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Can We Establish War Safety Controls?
Howard G. Kurtz, New York, N. Y.— From 14 years’ study of Kremlin grand strategy, and in the absence of an adequate U. S. grand strategy, I have come to conclusion that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have failed to provide the President with a weapons system or a grand strategy capable of assuring the future security of the United States.
On the formerly valid assumption that the greater the destructive power at our command, the greater the national defense, we have focused attention and budgets on the creation of ever-increasing destructive power with such fantastic success that use of this power in the future will destroy the national security, along with world civilization.
We have passed, or are soon passing, the point of no return beyond which increasing our defense effort destroys our national security—and we are devoting scarcely any attention or budget toward research and development into the problems of national safety and security.
Today we no longer can hold the nation secure into the future by use only of the concepts and weapons of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force because of the breakthroughs to fantastic new dimensions of national danger from modern weapons systems. The Joints Chiefs of Staff, committed to the outgrown concepts of Army, Navy, and Air Force weapons, do not bring forth new dimension weapons systems concepts, or grand strategy capable of meeting the problem of national security and national independence.
The above statements are absurd and pointless unless one is prepared to present the prospectus for the missing weapons systems and the missing grand strategy. This I would like to do, asking for strongest possible pro and con discussion and debate to see if the breakthrough concepts discussed are valid.
In a Consulting Report titled The Future Research Challenge: Control of World Crisis recently submitted to the Foundation for Instrumentation Education and Research ($.50 each from the Foundation, 335 East 45th Street, New York, N. Y.) outstanding defense scientists and engineers, and social and political scientists, publicly attest to the credibility of a proposed breakthrough, new-dimension military weapons system called War Safety Control, which, when operational some years in the future, could guarantee the national security and national independence of all countries in the world, simultaneously. This may well be the only way in which the national security of the United States may be maintained in the future.
The proposal calls for a giant international complex of electronic data transmission, surveillance and detection systems reaching into every critical facet of military, industrial, and economic activity of every major country! with control, inspection, and deterrent police forces, centering in the United Nations or some similar international organization. The plan would not interfere with individual national sovereignty.
The object of the plan is a super-sophisticated control system which would immedi-
ENTER THE FORUM
Regular and Associate Members are invited to write brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also to write brief discussions on any topic of naval interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Navy may be exchanged.
instance, if a carload of strategic ma-
atelY alert international authorities if any unUsual military, nuclear arms, transportation, 1 ustrial or similar activity took place which c°uld possibly imply war conditions.
enals headed for a consumer factory some- ere in the world suddenly were diverted °m its scheduled destination, the vast war c°ntrol system would detect this event and immediately signal an alarm. Inspection 'earns would be dispatched promptly and lce action would be taken if necessary. Another example might be if a factory in some country began to discharge unusual Mlspect wastes into a river. The chemical would be “sensed” and an alarm set oj.' Other possible examples range the extent the imagination. The system involves ' [jnical sophistication of a high order, he image of the United States in the United
Nations, and in the world, can be remade almost overnight. Where today the United States, the most powerful technological nation in history, stands before the world like an anxious giant with the Doomsday weapon in his hand, threatening the death of all humanity every time the giant is frightened, suddenly a new image can appear. Now it will be the image of the most powerful technological giant of all history, still defending himself against unwarranted attack, but in addition, a giant committed to the massive new research and development challenge of creating the new techniques and technologies for war safety control to guarantee the safety and security of the people of all countries.
The American people can face the Soviet people, not in fear and hatred, but in deepest concern for their future safety and independence.
The Soviet people can be won away from support of the Kremlin’s goal of world conquest, and this is the major test of a winning U. S. grand strategy. Ninety-seven per cent of the Soviet people have nothing to gain from a world conquest engineered by the remaining 3 per cent, the Communists at the top. But the 97 per cent are deeply patriotic people who will fight and die for the protection of their Motherland, as they have throughout history. Where today every threatening gesture made by the United States drives these Soviet people into even more blind followship of Khrushchev, as the people of all countries blindly follow their national leaders when their nation is threatened, a bold new U. S. grand strategy of war safety control would show the Soviet people the only way in which their Motherland can be protec-
ted in the cosmo-nuclear age.
The massive research and development effort into this new technology can start unilaterally and immediately, without the strange formality of negotiating first with our enemy for approval of our blueprint for a proper world order.
If President Kennedy announced to the world next month that, regardless of who first made outer space safe for human life, the United States now commits itself to the far more difficult, long range, massive research effort to create the new technologies required for war safety control, to protect the patriotic citizens of all countries in the world from ever again being threatened by war, world public reaction would be explosive.
The tide could be turned, in time.
The purpose of this letter is to motivate readers of the Proceedings to obtain a copy of the above mentioned report, and to tear it apart, to start the deep debate required.
"The Weapon That Came Too Late”
(See pages 84-93 March 1961 Proceedings)
Kenneth Schilling, Upper Darby, Pennsylvania—I enjoyed reading The Weapon That Came Too Late. Two excerpts from books, quoted below, give an example of the new machinery placed in these advance-type submarines.
From the book The Sea Wolves, is given the following description: “While still on passage through the North Sea from Bergen to the Atlantic, Schnee picked up the singing of an A/S group, but unlike the older boats which were forced to remain almost immobile, the XXI’s relied upon their speed to escape. Schnee altered course by no more than 30 degrees and the electric motors began to hum as the speed indicator rose steadily, until it was hovering round the figure of 16. At 16 knots U-2511 shot away from its pursuers, moving under the water as fast as the corvettes could steam on the surface. She maintained that speed effortlessly for a whole hour without unduly taxing the capacity of the batteries, while the pings grew steadily weaker and finally faded out.”
In the book, Defeat At Sea, is given a de
scription of some of the new devices used to attack surface ships:
“The new U-Boats were no longer dependent on their optical eye, the periscope, but had an electric eye to supplement it.
“This was the S-gear, which worked in a similar way to the British Asdic. At regular intervals it sent out a solitary tick which, radiated through the water, was reflected by the enemy ships and in the fraction of a second marked the corresponding echoes on the U-Boat’s dial indicating the ships’, their bearings, and their range. The echoes were transferred to a plot which, at the same time, automatically marked the U-Boat’s course and speed. ... An exact picture was thus obtained of how the enemy was maneuvering in relation to one’s own position. . . . His boat could fire her torpedoes quite as well at a depth of 25 fathoms. The S-gear would give him the mathematically accurate data for it. All that was needed was to send out three ticks at intervals of a minute, join up the echoes on the plot, and aim the torpedoes on where the next echo was due to appear. During their Baltic Sea training practice it was said that the result of such methods of operation was always 100% hits.”
Also among the new equipment used on the XXI’s and described in Defeat at Sea were several improved torpedoes:
“And now come the torpedoes. Either the ordinary, aimed torpedo, or the Lut or Fat torpedoes which first run straight ahead for a short distance, then turn and come back again, turn again, or go on zigzagging until they have hit a ship. Then again there is the Zaunkonig (Wren), an acoustic torpedo which is designed to respond to the sounds of the destroyers’ propellers. . . . There is, too, the improved Wren, the Til torpedo, which is not only responsive to destroyers, but homes on ordinary ships as well and is not to be diverted from its course by noise-making devices.”
Franz Selinger, Donau, Germany—As Lieutenant Commander Glennon wrote, U-3008 made a war patrol just at the end of the war without result. It might be of interest to add, however, that two hours after she had received the cease-fire order, she sighted a British convoy off the coast of Norway. The
CaPtain had to let the transports and escorts Pass although he was in a favorable position to attack. The boat was not detected and returned to Kiel for the surrender.
Some noteworthy statistics on the Type submarine are:
Test depth: 850 feet Crush depth: 1,100 feet Maximum speed submerged: 17.2 knots
D
found
a technical report of one of the many
tving time to 65 feet (keel depth): 20
seconds
Th
ue very fast diving time was achieved by su ^merging while running at high speed on e surface and keeping the diesels running Uni'l the top of the conning tower was awash.
Lieutenant Commander A. N. Glennon, • S. Navy—As I indicated in the article, my Cstimate of test depth for Type XXI was an Cxtrapolation from the test specifications for ^sterns exposed to sea pressure. I have since ,<,arns which collected information in post-war ermany which has verified my estimate to
some extent. '
All classes of German U-boats except Types A.I and XXVI were designed for a collapse ePth of 250 meters. Application of a safety actor of 2.5 gave the so-called nominal diving c ePth of 100 meters. This was considered the rnaxirnum operating depth in peacetime °Perations. However, periodically, and dur- 'Tf Wartime, the boats would go to a depth , Per cent greater than nominal depth. This dePth, the confidence depth, corresponded r°ughly to our definition of test depth.
In the case of Types XXI and XXVI, colaPse depth was about 300 meters, with some Uncertainty being introduced because of the new hull shape and possibly due to different Steel In the hull. The nominal depth was set at 135 meters, or about 450 feet, and a con- ence depth of 200 meters, 660 feet, was erived from the more or less arbitrary nominal depth.
My impression is that the 135 and 200 nteter depths were set forth in the specifica- Uons. This would require a 330 meter colaPse depth, which the designers were to a.chieve. Due to uncertainties, all the de- S1§ners could say was that it seemed to be Pretty close to requirements, at which point someone in authority decided there was no need to change the depths, as the safety factor would still be ample. Because of the uncertainty, at any rate, the normal relationship between nominal depth and collapse depth did not necessarily obtain with Type XXI
‘ i am grateful to Mr. Selinger for providing the additional details of U-3008’s wartime career. Having served on the 3008, it has always been a matter of frustration to me that the only reference I could find to her war patrol was vague and lacking in details.
Allison W. Saville, Glen Burnie, Maryland.-—Lieutenant Commander Glennon has presented a very fine article on the German Type XXI U-boat. On this boat rode the hopes of Grossadmiral Doenitz to return to the “Happy Times” of 1941-42 when the U- boats had been the scourge of the Atlantic.
But the Type XXI was by no means the ultimate in what the Germans achieved in submarine construction during World War II. Just a month before the war ended, three U-boats were undergoing final shakedowns at Randsburg in the Baltic. Outwardly they looked like the smaller streamlined sister- class of the Type XXI, the Type XXIII boats then rapidly coming into service. But these little 312-ton boats had an engineering plant entirely different from anything the Germans had at sea. These were the long- awaited Type XVII “Walter boats,” powered with a hydrogen-peroxide turbine. On their trials they had clocked 21.5 knots underwater, 4 knots faster than the Type XXI. But in addition these were the world’s first true sub- mersibles, intended for offensive operations. For normal patrol operations they had a single Deutz diesel whose air supply came from an ingenious snorkel system mounted in a periscope. Under diesel power the boat could run 3,000 miles at 8 knots, and its sole function was to preserve the hydrogen- peroxide fuel which was very expensive, and short in quantity. But in commencing a submerged attack these boats could switch over to the Walter engine and crank up 20 knots for five and one-half hours if necessary! However, U-1405 (Oberleutnant Rep), U-1406
{Oberleutnant Klug) and U-1407 (Oberleutnant Heitz) never did get to sea before the end of the war. Their captains scuttled them just before the German capitulation.
The truly strange twist to the story of the Walter-type U-boats lies not so much in their arrival just before the war ended, but because they had not come into action for the Germans years earlier. Professor Helmut Walter, presently chief of research for the Worthington Pump Corporation in the United States, was the first man to work on a new propulsion system for submarines utilizing a hydrogen- peroxide turbine that required no external source of oxygen for combustion. He aimed to lree the submarine from the surface entirely, for it would have no batteries which would require surfacing for recharging or something like a snorkel to achieve the same purpose. That was in 1933 at the Krupp Germania shipyard in Kiel. The very next year the Navy had made provision for a Walter-type boat in its U-boat developmental program. The ensuing six years, however, were frustrating for Walter because of his inability to get funds, support and additional technical help from the Navy or hydrogen-peroxide from I.G. Farben in a stable concentrated form. Finally in January 1940 the first experimental U-boat powered with a Walter turbine was launched at Kiel. The underwater tests for that boat in the spring oi 1940—even before the fall of France - were nothing short of phenomenal. On one of its tests the little V-80 (a three-man boat of 80 tons) clocked 28.1 knots on the measured mile.
I hereafter for almost four years Professor Walter met with the same kind of problems that had plagued him before the war, including lack of consistent support from even Grossadrniral Doenitz himself. A number of experimental boats were constructed and used for training purposes and tests, but it was not until 1944 that the first boats for war operations became a reality. In fact, so great were the complications and technical difficulties with this type in November 1942 that the U-boat Command ordered up the Type XXI program in its stead. But the latter boat ■—the “Guppy”—that became the craze of all the major navies of the world after 1945 and until the arrival of the first atomic boats, was never more than a “stop-gap” type for the Germans. At the end of the war hundreds of the Walter types, some ranging up to 1,900 tons in displacement, were either under construction or in the planning stage. This truly was “the weapon that came too late!”
Norman Polmar, Washington, D. C.—I thought Lieutenant Commander Glennon’s article on the Type XXI U-boat program was very well done, but I would like to take issue with him on one point.
As the author states, these ships were not in combat; however, the U-2511 did sight enemy ships—on two occasions.
Accounts I have read indicate the U-2511 sailed from Bergen, Norway, under Lieutenant Commander Schnee on April 30, 1945. Schnee was one of the top surviving U-boat skippers, credited with 17 battles and sinking 200,000 gross tons of shipping.
On her first contact with the enemy, Schnee went to periscope depth and identified several small British anti-submarine vessels. He ordered a change in course, increased speed to 16 knots and easily evaded them. Accounts differ as to whether or not the A/S craft had spotted the U-2511 with their Asdic.
On 7 May, while returning to Bergen in accordance with Admiral Doenitz’s cease-fire order, propeller noises were again heard and the periscope revealed a 10,000-ton British cruiser and three (some accounts say four) destroyers heading straight for the U-2511. Schnee ordered action stations and began an attack on the ships.
The U-2511 closed with the enemy force, passed under one of the destroyers and reached a firing position 500 yards from the cruiser. But when the submarine reached the firing point Schnee is said to have substituted a curse for the firing order and took his boat deep again. (T he U-2511 carried 20 torpedoes of the most advanced types.)
A day later the U-boat entered Bergen harbor. In the harbor lay a British cruiser— the same one which had crossed the U-251 Vs sights the day before. Schnee was ordered aboard the cruiser to give details of the U-2511. On board he revealed—to the disbelief of the British officers—his dummy attack on the cruiser. A check of the ships’ logs confirmed Schnee’s claim.
Schnee said the U-2511 was “first class in attack and defense; it was something com-
Pletely new to any submariner.”
„ ut the Type XXI U-boats were not the , t'mate” undersea weapon developed by le Germans in World War II. In May 1944 construction was ordered of one hundred VPe XXVI U-boats driven by the Walter \v°sed'Cycle, peroxide fueled engine. These Cre to be 850-ton craft with a top underwater speed of 25 knots. Underwater range at sls sPeed was to be 158 miles. Top surface J><cd was to be 14.4 knots. Their armament j . ''c be the most potent ever mounted in a °at; four bow tubes and six forward-firing air»dships tubes.
he first of these craft were scheduled to wiu'0 dle building ways in March 1945 tlie w^°le class being operational before j end of the year. However, Allied bomb- he^ Wrec^ec^ the timetable and none had ccn completed when the war ended, of .CC(]rh>ng to the latest (1960-1961) edition a ,ane s Fighting Ships, today both the French Ij0 Soviet navies operate Type XXI Ur °3ts' I he French Roland Morillot is the jJ^r U-2518, while the Soviet N-27, N-28, fj ~ and JV-30• are the former U-2529, a , 1 -3041 and U-3515 respectively. In
’tion, West Germany has the Wilhelm nfip^’ cx~F-2540, which is assigned non- cltar>’ duties, but is manned by a Navy r ?W- She was scuttled on 3 May 1945, and aised in 1957 and completely rebuilt.
"Are We Ready to Wage Limited War?”
(See page 27, March 1961 Proceedings)
Commander H. M. Rolph, U. S. Naval Reserve.—I am generally in agreement with the thoughts expressed by Capt. Seim in his splendid Prize Essay on psychological preparation for limited war. There has been a consensus that more material preparation loi limited conflict is overdue, but indeed too little thought has been devoted to the psychological impediments to prosecution of small wars with limited means and limited objectives.
Limited war seems to be developing into a “fashionable” concept, at least in theory, despite those. real psychological obstacles among Americans which have been pointed out so clearly by Capt. Seim. But along with this increasing acceptance of the idea ol limited conflict, there must be recognition and understanding of another very real obstacle to putting the theory into practice, which goes even beyond deliberate restraint in use of weapons and in political objectives. This is the hard fact that the world order has so changed in this century that limited war has lost much of the political, economic and cultural basis it once had, and that the stakes at issue in today’s international conflict are not conducive to limited tests of arms.
In previous centuries, the low state of
technology posed its own limitations. But the primary basis for a limitation on objectives, and in reality for the whole concept of limited war in the past, lay in the fact that states or their rulers fought over limited but tangible assets and interests which bear no comparison to the generally-recognized issues in international relations today, nor to the present standards of measuring and exercising national power. They fought over territory, bases, trade monopolies, colonies—prizes of limited and definable scope.
Our present struggle, strongly ideological in tone, involves the whole resources of the main protagonists, and the prize is nothing less than control of the world. The classical material stakes and the balance of power concepts which tended to keep earlier wars limited and less terrible are, in today’s political fashion, virtually taboo. The twentieth century has seen the rapid disappearance of the colonies and overseas bases of imperial powers, which were about the last tangible territorial assets over which limited wars might be fought. Today nothing less than the integrity, and even survival, of whole nations is at stake. This condition is not conducive to the limitation of conflict.
The situation today tends to make the West desire to avoid any kind of hostilities, limited or otherwise, ft enlarges the opportunity for the enemy to nibble away at the Free World, usually by proxy, with relative impunity. It seems clear that one of the principal reasons for Western hesitancy to engage in even a limited test of arms to halt this aggressive probing is the absence of really tangible and understandable national interests in most of the areas where the West has been in retreat since 1945. Korea was bald-faced communist aggression against a pro-Western nation intimately associated with the U. S., as well as a direct military thrust toward Japan, the main U. S. bastion in the Far East. Laos, more typical of what may come in the future, represents guerilla and subversive war within and against a neutralist country whose people apparently have little interest in being rescued and over whose government we have little real influence. The Soviets will probably avoid new Koreas, while generating more Laos-type situations.
Regardless of popular acceptance of the idea of limited war, or of material readiness for it, a decision to intervene in a situation such as Laos is exceedingly difficult, due m large measure to this lack of tangible stakes. Such intervention might be highly desirable from a strategic and psychological standpoint, but with no actual commercial or territorial assets, military bases, ironclad alliances or strong friendships at stake, would the Western peoples fully support military intervention, even on a limited scale? Defending tangible assets in the feudal era was one thing, but a commitment today, with its much wider ramifications, to defend the “integrity” of a distant country, over whose policy one has little influence, is something quite different.
Thus, there is no reason to feel assured that we shall turn back the Communist tide simply by material and psychological preparation for accepting limited war in principle. Unless a new, more tangible and more clearly-defined national interest is created and developed in the areas most vulnerable to Communist pressures, strong military measures to protect these areas are unlikely. As long as the interests at stake are intangible and moralistic, there is more likely to be a continued shrinking from timely military intervention, until such time as all-out war will be necessary to salvage what remains. This difficult position can probably be overcome, but only if the condition is recognized for what it is.
The Soviets and Communist Chinese have an immense advantage over us in this regard. They create their tangible assets and interests in the world’s “gray” areas by organizing captive parties and stooge governments and by taking harsh and repressive measures while the West’s hands are tied by laws, morals, and traditions. We have allowed ourselves to be further handcuffed by shibboleths, taboos and inhibitions arising out of the rampant and often irresponsible nationalism of our times and by hesitancy to make any moves which are not “popular” around the world. Unless the national interest of the U. S., as well as general Western policy, is freed of this impedimenta, no limited war strategy will be sound. Ultimate and idealistic goals must somehow be separated from immediate realistic requirements. In the political climate of today’s world, such a disengagement would be a monumental challenge. The cries of “im-
Perialism” would be deafening. But it would ^• reasonable to expect that a new clarity of 0 jective and firmness of purpose would bring only far greater unity and popular support within the Western countries, but also, u timately, a fair measure of understanding elsewhere in the world.
The Future of the Seaplane
es
' Ce Pages 54-63, May 1961 Proceedings)
Mr. E. R. Lewis, Eugene, Oregon. eaders of Commander Kirchner’s thoughtful j?rhcle niay be interested in a few additional acts concerning the non-military uses of large seaplanes.
The commercial flying boat has a history ^ginning at least as early as 1919, when oeing produced two open-cockpit boats ^ lch saw considerable service in the Puget iii'|Jn<^ re8*on- One of these flew 350,000 1 es in ten years before retiring, he 1920’s and 30’s, however, marked the ctajor development of this type, with Boeing, °nsolidated, Martin, and Sikorsky as the Principal American contributors. As Commander Kirchner has pointed out, the long range over-water service of the late 1930’s
made almost exclusive use of flying boats.
The first planes in modern transoceanic service were three Martins, China Clipper, Hawaiian Clipper, and Philippine Clipper, Pan American operated in the mid-1930’s between Alameda and the Orient. All three were the model 130, a 48 passenger flying boat of 52,000 lbs. gross weight, whose four 830 horsepower engines gave them a top speed of 180 mph. An improved version, the Martin model 152, was never completed.
Pan American’s next (and final) major flying boat was the Boeing model 314, a 42 ton double-decked giant, the world’s largest passenger aircraft at the time of its 1939 entry onto regular service across both oceans. Twelve of these planes were built for PanAm between 1939 and 1941, and with America’s entry into World War II, the airline continued to operate five of them for the Navy. Four additional planes went to the Army, where they were designated as C-98’s, while the remaining three were purchased by BOAC. Most of these, along with the majority of other pre-War flying boats, were retired by 1948.
Nevertheless, the multi-engine seaplane continued to find transport employment in a
number of regions lacking airports. Many surplus World War II patrol bombers were purchased for operations in isolated areas, particularly by small one and two plane airlines. The ruggedness of such craft, subjected to heavy and irregular transport service, has been more than adequately demonstrated by the fact that as late as 1960, over fifty Cata- linas were still being used as commercial cargo and passenger transports by Canadian, South American, and Asian carriers.
"Command Primer” and "Assumption of Responsibility—Essence of Command”
(See pages 85-89, September 1960 Proceedings, pages 61-67, January 1961 Proceedings, and pages 125— 127, May 1961 Proceedings)
Commander Parker Cleeve Cooper, U. S. Navy.—The normal tour for most fleet commanding officers is one year or less. The reason, as Commander Jones notes, is to share-the-wealth—give as many officers as possible the chance to command. Attempting to evaluate the officers who are fortunate enough to get a command on the basis of their one-year stint is very difficult. In many cases, the officer is a victim, for better or worse, of what he inherits. In his short tour, he brings his weight to bear, but the result is often not apparent on his watch.
There is a far deeper problem, however. In the heavily committed fleet today, we live by one expression -Fleet Readiness. Almost anything can be done if it contributes to this readiness. Conversely, if a project or program does not relate to readiness, the chances are that it will be deferred.
The ironic result of rotating Commanding Officers every year is a direct reduction in Fleet Readiness. Commands are in a constant state of flux, constantly adjusting to a new “old man.” Instead of a period of mutual education and indoctrination, followed by a long- period of peak efficiency, we have constant turmoil among the crew.
After a four-year absence from the fleet, the first thing I noticed was the higher caliber of officers in today’s aviation squadrons. I am sure that this is attributable to the fact that officers must obligate themselves for a longer period to be accepted for flight training.
But not so the Commanding Officer. When he has brought his experience and training to the fore, he is transferred. The result is hard on the individual; his potential for promotion will be judged in large part on his short performance as Commanding Officer. Far deeper, though, is the effect on the command—a decreased overall effectiveness. Instead of long periods of charging at full speed, the organization must struggle to move faster than “standard.”
An officer ordered to command an aviation squadron today from shore duty can expect to spend four to five months temporary duty in a replacement squadron. During this time he attends required schools and becomes proficient in his squadron’s aircraft. When he has his command for only one year, do we get proper return on a very expensive investment?
The Commanding Officer of a Canadian squadron similar to mine can expect a four- year tour. By way of contrast, some officers and men in my squadron have served under four Commanding Officers, in less than four years. It almost seems that we are dedicated to professionalism in all areas of the Navy, save one—the Commanding Officer.
Another irony in the current policy is the lengths we go to select Commanding Officers. One hears of boards, lists, and other processes and considerations that indicate a desire to select the most fitted. It is certainly an honor to be selected, for that frenzied year. You do your best to bring your command to top efficiency and meet operational commitments. All of this is hard on the Commanding Officer and even harder on the crew. The individual Commanding Officer spends only a year in this state, the crew may spend two to five years, adjusting to a new skipper every year.
The way to improve Fleet Readiness appears quite straightforward—lengthen the tours of Commanding Officers. Put the best possible officers in command, and keep them there. Each year a Command Selection Board could review the records of all Commanding Officers, weeding out those who have not lived up to expectations.
In aviation, we seem to have fallen into a trap. It is customary for an officer to command a deep draft vessel before he commands a carrier. The experience this officer receives is invaluable, but the result is the same on both ships—each has a new skipper yearly.
n some squadrons the same situation obtains. , n °fficer spends a year as Executive Officer, l^en fleets up” and assumes command. He s received valuable experience in the ^ffiadron, but, once again, the crew has a new °rnrnanding officer each year. In the small ew vve have attempted to raise the experi- thCe ^CVe^ our Commanding Officers; in e ong view, we have done this to the detri- of the command itself.
is 116 °^v'ous result of longer command tours S a ^ecrease in the number of officers who will ,Corrimands. This is regrettable, but un- 0lc*able. The British Navy, several years t< ’ ^Pflt their officers into two categories, i.e., ,sea ’ and shrinkins
‘shore.” They realized, with a
give
dilut:
ag fleet, that they could not possibly every eligible officer a command without ting their command experience to an unstable level.
I do not advocate quite such drastic action, mustU- our circumstances are different. We j_ st’ however, discover potential command- hp' ?^1Cers early in their careers. They must for^Uen ass'Snments which will prepare them O^mand. Once ordered as Commanding not'CerS’ t^ley must be allowed to command, rel' merdy hold the reins for a year, only to be T,voV«< by another “short-timer” skipper.
A ear tours as Commanding Officers 0r°U C'. seem to be ideal. This would allow the )Jn I niZation to stabilize and move ahead Yy '' one Commanding Officer. It still in a ab°w reasonable rotation and com- nes.nC opP°rtunity» and improve Fleet Readi- .... s' Afl other considerations should be Secondary.
T'k
e 1 est of Leadership
p ^''eutenant Commander Gordon E. Mc- iSS(^DEN> U. S. Nav)—The February 1961 ex ^ Hands Magazine contained an
A\C< tnt article on the 1960 Leadership c 'arbs- After reading the resumes of the \veKates and award winners, I’m sure that ou n°l °n^y aPPlaud them, but have resolved pelves to emulate their methods.
Co °- 001 w*sh to second guess the awards |1(J^lni'ttee or the Chief of Naval Operations; Ch‘ °n a comparative scale, I think that En'h ^ flham J. Hawkins, the Pacific Fleet lsted Winner, should have received two
awards. His extra entitlement is contained in that unique attribute evidenced in his desire to have all those men considered troublemakers and potential discipline problems assigned to his division. In my opinion, this is the real challenge of naval leadership tremendous and worthwhile.
From time to time, we are apprised of the Navy’s lost man-hour figures due to absenteeism and brig time. We are all aware of the large amount of manpower wasting away in our naval prisons. How many of us, at times, have not also sadly shaken our heads and correlated the rise to that of juvenile delinquency in the nation as a whole? But how many of us—officers and petty officers—are really attempting to do something about it? It is, therefore, extremely refreshing to see Chief Hawkins not only doing something concrete about it but also parading his results for all the rest of us to learn from.
I believe there is a lesson to be learned here or, rather, a reconsideration to be made of the old adage—“Take care of the people and the other problems in the ship will take care of themselves.” Too many of us are prone to put the cart before the horse. Too many of us are prone to think that we must drive our ships toward the “E” without ever realizing that by taking care of the people, by emulating Chief Hawkin’s example, the ships will drive themselves to the “Big ‘E’ .”
Too many of us, and especially commanding officers, are prone to look for the “easy way”; i.e., we want only the “good boys” in our ships and divisions. When we’re putting ships in commission, we’ve got to have only the outstanding officers instead of taking the random sample to which we’re entitled. Think of all the special units, forces, projects and jobs that we have in our Navy which require only outstanding officers or only “markedly superior petty officers” and only those personnel with “clean conduct records.”
There is too great a tendency among the so-called “career-conscious” to seek after and grab for the “plums.” One can’t very well condemn this for it is only a manifestation of human nature. But let’s face it—let’s be honest with ourselves—as far as naval leadership is concerned, how many of us can pride ourselves or flatter our egos on being commanding officers in the time-honored sense of the word unless we’re willing, able, and challengeable enough to do these three things:
1. Take command of what can best be called, for want of a more descriptive term, the “DesLant Duty Bad Boy” i.e., that ship unsatisfactory on “Insurv,” unsatisfactory in the last “Admin” inspection and unsatisfactory in Refresher Training.
2. Recruit an entire crew from among the inmates of our retraining commands, and
3. Shake down the “Bad Boy” into a man- o’-war and shake out the “bad boys” into a group of self-respecting man-o’-warsmen.
Unless we can take up these tremendous challenges of naval leadership then we shouldn’t be kidding ourselves as being leaders of men. We should stop paying just lip-service to General Order #21. I’ve only had the privilege of knowing two naval officers who correctly looked on these challenges as the true “plums”; who were able to tell the detailer—“give me the dirtiest job you’ve got.” How many more of them we need!
"Killing Nuclear Submarines”
(See pages 45-51, November 1960 Proceedings and pages 101-104 February 1961 Proceedings)
Raymond T. Sorel, Sarasota, Florida—■ Commanders DombrofT and Law have apparently taken the view that improved weapons and sonars in the surface fleet will soon overcome any advantages the nuclear submarine now enjoys. While I agree that the nuclear submarine may not be an all-purpose ASW ship now, it may still be better than a destroyer, even when the destroyer is equipped with improved weapons and sonars. Further, a group of nuclear submarines may be able to do a better job as escorts or as a hunter- killer group than surface ships, and at smaller cost, too.
Since Commanders DombrofT and Law are looking into the future, anticipating the performance of the destroyer, perhaps we should look into the future to see what kind of a submarine the future destroyer will have to contend with. In order to avoid the possibility of wandering into classified territory in discussing speed, we will mention only what is available in standard texts on naval architecture.
You can find the resistance curves of a
destroyer escort, in several texts and I will leave it to you to choose which one—but you will find one in which the curve of frictional resistance is plotted separately from the total resistance. When you subtract the frictional resistance from the total, you get the residual resistance—and in surface ships at relatively high speeds, this is almost entirely wave-making resistance. At the maximum speed of a destroyer escort (23 knots), the wave-making resistance is probably more than 90 per cent of the residual resistance.
A deeply submerged submarine theoretically has no wave-making resistance. We should be able to estimate the theoretical maximum speed of a submarine comparable in size and power to a destroyer escort by extrapolating the curve or frictional resistance out to the total resistance that the power plant can overcome. When you do this, the speed comes out to more than 70 knots.
It is probable that this theoretical maximum will never be achieved with this amount of power because of other factors such as turbulence, which will become important at high speed—but certainly 50-55-knot speeds are not unreasonable to expect. Note that I have chosen to compare a submarine of the size and power of a destroyer escort rather than a destroyer. I have done this to be conservative.
What can a destroyer do against such a submarine? This submarine need not even take evasive action. It can merely outrun the surface ships If helicopters or other aircraft are attacking, the submarine is invisible and the simplest evasive action will make their attack ineffective. If the aircraft could launch a weapon in the immediate area of such a high speed submarine, it would be difficult for a high speed weapon to catch up to the submarine since the weapon would have to carry so much fuel to travel at such high speeds for any length of time that there would be no room left for an explosive—or the weapon would be so large that it could not be carried by an aircraft.
Suppose that the surface ships did have a long range sonar that could pinpoint the position of the submarine at say, ten miles. All the sonar could do is tell where the submarine had been at some previous time since it would take about 25 seconds for the sonar energy to travel out to the target and return.
A 50-knot target could be nearly half a mile aWay from its plotted position in 25 seconds.
Homing weapons would be useless at high speeds. The self noise of a high speed weapon w°uld completely mask any noise from the target. If the weapon travelled slow enough to detect the target, it could not travel fast enough to catch it.
One must remember that when a surface j ls using a high-power, long range sonar 1° detect submarines, it is also acting as a eac°n to the submarine, telling its direction n sometimes its range. And the submarine Can detect the energy from such a sonar at a n[1]Uch greater distance than the sonar can etect the submarine.
■ Aircraft, as ASW vehicles, are hampered y weather. Conventional destroyers are too w and lack fuel endurance. Aircraft car- r'ers are expensive. Unless the Navy develops ace ships with hydrofoil or catamaran c°nfigUratjons tQ enakie them to reach higher S/<r,C<H’ it seems to me that most surface ships V1 he obsolete in a few years.
Analysis of Sound”
ee Pages 133-134, April 1961 Proceedings)
(j ^jfutenant Commander A. N. Glennon, ■ N Navy.—Commander Fitch says, with Aspect to the doppler effect, “ . . . the frequency shift is proportional to the frequency lo\ C 0UtS°ing signal. Naturally, then, a new, uw frequency sonar produces less doppler ^ct than an older, higher frequency sonar. In the older sonar, the frequency shift was m°r.e than three times as high as in the new e<Iuipinent. _ _ »
The presentation of these essentially cor- [(CCt statements is unfortunate, in that it serves ° Perpetuate the idea that the doppler effect resP°nsible for a problem that is, basically, e fault of our sonar design.
Less” doppler effect? Yes, if you’re talking a.)out cycles per second. No, if you’re talking a °ut musical pitch.
The relation between frequency and pitch is one of proportionality, rather than a direct relationship. To increase pitch one octave requires a doubling of frequency. This relationship holds true also for differences between notes in the scale. If it takes a change of 50 cycles per second to go from one note to the next at one point in the scale, it will take 100 cycles per second one octave higher. This note-to-note relationship is the same as the results of doppler. A range rate that produces a 70 cycle per second change of frequency at 5 kilocycles will produce a 140 cycle per second change at 10 kilocycles.
The difficulty in distinguishing doppler with any sonar lies in the fact that the operator does not hear the actual signals involved. He hears, instead, a note he has chosen for himself, or one that has been chosen for him. This note is produced by mixing the output of a beat frequency oscillator with the sonar signals. A characteristic of this process is that magnitudes of frequency difference are preserved. A change of 50 cycles per second at the sonar frequency will be presented to the operator as a change of 50 cycles per second in his audio frequency. The operator should not be required to detect doppler. By doing this electronically, we would improve our ability to make use of it, eliminate inaccuracies in determining it, and permit the operator to concentrate on the task of detecting and tracking submarines. The trend to lower frequency sonars has brought these points out more forcefully by making it more difficult for the sonar operator to detect the doppler shift.
Undoubtedly, the reason sonars now in the fleet do not have automatic doppler indicators is that no requirement has been stated for them. If this- is so, it must mean the commanding officers of all our sonar-equipped ships are satisfied with the quality and quantity of doppler information they now receive. This I find difficult to believe.
“Good men can make a poor organization work well, but poor men cannot make a good organization work at all.”
Admiral Arleigh Burke before the Committee on Armed Services, 1958