The first 100 days of the administration of John Fitzgerald Kennedy brought more change to the nation’s military establishment than any similar period since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. Even though many New Frontier defense moves have made headlines, the real extent of the changes being worked is more profound than apparent. To use a tired but still serviceable analogy, the changes can be likened to the iceberg, one-ninth visible, the rest out of sight.
In attempting to bring this most important period into focus, the “visible” changes will first be set forth as they appear in the public record, followed by an outline of the general policies and trends which distinguish the New Frontier as it affects defense—the invisible portion of the iceberg. The “Public Record” section will be based almost entirely on statements of the President and Secretary of Defense, Congressional testimony, and official Department of Defense press releases. The “Policies and Trends” section will rely heavily on the aforementioned material supplemented by other published information.
The Public Record
The President’s State of the Union message announced some military changes and called for a reappraisal of our entire defense strategy, policies, organization, etc. He announced that he had already directed three actions “clearly needed now”; prompt action to increase airlift capacity to give conventional forces the mobility needed to deal with small war situations; acceleration of the Polaris program; and “prompt action to accelerate our entire missile program.”
Three days later the new Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, held a press conference in which he discussed the actions which had been taken to carry out the measures announced in the State of the Union Message and the arrangements for the “reappraisal.”
He announced firm plans to increase troop/cargo airlift capacity by adding 30 C-135 pure jets and 23 C-130-E turbo-props. First deliveries were scheduled for mid-1961, four years ahead of previous plans for introduction of pure jets into the airlift inventory.
The Polaris program was to be accelerated by nine to ten months through the use of unobligated funds. Secretary McNamara emphasized that the program had not been increased but that procurement of additional boats was under consideration.
He also elaborated on the President’s announcement that restrictions on overseas dependents of military personnel had been rescinded.
As a first step in the clearing of the administrative underbrush, he announced elimination of two Assistant Secretary of Defense billets. The duties of Properties and Installations were combined with those of Supply and Logistics and assigned to Mr. Thomas Morris, who was appointed Assistant Secretary, Installations and Logistics. The duties of Assistant Secretary, Health and Medical were assigned to Assistant Secretary, Manpower. Mr. McNamara made it clear the move was taken for “span of control” considerations, pointing out that he had 15 Presidential appointees reporting to him and that after the announced changes “that number will be reduced to 13, still far too many, but at least a step in the right direction.”
He announced that in order to carry out reappraisal of the defense organization and procedure, he had established an Office of Organization and Management Planning staffed with an officer from each service working under the immediate supervision of Mr. Solis Horowitz, Washington attorney. “This office will study . . . not only major organizational changes but minor ones as well.” More was to be heard of their activities before the first 100 days had run out.
On the placement of this group within the organization, Mr. McNamara said:
It is assigned in a rather peculiar fashion. It probably should be reporting directly to Mr. Gilpatric and to me, but with 13 people, plus the additional assistants and so on already reporting to us, we have assigned this to the General Counsel for direction, Mr. Cyrus Vance.
If one were to judge by the official news releases, the month of February 1961 was a quiet one in the Pentagon with the usual routine of contracts let and generals transferred. The announced changes were not major news stories. On 6 February it was announced that the functions of keeping track of and reporting continental military flights had been transferred from the Air Force to the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA).
On the 13th, the abolition of the post of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Manpower and Reserves, was announced. The duties of that office were assigned to the Under Secretary of the Navy, while the financial management and comptroller duties formerly performed by the Under Secretary were assigned to a new billet, Assistant Secretary for Financial Management.
On 1 March, the new Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Mr. Charles J. Hitch, made an address entitled “The Defense Budget as a Management Tool” to the annual national conference of the Armed Forces Management Association. In this talk he reiterated some of the financial management philosophy which had been published in greater detail in his book, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age. He announced some changes in his “shop” designed to help “bridge the gap which now exists between military planning and budgeting.” A new office headed by a new Deputy Assistant Secretary for Programming had been set up. To fill this new office he selected Mr. Hugh McCullough, Director of the Plans and Programs Division of the Special Projects Office. At Special Projects, Mr. McCullough had been in charge of the management team which had successfully kept the Polaris project on the tightest schedule ever attempted for an undertaking of that size and complexity. Of Mr. Hitch, his ideas, and his organization, more will be heard, both in this review and in the months which lie ahead.
The Space Decision
The first of the much heralded New Frontier actions was unveiled on 8 March with the announcement of a “new directive for development of military space systems,” the work of the organization and management planning group in the Office of the General Counsel.
It assigned the development of all space systems to the Air Force “except under unusual circumstances” and precipitated hearings by the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, which began 17 March. Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric was the lead-off witness. The press reported that Chairman Overton Brooks (Democrat, Louisiana) had invited Mr. McNamara to appear but that Mr. McNamara said he would send Mr. Gilpatric instead, “inasmuch as Gilpatric knew more about it and was the ‘key man involved in the action.’ ” Mr. Gilpatric’s testimony amplified the original announcement. Under the directive, each department would conduct preliminary research to develop ways of using space to carry out its own functions. The amount of such research would be set by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering in terms of expenditure limitations. After preliminary study by the Services, all proposals approved by the Secretary of Defense would then be turned over to the Air Force for development.
On operational control of space systems, “the Secretary made it absolutely clear that the question of operational assignment was being reserved for future determination.”
Secretary of the Navy Connally presented his view of the order. He testified:
I had the opportunity on the morning after this directive was issued to talk to Secretary McNamara ... I expressed my feelings in detail and he then assured me that he agreed with me that the Navy research capabilities in our laboratories were the finest in Government.
He assured me that it was his intention to continue to use these services and that the last thing anyone would want to do was to stifle their activities.
He further assured me that the Navy would be given an opportunity to continue working on space programs in which we are interested and that if this directive did not result in the requirements of the Navy being met, then, under the directive, exceptions would be made in order that the Navy might itself pursue these activities. Or even if necessary, the directive might be altered to assure that the Navy keeps the abilities and capabilities to perform its naval missions. . . .
The decision has been made and the Navy, as it always has done and always will do, will cooperate with that decision to the utmost of its ability.
Mr. Hitch, the Office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller, was also invited to testify although he had nothing to do with the decision. However, he had authored a book, his views had become known and some of those views, when quoted out of context, made it appear that he opposed moves such as the one just issued. With his permission, pages 235 through 265 of his Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age were reproduced in the hearings record. The following excerpts will reveal why it was concluded that he was not in full accord with the space order.
On the idea of making military administrative decisions “at a level high enough to include all the responsible organizations that might be affected,” Mr. Hitch had written:
If such “solution” were attempted, our governmental organization would become muscle-bound, rather than merely sluggish. Unfortunately the superficial illogicalities of decentralization are more strikingly obvious than the deadening consequences of extreme centralization, (p. 238)
On competition (sometimes called “rivalry”):
. . . there is nothing so stimulating to most people and organizations engaged in research and development as the fear that another company or laboratory will beat it to the objective. Even competition among the military Services has proved highly beneficial, (p. 250)
Under the subhead “Reorganizing Research and Development,” his rejection of the assumptions underlying the “czar” approach to the solution of problems of the organization of research was clearly set forth:
With amazing unanimity the critics have pointed to the uncoordinated character of research and development, the lack of adequate planning, the absence of strong central direction, and the alleged duplication, competition, and waste. . . .
These criticisms, we think, are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of research and development. . . . They try to strengthen control at the top when what is needed is initiative and spontaneity at the bottom. They try to suppress competition and diversification because particular duplications are obviously wasteful from the vantage point of hindsight, apparently unaware that duplication is a rational necessity when we are confronted with uncertainty and that competition is our best protection against bureaucratic inertia.
The popularity of these criticisms is a little surprising when one reflects that military research and development is being pilloried for precisely those characteristics that it has in common with research and development in the free enterprise economy. . . .
Instead of striving for an extreme form of monopolistic bureaucracy in the management of research and development, we would do well to consider emulating part of the practices of our more progressive industries. . . .
If inter-Service rivalry did not exist, we would be forced to invent something very like it. (pp. 256-258)
In his statement, Mr. Hitch said newspaper quotations from his book had made it appear he opposed the space order, an implication “clearly in error.” He had not opposed the order. He had neither read it nor seen it, since he was in the hospital with pneumonia at the time. Under cross-examination he stated, “my personal opinion was not solicited and I did not volunteer it.” He added later, “I don’t think it is good management ... for us to be taking positions and throwing our weight around in matters that are the primary concern of the other parts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.”
It became apparent from the cross-examination (1) that Mr. Hitch is a loyal member of the team; (2) that except for the time in the hospital, he was working 12 or more hours a day on problems which are in his primary domain; (3) that he stands behind what he wrote in the book; and (4) that had he known he was going to have his present job, he would probably not have written the book.
Mr. Hitch evidently made a favorable impression on the committee. When he completed his testimony, Chairman Brooks thanked him and added, “I haven’t read all of your book, but I promise you this, I will read it.”
Proposed Revision to 1962 Defense Budget
By all odds the biggest story of the first 100 days was the President’s defense message delivered to Congress on 28 March containing his recommendations for modification of the fiscal 1962 defense budget submitted by the previous administration.
The message set forth eight basic defense policies designed to “constitute essential guidelines and standards,” since “meaningful defense budget decisions, . . . are not possible without preliminary decisions on defense policy, reflecting both current strategic assumptions and certain fundamental principles.” The message, in addition to the policy statements, did indeed reflect some “meaningful budget decisions.”
The President strongly recommended “that the Polaris program be greatly expanded and accelerated.” Ten additional boats at a cost of 1,223.4 million dollars were requested with the program accelerated so that the total of 29 vessels would be ready in 1964 instead of in 1967 as under the previous schedule.
The President recommended spending an additional 60.4 million dollars to speed the development of the 2,500-mile range Polaris A-3 missile, on which development work had begun in the summer of 1960. Secretary McNamara told the Senate Committee this move might eventually save 100 million dollars by reducing procurement of the number of second generation intermediate range (1,500- mile, A-2) missiles, which are in an advanced stage of development. The A-3 missile would not only permit Polaris to cover more targets, it would also reduce the launching submarine’s exposure to shore-based antisubmarine warfare measures by allowing it to operate in a wider expanse of ocean.
The budget requested 42 million dollars for additional practice firings in order to provide more knowledge of Polaris operational characteristics and for crew training.
President Kennedy noted that the fiscal 1962 budget of the previous administration had not provided funds for Missileer, but that Eagle had been continued in the hope that it could be adapted to another aircraft. “I am now advised that no such alternative use is in prospect; and I have directed the cancellation of that project.”
In his 4 April statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee with respect to the original Eagle-Missileer concept, Secretary McNamara said, “we agree with the previous Administration that it is much too expensive in relation to the available alternatives and the anticipated requirements for fleet air defense.” “ ... in view of the high costs involved—about 3.5 billion dollars— and the numerous alternatives available, we are terminating the Eagle project with a reduction of 57.7 million dollars in the 1962 budget.” Among the alternatives, he mentioned the “tri-Service tactical fighter” and “a new ship-to-air missile called the Typhon.” Later, in his 24 April address at the annual luncheon of the Associated Press, Secretary McNamara had this to say: “Because we plan to develop a single fighter aircraft to serve the tactical needs of all three Services, it will be possible to cancel the Navy Eagle-Missileer fleet air defense fighter program.”
The President requested 45 million dollars in new obligational authority to develop an “advanced tactical fighter emphasizing nonnuclear capabilities.” Secretary McNamara, in his 4 April statement, referred to this projected aircraft as “specifically designed to meet the requirements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps” and “eventually to supplement and replace the Air Force’s F-105 and the Navy’s F4H.” He specified that the aircraft was to incorporate the “variable geometry wing concept evolved by NASA,” which he said would permit designing a plane which could operate from carriers or short crude runways yet carry a heavy conventional ordnance load. It also would have transoceanic ferry range.
The budget contains a request for an additional 84.4 million dollars to improve Fleet material readiness. Of this sum, 23.7 million dollars will be spent for Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization of ten additional ships, bringing the FRAM program total to 45 ships, each of which will have her useful life extended by five years. Periodic overhaul of 283 ships, instead of the 246 scheduled in the January budget, will cost 42.7 million dollars. The remaining 18 million dollars will go for aircraft maintenance reworks, principally of carrier-type planes, increasing the number of aircraft repaired and modified under the Progressive Aircraft Rework program from 3,625 to 4,178. This will enable the air elements to “retain in 1962 the level of material readiness achieved during the current fiscal year.”
An additional Polaris tender was lumped into the money requested for the Polaris program. An additional Amphibious Ship, Dock (LPD), was requested at a cost of 39.7 million dollars increasing the number for 1962 to three. Three LPD-type ships were requested earlier, one each in the 1959 through 1961 budgets.
In his Senate statement, Secretary McNamara spelled out the administration’s reasons for the proposed cancellation of the Polaris installation scheduled for the cruiser Long Beach:
The cost of modifying the Long Beach to accommodate eight ready missiles is estimated at $57.7 million or about $7 million per missile excluding the original cost of the ship itself and the cost of the missiles. The cost of a new nuclear Polaris submarine, excluding the cost of the 16 missiles, is $115 million—just slightly more than $7 million per missile installation.
Long Beach is still scheduled to be equipped with Terrier, Talos, and Asroc.
The President recommended spending an additional 96 million dollars on the Minute- man program to pay for earlier incorporation of changes, more missiles for practice firings, and increased production capacity. The three rail-mounted Minuteman squadrons previously programmed would be deferred in favor of three larger fixed-base squadrons. In recommending deferring of the rail-mounted installations, Secretary McNamara noted that each rail installation would cost almost double the cost of a fixed-base missile. Development looking toward eventual rail- mounted missiles will continue.
The President requested an additional 50 million dollars for the Skybolt, a 1,000-mile solid-fuel nuclear warhead missile to be carried by the B-52 and British V-bombers. “Such action,” he said, “may extend the useful life of our bombers into the missile age.”
Additional funds were requested for various space projects: 60 million dollars for Midas, the early warning satellite designed to give this country 30 minutes notice of ballistic missile attack; 30 million dollars for Dynasoar; 21 million dollars for Project Defender, a research effort designed to study problems of detecting, tracking, intercepting, and destroying attacking ballistic missiles; 15 million dollars for Advent, a satellite-borne instantaneous communications repeater; 30 million dollars for Discoverer, some of whose capsules have been recovered in mid-air; 14 million dollars for Saint, a system for inspection of other satellites; and 132.4 million dollars for “certain other projects.”
In support of the portion of the President’s budget message concerning protecting our bomber deterrent, Secretary McNamara testified that “the number of bombers on an alert status and capable of immediate launching is much more important than the total number of bombers available in the inventory.” The President specifically affirmed the decision of the previous administration not to request any additional funds for procurement of B-52’s or B-58’s. Instead, he proposed to increase the number that might survive a surprise attack by standby preparations for an airborne alert of one-eighth of the force, and an increase in ground alert from one-third to one-half the force. Ground alert means the ability to take off in 15 minutes after warning.
Increasing the ground alert would involve additional costs of approximately 42.6 million dollars, “but more important than the dollar cost is the requirement for additional trained crews.” Some of the additional crews he proposed to obtain through a “somewhat faster rate” of phase-out of the B-47. This action would result not only in freeing personnel, but also in a saving of 34.7 million dollars in fiscal 1962.
An additional measure in this area which would free manpower and save 6.9 million dollars is the proposed early phase-out of the “subsonic Snark air-breathing long-range missile, which is now considered of only marginal value.”
The net effect of all these changes is to provide more second strike deterrent capability with less aircraft and at a net additional expense of “only 1 million dollars.” These measures illustrate the approach to military problems recommended by Mr. Hitch, who applies the operations research method to the analysis of a weapon system to bring all its elements into balance.
On continuing the Atlas program, Secretary McNamara said, “the entire Atlas program is now so far along in production and base construction that little, if anything, could be saved by curtailing it.” However, since virtually no work had commenced on the last two squadrons of Titan, a total of 18 missiles, they were cancelled at a total savings of 270 million dollars, or 15 million dollars per missile.
The President requested an additional 16 million dollars for the “beginning of a major but absolutely vital effort to achieve a truly unified, nationwide, indestructible system to insure high-level command communication and control and a properly authorized response under any conditions.” The objective is “more flexible, more selective, more deliberate, better protected” command and control of our strategic deterrent “under ultimate civilian authority at all times.” Measures are reported to include strengthening of communications through providing alternate means and hardening of lines, alternate command posts, including a cruiser as a seaborne command post and an airborne command post with communications equipment and an alternate Strategic Air Command commander aboard, maintained in the air 24 hours a day.
Of the B-70, the President said, “The acquired missile capability programmed by this message also makes unnecessary and economically unjustifiable the development of the B-70 Mach 3, manned bomber as a full weapons system at this time.” On cost implications of the system, Secretary McNamara estimated it would cost 2.7 billion dollars to complete it as a full weapon system and an additional 4.5 billion dollars for a production program of 200 aircraft, or 36 million dollars per plane; as he put it, “an extremely complex and costly aircraft.” He enumerated operational difficulties including the fact that increasing capabilities of ground-to-air missiles would practically eliminate the advantage of its speed and altitude. He also pointed out problems with this aircraft as a “second strike” weapons, since “the B-70 would be more vulnerable on the ground than hardened missiles and it does not lend itself to airborne alert measures.” However, because of the remaining uncertainties about the operational characteristics of missiles, experimental development of the B-70 is to continue in order to “preserve the option of developing a manned bomber if we should later determine such a system is required.” In addition to the 800 million dollars already invested, continued experimental development was estimated to cost 500 million dollars with 220 million dollars of it to be spent in fiscal 1962, 138 million dollars less than proposed under the Eisenhower budget.
The atomic airplane project, after nearly 15 years of effort and an expenditure of over a billion dollars, has been cancelled. The President estimated it would take at least a billion dollars more to achieve experimental flight and that there was only a remote possibility of developing a militarily useful aircraft. The whole project is to be transferred to the “Atomic Energy Commission budget where it belongs, as a non-defense research item.” Cancellation of the atomic airplane will save 35 million dollars in the 1962 budget.
Of this move, Secretary McNamara said:
Further temporizing on experimental nuclear aircraft will be brought to a halt. Work will be discontinued on a nuclear-powered plane which would have little or no military value. Total savings over the life of the project will amount to ¾ billion.
As to the argument that first flight of a nuclear aircraft would enhance the prestige of the United States, Mr. McNamara expressed doubt “as to whether defense projects should be pursued solely to provide prestige value.”
The Secretary went into considerable detail on the administration’s reasons for resisting the drive to move parts of the Nike- Zeus anti-missile missile system “into the production phase before the development, test, and evaluation phase is completed.” He pointed out that “there is still considerable uncertainty as to its technical feasibility,” but indicated that the biggest reservation was based on cost/benefit considerations, noting that “it is a very expensive system in relation to the degree of protection it can furnish.”
Besides the additional Amphibious Ship, Dock, and the extra 84 million dollars for Fleet maintenance, the President requested substantial measures to increase limited war capabilities. The Army’s Special Forces, trained in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare, are to be increased from 2,000 to 5,000. An additional 172.2 million dollars was requested to provide 129 new airlift planes instead of the 50 previously programmed to meet interim airlift requirements pending delivery of the new specially designed, long-range, C-141 jet transport. Funds for the C-141 were provided by the January budget and a contract for development was awarded in March. Squadron deliveries are not expected until 1965. An additional 230 million dollars, 10 per cent over the January budget, was requested for procurement of modern conventional weapons, equipment, and ammunition. Included would be almost 40 per cent more nonnuclear Bullpup air-to- surface missiles for Navy and Marine use. It also provides almost twice as many nonnuclear bombs for use by tactical aircraft. For research and development on non-nuclear weapons, a “substantial increase” of 122 million dollars was requested.
An additional 24.6 million dollars was requested for modification of the F-105 tactical fighters to improve their performance and their capability to handle conventional ordnance. The modification would enable them to use Bullpup missiles.
Personnel increases requested totaled a modest 13,000. Of the 5,000 for the Army, 3,000 were to be in Army Special Forces trained for guerrilla warfare. For the Marines, 3,000 extra men were requested to add a communications company, a light helicopter squadron, a fourth battery in each of three Hawk field air-defense battalions, two rifle companies for the 1st Marine Brigade in Hawaii, and the rest to raise the manning level in the three air wings and three Force Service Regiments. In order to “assist the Navy” in providing crews for the additional Polaris submarines and necessary support forces, 3,000 more men were requested. Since “crew training is one of the longest lead-time elements of the Polaris program . . . the personnel input must be raised immediately.” The Air Force was slated for a 2,000-man increase.
The Secretary noted that since the preparation of the January budget it had become apparent that “in increasing numbers, military personnel are tending to exercise their right to early retirement.” An additional 25 million dollars was requested to cover this item.
Secretary of the Navy Connally announced on 17 March that the campaign promise to review the decision to close the Naval Weapons Plant in the District of Columbia had been fulfilled, that the soundness of the decision of the previous administration had been verified, and that the plant would be closed on schedule. This action was followed on 28 March with the announcement by the President that 73 military installations were in excess and would be closed. Mr. McNamara has made clear that this was merely the first step in a process of culling out “facilities and installations which fail the test of true need.” No savings are expected during fiscal 1962 because of close-out expenses, however, eventual savings of 220 million dollars per year, including annual foreign-exchange savings of approximately 100 million dollars, are expected. Of the 73 bases, 52, including 20 naval installations, are in the United States.
Budget Overview
Evaluation of the total budget is a complex task, and not all of the information required is available. As Secretary McNamara noted in his 24 April address to the Associated Press, “the complexities of government accounting techniques tend to obscure . . . savings. . . . Future costs of several projects added are included in the current year’s budget, while future savings from several projects cut back or eliminated do not show up in the current figures.” He said that if both short-run costs and long-range savings were taken into account it would show that the net effect of the changes will be a reduction of defense expenditures. As an example of long-range savings not shown in the budget, more than six billion dollars in future savings is expected to accrue from just two actions, the reduction in the B-70 effort and the elimination of the atomic airplane. An additional factor which somewhat obscures the picture is an item of 320 million dollars of “additional transfers from working capital funds” which will reduce the requirement for new appropriations for fiscal 1962, but should not be regarded as “savings.”
Analysis of the summary tables submitted with Secretary McNamara’s statement show increases for the Navy and Marine Corps of 1,621.9 million dollars and deletions of 115.4 million dollars for a net gain of 1,506.5 million dollars. The Air Force gained 783.2 million dollars and lost 314.6 million dollars, for a net gain of 468.5 million dollars. The Army gained 229.0 million dollars with no deletions. It would appear that the Army came out only half as well as the Air Force, but 267.1 million dollars of the Air Force increase is for airlift and other programs in direct support of Army missions.
A new Department of Defense Directive (5160.34) signed by Deputy Secretary Roswell Gilpatric and issued 1 April 1961, gave the Air Force operational control of all reconnaissance satellite systems, while the Army was given responsibility for the establishment and management of a single geodetic and mapping program. The Navy was made responsible for research, development, and operation of all oceanographic and geophysical equipment required for the survey of the ocean areas and for providing the Army with data required for the Army geodetic programs.
Another development, more important for what it indicated than for what it accomplished directly, was a Secretary of Defense Memorandum of 3 April 1961 on the subject of “Committees.” In effect, it put all the Department of Defense committees on trial for their life with a presumption of guilt. The order stated, “Unless there are over-riding reasons to the contrary, responsibility for most committee work will be assigned to one department or agency to continue the work by maintaining direct communication with the other responsible agencies on matters of common interest.”
The rest of the 100 days, though filled with rumors of impending moves, such as a merger of the intelligence operations of the three services, a merger of the Army’s Strategic Army Corps with the Air Force’s Tactical Air Command, and much greater application of the type of organization used by the Navy to develop the Polaris system, was relatively quiet as far as official, on-the-record news.
Policies and Trends
The policies behind the new budget were clearly set forth by the President in his defense budget message. The budget was an attempt to work out the implications of the policies on programs, bases, and hardware. Secretary McNamara expressed the reasoning behind the general war portions of the budget in this passage from his statement:
... in re-evaluating our general war position, our major concern was to reduce our dependence on deterrent forces which are highly vulnerable to ballistic missile attack or which rely for their survival on a hair-trigger response to the first indications of such an attack. Conversely, we sought to place greater emphasis on . . . the kind of forces which could ride out a massive nuclear attack and which could be applied with deliberation and always under the complete control of the constituted authority.
There is no doubt that providing this secure deterrent had first call on the requested budget increases. However, the figures in the budget may not be a valid indication of the relative stress to be placed on deterrence of general war, compared with limited war preparations. Secretary McNamara emphasized that the budget was “based on a preliminary reappraisal of our defense posture.” He said no attempt was made to review every item in the budget, but that if such review showed need of further changes, these would be proposed during the current session.
Preparation for waging “less than general war,” particularly non-nuclear limited war, was the objective of many of the changes proposed in the budget. The successful achievement of a “credible deterrent” ironically increases the likelihood of limited war. As Senator Leverett Saltonstall (Republican, Massachusetts), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, put it, “The chances are that the Communists will not dare to ‘bite’ with their nuclear strategic power, but rather that they will ‘nibble’ with their own or their allies’ tactical conventional forces around the free world perimeter.” In order to deal with such wars in a manner “suitable, selective, swift, and effective,” the budget proposed various measures to strengthen our ability to wage non-nuclear war, for, as the Secretary observed, “The decision to employ tactical nuclear weapons in limited conflicts should not be forced upon us simply because we have no other means to cope with them.”
Some Characteristic Trends
Many important trends or characteristics of the New Frontier are not so clearly spread upon the public record, since they deal with less tangible things. Some are more matters of attitude or style, but are nonetheless important. Many of these less tangible trends were apparent in the address which Secretary Connally made to 3,800 Washington area officers in Constitution Hall on 11 April. Portions of it will be quoted, both because it was an expression of New Frontier thought and because it was an important event in the history of the first 100 days.
It is my purpose to talk to you today in your capacities as officers of the Navy and Marine Corps of the future. It is you who will lead the services in the future, you who must contribute ideas to the future Navy and Marine Corps, and you who must largely decide what kind of a Navy and Marine Corps we will have.
. . . there is nothing constant except change. . . . Let us not permit our thinking to so set in mental concrete that we cannot move forward. . . . Ideas and initiative are vital. Ideas cause the forward movement we want in the Navy and Marine Corps. I call upon each of you to exercise your initiative, to move your ideas out into the open with boldness and courage. . . .
I firmly believe the importance of Sea Power is increasing with each passing year. . . . Americans are becoming more aware of this fact. . . . This awareness is reflected in President Kennedy’s amendments to the 1962 budget. . . .
Do not forget that you are an officer twenty- four hours a day. ... I have a simple rule of thumb (with reference to public relations’ discipline) by which I hope you will all govern your actions: Recognize and accept your own responsibility by insisting upon being quoted by name, rank, and billet. Your responsibility will then be fulfilled much the same as when signing the log for your watch. In short, if you are not willing to be quoted by name, you should not be speaking. . . .
. . . Our tasks are great—our responsibilities no less exacting. Whether we are worthy to stand in the reflected light of those who preceded us, we cannot now know. That judgment truly can be made only by those who follow us.
Let it at least be said of us:
They understood their task—
They accepted their responsibilities. . . .
And, above all, they placed Country above
Service and Service above self.
Three of the trends apparent in this talk, and which will be discussed in greater detail, are: (1) willingness to make hard choices, (2) the acceptance of personal responsibility, and (3) public relations discipline.
Willingness to Make Hard Choices
The President expressed the New Frontier attitude in his budget message when he said:
. . . hard decisions must be made. . . . The national interest must be weighed against special or local interests; and it is the national interest that calls to . . . cut back those programs in which a very dim promise no longer justifies a very large cost.
The New Frontier way of looking at problems forces a conscious examination of the purpose of organizations, bases, weapon systems, etc. This sense of purpose is coupled with a determination to run the military establishment according to the logic of the military mission. The new officials have been “ruthless in eliminating projects of dubious value.”
In making “hard choices” and carrying them out, they have shown a determination to stand up to powerful special interests. In his Associated Press address, Secretary McNamara said, “I expect to make it clear that our decisions, once taken, will not be subject to reversal, except for changes in the facts on which they were based originally.” He has emphasized that the changes made so far and the bases closed are only the beginning. “Over the years, we will continue to make major changes in the pattern of defense spending. We cannot afford to modify these decisions to accommodate local or private interests, no matter how legitimate.”
Determination to close out “budget generating activities” which are no longer “best buys” does not indicate a lack of compassion for communities facing difficult readjustments in the process. A program has been set up to ease their burden as much as possible.
The President has called upon his team to accept responsibility and has provided the example. One indication of this tendency has found expression in a definite anti-formalism bias. Committees are no longer used as a means of having others to share the blame when things do not turn out well. Decisions are being made by identifiable individuals. Committees may explore ideas and develop alternatives, but the selection from among the alternatives is made by an individual who is willing to live with the results.
Public Relations Discipline
There was nothing ambiguous about Secretary Connally’s remarks as they applied to “press leaks.” Secretary McNamara has spelled out his policy in equally unequivocal language. In his first press conference, he was asked if he had taken any steps to insure that military speeches conform to Administration policy. His reply was, “Yes.” In elaboration, he added that while policy was being developed and prior to a decision, he expected frank, full, and open discussion, but that after a decision had been reached “all members of the Department, civilian and military, will be expected to support that decision, publicly and otherwise.” He took pains to point out that when these officials were asked for their personal opinions by Congressional committees, they were to respond fully and frankly. In a television interview, the Secretary was asked what would happen if a member failed to comply with these guidelines. “What do you do? Ask him to hand in his suit?” The Secretary answered, “I think that would be appropriate.”
In that same program, he discussed his attitude toward foreign policy statements by military officers. He acknowledged:
... a very simple and strongly held belief . . . that it’s inappropriate for any member of the Defense Department to speak on the subject of foreign policy. That’s a field that should be reserved to the President, the Secretary of State and other officials in the State Department.
Position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
There has been much speculation about the status of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in current defense planning. There seems little doubt that things have changed, as would be expected with a new team coming in. However, much of the change might be accounted for by the anti-formalism bias of the New Frontier. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an organized body may not be formally consulted on some of the moves, the individual officers who are members of that group evidently are consulted. And again, some of the lessening of “consulting” might be accounted for by the unprecedented speed with which some of the changes have been carried out. Secretary McNamara said of the budget studies which resulted in the budget proposals, “I personally reviewed the results in detail with the . . . Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to have the benefit of their advice and counsel.”
General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discussed their position under the New Frontier when he testified in the “Space Hearings.” This is the way he defined working relationships:
(Secretary of Defense) is responsible for the operation of the Department of Defense. We make our recommendations, and he makes the decisions. That is the way the Department of Defense is set up. That is the way it has been operating. That is the way it is operating now. As I pointed out. . . the working relationships between myself and the Secretaries McNamara and Gilpatric are very close and harmonious. I could not ask for better working relationships. I am constantly consulted.
Most observers of the New Frontier have commented on the “sense of urgency” which has been apparent in defense activities. Orders have come from the top demanding massive and detailed information with deadlines which many have found oppressive. It remains to be seen if this is a temporary phenomenon associated with the drive to complete the reappraisal of the entire defense effort required to develop the revisions to the January budget. The new administration is known to be studying ways of speeding up the decision-making process, particularly as it applies to the preparation of the budget.
The Quantitative Approach
Of all the changes which have been made and are in store, probably the most far-reaching will be achieved through the application of a “new way of looking at problems,” known as “quantitative analysis.” Basically, this new approach is the application of operations research techniques to the solution of the problems of choice in budget making. The “quantitative approach” is likely to catch on, since its practitioners have control of the budget-making machinery, and Secretary McNamara springs from that general background.
The ideas of the “quantitative approach” are set forth in the aforementioned The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, which is now in great demand in defense circles. Some very important people are putting in hard study on this book, which Hanson Baldwin has called “the ‘bible’ of the Pentagon.”
The purpose of the book, according to its authors, was “to explain a way of looking at military problems . . . fruitful in insights and productive of solutions.” Essentially they view all defense problems as problems in the allocation of limited defense resources among unlimited defense needs. Said Mr. Hitch:
is the comparison of all the significant alternatives from the point of view of the objectives which each can accomplish and the costs which each involves, and the selection of the best (or a ‘good’) alternative through the use of what I would call appropriate ‘economic criteria.’
He also enumerated deficiencies of the defense financial management systems:
It does not facilitate the relating of costs to weapon systems, tasks, and missions. It does not disclose the full time-phased costs of proposed programs. And, it does not provide the data needed to assess properly the cost and effectiveness of alternative programs.
It will be the job of the new Deputy Assistant Secretary for Programming, Mr. Hugh McCullough, and his staff to remedy these defects. Their aim is to present defense decision makers with the information they need to allocate defense dollars in the way that will give the country the most “survival insurance” for its money.
This approach will profoundly influence our way of doing business. In the struggle for survival and funds, it makes solid value relatively more important, and glamor, public relations, and pressure groups relatively less important. If weapons are to be selected for procurement, designers must weigh carefully their “requirements” to make sure that each adds at least as much to the system’s value as to all its costs, including support equipment, spares, maintenance, etc. For line officers, this “way of looking at problems,” will put a premium on sound management which is the ability to achieve the optimum mission effectiveness within the limits of available personnel and other resources. Secretary Connally was attuned to the realities of life on the New Frontier when, in his 11 April address to the officers of the Navy and Marine Corps, he said:
Let us have men who know the wisdom of savings—savings of men, dollars and materials— so that we can build and man more ships and aircraft—so that we can improve the quantity, the utility, and the quality of our weapons to better preserve freedom. I say to all of you —the officer or enlisted man who by his own industry saves enough money to pay his own salary has truly served his country well.
Lieutenant commander Robert J. Massey entered the Navy during World War II, after graduation from Fullerton (California) Junior College and served with Squadron VBM-117 during the 1944-45 Philippine liberation. He received his B.A. degree from San Diego State College in 1960. During the Korean War, he served with Fleet All Weather Training Unit, Atlantic, and the Naval Air Advanced Training Command, Corpus Christi. Since then he has been Carrier Control Approach Officer in USS Bennington (CVA-20) and Executive Officer, Fleet Air Service Squadron 12 at Miramar. Lieutenant Commander Massey is now the Associate Editor of Naval Aviation News.