, achieve considerable initial success because they can fix the time and always secure the necessary superiority at the beginning. But in a protracted war, a central power system with an inferior power potential such as Soviet Communism possesses, could not outlast the Free World with its encircling power system. Time will always work for the freedom of action of the encircling states’ superior sea power in a global strategy. Sooner or later, the Soviets will also stand before their “Stalingrad,” from where retreat begins. Therefore, the Soviets see as the only way out for increasing their total potential and weakening that of the Free World, the initiation of a conquest of the eastern Mediterranean area, followed by the encirclement of Europe from the south.
In order to carry out this attack successfully from its inferior position, Soviet Communism must neutralize Western Europe, undermine its reliance on NATO, and render it defenseless. Then, no superior European threat to their flanks will endanger Soviet attacks in the Mediterranean. The resumption of this Soviet Communist campaign in the Mediterranean area will, therefore, be prepared in the old manner with Soviet infiltration during the Arabian war of annihilation against Israel, and can be expected soon. In Lebanon, it has already begun. Soviet Communist infiltration into Arabian political life is fighting the Arabian governmental and ruling classes as energetically and methodically as the Soviet Communist aggressive forces in Europe. Whether the danger to the world from this ruthless Soviet infiltration of the Arabian area—in no way corresponding to well-understood Arabian interests—will be recognized in time, cannot be predicted at present. There are signs of a dawning discernment. To cultivate this carefully and sensibly is an important political task for the entire Free World.
There is no need to discuss here the possibilities of Western Europe’s military defense. Another world war is not at all to be considered by the Free World as a “continuation of its policy by other means,” but rather as its defeat. But such defeat can only be avoided through superior strength and a determined will to use this strength, if necessary, against the aggressor.
The final victory depends again on United European forces under a single leadership. To build up this unification is the task of our generation.
* From the book “Frelheit Ohne Furcht” by Mogens Lauesen. Copyright by Okeanos Verlag GmbH, 1959; Munich, Germany. Reprints with permission. Translated by Captain A. P. Scott, U. S. Navy.