It had been the custom in the East Indies Fleet during 1944 and early 1945 to carry out periodic sorties to the eastward of Ceylon with carriers and battleships to test the strength of the air defenses and to strike at or bombard such targets as Soerabaja, Sabang, Port Blair, and Car Nicobar. By late February 1945, air opposition had become so slight that it had been possible to order a number of offensive sweeps by destroyers as far east as the Tenasserim coast without air or heavy surface support.
By the end of April the Burma campaign was reaching its victorious climax. The early days of May saw the 14th Army enter Rangoon and, in consequence, the 3rd Battle Squadron under Vice Admiral H. T. C. Walker returned to their base at Trincomalee, Ceylon on 9 May. The Commander-in-Chief, East Indies (Admiral Sir Arthur Power) had remained behind in Rangoon.
During the fortnight that the fleet had been at sea there were clear indications from the intelligence received that a crisis was approaching for the Japanese garrisons in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and that the Japanese were taking steps either to evacuate or reinforce these important outposts. It was known that there were two Japanese heavy cruisers and a number of destroyers at Singapore. The mere fact of their being there was a sure indication that they would probably play some part in whatever operations were afoot. It was also judged that whatever the enemy was going to do would be done almost at once.
Admiral Walker had no hesitation in ordering an operation (Dukedom) which had as its object the countering of any move the Japanese might make. Although some ships were short of fuel and ammunition, the fleet sailed again on 10 May—they had had only about 24 hours in harbor.
Hardly had they got clear of the anchorage when a signal was received from the submarine Subtle (one of the three submarines on patrol in the Malacca Strait) reporting the sighting of one Nachi-class cruiser, one destroyer, and two submarine chasers almost in the center of the Malacca Strait steering 315 degrees at seventeen knots. This report was later confirmed by the submarine Statesman. This looked like business, and so Admiral Walker set course with the major part of his force for the channel south of Great Nicobar which he intended to reach on the afternoon of 12 May.
About noon on 11 May, an enemy aircraft was picked up by radar in the flagship and Fleet Air Arm fighters were sent in pursuit, but without success. It was at the same time that a formation of Hellcat aircraft from one of the carriers struck at the Japanese airfield at Car Nicobar, destroying aircraft on the ground and inflicting damage on the installations situated there. Admiral Walker took this opportunity to issue fresh instructions to his forces—it was obvious his force had been sighted so W/T silence could be broken.
Nothing further transpired until 1430 on 12 May when the Commander-in-Chief sent Admiral Walker an appreciation of the situation which was briefly as follows:
a. Cruiser should have reached Latitude 11 degrees N. by 1200 on 12 May. (About due east of Port Blair, Andaman Islands.)
b. Air reconnaissance had failed to sight her.
c. It was probable that she doubled back into the Malacca Strait as a result of the fleet having been sighted the day before.
This appreciation was apparently confirmed half an hour later by a report from the submarine Statesman of one cruiser and three destroyers steering 180 degrees at eighteen knots at 0845 that morning. Admiral Walker on receipt of this turned the Fleet to the southward and retired to a position 300 miles southwest of Achin Head (north point of Sumatra) to complete refueling operations and await developments.
Nothing further transpired during 13 May, but in the evening Admiral Walker received the Commander-
in-Chief’s appreciation of the situation which read as follows:
“Estimate enemy will sortie now but will not reach 11 degrees north till noon 14th.”
Actually during daylight on 14 May the main fleet was in the vicinity of Nicobar/Sumatra Channel ready for any eventualities. At 1730, since nothing further had been heard, Admiral Walker returned to his waiting position and continued fueling.
Preliminary Movements
It is strange that in sea warfare really important things often happen during the middle watch (midnight to 0400). This case was no exception. Just after midnight on 15 May a report was received of the sighting of enemy auxiliary vessels at the north end of the Malacca Strait. The natural supposition was that these were transports and therefore an important target. Admiral Walker at once decided to order Operation Mitre. This operation, which had been in cold storage for some time, had been planned for just such a situation as had now revealed itself. It visualized an air search combined with a destroyer sweep designed to “locate and report, attack and destroy” any enemy vessels in the area of operations. On the face of it, here was a situation with a perfectly clear objective and fraught with unlimited possibilities. At 0200 Admiral Walker sent a signal to Captain (D), 26th Destroyer Flotilla (Captain M. L. Power) ordering him to carry out Operation Mitre with all despatch, at the same time ordering the cruiser Cumberland and the French battleship Richelieu to act as support. Here was a force capable of high speed and packing a considerable “punch” quite capable of dealing with the situation as it was visualized. The air support that went with the force was provided by four assault carriers which had only just arrived on the station from supporting the amphibious landings on the south coast of France. Between them they had 62 fighter aircraft and nine strike/reconnaissance Avengers, which were armed with bombs only. This was a bit of bad luck, but in war one has to make do very often with what one has at hand. To add to this unfortunate state of affairs, the carrier Shah had a catapult failure which meant that the Avengers had to be transferred to the carrier Emperor whose operations staff were conversant only with the briefing of fighters for army support—they had not been shipmates with strike/ reconnaissance aircraft before. In spite of these unfortunate circumstances, it is to the credit of all concerned that this scratch lot of aircraft did succeed in locating the enemy cruiser and they did manage to carry out a strike.
The 26th Destroyer Flotilla consisted of five ships organized in two divisions:
51st Division—Saumarez (Captain D), Verulam, Vigilant
52nd Division—Venus, Virago
All these ships were on the short side as far as fuel was concerned, as it was intended that they should fill up on 15 May. Beyond the fact that they were down to the bottom of their tanks when they rejoined the fleet, this had no effect on the operation.
Approach
Immediately on the receipt of Admiral Walker’s signal, Captain Power set course at 27 knots to pass forty miles north of the Japanese Radar Station at Pulo Weh (north end of Sumatra) and at daylight adopted a circular anti-aircraft disposition while passing through the Strait between Sumatra and Great Nicobar. The weather was fine and the visibility good.
During the forenoon of 15 May the Avengers carried out searches to the eastward ahead of the destroyers and soon reported several merchant vessels off the north end of Sumatra. Everything was apparently going according to plan.
Contact
Suddenly, out of the blue, one of the Avengers engaged on the search reported that she had sighted a heavy Japanese cruiser accompanied by a destroyer steering 140 degrees at twenty knots in a position rather to the northeastward of the merchant vessels. The Avenger was able to identify the cruiser as Haguro and the destroyer as Minikaze before she had to return to the carrier to refuel. The time was 1150. This was contact at last, and at once the situation became very tense.
Contact had been lost when the searching Avenger had to return to the carrier, but at 1250 a shore-
based Liberator reported the enemy ships in a position twenty miles to the westward of the first-sighting position and later another Liberator sighted and reported them some fifty miles to the north.
By a stroke of bad luck neither of these reports was received in time for the briefing of the crews of a strike of three Avengers which was launched at 1335. Full of hope, the crews of these three aircraft set off and, after carrying out a “square” search in the vicinity of the cruiser’s estimated position, they located the enemy and went down to the attack at 1541. In spite of fierce opposition, one hit was claimed on the cruiser’s forecastle—later the Japanese declared it was a near miss. The aircraft then returned to the carrier. This completed the aircrafts’ share in the sinking of Haguro, as there was not time to launch another strike before nightfall.
The Chase
Now we will return to what was happening to Captain Power and his destroyers. As this force was passing through the Nicobar/Sumatra Channel, Captain Power received a signal from the Commander-
in-Chief which ordered the cancellation of Operation Mitre. This signal was received about 1040 and, in conjunction with other signals which he had received about this time, left Captain Power in some doubt as to what was his right course of action. While deciding on what should be his next move, he received the aircraft report of the enemy merchant vessels. He judged that this signal originated before the Commander-in-Chief had received the aircraft signal, and so he decided to stand on as he was, sure that with an enemy in sight the Commander-in-Chief would not wish the operation to be discontinued. Hardly had he made up his mind when the report of Haguro was in his hands. Now there could no longer be any doubt in his mind. Here was a powerful enemy at sea. It was within reach of the 26th Flotilla. Therefore, it was Captain Power’s object to sink her. Orders were at once given for the destroyers to take up a searching formation, and course was set to intercept. If he still had any lingering doubts concerning his action, they were at once set aside when he received a signal from the Senior Officer of the Supporting Force in Cumberland which read, “You should sink the enemy before retiring.” By acting on his own judgment and using his initiative, Captain Power had saved a matter of about forty miles, which might well have made the difference between missing and intercepting the enemy.
The first sighting report made by the aircraft put Haguro bearing 070 degrees some 130 miles from Saumarez at 1150. This, on the face of it, meant a long stern chase, and it was also clearly impossible for the Flotilla to reach the vicinity of their quarry before dark. One can well imagine the tense moments that passed on board Saumarez and her accompanying destroyers during the afternoon and evening particularly when they were intercepting the reports of the aircraft attack. There must also have been keen disappointment when it was realized that no aircraft were available to carry out the duty of shadowing the Japanese force now that it was definitely located.
Nothing daunted, however, the Flotilla went on its way acting on the information available and hoping that by guess and by God they would eventually fall in with the enemy and finish her off.
The Dark Hours
So far the weather had been good, with the usual tropical rain squalls, which at times affected the visibility and the radar scans. The plan of attack decided on by Captain Power was first to locate the enemy and then to dispose his ships round her in the dark so that, whichever way she turned, there was a chance that she would provide a suitable target for torpedoes. It must be remembered that Haguro had complete freedom of maneuver and was in a position to turn as she liked to avoid a torpedo attack if it were carried out in the normal way—the attacking formation was specially designed to allow for this eventuality and was known as the Star formation.
Darkness descended suddenly, as it does always in the tropics, and it was accompanied by a very heavy thunderstorm with a magnificent display of lightning. This storm in no way interfered with the lookouts in the destroyers, which by now were spread on a line of search covering a distance of about twenty miles which was deemed necessary to counter any avoiding action taken by the Japanese ships as darkness came on—a well-known device for throwing a pursuing force off the scent.
Slowly and anxiously the hours of darkness went by to those in the 26th Destroyer Flotilla as they strained their eyes and all their senses in an endeavor to locate the enemy. Suddenly, at 2245, just when everyone was getting thoroughly keyed up, the radar operator in Venus reported that he had a contact bearing 045 degrees at 68,000 yards. His Commanding Officer (Lieutenant Commander Graham De Chair) at first did not believe the report and told the young operator so in unmistakable terms! But the young operator persisted and so the contact was plotted for a matter of thirty minutes. Finally the Captain was convinced. He duly made an enemy report to Captain Power stating that Haguro was bearing 040 degrees distant 46,000 yards steering 135 degrees at 25 knots. This was indeed a phenomenal performance on the part of the radar then fitted in H.M. ships. Captain Power was at first skeptical and asked Venus for confirmation. Venus at once replied that she was certain and was in consequence ordered to shadow. The time was now 2340.
At 2345 Saumarez made an enemy report and ordered the remainder of the flotilla to take up their allocated shadowing positions. In complying with this, Venus, who had now reduced to twelve knots and altered through south to southwest, lost contact. On hearing this, Captain Power redisposed his ships with the object of spreading them between Haguro and the coast and then encircling her from the southeast—from the direction of Singapore, for it was obvious she was making for her base.
It was at 0003 on 15 May that Saumarez got her first radar contact which placed the enemy bearing 010 degrees at 28,000 yards. Shortly afterward the course was given as 170 degrees and the speed at twenty knots. The course of the flotilla was at once altered to 180 degrees and speed reduced to twelve knots with the object of allowing the plot to develop and the enemy to close. At 0025 the shadowing sectors were reallocated, and the ships maneuvered as best they could to get into their positions.
The trap was now set. The enemy appeared to have noticed nothing and continued on his course. Excitement mounted in all the ships of the flotilla. Here was a situation often dreamed of by all officers who had had the honor (and the luck) to have been employed in destroyers.
It was at 0039 that Captain Power made the signal to his Flotilla:
“Intend to fire torpedoes at 0100. You are to endeavour to synchronise your attacks. Torpedoes to be set at nine feet.”
The latter order was given so that Minikaze would not be neglected by having the torpedoes pass underneath her!
The Attack
The scene was now set and the curtain was due to go up in twenty minutes’ time. Everyone in the Flotilla knew his part.
It was about this time those in the enemy force appeared to become aware of the presence of the British ships. Both ships began to zig-zag violently and, when they had reached a range of 18,000 yards from Saumarez, it appeared on the radar screen that the destroyer had parted company with the cruiser. As far as the Flotilla was concerned all was going according to plan. When Saumarez, the flagship, was 12,000 yards on the enemy’s starboard bow, Captain Power went down to the attack.
About the same time Haguro altered course round to starboard and set off in a northwesterly direction while the destroyer made a wide sweep to the eastward and then came round on the starboard quarter of the larger ship—all this was clearly shown on the radar screen. This brought Haguro right on top of Venus. Before the latter could fire her torpedoes, Haguro swung around to port to the southwest, obviously under the impression that torpedoes had been fired at her. She eventually steadied on a southeasterly course (straight for Singapore).
Haguro's turn had balked Saumarez’s attack, but at 0106 she sighted the enemy destroyer on the starboard bow and opened fire with her guns. It was apparent that the latter was more than somewhat bemused and her crew were apparently not fully closed up at action stations. After the first salvo fell around her, she started flashing lights, either on the assumption that she was being fired on by her own cruiser or in a vain attempt to make Saumarez think she was one of her own flotilla. So close was this range that Saumarez had to alter violently to starboard under the stern of the Japanese to avoid a collision.
This alteration placed Saumarez on the port bow of Haguro, now steering a southeasterly course. The latter at once opened fire with both 8-inch and 5-inch armament and illuminated Saumarez with very efficient star-shell. Saumarez at once replied and closed the target at full speed. Under a veritable hail of fire, she fired her torpedoes at a range of 2,000 yards broad on the enemy’s bow. The time was now 0113. During this encounter Saumarez was hit in No. 1 boiler room by a 5-inch shell. The damage resulted in a temporary loss of speed.
At this moment Verulam carried out an unmolested attack on the cruiser, and at 0115 Haguro was hit by at least three torpedoes, which had the effect of silencing her except for spasmodic fire from one 5-inch gun and also from short-range weapons.
The three remaining destroyers now closed in for the kill. At 0125, Venus attacked the cruiser on her starboard side and got one hit. Two minutes later she was followed by Virago, who had been forced to withhold her fire to avoid hitting her own ships, and she got two hits. Vigilant, whose surface radar was out of action, could not get into a firing position until 0151, but then she got one hit and engaged the enemy with gunfire very effectively.
Haguro was now lying stopped, and it devolved on Venus, who had first sighted the enemy on her radar, to deliver the coup de grace. She closed, fired her two remaining torpedoes, and got two hits. Haguro sank at 0209.
End of the Operation
Thus ended a neat destroyer job. When it was established beyond doubt that the enemy had sunk, Captain Power formed his flotilla into single line ahead and set course to rejoin the main fleet under Admiral Walker. This was effected, in due course, with the Flotilla very low in oil fuel—Virago by that time was down to her diesel-fuel tanks. Beyond the damage sustained by Saumarez in her spirited attack, the only other damage was that inflicted on Virago by a near miss from an aircraft bomb which occurred after she had rejoined the main fleet.
Looking at the whole operation in retrospect, we must judge it an outstanding example of the value of initiative, careful planning, and above all the value of training and teamwork, which are the two words that have always been associated in the minds of the officers and men who have had the honor (and the luck) to have served in destroyers.
A regular contributor on naval topics to British publications, Admiral Horan commanded destroyers throughout World War I; between wars commanded HMS Durban, HMS Coventry (destroyer flagship), and HMS Barham (flagship of the Mediterranean fleet); and in World War II was Chief of the Naval Staff, New Zealand, commanded HMS Leander on Red Sea convoy duty, and was Rear Admiral Commanding Combined Operations Bases (Western Area).