Perhaps growing friendship between our Governments and our peoples will turn out to be the greatest achievement of the South East Asia Treaty—a friendship based upon mutual understanding, based . . . upon a sense of mutual interdependence for our security and for our progress. . . .
Robert G. Menzies,
Prime Minister of Australia
On 8 September 1954 in an atmosphere of division and defeatism, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty was born. This multilateral defensive alliance was the first to link East and West since the defeat of the World War II Axis powers.
The Manila Pact, as the alliance is popularly known, was an attempt to erect a new levee against the Red flood in Asia. It was drawn up after a summer in which half of Indochina was lost, the European Defense Community Treaty defeated, and the cleavage between the United States and Great Britain widened over policy toward Communist China. The ratification of the Pact completed on 19 February 1955 by Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States opened up a new chapter in the struggle for the world. It served notice upon Moscow and Peiping that the signatory nations would resist any new Communist aggression in the Asian-Pacific area in order to prevent future Koreas or Indochinas.
The Manila Pact, known officially as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, is definitely less well known and understood than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is a counterpart of NATO but with marked differences. Unlike NATO, it has no unified military command or standing force, nor is instant and automatic action provided by the partners of the alliance. The only provision is that the parties “consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which would be taken for the common defense. ...”There is, however, a Council, with wide powers for military planning and for economic programs to help Asia’s free nations survive. Because of background differences and peculiarities, Southeast Asia in 1954 was not ready for an equivalent to the North Atlantic Treaty. And SEATO in its original concept was considered as only a small beginning to the great task of creating a strongly integrated Asian and Pacific organization, capable of meeting the diversified threats of Communism.
On the other hand, SEATO resembles NATO as an agency for collective self-defense as provided for by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It complements the other U. S. security treaties made in the area for the purpose of developing a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific.
It is now generally conceded that the United Nations cannot act against open aggression, as in Korea, or against an internal take-over by the Communists anywhere in Asia. The Russian veto can prevent action in the Security Council, while the neutrals and Soviet satellite nations can block a decision in the General Assembly. Here, then, is a basic reason for the existence of regional defense pacts.
The main purposes of SEATO can be briefly stated as defense against open armed aggression, defense against subversion, and the improvement of economic and social conditions.
The Manila Pact signing by the eight nations involved three documents—the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty itself, a protocol, and the Pacific Charter.
The Treaty area covers the “general area of Southeast Asia,” including all the territories of the Asian parties to the Treaty, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific as far north as 20 degrees 30 minutes (thus excluding Formosa, Hong Kong, and Japan). The protocol extends “a mantle of protection” to the Indochina states of Laos, Cambodia, and southern Viet-Nam, which are debarred by the Geneva agreement of 1954 from entering military commitments of their own.
Article IV, which is the key article of the Treaty, provides that in the event of aggression, each signatory will regard an attack as endangering “its own, peace and safety,” and will undertake in that event “to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” Although for diplomatic reasons the other signatories declined to direct this clause at the Communists, there was appended a statement of “understanding by the U.S.A.” that “aggression” meant “Communist aggression.” Accordingly, the United States reaction to aggression other than Communist would be one of consultation rather than anything more drastic.
If any treaty area is threatened “in any way other than by armed attack” (such as by Communist subversion, coup d'etat, or civil war on the Korean pattern), members “shall consult immediately” on measures “for the common defense.” This clause introduces a new kind of commitment in Asian affairs.
Along with the defense pact, the eight nations adopted the Pacific Charter which put them on record as guaranteeing self-government by peaceful means for Asian peoples who desire this status and who are able to undertake the necessary responsibilities. Here, for the first time, West joined East in an expression of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. Quite fittingly, the underlying principles of the Charter were inspired by President Ramon Magsaysay of the Philippines.
The signatories are also pledged to undertake to help one another in economic measures, including technical assistance, “to promote economic progress and social wellbeing.” The Indochinese states of Laos, Cambodia, and South Viet-Nam are also made eligible for these economic provisions.
There was no elaborate plan of organization devised for the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty when it was drawn up in 1954. Article V of the Treaty simply provided for the establishment of a “council, on which each of. . . [the Parties] shall be represented to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty.” As a result of the first three meetings of the Council, especially the Canberra meeting in 1957, a small permanent administrative body was set up at Bangkok. The 1959-60 budget of $896,860.00 covers the costs of the civil and military headquarters and the various programs undertaken by the Organization.
The Secretariat-General, which supports and co-ordinates the civil work of the Organization, is composed of an international staff in which all the member countries are represented. Mr. Pote Sarasin, former Foreign Minister of Thailand, who is presently the Secretary-General, is the head of the permanent civil offices of SEATO at Bangkok headquarters. He takes part in the annual meetings of the SEATO Council and all meetings of the Council Representatives. A Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. William Worth—a senior Australian public servant—assists him and also acts as the chairman of the Permanent Working Group. The Secretariat-General consists of six offices. There is a Central Services Office which deals with administrative and financial matters and provides a conference secretariat for meetings. The Research Services Office receives, collates and evaluates information on current developments in Communist policy and tactics, which forms the basis for various publications distributed to member governments. The Public Information Office has the task of publicizing SEATO activities. It also produces material which the member governments may use for national purposes to make known the nature of Communism. Publications totaling nearly one million copies were produced in 1958. The main mission of the Cultural Relations Office is to suggest ways in which the member countries can improve understanding among their peoples by various forms of cultural exchange. The Economic Services Office prepares studies on economic affairs for the Committee of Economic Experts and makes reports for the member governments on current economic problems and developments in the Southeast Asia area. A Security Office is responsible for SEATO civil security measures.
The governing body of SEATO is the Council which consists of the Foreign Ministers from the member countries. It met in Bangkok in 1955, Karachi in 1956, Canberra in 1957, Manila in 1958, and Wellington in 1959, for the main purpose of formulating over-all military and non-military policies for the Organization. All its decisions must be unanimous.
The Council Representatives, composed of the heads of diplomatic missions, are the permanent representatives at SEATO headquarters designated to maintain continuous consultation on matters relating to the treaty obligations and provisions. In his “Report on SEATO, 1958-59,” Mr. Pote Sarasin states that “a most valuable feature of these meetings [Council Representatives] is the exchange of views on the political situation in the Treaty Area, which enables the Organization and the individual member Governments to evaluate, expose and counter Communist activities.”
The Permanent Working Group is composed of members of the diplomatic staffs of each Council Representative and meets almost daily. It considers and sifts proposals submitted to the Council Representatives.
The Budget Sub-Committee, which is comprised of staff assistants of the Permanent Working Group, prepares recommendations for the Council Representatives and advises the Secretary-General on matters connected with the budget.
There are three expert committees which report to the Council Representatives. (1) The Committee of Security Experts deals with certain problems of subversive infiltration and has played an essential part in the counter-subversion effort of SEATO. (2) The Committee on Information, Cultural, Education, and Labor Activities initiates an active exchange of information, talents, and skills in order to knit more closely together the diverse peoples represented in the alliance. (3) The Committee of Economic Experts prepares economic studies and recommendations for the consideration of each member government. All three committees are composed of national delegations which are nominated in advance of each meeting by each member government.
The Military Advisers have the task of coordinating the military planning of the SEATO countries and are responsible to the SEATO Council for the military aspects of the Organization’s activities. Each member country nominates one high-ranking officer as its Military Adviser. All detailed military planning is carried out at SEATO headquarters by the Military Planning Office (established 1 March 1957) headed by Brigadier L. W. Thornton, C.B.E., of New Zealand. Each member country is represented in the Planning Office by a Senior Planner and assistants, and their job is to devise methods of resisting possible armed aggression and to plan joint military exercises for approval by the Military Advisers. A Military Secretariat, an Administrative Staff, and a Military Assistant to the SEATO Public Information Officer complete the military organization.
At the Manila meeting of 1954 the representatives of the eight member nations talked at some length about whether they should form a unified military command with joint military forces composed of units from each nation. It was not the desire of Secretary of State Dulles in 1954 to create an Asian NATO complete with a unified command and common strategy to implement precise military commitments. He opposed such an arrangement (which Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia reportedly favored) on the grounds that U. S. responsibilities in the cold war were virtually worldwide and that it would be unwise to tie down additional forces to any one area of the world. Because of the many potential “explosion points” in Asia, the United States wanted to keep free of specific commitments in areas other than Formosa and Korea, but at the same time to provide military and economic assistance where needed. Mr. Dulles carefully explained the American position by stating that:
“. . . the United States’ responsibilities were so vast and far-flung that we believed that we would serve best, not by earmarking forces for particular areas of the Far East, but by developing the deterrent of mobile striking power, plus strategically placed reserves. . . . Those plans [defense plans] already call for our maintaining at all times powerful naval and air forces in the Western Pacific capable of striking at any aggressor by means and at places of our choosing. The deterrent power we thus create can protect many as effectively as it protects one.”
SEATO’s military forces have no organized command and no common strategy. Each of its eight members simply pledges its own armed forces to resist a Communist attack. The military pattern as previously drawn up in the earlier mutual defense pacts of the United States with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS), with the Philippines, and with South Korea was retained. SEATO, therefore, is a loose arrangement of weak local forces, dependent for military power on Great Britain (which has a small fleet and a “fire brigade” based on Singapore) and on the nuclear striking power of the U. S. Seventh Fleet and SAC’s bombers based on Okinawa. The Seventh Fleet does not have permanently assigned forces; they are assigned by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific as they are needed. But it usually consists of four carriers, three cruisers, 36 destroyers, several patrol aircraft squadrons and approximately one squadron of submarines. Without this force, SEATO would be an easy prey for the Red Chinese.
As a result of the masterly handling of the Quemoy crisis in September 1958, U. S. prestige has risen throughout Southeast Asia. The fact that the United States could and would act immediately and decisively with its military striking power in defense of an Asian ally had a most impressive effect on the Treaty area countries and served as a somber warning to the Communists.
The various bilateral military assistance programs continue to strengthen the Asian members by providing equipment, by direct money aid, and by the training of personnel. Training missions and advisory groups have been exchanged and facilities have been provided in the training schools of member nations for students from the others. The United States and the Philippines are planning to establish a Pacific Defense college in the Philippines, which will provide training in combined and joint operations for military officers of the SEATO member nations and other free nations in the Western Pacific area.
Since 1956 the SEATO powers have engaged in joint training exercises. During 1958-59 several major combined military exercises took place, as well as a number of lesser maneuvers employing various combinations of land, sea, and air forces.
These exercises, according to military observers, have shown marked improvement over SEATO’s first joint international land sea, and air maneuvers called Operation Firm Link held in February 1956, which was evaluated as little more than an Armed Forces Day show in the United States. Because of the annual schedule now set up by the Military Advisers for this type of training, it can be rightfully assumed that proficiency in the conduct of combined operations in the SEATO area will increase and that the forces will be made more ready for speedy action in the event of a sudden attack.
At the close of World War II as the nations of Southeast Asia gained their independence, the Communists resorted to every effort—force as well as subversion and propaganda—to win over the struggling nations.
One of the truly distinctive and unusual features of the Southeast Asia Treaty is the concern for subversive activities directed from without against the territorial integrity and political stability of the Treaty area nations. This particular aspect of the Treaty has been heralded as a most significant contribution to security in the area.
No other mutual defense treaty between the United States and Asian countries carries such provisions to counteract the very real and continuing dangers of subversion and infiltration. Article II calls upon the member nations “ by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid ... to prevent and counter subversive activities. ...” The response to be made by the Treaty powers in the event of threat “other than by armed attack” is provided for in Article IV. It should be noted that no action decided upon in the event of infiltration in a state or territory designated by “unanimous” consent can be taken except upon the invitation or approval of the government concerned. And when infiltration occurs, the Treaty powers merely consult “in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.” Furthermore, any measures decided upon by the Treaty powers will be taken only in accordance with the “constitutional processes” of each of the powers. These are the safeguards of restraint against unlimited interference in the internal affairs of member and non-member nations.
It becomes increasingly clear from the 1957 and 1958 annual reports of SEATO that the member nations are giving greater attention to Communist tactics. One of the principal SEATO agencies in identifying the subversive threat is the Committee of Security Experts. Since much of this work has to be carried on unobtrusively, it is hard to appraise the work of this group. The Research Services Office of the Secretariat-General continues to supply member governments with regular reports on current developments in Communist movements.
Red China’s festering war in Tibet, political and military subversion in Cambodia, the military revolt by Pathet Lao rebels in Laos, and economic penetration in Indonesia have all had their effect on treaty and non-treaty members regarding the true nature of the Communist threat. SEATO has done much to publicize and expose throughout the treaty area the objectives toward which subversion is directed and the methods by which it operates. The officials of SEATO report an increasing interest in its propaganda pamphlets (e.g. “Communism and Religion”) and a growing willingness of member nations to attend the various seminars on Communist subversion held throughout the treaty area.
In the last resort, the fight against Communism for the minds of men is one which must be won by internal consolidation of each nation at home. The will to resist Communist propaganda varies markedly among the SEATO countries, but the combined experience of the member countries is now available to each one to assist in countering subversive activities.
At the time that the Treaty was signed it was not intended that its economic aspects should be emphasized by the creation of a new exclusive organization to give economic aid. It was agreed that the use of existing organizations (Colombo Plan, United Nations Agencies such as the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, the World Bank) would be desirable and sufficient in providing adequate channels for economic and technical assistance in the area. In view of the large existing aid programs to India and Japan, the United States did not wish them to feel in a different category from pact members and the Commonwealth countries did not want to detract from the importance of the Colombo plan. Thus the Treaty builds no economic walls and assistance to needy Asian countries is given with or without alliance.
But the economic and cultural opportunities of SEATO are not, however, ignored. Increased importance has been attached by the member countries to the promotion of economic and social wellbeing.
SEATO’s Committee of Economic Experts meets periodically to consider special economic questions arising out of the Treaty commitments of the member countries. At its 1958 meeting it intensified its study of the Communist economic offensive, and the Organization is accordingly collecting and analyzing information for member governments to assist them in taking countermeasures against the Soviet economic-political penetration.
Although economic assistance to SEATO countries is given largely on a bilateral basis, there has been collective action in 1958 and 1959 which has resulted, for example, in establishing a SEATO graduate school of engineering at a Thai university and vocational training programs in the three Asian member countries.
The main purposes of the SEATO cultural relations program are to give the peoples of the member nations a better appreciation of the common values of their cultures and to provide closer co-operation in scientific research and technological development.
This cultural program was considerably expanded in 1958 with a greatly enlarged program of undergraduate scholarships, fellowships, professorships, and travelling postgraduate scholarships and lectureships. The Southeast Asia Round Table, organized by SEATO, was held in Bangkok from 27 January to 2 February 1958. It was the first gathering of its kind to be held in Asia. Fourteen eminent scholars from twelve countries (eight SEATO nations plus India, Japan, Sarawak, and Viet-Nam) attended and discussed the impact of Western technology on Asian traditional cultures.
From its very inception the SEATO Pact has had more than its share of critics who have denounced it as a “creaky tiger,” “a dilapidated umbrella,” “a paper pact without an armed force of its own,” “a military illusion,” and “a false pretense.”
Opponents of the Treaty have been quick to point out the fact that despite its title its membership is composed of only three Asian members—Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand—as against five non-Asian members—Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, and the United States.
Furthermore, India, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia have refused to join the Pact for fear that a military partnership with the West might aggravate their already delicate relations with Communist China and Russia. They have remained aloof as “neutralist” nations unwilling to involve themselves in cold war. Various claims have been made by the non-members, especially India and Indonesia, who depict SEATO as being dominated by Western powers, and as being simply Western colonialism in disguise.
From the time that the alliance was first discussed, India also contended that SEATO could well be a means of involving non-Asian members in purely Asian disputes. The Indians, for example, fear that Pakistan, a SEATO member, may bring fellow members actively into the Kashmir dispute. It is possible, but quite improbable, that SEATO members might be involved in situations other than those arising from a Sino-Soviet threat.
India, in spite of the recent Chinese Communist incursions along her northern frontiers, ruthless Communist repression in Tibet, and the debacle of the Communist state of Kerala, continues to shun the SEATO Pact and still believes that peaceful co-existence with the Communists is possible. But Red China has now accomplished something that the West alone could not do. It has almost completely changed India’s sometimes anti-Western neutralism to a tacitly anti-Communist neutralism.
No one can deny that limited membership is a weakness of the Pact, but it can be argued that the collective will and determination of just a few member nations possessing great strength can be an effective deterrent. As long as the Red threat continues to be subversion rather than massive armed aggression, SEATO is committed to a powerful mobile striking force rather than to the utilization of such vast Asian manpower as could be furnished by India, Indonesia, and Burma. If the present Red tactical threat changes from subversion to massive armed aggression, then the lack of support from the non-signatory nations will be serious.
SEATO should be considered for what it really is and what it has done in the five years of its existence. The way to collective security in Southeast Asia was beset with certain obstacles and problems that were not present in the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. There was, and continues to be, a great disparity in the racial background, religion, language, institutions, cultures, economic systems, and political structures among the Southeast Asian countries. And it should not be forgotten that the Asiatic member nations only recently regained their national freedom after fairly lengthy periods of colonial rule and they were naturally suspicious of attempts to take away their newly won sovereignty. The fact that these Asian peoples could even unite to create a common denominator in the desire to be free, and to remain free, is a major accomplishment in itself. By joint effort they are resolved to meet the common danger. Also the fact that the Soviet and Chinese Communists continue to find SEATO so objectionable, particularly Article IV, reveals that they recognize SEATO for what it is— an obstacle to their own aggressive plans. Communist propaganda still proclaims loudly that SEATO is “an aggressive instrument of warmongering imperialists.” The fact, of course, is that it is strictly a defensive alliance which stands as a buffer against aggression in Southeast Asia.
SEATO should not claim to be what it obviously is not. It is not another NATO, nor an Asian copy of the Council of Europe. It is a declaration of intent, especially by the United States, to defend Southeast Asia, but the development of permanent institutions and a unified military structure is not precluded by the terms of the treaty.
The work so far done by SEATO as an organization has given it considerable substance. Its accomplishments have been modest but encouraging. Yet these steps which have been taken to make it a going concern are difficult to publicize. A glance at the record shows that SEATO members have not been lulled by Moscow and Peiping into a false sense of security by the “peaceful coexistence line.” The Communists have been put on notice that any overt aggression in Southeast Asia will be met by a common front of the members.
SEATO has extended its protective blanket over South Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia.
SEATO has publicized and exposed quite markedly the degree of Communist subversion in Asia and has set up a research center in Bangkok where experts from member nations can study and report on Communist activities.
During the past two years, especially, the member nations have carried out highly successful joint maneuvers and military advisers have coordinated their countries’ defense plans.
Permanent military, economic, and cultural committees established in Bangkok have strengthened the Organization. Contacts with other collective security organizations, such as NATO and CENTO (formerly the Baghdad Pact), were fostered in 1958 and 1959. Through an exchange of information these three organizations are now working toward their common objectives.
As a defensive shield and a deterrent to Communist aggressive plans, SEATO is proving its worth. The true measure of SEATO’s value is to be found in the fact that since the Treaty’s ratification back in 1955 there has been no major Communist open aggression against the treaty area. The way of the aggressor has been made more difficult.
SEATO is, after all, a defensive alliance whose tasks have been rather narrowly defined, and whose success depends on how solidly these tasks are carried out.
Within Southeast Asia there is currently an urgently felt need that the Treaty’s military provisions should be paralleled by massive and effective support for greater economic and social development on a regional basis. This question of a special SEATO aid plan was debated vigorously at the fifth annual
Council meeting in Wellington, New Zealand, 8 April 1959. Mr. Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister of Thailand, demonstrated his awareness of the deep economic penetration by the Soviets throughout Southeast Asia when he said in his opening speech at Wellington that all SEATO’s military efforts “may prove futile if we allow potential aggressors to undermine our economy and exploit our economic weaknesses to their advantage.” But the United States, European and Australasian allies were equally insistent that economic aid to Asia should continue to be channeled through already existing organizations. And, in any event, military needs limited the availability of economic aid and resources. The sharp division over methods and means for meeting the Communist economic offensive continues. It can be anticipated that when the Council has its sixth annual meeting in Washington, D. C., in May 1960, full consideration will be given to the development of a countermeasure. Increased economic assistance to supplement the military defense agreement is essential if there is to be peace in Asia.
SEATO is now five years old. No one knows yet whether it will grow up to be big and strong like its older brother, NATO. At the present moment, it is receiving the same type of provocation from the Communist world that brought NATO into its own. The current challenge of Communism to Free Asians on three widely separated fronts—Laos, Tibet, and India’s Himalayan border—may well provide the time necessary to bind together and strengthen the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in those areas.
Mr. Miller is Professor of International Relations in the Naval Command Course for Senior Foreign Officers at the U. S. Naval War College, Newport, R. I. During World War II, he was an air Combat Intelligence Officer and served in combat with the Seventh Fleet. Formerly an instructor in the Department of English, History, and Government at the U. S. Naval Academy, he is a Commander in the U. S. Naval Reserve.
The photographs illustrating this article are official SEATO and U. S. releases.