It may well be said that the frontiers of the United States extend to every hostile shore. The recognition of this concept has been demonstrated by the fact that we keep fleets on station close to the sources of potential Eurasian hostile activity and by the pattern of alliances which we have formed with those distant nations which may share with us the difficulties of any involvement.
When one examines the features of the sea areas contiguous to those nations along the coasts of North and Southeast Asia, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Eastern Mediterranean, the situation as regards the maritime importance of restricted waters is very obvious. It is through those waters, not suitable for the employment of carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and destroyer escorts, that much vital waterborne activity occurs in peace and in war. The people of these lands are extremely adept at deriving the maximum benefit from very small vessels moving in waters which are not normally used by oceangoing vessels. Such use of the sea, in time of conflict, can have a determining influence on a general strategy involved in the area.
This coastal shipping will require protection against those who would harm it. Such protection may consist of escort by armed light vessels, of gun batteries located along the coastal route, of air cover of one sort or another, or any combination of these or other means. It will be the task of our Navy or those of our allies to destroy or prevent the movement of this shipping in any way possible. It is an accepted truth that the best way to combat anything is with something of its own kind. From this it follows that the most effective way to cope with this coastal shipping and its various forms of protection would be with small, fast, well-armed vessels which can go close to shore in shallow water and seek out the opponent in his own element. Unfortunately, such types are not found in the composition of our own Fleet, nor in those of our Asian allies at this time. It is public knowledge that the Soviets and their Asian colleagues have these little ships in considerable numbers and they are located in the areas where they can be employed most effectively.
For general operations in coastal and confined waters and in narrow seas, the most useful type would be a vessel that could cope with any problem that might be met in such waters and not be of limited characteristics. Such a vessel would be eighty to 100 feet in length, about twenty feet maximum beam, draw six to seven feet, and would have a top speed of approximately forty knots. It would carry guns and perhaps spin-stabilized rockets as its principal armament, but be so designed that torpedoes could be carried should the nature of the enemy to be encountered make it appropriate. Such little ships when built in quantity could be designed with a single type of hull and engine characteristics. All features of their construction could be standardized. Only the armament would vary and would be treated as a readily changeable characteristic. By emphasizing the gun armament they would become motor gunboats and by carrying torpedoes as a primary offensive weapon they would be motor torpedo boats. But by designing vessels that could be used as both it would not be correct and proper to call them either. Considering their fundamental character and the flexibility of their armament it is suggested that the name, Fast Patrol Boat, would not be inappropriate.
The hull of the FPB should be made of wood, using diagonal planking of mahogany, and with frame spacing fairly close. Wood is preferable to metal because it is rather flexible and not as sensitive to rough seas. It would also increase the boat’s safety in the event of passing near magnetic mines. But the most advantageous feature of a wooden hull is the relative ease with which repairs can be made to it. Bullet holes, ruptures from bomb fragments, damage by grounding, and other hull injury can be mended by laying on wooden patches, requiring a minimum of tools and talent. There are no electrolytic actions on a hull made of wood and the harm experienced from vibration is minimized. A wooden hull also gives better insulation than a metal hull and increases the comfort of the ship’s company in conditions of high temperature and extreme cold.
Engines which use gasoline as fuel should be avoided. Gasoline not only creates a constant fire hazard, both from battle damage and in fueling operations, but its consumption per mile travelled is excessive. This high rate of consumption causes a logistic problem which creates a load in operations in some areas. Diesel-powered engines are better and they are in general more durable and easy to maintain. And diesel oil is more readily obtainable and gives more performance per gallon than gasoline. The fire hazard connected with diesel fuel is very small. There would be a lower frequency of required engine changes with diesel engines.
The armament should be capable of being readily changed, depending on the operating conditions to be encountered in the waters in which the FPBs are employed. For use as gunboats the main armament should consist of rapid-fire guns which could be controlled by one man. The gun platform is not sufficiently stable to make the co-ordination between a pointer and a trainer practicable. The main guns should be of as large a caliber as possible commensurate with the weight factor. They should embody manual training and elevating features and for the sake of reliability and ease of maintenance, power- drives should be avoided. Guns carried for antiaircraft purposes should be no larger than 20-mm. All guns should have as large a magazine capacity as possible because reloading small craft under fighting conditions is somewhat difficult for many reasons. Ring and open sights are sufficient for the conditions usually encountered. Any other form of sight is undesirable for reasons of weight, maintenance, and erratic power sources. Ammunition should include armor-piercing and explosive projectiles as well as tracer loads. Ahead-firing rockets are most useful for fighting other vessels and for bombardment of land targets, and against troops on shore.
When torpedoes are carried it will no doubt be necessary because of weight and other limitations to remove the heavy gun and rocket batteries. The smaller guns should be retained. Torpedoes should be carried so that they can be dropped over the side from racks to avoid using torpedo tubes. Tubes can create a number of difficulties: poor performance of impulse charges, the question of excess weight, and the lack of ease in taking on replacement torpedoes. The homing torpedo would be the best type to carry because absolute accuracy in firing is difficult to attain on account of the instability of the launching platform. The control features should consist of an open sight and not a torpedo director because of the excess weight and the lack of space involved topside.
A large mortar carried on board would be useful for firing illuminating projectiles and for shore bombardment when it is not desired to disclose one’s presence or position. Its high trajectory is very useful under certain conditions.
Since small craft actions are very intimate in nature, hand grenades should be carried for use in close situations especially against open vessels carrying large numbers of troops or material which may be damaged by explosives. These, with a number of submachine guns, would be most useful in brief raids ashore and in circumstances where boarding of enemy vessels might be necessary.
FPBs should carry two or four depth charges. They can be most helpful under some conditions. There are instances when a gun action has failed to sink a ship or, if torpedoes are carried, its extremely shallow draft has made them ineffective. If this situation arises, depth charges, set at thirty feet, can be dropped at high speed alongside its hull which will probably cause it to go down. And occasionally they may be used against submarines in a surprise submerging situation or dropped in the path of an overtaking destroyer in a case of hot pursuit.
Another weapon, which may be carried mounted in the bow pointing dead ahead, is a long-range flamethrower. There are many situations encountered in close-in naval warfare where such an agent can be the ultimate factor in consummating the accomplishment of a mission. Its effect is most devastating.
Tanks for producing a smoke mixture should be carried in the stern of all boats. This can be useful in tactical situations involving other vessels, small and large, and as a protective aid when under fire from shore batteries and artillery ashore.
The bridge construction in FPBs should provide an unobstructed view all around and overhead. The truly open bridge is the most appropriate type for this class of vessel. The steering system should use cables from wheel to rudder yoke for simplicity’s sake and saving of weight. The compass should be a reliable one but as light as possible. A heavy gyrocompass installation should be avoided. While directional controls for main engines should be in the engine room, the speed controls should be on the bridge near the wheel. An engine order telegraph may be combined with the speed control assembly. A pitometer log for speed measurement can be helpful in smooth water but is not necessary.
Radio equipment should be sufficient to permit communications between boats in the same area, boat to base (which may mean 300 miles), boat to aircraft, and boat to troops ashore in joint operations. Provision should be made for both voice and CW channels. There should be carried a combination searchlight and signal light as well as blinker gun or directional Aldis lamp.
FPBs will require a surface search radar having good discrimination and requiring a minimum of material care. The scope should be located so that it can be watched from the bridge as well as below decks. A presentation in terms of relative rather than true bearings is more realistic for small craft conditions and simplifies the installation.
Incidental features should include towing gear, a light dinghy or rubber boat carried topside, an automatic bailer, and an auxiliary engine for driving the ship’s generator. All electrical principles should be such that they conform to ship standards as far as possible. This is to permit the use of shore power or big ship sources when alongside situations make it available.
Living features on board must be kept at the fundamental level but should embody the naval standard of propriety. High standards in living conditions are more important in small craft than in large ships.
A little ship of this type could be adequately manned in peacetime by one officer and ten men. In wartime the number could be increased slightly. Because cruising range would be such that the time at sea would not be over 48 hours, usually much less, the watch-standing requirements would be very low. All hands must be hardened and prepared to be at their watch stations or at general quarters throughout the period that is spent underway.
In carrying out the naval mission in restricted or coastal waters and in narrow seas, the organizational position occupied by FPBs in the naval picture naturally fits them into an Area Commander’s province. In such an area there might also be the naval air elements locally based, the troops holding positions at important places, and other naval forces operating in or passing near those waters for various reasons. In such an area, depending on the situation which exists, FPBs may carry out many and varied roles. These might include:
(1) The interdiction or destruction of enemy coastal shipping which will in general be carried by small vessels.
(2) Destruction of small enemy naval elements acting to oppose our own operations, or those acting in support of his local shipping.
(3) Support of the wet flank of any of our troop movements or of their positions being held.
(4) The landing and recovery of our agents involved in a clandestine manner.
(5) Attacks against larger enemy vessels which may enter the area from time to time.
(6) Bombardment of enemy activities ashore.
(7) Destruction of any works at the water’s edge that may be important to the well-being of the enemy.
(8) Reconnaissance of places in which we are interested for naval or military reasons.
(9) Evacuation of persons who may be in enemy territory.
(10) Transporting and supporting raiding groups made up of our own troops.
(11) Protecting our amphibious forces against sneak attacks.
(12) Denying to the enemy freedom of tactical movement of his troops by water or across rivers and estuaries.
(13) Causing interference to enemy methods of transport ashore by rail or by vehicle along routes close to the sea or at a distance from which naval weapons can be effective.
(14) Support of guerrillas or other small organizations operating within enemy occupied territory.
(15) Prevention of enemy fishing efforts or those of anyone who may supply him.
(16) Attacks against port installations.
(17) The laying of mines in sensitive places.
Fast patrol boat operations are in general nocturnal in nature because enemy coastal movements by water usually occur at night. Also air operations by both sides are such that movements in daytime are not profitable or safe.
These FPBs could be carried to the general area of operations in an LSD. Cradles for the boats could be installed in the well deck and secured there temporarily. The boats would be moved into place when the ship was ballasted down and when the ship was raised the boats would come to rest in their individual cradles. They could be carried in such numbers as the capacity of the well would permit. On arrival in the area, the LSD would ballast down and float the boats which could be moved out and probably sail to their advanced base location as a group.
The LSD is a particularly appropriate type to support FPBs. Because of the naval and air situation in an area of FPB operations, the LSD would usually have to remain at some distance from the location of advanced bases. But it has all the characteristics required in rearward support. It can retain one cradle in place in the well deck for docking any boat which might have to steam to the rear area for underwater repairs which cannot be done at the advanced base. It has large cranes which can be used for engine changes and other heavy work requiring a lift. The shipboard machine shop and full repair facilities would provide the means to accomplish major work. The LSD could be provided with spare engines, spare torpedoes, in fact all the material needs which would not ordinarily be moved into the advanced bases. And the LSD ship’s company would provide the necessary ratings to carry on the necessary major overhaul and repair work.
For moving fuel in drums to the advanced bases the LSD provides a very adaptable situation. The drums could be loaded into the well, and, if diesel oil were used, the danger in transit would be nothing as compared to gasoline. After a high-speed run to destination the ship could ballast down and float the drums ashore where they could be rolled into the storage spot near the water’s edge and camouflaged. Under austere circumstances this would be a solution to the problem of maintaining a fuel supply for the boats in advanced positions.
The fact that advanced area operations bear a close relationship to the interests of the amphibious forces acts to support the expectation that an LSD will be available for carrying out the support features of aiding the little ships in carrying on with their prolonged mission. This type can provide all forms of logistic support and its peculiar characteristics make the unloading and transfer of material most appropriate in those circumstances when everything must be done in a fundamental and simple fashion.
The purpose of this discussion has been to attempt to show that it is important and timely for the U. S. Navy to appreciate the fact that complete exercise of naval power must extend into the water areas of the world which lie beyond the limits of the high seas, and that ship types must be developed to do so.
The fact that our Navy has through the years concerned itself primarily with the “blue-water” naval strategy is the strongest circumstance which creates a hesitance to look into the importance of carrying the naval war against an enemy into the intimate confines of his maritime interests.
In these times of long-range naval aircraft and the employment of missiles of extended range and destructive power, we are rapidly coming to subscribe to the “immaculate conception” of naval warfare and maritime strategy. But there will be many situations in any war of the future where hostile nations and elements will use the waters of the world in a very fundamental and sometimes primitive way. Although such a situation does not lend itself to the aggressive actions of the big ships and the air arm around which we are forming the structure of our naval potential, it is vital to their purposes. In the atmosphere brought on by the extensive existence of massive naval weapons, there is grave danger that we shall overlook the fact that close-in naval warfare is the only effective way in many situations of bringing certain elements of an enemy complex to terms on our own conditions.
The day appears to be rapidly approaching when the missile will entirely replace the gun in all our combatant ships from those the size of destroyers upwards. When this condition obtains, our Navy will be faced with a situation in which it will be impotent to cope with the need for offensive action in intimate circumstances which will demand close-in and positively accurate delivery of destructive power to hostile elements, especially those of small proportions. We must be careful not to progress ourselves into a realm which will remove us from the ability to cope with the fundamentals of maritime reality, which will continue to exist in the world in many forms for years to come. To be completely satisfactory, the prosecution of our naval role must be absolutely final to the utmost, intimate degree.
In this era of weapons of distant delivery and massive destruction, the words spoken by Sir Francis Drake in 1587 continue to hold the lasting truth that,
. . There must be a beginning to any great matter, but the continuing unto the end, until it be thoroughly finished, yields the true glory ...”
Captain Taylor graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in the Class of 1935. During World War II, he was Exec and Gunnery Officer of USS Russell (DD-414), participating in the First Marshall Islands Raid, the Battles of the Coral Sea, Midway, and Santa Cruz. Subsequently he was Commanding Officer of USS Parker (DD-604) and MTB Squadron Eleven. His service includes assignments as CO of USS Cone (DD-866) and USS Shadwell (LSD-15); Staff, CinC NELM (Naples); Staff, CinC Allied Forces, Mediterranean (Malta). At present he is Head, Foreign Weapons Production Branch (Op-415), Office of the CNO.