The combined personnel strength of the navies of the NATO powers, excluding that of the United States, is 340,500 officers and men,* which is just about half that of the latter. It would, however, be wrong to pretend that the former represents 50 per cent of the latter’s striking power. The contribution of each nation is not governed by any clear- cut plan regarding the manner in which its naval forces would be required to act in the event of total war, but rather by a compromise between what its government considers it can afford, its national needs, and those of the alliance.
Alastair Buchan in his book N.A.T.O. in the 1960’s remarks, “To date naval planning within NATO has been largely concerned with keeping the high seas open against submarine and air threat. This predicates a future Battle of the Atlantic, although the possibility of such a battle has been denied by the British Government.” He goes on to affirm, “Whatever view one takes of the likelihood or unlikelihood of total war, the idea of a Battle of the Atlantic in ‘broken-backed’ war—traces of which linger in the naval thinking of all the different NATO powers— is a very unlikely contingency.”
Opinion is sharply divided between those who believe that Russia, relying on her vast hinterland and widely dispersed sources of power, would be prepared to risk an exchange of nuclear weapons with the West and those who hold that not even a coldly calculating Communist government would pursue a policy of mutual self-destruction. The supporters of the former theory believe that in such circumstances naval forces could not influence the outcome to any material extent, whereas the proponents of the latter theory consider that in such an event naval forces would play their traditional role of maintaining the sea lines of communication. But there is yet another possibility, namely that the Russians, while refraining from the use of nuclear weapons against shore targets, might implement their declared policy of using them against ships. The outcome of any land campaign in Europe must depend upon the arrival of supplies and reinforcements from overseas to support the forces of the Western alliance, hence it is logical to assume that the struggle at sea would be fought out ‘with no holds barred.’
All-Out Nuclear War
The official defense policy in Britain, which was set out in a government paper entitled “Britain’s contribution to Peace and Security” states “ it must be understood that if Russia were to launch a major attack on them [the Western nations] even with conventional forces only, they would have to hit back with strategic nuclear weapons. In fact, the strategy of NATO is based on the frank recognition that a full scale attack could not be repelled without resort to a massive nuclear bombardment of the sources of power in Russia.” By implication, this is also the policy of the United States through her membership in NATO. Now, although it is being argued with some force that so far as Britain and Western Europe are concerned, this policy is a frank avowal of a determination to commit suicide, from which it follows that there is no possible role for naval forces in an all-out nuclear war, yet both the Navy Department and the Admiralty have stated categorically that even in such circumstances, they consider that these forces have a definite part to play. For instance, it has been stated that each of the four U. S. fleets has specific missions in its respective area in the event of general war, and Captain Daniel J. Carrison, U. S. Navy, in his article “The Role of the Navy in Cold War” in the June 1959 issue of the Proceedings, states with reference to the U. S. attack carrier striking force missile capability, “This unique naval capability for general nuclear war is one which will make the Soviets hesitate before initiating nuclear surprise attacks on the Western world.” In Britain, in the statement accompanying the Navy Estimates for 1958-59, it was stated, “It will be equally clear that the Navy will have a part to play in global war,” and this is defined in the 1958 Report on Defence as “to make an effective contribution to the combined naval forces of the Western Alliance.” Pressed to explain in more detail what this role really amounts to, the First Lord of the Admiralty said recently, “As to global war, we are primarily collaborating for the purpose of deterring war and the significance of what we are doing lies in the clear evidence of the growing ability of the navies of the free world to act together.” Although this statement does not exactly answer the question, “What is the role of the Navy in global war?” by implication it affirms that there is such a role.
The Russian view of naval strategy in a global war as given by Dr. Dinerstein in his book, War and the Soviet Union, is “the advent of nuclear weapons has made it harder for the United States to base her strategy on naval might and easier for the Soviet Union to frustrate the execution of that strategy,” and the conclusion is drawn that “naval task forces are a thing of the past, capital ships are obsolete or obsolescent and much smaller vessels can execute naval tasks as well or better than larger ships.” While there is no denying the increased vulnerability of surface ships to attacks by nuclear weapons, it is not necessary to go all the way with the Russian point of view, but it does mean that only ships fitted with the latest equipment and a powerful air defense capability would be of any value in such a war. The claim was made recently that with the help of three-dimensional radar, HMS Victorious was able to intercept 90 per cent of the dummy attacks made on her by U. S. aircraft; while impressive, this is still inadequate. Nothing less than 100 per cent is acceptable in the face of nuclear attack.
Conventional War
In the event of a war between Russia and the West in which neither side was prepared to unleash weapons of mass destruction, it is clear that the war at sea would be of paramount importance. However, as ships would be subject to heavier air attacks than ever before, and in certain circumstances to attack by shore-based missiles armed with high-explosive warheads, it follows that a highly sophisticated air defense system will be an essential requirement. The U. S. Fleet with its surface- to-air and air-to-air missiles is well equipped to deal with this threat, but the same cannot be said of the navies of the rest of the Western alliance. There is even an indication of a shift of emphasis on the part of the Russians from the submarine threat to that of air attack, mainly because of their success with rockets, hence we should rid ourselves of the idea that even in the circumstances envisaged, military supplies would again cross the Atlantic in vast, slow-moving convoys. Rather should we consider fast, small, well protected convoys with strong antiaircraft and antisubmarine protection on the lines of the operational convoys of the last war.
In a conventional war, it seems likely that Russia—despite her preponderance in land forces—would have to use her most powerful, weapons to counter the great advantages which sea power would confer on the West. Writing in the June issue of The Navy Jurg Meister, a leading expert on the Soviet Navy, says, “It is tempting to conclude that if the Russians really scrap their cruisers and concentrate even more on submarines than they have done so far, they contemplate either total war or total peace, but certainly not limited war,” and Dr. Raymond L. Garthoff, also a well known authority on the subject, says in his Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age: “If there were a limitation on the use of nuclear weapons, the role of the [Russian] navy for interdiction of sea communications would become crucially important. The Russians are well aware that despite its size, their navy is no match for the combined strength of those of the West, so in a struggle at sea fought with conventional weapons, they would be at a serious disadvantage from the start. They have made it plain however, that with the help of nuclear weapons, they are confident of being able to redress the balance.
Nuclear War at Sea, Conventional War on Land
Despite the official Western pronouncements quoted above, if it came to the point where Russia launched an attack on the West with conventional weapons, it seems questionable whether the latter would immediately reply with nuclear ones, knowing full well the consequence of such action. Moreover, Western Europe would be a gain of such incalculable benefit to the Soviet Union that the Russians would have every reason for not reducing it to a heap of radioactive rubble. As Professor Anthony Sokol says in his article, “Sea, Land, Air, and Missile Power,” in the May 1960 issue of the Proceedings, “Prudent conquerors therefore refrain from unnecessary devastation, preferring to profit from the conquered country’s wealth rather than wreck it.” But there are no similar inhibitions regarding the sea.
It is estimated that the lethal range of an H-bomb at sea is of the order of 12 miles, hence to avoid total destruction, a task force will need to steam in a very open formation and so surrender the advantages of mutual protection which were a feature of air defense tactics at the end of the last war. While this disability can be offset to a large extent by the introduction of surface-to-air and air-to- air missiles, together with improved radar and communications, the development of the stand-off bombing technique using powered missiles is improving, and the advances in the radar field may well be mutual. There is, therefore, a demand for an air defense capability of a high order in all naval forces approaching within range of enemy air bases and rocket installations. As was previously mentioned, the U. S. carrier striking force has this capability, but the same cannot be said of the navies of the other members of NATO, whose missile development and ship-fitting programs lag a long way behind. Britain, for instance, will not commission her first long- range guided missile ship until 1962, at the earliest, and France, not before 1965. Italy, thanks to U. S. aid, may have one such vessel in commission by the end of this year. It is for this reason that there has been much criticism of the shape, size, and role of Canadian and European contributions to the naval forces of NATO. If, as has been suggested, there is no likelihood of a future Battle of the Atlantic, is there any point in devoting so much of their resources to the construction and training of antisubmarine forces? Are the two new French carriers, Clemencean and Focli, with their armament of eight 100-mm. guns the best contribution which that country could make to the alliance? Do Canada and the Netherlands need to maintain the carriers Bonaventure and Karel Doorman with a top speed of only 24 knots? If the primary role of the Royal Navy is indeed to deter war, should it not include deterrent forces either of the carrier- striking or missile-firing-submarine type?
It is true, as the First Lord of the Admiralty said recently, that one Scimitar aircraft armed with a nuclear weapon could today achieve the same or better results than the 40 Swordfish aircraft which attacked the Italian fleet in Taranto during World War II, but ships which attack with nuclear weapons must also be prepared to repel similar attacks On the part of the enemy, and this the NATO navies, other than that of the United States, are not yet equipped to do. Faced with the centralized direction of Soviet power, if we continue to pursue our individual naval policies, we will be merely dissipating our strength.
Total naval expenditure by the NATO countries, excluding the United States, is estimated at two and one-half billion dollars, but in proportion to the manpower of these countries, the contribution could well be twice that amount. Nuclear stalemate ashore does not necessarily compel a similar state of affairs at sea.
A graduate of the Royal Naval Colleges, Osborne and Dartmouth, Admiral Schofield commanded the cruiser Galatea and the battleships Duke of York and King George V during World War II. From 1941 to 1943, he was Director of the Trade Division (Convoy and Routing) of the Admiralty. Subsequently he was Chief of Staff to the Admiral, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, D. C. Author of The Royal Navy Today, Oxford University Press, 1960, he is also naval correspondent to the Army (Defence) Quarterly and is a regular contributor to Brassey’s Armed Forces Annual, The Navy, and other journals.
* Made up in thousands as follows: Belgium 5 Canada 20, Denmark 7, France 68, Greece 15, Italy 41, Netherlands 22, Norway 5, Portugal 9, Turkey 26, United Kingdom 102, West Germany 20.
