Since the end of World War II, as almost everyone concerned with the defense of the United States must well realize, the Navy has been wrestling with the serious problem of retaining sufficient junior officers on active duty to meet its world-wide commitments. This problem not only concerns the immediate manning of the thousands of ships and activities currently operated by the Navy but also involves considerations of supplying the Navy twenty and thirty years from now with a large number of competent senior officers. Recent reductions in force have reduced the scope of, but have not solved, this problem.
Congress has legislated some increased benefits while reducing others; the Navy has provided choice billets as incentives for young naval officers to continue in the service and perhaps become career officers. Uncountable hours have been whiled away by conscientious officers on all levels in discussion of the subject, and quite detailed research and survey data have been compiled.
In the main the results have been disappointing. Prior to World War II the theory of remuneration to officers was that they be provided with sufficient funds to make them reasonably indifferent to money. Whereas in civilian life the amount of a person’s salary is his index to success, the military equivalent of the foregoing is the rank that an officer attains.
Such facets of material rewards as increased naval exchange privileges, reduced commissary prices, increased medical benefits, etc., while important, should never be the gauge by which an officer decides for or against a military career. Yet, too much emphasis has been placed on increasing the material rewards of the service to attract a larger number of career officers.
The proper frame of mind is by far the most important motivating factor, or should be, for any officer contemplating a military career. Civilian and military standards, while complementing each other, dictate, both through necessity and historical precedent, two essentially different sets of goals.
For those officers possessing special interests and talents, the Navy offers challenges in almost every field where these same officers would work in civilian life. But there is a basic difference between the motivation of the specialist and the jack-of-all-trades officer. The specialist will in general identify himself first with his specialist work, the general line officer first with his military duties.
The term specialist as used herein is not limited to any corps of officers or to those bearing special duty designators. There are quite a large number of officers in the unrestricted line eligible for command at sea who by background have become specialists. Many types of billets, especially on staffs, are technically classified sea duty but in actuality are either never afloat or are only ship- based a part of the time. It is, therefore, possible for an officer to become quite specialized and still, on the record, be a general line or jack-of-all-trades officer.
Before proceeding further with a discussion of what makes up and how to procure the jack-of-all-trades officer, it is necessary to mention something of how this individual comes to exist. Every individual in his formative years develops certain thought patterns. Sociologists point out that environment, social status, stability of home life, etc., are influences that will largely shape a man’s way of life. It is in these years that an individual would normally develop a latent predisposition to military life even though at the time he may never have heard of either war or the armed forces.
A reserve officer commencing active duty and his first association with the Navy, and planning to return to civilian life after his release from obligated service, must of necessity be ruled by civilian concepts since that is all he has ever known. Many senior career officers have praised the efforts of this category of officers, and their generally excellent performance on active duty both in peace and war is an established fact.
Officers of that category will largely determine the performance of the Navy in any future conflict, through mere numbers, as they have in the past, if for no other reason. “The regular sailor keeps the gun greased for the reserve to fire.” Although an oversimplification, that statement indicates a basic and unalterable fact of Navy life. But included in the reserves are a number of individuals from which the Navy can realize a good source for the further procurement of the future jack-of-all-trades career officers.
Through increased technology the Navy, as well as the other armed forces, is becoming more and more specialized in weaponology. The corollary to this is that the prewar officer equally at home on the bridge, or in the engine room of a ship, or behind a desk in the shore establishment is disappearing. Advancing technology limits development of new officers, and those remaining, mostly now in senior grades, are gradually disappearing. The exercise of military command necessarily entails a broad background. But, there is not enough time in one life to learn everything about everything. Therefore, an individual has to decide whether he wants to know a great deal about something or something about a great deal.
Sandwiched in between the specialist and the broadly qualified officer are a large number of officers who are specially qualified in one field but not to the extent of a full-time specialist. Naval aviators and submariners fall within this category. As long as the primary unit of the Navy is the surface ship, specializing will be at the expense of time that the “general” general line officer would spend in learning broadly several other of the mariner’s arts. If and when the primary mission of the Navy shifts from operating surface ships, then perhaps either or all of the groups of naval aviators, submariners, or guided missile specialists may become the true jack-of-all-trades officer.
The procurement and retention of specialists has received a great deal of attention from many sources. Apparently, however, the jack-of-all-trades officer has been taken for granted. As the number in his type has dwindled, the importance of the “boat driver” has become recognized and has brought with it the problem of re-establishing his place in the sun.
Other factors being equal, it is more reasonable to detail an officer to command if he has had some satisfactory engineering, gunnery, deck, CIC, etc., experience than if he is solely an expert in some one of the above fields. As long as this is true, it is incumbent upon those charged with personnel planning to define the status of the jack-of-all-trades officer, not for the purpose of building morale in the general line (although this will naturally follow), but to provide a basis for developing during the two or three years that they are on active duty those officers with a natural military predisposition.
It is unlikely that commanding officers in the first few months can identify such junior officers. The commanding officer will have to spot characteristics that indicate a potential. In order to balance procurement, the commanding officer should not try to sell postgraduate instruction, flight, and submarine training, and billets or training of similar nature to that particular individual. These fields are already well publicized.
What indications will a commanding officer have, then, of a prospective general line officer? If the commanding officer regards the material at hand as good potential, then he might apply some of these tests.
Does the officer have strong family ties that would indicate a ready-made business position upon leaving the Navy? Although this background is not necessarily a bar to developing the military outlook, it is an obstacle. It will require an effort on the part of the naval officer to kick over the traces and choose a career that is relatively unknown.
Does the officer tend to shy away from dealing with his men and concentrate on the more technical aspects of his billet assignment? This characteristic may indicate a minor form of introversion, and it is likely that this officer would enjoy only a specialist’s billet, either in or out of the service.
Is the officer ambitious for a large income? A large number of young naval officers who have known only years of school and then something of the Navy are attracted by the normal desire to test their talents without the restrictions imposed by the service. It is likely that these officers have quite a distorted view of the realities of civilian life, and although they will, in general, do well from a financial point of view, they will eventually realize that many of the advantages of a service career are not obvious. These will be mentioned later. In most cases, however, most young officers sustain a marked loss of income in their first years of civilian life. For officers in this category, there is often room for recruitment if their desire for a civilian career is not too strong.
Does the officer show an unconstructive attitude? If an officer has a negative approach, or perhaps it would be better to say a pessimistic approach, towards a naval career evinced by measuring its advantages against a perfect as opposed to a relative standard, then this point of view will create another block. Before discounting an officer in this category, one aspect should be considered. It has been fashionable for some time for an officer to serve his time and request release. In order not to be considered odd, a large number of officers seem to demonstrate a much more negative approach towards the Navy than they really feel. This is only natural, and careful counseling can do a great deal to form a dedicated career officer of such an individual.
Officers who do not fall in any of the above groups and who do not have any obvious disqualifications may be considered the best prospects for career officers. It is contended that once a basic military attitude is cultivated, no curtailment of commissary privileges, no reduction in pay, and only the most drastic hardships will force an officer from his career.
How is that military mind built? To a large number of people the term “military mind” conjures up imaginations of helmeted and braided officers plotting wars and intrigues to the detriment of the human race. But a military mind is not synonymous with a tyrannical mind. First of all a military mind derives from an appreciation of organization and efficiency. This is a good time to point out that there are a large number of civilian executives who have never worn a uniform, yet are possessed in some measure with a military mind.
Secondly, a military mind is disciplined to regimentation. To a majority of the American people the word regimentation is probably anathema. Strangely, a large number of these persons are unknowingly regimented just by being subject to economic and social laws that, while not as obvious, are just as an effective curb on behavior as is military regimentation.
The purpose of this article is not to recruit a nation of militarists, even should this be possible. Only a relatively small percentage of individuals are inclined to be doctors, firemen, tailors, automobile salesmen, etc. It follows, therefore, that only a few are potentially military officers. Unfortunately, the number of those who strongly lean to the military is not enough to meet the world wide commitments of our present day armed forces or those of the unpredictable future. For this reason the armed forces must begin developing the less strongly motivated and motivate those with only a latent predisposition towards a military career.
As with many other details of the Navy, l motivation is a command responsibility. In this connection, officer training schools must present an up-to-date picture of the Navy, keeping theory in tune with the day-to-day facts. An officer candidate must be trained in advance to realize, for example, that the commanding officer of a ship is a distinct personality with likes and dislikes and may not believe in all aspects of the training the young officer has received per se.
The commanding officer of a small ship, the executive officer of a destroyer type, and so forth will be the prime influence on whether or not an individual chooses a military career. If, by example, these officers contradict the mental picture that an officer has of the ideal, then the officer will be disoriented and will lose faith in the other principles in which he has been trained.
A young officer fresh from college has been steeped in ideals and principles of one sort or another for somewhere in the neighborhood of sixteen years. An officer commanding a ship is often prone to forget that he, too, years ago had much the same mental attitude as the new ensign. Furthermore, in the press of maintaining a high degree of material and operational readiness, it is easy to overlook the new officers reporting aboard. It will affect the new ensign adversely not to have an opportunity to gain recognition in the eyes of his commanding officer.
If one of these ensigns is considering a military career, this ambition can be effectively stifled by a number of occurrences. If the ensign finds cliques in the wardroom, he will be unfavorably impressed, even if he, as probably will happen, soon becomes a part of one himself. Although he may not realize it, this sub-loyalty violates the team spirit impression that he had been taught and which has become a part of the fabric of his thinking.
Secondly, if this new officer is assigned as division officer and then finds his superiors dealing directly with his men, he will assume that there is a lack of faith in him, and behave accordingly. Often superiors will do this as an expedient, with no intention of any slight; but it is not important in this case what the reasons are in fact but what the young officer thinks them to be.
If the officer finds that he is actually treated, except for formalities, as ranking somewhere between an apprentice seaman and a third class yeoman instead of as an officer with commensurate authority and responsibility, this will also tend to turn him against a naval career.
The prospective career officer should not be coddled, but if the Navy is to procure additional officers who are motivated by the pleasure of doing a good job, by successfully meeting the challenges of Navy life, and by finding their rewards in their association with their contemporaries and rightfully enjoying the increased responsibilities and recognition of advancing rank, then the Navy must seek, locate, and counsel with intelligence.
With increasing specialization, officers and civilians may be making decisions which vitally affect many but of which they themselves have little or no knowledge outside their own fields. By contrast the jack-of-all- trades officer must be a resourceful individual, a dynamic leader, a competent mariner, and, while he may not possess the intimate knowledge of the specialist on a particular subject, he must have a comprehensive knowledge of all facets of naval operations. To gain these qualifications he will have to sacrifice much that his specialist contemporary will usually enjoy. First he will spend a great deal more time at sea and on foreign station, deprived of normal home life. He will be prominent on watch lists. He will find himself frequently confronted with complicated situations with little or no precedent and which require a great deal of research and in a hurry. He will have to make unpleasant decisions which sacrifice an individual’s desires and conveniences. The fact that this is for the benefit of his country will not make it any the less unpleasant.
For reward he will enjoy increasing rank, but with that will come the realization of increasing age. The contemplation of large amounts of gold braid in the future will not be particularly inspiring at the moment. The realization of doing a complicated job well, of being given an opportunity to employ all his abilities in ever-shifting fields, and of developing friendships which will enrich his life will be sufficient remuneration.