The New Look in Chief Petty Officers —Master and Senior
By Joseph R. Heinzel
In August of 1958 the Navy held its first examination for advancement to Master and Senior Chief Petty Officer. These are the titles for the recently established pay grades E-8 and E-9 provided for in the latest pay bill, Public Law 85-422. Creation of these two additional pay grades came about in the following manner.
Ever since World War II the Services have experienced a shortage of well qualified highly-technical personnel. This problem was not unique to the Navy alone; it was common to all the Services. Personnel would enlist for four years, spend much of this time at service schools becoming proficient in a highly technical area, and upon termination of their enlistment discover that the rewards from industry were much higher for their specialty than were the benefits to be gained from reenlisting. Thus, it might be said that the Armed Forces had become a lucrative recruiting field for industry.
Inasmuch as the Services were competing with industry to retain personnel in whom they had a high training investment, it was imperative that they be put in a competing position. Therefore, the Defense Advisory Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation, commonly known as the Cor- diner Committee, was created in March, 1956. Briefly, the purpose of this committee was to study possible adjustment to the existing pay structure to attract and retain the officer and enlisted technicians and civilian personnel required by our defense activities. The committee submitted its recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on May 8, 1957. The two recommendations in the enlisted area which were of most far reaching significance were: 1) creation of two additional pay grades (E-8 and E-9), and 2) establishment of a proficiency pay program which would permit certain highly qualified personnel to be paid at one or two pay grades higher than their military grade actually held. While it is easy to confuse these two programs it must be remembered that they are separate and distinct; this discussion will limit itself to E-8/E-9 features of the pay bill.
Subsequent to submission of the Cordiner report, several bills were introduced into Congress providing for either all recommendations of the Committee or certain of the recommendations with ramifications thereto. The legislation which was eventually passed was the Kilday Bill which became Public Law 85-422. In addition to a general pay raise, on the enlisted level this bill provided for establishment of two additional pay grades and a somewhat broader proficiency pay plan than that recommended by the Cordiner Committee. Numbers to be advanced to the newly created pay grades E-8 and E-9 were limited to 2% and 1%, respectively, of total enlisted strength.
Now how are these new pay grades to be allocated? Considerable confusion on this point exists among our enlisted personnel. These pay grades are not to be weighted in favor of critical ratings (ratings in which there is a high training investment and a shortage of personnel) as in the case of proficiency pay. Rather, they are to be distributed equally percentage-wise among the some 65 ratings. This means, taking two of the extremes for examples, that the AD which has a large number of personnel in the rating would get a much greater allocation of pay grades E-8 and E-9 than would the SV which, comparatively speaking, has relatively few people in the rating.
To qualify for advancement to E-8 and E-9 there are several prerequisites which must be met. First of all, the candidate must have outstanding leadership and military ability as well as superior administrative and technical proficiency. Secondly, he must meet certain service requirements. For the first group advanced, service requirements for E-8 eligibility were four years in grade as E-7, p.a., and a minimum of eleven years total service. For advancement to E-9 service requirements were six years as E-7, p.a., and 13 years total service. Present plans call for E-8 service requirements remaining the same but E-9 will be phased in as follows:
1. Time in pay grade E-8
FY 1959—Waived*
FY 1960, 1961, 1962—1 year
FY 1963 and subsequently—2 years
* During FY 1959, to advance to E-9 candidates must have completed six years in pay grade E-7.
2. Minimum total service—13 years
Personnel who meet the foregoing prerequisites must also be recommended by their commanding officer and successfully pass an examination based upon technical, military /leadership, and comprehensive/reasoning areas. Those who obtain an appropriate cut score on the combined technical and military /leadership areas of the examination are then considered by a selection board. Criteria used by the Board in selection are:
3. Marks obtained on the combined technical and military portions of the examination.
4. Past performance as reflected in the candidate’s service record.
5. The special evaluation sheet submitted on each individual taking the examination.
6. Marks obtained on the comprehensive- reasoning portion of the examination. These are included as an additional aid to the Board.
Advancement to the new pay grades will come from E-7 quotas. For example, of the present E-7 strength, plans call for 75% being retained at E-7, 19% being allocated to E-8 and 6% to E-9. These strength requirements will be phased in over a four year period as follows:
|
1959 |
1960 |
1961 |
1962 |
1963 |
E-9 |
300 |
600 |
1,400 |
2,100 |
2,800 |
E-8 |
1,850 |
4,200 |
6,450 |
8,600 |
8,600 |
E-7 |
42,950 |
40,300 |
37,250 |
34,400 |
33,700 |
Total |
45,100 |
45,100 |
45,100 |
45,100 |
45,100 |
These figures represent an E-8 and E-9 allocation of 1.5% and .5% respectively of total enlisted strength rather than the maximum of 2% and 1% authorized by the pay bill. Initial advancements as a result of the August, 1958 examination will be effective November 16, 1958. The second group of advancements will be effective May 16, 1959 for the February, 1959 examinations.
There will not be a special training program set up to provide for advancement to the E-8 and E-9 pay grades. The limited numbers involved would not seem to warrant institution of such a program and present plans call for training going no higher than the E-7 level. In addition, since present planning calls for distributing our Master Chief Petty Officers and Senior Chief Petty Officers to key billets which require greater administrative, military, and leadership abilities, additional training in the rating concerned would not seem practical.
While there is general agreement as to how these new chief petty officers will be used, to date no qualitative standards have been established. At first glance it might appear difficult to develop qualifications above those of the present E-7, yet below those of the warrant officer. This problem is not so great as it might seem, however, because there are several different criteria which can be used in the development of such requirements. First, there is the concept of a more broadly qualified petty officer at the E-8 and E-9 level. For example, in the Group VIII, construction ratings a BU at the E-8 level might be required to be qualified in allied fields such as SVV and SV. At the E-9 level it might be necessary for the BU to be familiar with the jobs of all the Group VIII ratings—BU, SW, SV, UT, CE, CM, and EO. This would conform generally to the practice followed in the building trades in which the foreman on a construction job is thoroughly familiar with the work of all his subordinates.
Then there is the concept of specialization at the E8/E9 level. The HM rating provides a good example in this connection inasmuch as there are 32 specialist fields within the HM rating. Thus, at the E-8/E-9 level the HM might be required to be a specialist as a tissue bank technician, environmental sanitation technician, etc. Here again, this would correspond to the practice followed in the civilian counterpart of the profession; i.e., general practitioner vs. specialist.
Finally, there is the concept of common requirements for blocks of ratings. For example, it might be desirable to have ratings such as BM, GM, SM, QM, etc. qualified to stand a JOOD watch at the E-8/E-9 level. Below decks, it might be feasible to require the E-8 /E-9 MM, EN, BR, BT and other pertinent ratings to stand a Junior Engineer Officer Watch.
Development of qualitative requirements is only one of the problems to be solved in implementing pay grades E-8/E-9, however. Any new program such as this requires a shakedown period before all the answers are forthcoming. Needless to say, the Navy is working hard to get all the answers.
Mr. Heinzel is director, enlisted qualifications and classifications division of the U. S. Naval Research field activity, Washington, D. C.
Warning System Spots Deadly Ocean Waves
The Baltimore Evening Sun, November 12, 1958—Huge deadly sea waves, spawned by submarine earthquakes, are being spotted by an expanded warning system that now covers virtually the whole Pacific area.
The addition of the Fiji Islands, Chile and Australia as co-operating members of the system was announced here today by Rear Admiral H. Arnold Karo, director of United States Department of Commerce’s Coast and Geodetic Survey.
The warning system was developed by the Survey after a seismic sea wave, or tsunami, had ripped into the Hawaiian Islands in April, 1946, killing 170 persons and causing $25,000,000 in damage.
Location of Stations
The nine seismograph stations and 24 tide stations of the system are located on the west coast of the United States, in Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, Peru, Japan, the Philippine Islands and some Pacific islands, as well as the three new areas. Success of the warning facilities depends on the rapidity of communications between stations. The waves travel across the open ocean at speeds up to 600 miles an hour and can strike an area 2,500 miles from their point of origin in as little as four and a half hours.
The warning system works on the following basis:
After a large earthquake, the seismograph stations rush their detection data to the Honolulu headquarters. The earthquake center is located and warnings of a possible sea wave with the expected time of arrival are transmitted. In addition, the widely scattered tide station observers check their gauges for unusual sea activity.
Seismic sea waves are commonly and incorrectly called “tidal waves.”
The Perils of Bulletin Board Leadership
By Rear Admiral Fitzhugh Lee, USN
Readers of Fly magazine have read about the Moral Leadership Program recently started by Secretary of the Navy Gates. It has the enthusiastic backing of Admiral Burke and Admiral Smith, the Chief of Naval Personnel, as well as all leaders in the Navy who are concerned with the basic task of making and keeping the U. S. Navy the finest fighting organization in the world.
I first viewed this program with mixed emotions. On the one hand it seemed something of an indictment of our Navy that it should be necessary to start it with formal orders from the top. Leadership—both moral and all other kinds—has been for centuries the hallmark of any military organization. That our Navy’s standard of leadership had reached a level where a new and major program was required seemed to be a rather unhappy circumstance.
On the other hand, I did sense that in the difficult years since the end of World War II, we had gone through many difficult phases of Navy planning, education and administration. These introduced many factors which have perhaps eroded the high standards of leadership we had always enjoyed. One of these factors was a succession of rapid buildups followed by equally rapid declines in personnel strengths. This caused major turnovers of personnel in the Navy. In such circumstances high standards of leadership were difficult to maintain. Leadership cannot be inculcated in a very short period of time; it must be exercised and lived with for years. Nor is leadership a thing you can turn on and off like a faucet.
It was not until I had studied it thoroughly that I realized what a valuable program the Moral Leadership Program could be and would be in our large and changing Navy. There are many aspects of it which had not occurred to me in concrete form but which are set forth clearly in the over-all guides for the program now being published.
Most officers who have served many years in the Armed Forces have come to draw from their own experience some examples of leadership which they have found to be successful, and on which they lean in trying to achieve good leadership. I am no exception. I have found that one quality of good leadership which is often overlooked is that of taking a personal interest in all, or as many as possible, of the men who are working directly for you. This quality is important for a few key people: the Leading Petty Officer of the division, the Division Officer, the Personnel Officer and the Commanding Officer. In their hands lie great powers to control the morale of the greatest number of people in the Navy, and the leadership that they exert can have more influence collectively than can the leadership of any more senior officer as an individual.
Forgotten Men
Unfortunately in the rapidly changing Navy of postwar years, the Division Officer and Leading Petty Officer have tended to become forgotten men. Both of them have been bypassed by individuals and by systems. Too many officers fail to appreciate the responsibilities and great importance of the Division Officer and the Leading Chief. They short- circuit them in too many ways in dealing with the men as a whole. As an example, it has often become a general practice to simply post plans of the day and other notices on bulletin boards and issue a standing instruction that if someone misses the word it is his own fault. In a command in which the men are mustered daily by Division Officers and/or Leading Chiefs, these individuals—as persons —become the source of the orders. They are the leaders and the ones to whom the men will look for instructions and example. A Bulletin Board can’t lead.
We have sometimes casually drifted into headless groups of men who work outside the framework of a division. They work in this or that office, or in this gang or that gang on a special job. Instead of one responsible person to whom they can look for solutions to their problems, such men are told to go to the Training Officer for this; to the Personnel Officer for that; to the Chaplain for something else. The Division Officer and Leading Chief have disappeared as leaders for these men, and nothing in the way of leadership has been furnished to take their place. This is an organizational pitfall to which the Training Command is particularly vulnerable. We must seek ways and means to ensure that every enlisted man, including every student, feels that he knows who his Leading Petty Officer is and who his Division Officer is.
Student officers must similarly have a designated “boss.” This may be difficult for us because the students change often and move often from one unit to another. If any man in the Navy does not know who his responsible leading man is, and does not feel that this man knows him and is interested in him, then he is not being supplied with the best in leadership.
In San Diego recently I had the opportunity to visit the Naval Training Center including the Recruit Training Command. This command runs many of the Class ‘A’ schools for the Surface Navy paralleling the work of the Naval Air Technical Training Command for the Aeronautical Organization.
I was interested in the work of the man who had just completed three years as the Commanding Officer of the Naval Training Center. He was an able officer, keenly interested in every aspect of leadership and determined to exercise it in every possible way in the job that he held. In order to determine the value of the Class A training which accrued to the commands receiving the graduates, he told me he had conducted many inquiries; he and his principal officers and petty officers had conducted personal interviews; post-training evaluation forms were distributed to various units.
The one thing he discovered which he felt would have the greatest effect in increasing the efficiency of the Class A School training and the morale of the students who graduated was one simple, almost trivial, action which he found was not usually being taken. He found that ninety per cent of his students were never asked by any responsible individual— their Leading Petty Officer, their Division Officer, or any other senior officer—what they had learned in school and how that knowledge could help the ship or station in improving its efficiency! This officer firmly believes that if some responsible leader had asked the graduate THAT ONE QUESTION and let him answer it in his own words, the value of the Class A school training would have been doubled.
This brings me back to the thought expressed earlier. Taking a personal interest in the ones who work for you—especially those who work directly for you—is one of the major aspects of leadership of any kind. I pass it along as a thought to the readers of Fly and suggest that each of you examine your own area of responsibility and see what you can do by YOUR own contribution to improve leadership in our Training Command.
Admiral Lee is Chief of Naval Air Technical Training, U. S. Navy.
Antarctic Looks to Atomic Power
By Philip Benjamin
The New York Times, October 29, 1958.— The Antarctic may have a nuclear power station within the next two years.
At a briefing session conducted by Rear Admiral George J. Dufek, commander of Navy forces supporting United States scientific research in the Antarctic, Comdr. Herbert W. Whitney said that a nuclear reactor at McMurdo Sound was “most feasible” in the next two years.
McMurdo Sound is the site of the Navy’s air operating facility through which supplies for other bases in the polar continent are funneled.
However, Admiral Dufek noted that while the reactor for McMurdo Sound had been approved, “we still haven’t got the money.”
Smaller Plant Also Planned
Commander Whitney, a construction specialist, also said that it was expected that within three years Byrd Station in Marie Byrd Land would receive a small “packaged” nuclear power plant. This plant could be carried in a twin-engine DC-3, Commander Whitney said.
Admiral Dufek said that the reactor he had in mind for McMurdo Sound would cost between $4,000,000 and $5,000,000.
He pointed out, however, that the reactor would probably pay for itself within three years after its installation because it would cut enormously the cost of transporting Diesel fuel for heat and power.
At present, the admiral said, about 60 per cent of the total Diesel fuel shipments to the Antarctic is used for generating heat and power.
Admiral Dufek foresaw also the use of nuclear power to exploit mineral resources that might be locked in the ground under continental ice sheet.
He noted that while minerals had not yet been found in sufficient quantity for commercial extraction less than 1 per cent of the Antarctic had been surveyed geologically.
Admiral Dufek said that even if nuclear power was used to generate heat and power, Diesel fuel would always be kept on hand as a stand-by and that gasoline would still be needed for aircraft and some motor vehicles.
One problem to be worked out would be how to prevent the melting of the ice on the site of the nuclear plant because of the transference of heat from the reactor. Commander Whitney said he expected that the problem would be solved.
OOD Training in the Soviet Navy
By Lieutenant William A. Cockell, Jr., USNR
The appearance recently of an unusually large number of articles in the Soviet press dealing with deficiencies in the training of naval personnel indicates a growing concern in the Soviet hierarchy over the technical proficiency and operational readiness of its seagoing units. The fact that most of these articles have appeared in the Ministry of Defense central organ, Krasnaya Zvezda, rather than in the Navy newspaper, Sovetsky Flot, reveals that the problem is receiving attention at the highest level. An editorial in the July 8 number of Krasnaya Zvezda, under the heading “Taut Watch Organization Is the Guarantee of Safe Navigation,” suggests that this concern is prompted by an increasing number of collisions and groundings caused by navigational and shiphandling errors. The solution, it declares, lies in better training of watchstanding personnel, particularly officers of the deck. It is the question of OOD training that has received the most attention in recent articles. Perhaps the most interesting, from the point of view of western naval readers, was that written by Captain V. Akimov, commanding officer of the destroyer Surovy which appeared in the June 10 issue of Krasnaya Zyezda. Akimov (apparently with Ministry of Defense approval)1 argues strongly for revision of the formal examination which is required in the Soviet Navy for OOD qualification. The examination at present consists of both a written and a practical part, and Akimov’s view is that it is too comprehensive, placing on prospective Officers of the Deck the burden of acquiring knowledge which is not essential to the proper performance of their watchstanding duties. His remarks, excerpts of which follow, shed revealing light on the level of professional qualifications and the quality of junior officers in the Soviet Navy today.
“Under the prevailing system we try to have the watch officers know in detail literally all the tactical rules set forth in the principal publications. It might seem that there is nothing wrong in this; but in fact the result is that the young officer wastes much time mastering problems which he will never come up against in his practical work and which will be solved by other people. For example, he will never be required to make decisions concerning the employment of weapons or the maneuvering of the ship in a complex situation. This is the sphere of activity of the commanding officer or the executive officer, one of whom is always present at the main conning station. And incidentally, on the examination they ask the OOD almost as much about these areas as they do the commanding officer. . . . Once, while we were underway, they asked Lt. Bogomolov, who had the watch, to give the rules governing an engagement at sea between ships of different classes. His incomplete answer provoked a serious rebuke from the examiner. But the fact is that the OOD does not need to have a detailed knowledge of such rules; they are the concern of ship and unit commanders.
“For this reason, in my opinion, the time has come to think through seriously and define concretely those rules and principles which it is necessary to know in order to stand a watch underway. But let me touch on one other question first. Often officers, while standing a watch on the bridge, are required to keep up a constant navigational plot and to fix the ship’s position, using all available means. This requirement is far from practicable and for this reason is frequently carried out lackadaisically. While cruising in company, the chief concern of the watch officer is to maintain station in the formation and, during maneuvers, to work a maneuvering board. If it becomes necessary for him to fix the ship’s position he will have recourse to the simplest methods—taking two or three bearings, or a bearing and distance. For other methods, particularly celestial, he simply has no time. When proceeding in low visibility, the responsibility for navigational safety is placed on the navigator and CIC. The OOD’s function then is to operate the PPI repeater on the bridge, unless the commanding officer or some other qualified officer is occupied with it.
“For this reason it does not seem practical to me to require the OOD to be completely trained in all aspects of navigation. Primary emphasis should be placed on the conduct of maneuvers in company with other ships, maintaining station in line and column formations, working rapid solutions on a maneuvering board, independent utilization of the remote PPI scope, and accurate fixing of the ship’s position by the most simple means. The OOD has no reason to solve a large number of problems in celestial navigation, or to learn in detail the navigational aids of an entire operating area. I am convinced that it would be better to reduce the time spent in mastering such subjects and to give the officers an opportunity to study more thoroughly the rules of formation cruising and the rules for prevention of collisions at sea; and, of course, not only to study, but to master their application in practice.
“Under present conditions I see no sense in the OOD requirements relating to gun fire control. The fact of the matter is that the watch officer is not called on to control the weapons, but simply to sound the battle alarm in time. Consequently there is no need for him to know in detail the gunnery installation, or all the rules for controlling it in defense of the ship. However, every OOD should know to perfection the rules for taking evasing action against various types of attack, and be able to act intelligently in case of a sudden encounter with the enemy. . . .
“In connection with all this I would like to direct a few remarks at our naval academies. It is a fact that some graduates on reporting aboard ship prove themselves to be poorly prepared to carry out even the duties of JOOD. I need not go far for an example; we have a Lt. Portnov on our ship who has more than once failed his examination for OOD qualification. Each time he displayed a weak theoretical and practical background. This officer is still not qualified, and the academy is largely to blame for this. Portnov came to the fleet from the academy without a firm knowledge of formation maneuvers or the rules of the road, unable to read flaghoist signals, and without the ability to use a maneuvering board and logarithmic scale, to give orders to the helm, or to keep a log.
“It would seem that the time has come for the academies to lay stress on the development in the midshipmen of those practical skills which are necessary for the service; of course, this should not be at the expense of theoretical studies. But if it were done, then each of them on arrival aboard ship would plunge more confidently into the business of preparing to stand an underway watch, and we commanding officers would not have to waste so much time working out the most elementary of problems with these young officers.
“In conclusion I would observe that the time has come to give some thought to the question of incentives for increasing in our officers the desire to become qualified for independent watchstanding more quickly. It is a fact that under the present state of affairs a division officer who is not qualified as an underway OOD is in a more advantageous position (leaving aside the question of personal pride) than the officer who is so qualified. When the ship is underway he has a smaller load to carry; he has more free time, and less responsibility. ... I believe that we must develop in officers, especially the young ones, a personal interest in becoming qualified as soon as possible. It might be possible, for example, to establish a special title and insignia, Watch Officer, first and second class. But in any case, one thing is clear: under the present conditions the training of OODs deserves special attention. On it depends the further raising of the combat readiness of our ships.”
Lieutenant Cockell, Jr. USNR (Inactive) is now a candidate for Ph.D. and J.D. Degrees at the University of Michigan.
Harmon International Aviation Trophies Awarded
The New York Times, November 13, 1958. —The Harmon International Aviation Trophies for 1958 were presented by President Eisenhower to Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, and Navy Commander Jack R. Hunt.
The President congratulated both men as he gave them scrolls signifying outstanding achievements in aeronautics.
General LeMay was cited for having piloted a stratotanker last November for a nonrefueling record distance from Westover Air Base, Mass., to Buenos Aires.
Commander Hunt’s award was for having led the ZPG-2, a Navy blimp, on the longest non-stop, non-refueling flight in March, 1957. The blimp took off from the South Westover Naval Air Station and roamed the Atlantic for eleven days. It cruised off the coast of Portugal, off Africa and back through the West Indies to Key West, Fla., for a total of 9,448 miles in 264 hours and 12 minutes.
The trophies were established in 1926 by the late Col. Clifford B. Harmon.
Navy Unveils Electronic War “Game”
The New York Times, November 8,1958.— Simulated naval warfare can now be waged on an electronic battlefield by United States admirals and skippers, and by student officers who will succeed them in command.
The aim of the simulated clashes is to give the officers combat command experience.
A huge installation at the Naval War College in Newport can create battle conditions in theoretical fighting in areas up to 4,000 miles square. These grim games can bring into play every conceivable weapon and weapon carrier, both conventional and nuclear, with speeds ranging up to 20,000 m.p.h.
Installation of the 2,889 pieces of equipment of 263 different types, the 10,000 electronic tubes, 2,500 miles of wire, and 25,000 electrical connections began four years ago.
Housed in a block-long three-story building, it remained a secret project until today.
Two Opposing Teams
Now in operation, it can simulate both sides of a contest with rapidly changing developments covering an entire ocean. Surface ships and submarines, aircraft and air missiles, depth charges and torpedoes, plus ground forces, all can figure in the simulation of modern tactics and weaponry. The interplay of opposing forces can be projected for any area of the globe.
Two hundred men in command capacities —divided into “enemy” and “friendly” forces—can work simultaneously on a battle problem.
Basically, the warfare simulator focuses on a translucent screen fifteen feet in diameter and is observed in a darkened auditorium by umpires who can make instantaneous decisions. Upon it, images of each simulated force are electronically portrayed. Contributing to the total operation are many machines, rather than one big electronic brain. Navigation computers play a major role in the operation.
Commanders and staffs and individual unit commanders in twenty command centers— ten to a side—are housed in individual windowless rooms. Each realistically simulates a type of control center or flag (command) plot. And from the flag plot, the commander observes the situation involving his forces, evaluates the developing battle, and controls his forces.
May Begin with a Blip
A battle may begin with a blip—an object showing upon a radarscope. Then comes intelligence about the radar’s find, its size, speed, direction and altitude. But the facts are only those the commander would get if he were on the bridge or combat information center of his ship at sea.
Then follows the action between the two opposing forces.
Built into the warfare simulator are extensive communications systems.
Interactions of the forces are judged by the umpire, using professional judgment assisted by a digital analog computer. The computer, stored with weapon characteristics and target damage data, determines hit probability and increasing damage per hit, based in part on the vulnerability of the target.
The computer, working out interaction damage, automatically reduces the maximum speed and effectiveness of the target force. And the umpire may himself make judgments, on the battle progress, recording them manually.
The rapid calculation can reflect the progressive capabilities of the forces at any moment of the operation and test the elements of mobility and fire-power and the skill of the commanders.
Simulated Ocean Will Test Cable
The New York Times, November 13, 1958. —An “ocean” is being built at Chester, N. J., about eight miles west of Morristown, N. J. There, Bell Telephone Laboratories engineers are constructing an unusual dry-land facility for testing telephone cable. It will have a simulated depth of two nautical miles.
The “Chester ocean” is a concrete trough 315 feet long, about eight feet wide and three feet deep. It will be covered with pre-cast concrete slabs and four feet of soil. When completed later this month, the trough will be filled with fresh water that will be maintained at a constant temperature of 37 degrees Fahrenheit by means of cooling pipes cast in the walls of the trough.
Inside the trough will be ten lengths of steel tubing into which will be inserted undersea cable and water with the saline content of water two miles below the surface of the ocean. Pressure will be maintained at 5,000 pounds per square inch, duplicating the actual below-sea conditions.
Each cable will be 630 feet long and will be looped in a pair of the pipes so that both ends will be accessible for testing.
The tensions that accompany cable-laying operations also will be simulated through the use of ground anchors at one end. Stretching will be reduced gradually to duplicate the trip from ship deck to ocean bottom. The cables will be subjected to tests lasting five to ten years.
Bell Laboratories engineers were faced with the decision of actually laying test cables or building the “ocean.” They found that land- based tests would be 75 per cent cheaper than the actual sea operation. It will also permit much more accurate control.
O. D. Grismore and J. W. Phelps, Bell engineers designed the “Chester ocean.”
All Quiet for the Oysters
By Desmond Wettern
For 13 years since the war the Royal Navy has been making almost ceaseless depth charge attacks, but not against U-boats but their victims.
In the confined waters of the English Channel, in the Thames Estuary, and in the approaches to many other British ports the end of the war posed a great problem. As a result of the work of enemy submarines, mines, surface craft, and aircraft no less than 500 wrecks littered the sea lanes around the British Isles. Almost all these wrecks were to a greater or lesser degree a menace to navigation.
But the problem did not begin in 1945. It started in the very early days of the war. In 1940 it was found that the peacetime methods of wreck clearance could not possibly cope with the situation and the Admiralty Wreck Dispersal Fleet was formed. The “Fleet” for most of the early days of the war was composed of a former railroad company coastal freighter, a large German trawler which had been taken as a prize, a small ex-German coaster, two ex-minesweeping trawlers, and a 44-year old Dutch Schuyt or coaster.
This assortment of craft did valiant work during the war years but when the war ended and other craft could be spared 20 Isles-class antisubmarine trawlers were converted for wreck dispersal duty. These trawlers, which were disarmed, displace 560 tons and are coal burners. Crew is normally around 38. Two of the twenty were fitted as store carriers for the “Fleet.”
Over one hundred wrecks had been disposed of by the original “Fleet” up to 1944 but many more remained to be moved. In the early days the men in the dispersal ships had little or no experience in the tasks involved, which included navigation of a very high order, handling explosives and diving. There was no book of rules to which to refer and everyone in the “Fleet” learned in the hard school of bitter experience. The weather was always a problem. The nature of the work required the dispersal vessel to remain at anchor often for long periods near a wreck. In exposed waters this was often very difficult and on an average 185 days were lost each year up to 1944 due to adverse weather.
With the Allied invasion of Europe, the work of the dispersal ships increased enormously. The number of ships was greatly increased too. At Ostend a channel was literally blasted through the wrecks while at Boulogne 26 wrecks piled on top of one another had to be cleared. At Calais a channel was made through 14 wrecks in nine days.
After helping the Army clear 27 bridges which were blocking the Rhine at the end of the war, the “Fleet” moved back into British coastal waters. Soon the Isles-class trawlers were a familiar sight around Britain’s coasts, flying a red flag at the masthead and bearing the hull identification letters DV 2-20.
The wrecks were ships of all types, merchant ships and warships, and they were by no means all British. In some cases the identity of the wreck was never known but they all had one thing in common: they were a menace to shipping.
Disposal of wrecks was usually done with explosives. The first move was normally to carry out a survey of the wreck using divers and echo sounders. Then depth charges would be dropped at various settings. These would either blast away the superstructure of the wreck or, in shallow water, would be used to flatten it into a heap of steel plates. To move the wrecks using ordinary salvage methods was either impossible or totally uneconomic. But where practicable a depth of at least 45 feet over the wreck had to be made. Often this involved literally blasting a grave for the sunken ship on the sea floor. Each of the trawlers was equipped with two “wrecking boats”—32-foot motor cutters— fitted with echo sounders. Other equipment included 180 Mark VII depth charges. The use of various obsolete types of depth charges allowed the Admiralty to use up some of its vast wartime stocks.
The work of finding the wreck was often very difficult. Local knowledge was surprisingly inaccurate. Frequently wreck buoys were a long way off the correct position. Silting caused problems as mud and sand might often so cover a wreck that there would be no sharp “peaks” on the echo-sounder. Once the wreck was found, two or three runs would be made across it by the dispersal trawler using her echo-sounder. These would show in what position the wreck was lying, the position of “peaks” and scours and the amount of silting which has taken place. If there was insufficient water for the trawler the motor cutters would be used. After the first survey a “blow” of anything from two to 40 depth charges would be dropped. Further soundings would be taken with the echo-sounders and possibly a quick survey would be made by a diver. The routine of surveying and “blowing” is kept up until the wreck is blasted down to the desired depth. On completion of the work it was customary to send a “check” to Trinity House or whatever authority was responsible for navigational aids in the area. “Checks” were only sent in the case of merchant vessels and since 1945 these “checks” have averaged 11s. 6d. per ton gross dispersed.
Though the work of the dispersal ships was of the utmost value to shipping, some folk ashore did not appreciate the service. The blasting of wrecks close inshore often produced strong protests from seaside towns whose inhabitants were disturbed by the periodic explosions. In one or two places there were also temporary disturbances of the fishing grounds but the noise and the loss of a few thousand fish were far outweighed by the importance of making the sea lanes safe for all users. One of the trickiest problems dealt with by a trawler of the service was to remove the wreck of a small warship from the middle of an oyster bed. Oysters, like salmon, deer, and swans, are almost sacred in England and many thousands of pounds are spent in encouraging their breeding and in protecting them each year. With what must have been top flight diplomacy the wreck dispersal team flattened the wreck and the noise did not apparently seriously annoy the oysters.
The work of wreck dispersal could usually be carried out only in the summer and the 1958 “season” began at the end of April. Only one ship, the trawler HMS Steepholm, was now employed and she has been dealing with wrecks off Deal, Dover, and Sheerness, as well as in the Wash area off Norfolk and Lincolnshire. The ship will also make a “showing the flag” visit to the French port of Boulogne. The service is to be wound up in the fall and the Steepholm will pay off. Any further work will be carried out by civilian authorities. The Steepholm may probably be scrapped and her decommissioning will mark the end of 19 years vital service by the Royal Navy to ships of all nations.
Mr. Wettern, a British writer on naval and maritime subjects, is a frequent contributor to the Proceedings.
U. S. to Increase Ocean Research
By John W. Finney
The New York Times, November 12, 1958.—The Government, under the impetus of the Soviet submarine threat, is preparing to take the biggest step in over a quarter of a century to accelerate oceanographic research by the United States.
Plans are being made by Government research agencies for construction of two oceanographic ships particularly designed for deep-ocean research work.
One of the ships would be constructed by the Navy, the other by the National Science Foundation. Upon completion in the early nineteen sixties they would be assigned to private oceanographic institutions for basic research in the Atlantic and Pacific.
The ship construction plans are indicative of a growing emphasis that has been placed on oceanographic research as a result of the critical analysis of the national scientific effort during the last year.
Soviet Seen in Lead
Both within and without the Administration there is a prevailing feeling that oceanography is one of the major research fields that has been inadequately supported in the past and in which the United States is in danger of falling behind the Soviet Union.
A sense of urgency has been added to this feeling by the conclusion that only through increased knowledge of the seas can an improved defense be developed against the large Soviet undersea fleet, now estimated to number nearly 500 submarines.
It appears, therefore, that oceanographic research is to get its biggest lift since the late nineteen twenties, when the Rockefeller Foundation, on the basis of a National Academy of Science report, provided grants for development of several private oceanographic institutions.
Design Carefully Studied
Navy plans call for construction of a 1,150- ton ship, 204 feet long and with a 37-foot beam. Its design has been worked out in cooperation with oceanographers throughout the country to provide the most up-to-date type research vessel.
A ship of similar size is planned by the National Science Foundation. The Navy ship probably will be assigned to the Woods Hole (Mass.) Oceanographic Institution and the Foundation ship to the Scripps Institution of Oceanography in La Jolla, Calif.
Funds for the two ships are being proposed for inclusion in the fiscal year 1960 budget, which President Eisenhower will present to Congress in January.
While the budget is being drafted under economy dictates, it appears certain that the ships will be included on the basis of urgent recommendations of influential forces within and without the Administration.
Soviet Fleet Modern
The Soviet Union is believed to be operating about a dozen large, well-equipped research vessels, including two 7,500-ton icebreaking cargo ships and the recently completed 3,250-ton Mihail Lomonosov, which the Navy describes as “probably the finest oceanographic research vessel afloat today.”
In contrast, the United States oceanographic fleet consists of two converted seaplane tenders operated by the Navy and about a dozen converted yachts, tugs and trawlers—none larger than 750 tons and most smaller than 300 tons—operated by private oceanographic institutions.
As an intermediary step, until the new ships can be built, the Navy is converting two 2,000-ton salvage vessels and a seaplane tender for oceanographic research—the first conversions for this purpose since shortly after World War II.
New Studies Set on Rocket Fuels
By John W. Finney
The New York Times, October 28, 1958.— The Defense Department’s space agency initiated today a major research program aimed at developing high-powered solid fuels for military and space rockets.
The Advanced Research Projects Agency awarded research contracts to four chemicals companies for the long-range development of new types of solid fuels that would be more energetic than those now coming into use in military missiles.
The fuels would be used to power more compact, reliable military ballistic missiles, as well as upper stages in space exploration rockets.
Roy W. Johnson, agency director, emphasized the significance of the research program, saying:
“The long-range importance of these research contracts to our ballistic missiles programs for all ranges and to our anti-ballistic missile program cannot be overstated.
“Our national space programs of the future will be greatly benefited by the returns from these contracts.”
New Chemical Field Seen
The contracts range from $1,000,000 to $2,000,000 each. They are just the start on a multi-million dollar research program that will stretch over several years and should promote a new field in the chemical industry.
Expanded research on solid fuel was decided on by the agency shortly after it was formed early this year. As a start, $20,000,000 was appropriated to it for this fiscal year.
Until recently most of the emphasis on propellants for military missiles, particularly the long-range ballistic types, had been on liquid fuels. These are generally composed of hydrocarbon fuel, such as kerosene or alcohol, and oxygen supply, such as liquid oxygen.
Several “second generation” military missiles are under development using solid fuels. They include the Navy’s Polaris intermediate- range ballistic missile, the Air Force’s Minute- man intercontinental, the Army’s short-range Pershing and the Nike-Zeus anti-ballistic missile.
The new program, however, looks beyond these to technological breakthroughs that could be utilized in military and space work five years from now.
The long-range interest in solid fuels stems primarily from the fact that they are more reliable, storable and compact than the volatile, tricky liquid fuels. In contrast to the long preparatory countdown for firing a liquid- fuel rocket, a solid-fuel missile is always at virtual readiness for firing.
Solid fuels are a molded or cast compound of chemicals combining both the oxidizer and fuel, thus eliminating the need for the multitude of pumps, piping and valves found in liquid-fuel rockets.
Thus far, the draw back to solid propellants is that they do not produce as much energy per pound of fuel, or what the missilemen call specific impulse, as liquid fuels.
RCN Launches Ice Forecasts
The Crowsnest, June, 1958.—Canada’s first ice-forecasting service, providing information on ice conditions in Canadian and adjacent waters, went into operation this spring. The service is being operated this year by the Royal Canadian Navy on behalf of the Department of Transport, which will take it over in 1959.
The service is a part of a mutual arrangement between Canada and the United States for provision of information on ice-infested areas around the coast of North America, for the benefit of commercial and government shipping.
The areas covered by the RCN ice forecasts include the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Hudson Bay, Hudson Strait and the northern coast of continental Canada.
Ice forecasts for the Central and Eastern Arctic and for the shipping lanes along the east coast of Baffin Bay have been provided in the past by the United States Navy’s Hydrographic Office. This year the Hydro- graphic Office will provide the usual full support to shipping along the east coast north to Baffin Bay and five and 30-day forecasts for the Eastern Arctic area. Other ice advisories and ice forecasts will be provided by Canada.
The new Ice Central, as it is called, is located at the RCN Air Station, HMCS Shearwater, and is operated by RCN personnel who have had previous practical experience with sea ice and taken special training courses with the U. S. Hydrographic Office. The Department of Transport has organized an extensive system of surface and aerial ice observations, which are relayed to the Ice Central at HMCS Shearwater for use in issuing ice bulletins and ice forecasts. Both civilian and Royal Canadian Air Force aircraft will be used in the aerial ice surveys.
By midsummer of this year, three field forecast stations will be set up at Churchill, Cambridge and Frobisher in the north. While the HMCS Shearwater Ice Central will be manned the year round, these stations will be manned, two at a time, during the summer months only.
The HMCS Shearwater unit will provide basic ice information to the three northern stations, which will be equipped with radio facsimile recorders.
The service began by providing forecasts for the Gulf of St. Lawrence area, to assist shipping in both the river and the gulf. There will also be a build-up of ice information which may assist in extending the shipping season in the St. Lawrence Seaway.
Forecasts covering the Hudson Bay and Hudson Strait area will assist shipping operating to and from Churchill and the service will gather data for further knowledge of shipping seasons in the Ungava and other areas.
Ice information, both observed and forecast, along the northern coast of continental Canada will be used largely by shipping employed in the sea re-supply of DEW Line sites.
Six Scheduled Airlines Now Using Polar Route
The New York Herald Tribune, November 2, 1958.—The polar region of the North, once a dreaded white wilderness, has become a smooth, safe aerial superhighway for commercial aviation.
Today, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines became the sixth scheduled carrier to use the Polar route across or near the North Pole for long-distance inter-continental flights.
KLM, using DC-7Cs, inaugurated Amsterdam-Tokyo service via the Pole—a route that slices 1,500 miles and sixteen hours from its old southern route.
Trans World, Pan American, Scandinavian, Air France and Canadian Pacific Airlines are the other carriers using the polar route. Since Scandinavian pioneered commercial polar flights about three years ago, these five airlines have hauled approximately 250,000 passengers over the roof of the world.
The time and distance advantages are obvious: the world is a sphere and it is faster to fly across the top than around the side. But not so obvious and well known are the safety advantages—for the Polar route in terms of weather, and smoothness is far superior to flying the North Atlantic.
This is why the pilots themselves prefer the Polar trips:
Temperatures are low but dry, so that engine and air-frame icing is virtually unknown.
Turbulence is extremely rare because the cloud formations associated with turbulence are seldom found above the Pole.
Contrary to common belief, snowstorms are local and easily avoided because Polar winds are weak.
Flying weather is consistently stable the year-around; there are no thunderstorms to worry about and the so-called “low” and “high” air masses, which bring violent weather changes, have very little influence in the area around the Pole.
The chief difficulty to polar flight operations is the fact that the air liner’s usual major navigation aid, the magnetic compass, is useless at the top of the world. It becomes unreliable as soon as an aircraft reaches the vicinity of the Magnetic Pole, and could have a pilot flying in circles without realizing it.
Also, in the summer months when night becomes day in the far North navigators are unable to “shoot” the moon and stars for position fixes; the moon and the stars are invisible in the bright sunshine.
What the air lines did was to develop a new system of polar navigation. First they installed gyro-compasses in cockpits as supplementary instruments to the magnetic compass. These are unaffected by the electromagnetic disturbances of the polar regions. The polar carriers also use a navigation “grid” chart system which eliminates the polar area distortions on a conventional chart.
For position fixes in the summer, crews employ a “polarized” compass which literally measures the angles of the sun’s rays above the horizon and gives a pilot an accurate check of just where he is at any given time.
While polar flights have become routine to the gentlemen in the cockpit, they offer some unusual experiences to the passengers in the cabin.
In the winter, for example, a person leaving Amsterdam for Tokyo at 10 p. m. will not see sunlight again for twenty hours. But during the summer, he will fly in daylight virtually the entire trip.
The polar routes, although they cross thinly-populated areas and cover miles of vast wilderness, are still dotted with many emergency airfields, mostly military.
1. Unless a Soviet newspaper article is accompanied by the disaffirmative notation “published for discussion purposes only,” it is presumed to have the approval of the publishing authority.