Comment and Discussion

Theodore Roosevelt

(See pages 76-82, 87-100, October, 1958 Proceed­ings)

Rear Admiral Henry Williams, usn (ret.).—It might be of interest to mention that the first book ever dedicated to Theodore Roosevelt was the Class of ’98 Lucky Bag. When he was Assistant Secretary of the Navy and as such came to Annapolis to address the naval cadets, he made such an impression on us that we dedicated our Lucky Bag to him. Of course, this was done before he achieved fame in the war. We left the Naval Academy after April 2, 1898, and all copy was submitted before that date.

When General Shafter’s expeditionary force arrived for the capture of Santiago, small boats for the fleet, then blockading the har­bor, were sent to land the troops. Naval ca­dets from the ships—some from my class and also ’97—were there and I personally landed many of the Rough Riders. We dubbed them “Rough Walkers.”

My classmate, the late Captain C. P. Nel­son, was the captain of the submarine Plunger when Roosevelt took the controls. Captain Nelson later told me how, in Roosevelt’s en­thusiastic maneuvering, he had just about exhausted the compressed air supply necessary to surface the boat after submerging. Fortu­nately, the President relinquished the controls in time to avoid forcing the skipper to take over.

Professor Johnson’s article does not over­estimate the effect of President Roosevelt’s in­fluence in support of Sims and his campaign for improving accuracy of gunfire. At Santi­ago, with the American battleships firing at almost point-blank range, Cervera’s ships were destroyed not by the main battery guns but by those of the secondary batteries. Until target practice was improved to a point where the big guns could hit targets, the secondary batteries remained an essential component. Sims, with the backing of Theodore Roose­velt, accomplished this notable advance in American naval gunnery.

Statistics of Submarine Warfare,

1939-1945

Lieutenant (SB) Philip Chaplin, rcn(r) (ret.).—The submarine arm was by far the most effective branch of the German Navy in two World Wars and is of abiding interest to German naval historians. The German periodical Marine Rundschau is in its fifty-fifth year of publication and has recently con­tained a significant feature, authored by Dr. J. Rohwer, titled “Documentation.” This analysis, published in five installments, has evaluated the performance of submarines in World War II. The five titles are: “The Most Successful German Submarines,” “Submarine Successes against Large Warships,” “The Most Successful Submarine Captains,” “The Most Successful Commerce Raiding Sub­marine Patrols,” and “Submarine Victories Over Submarines.”

The first article lists those German boats that sank more than 100,000 gross tons of merchant shipping. U-48, commanded by H. Schulze, Rosing, and Bleichrodt, led with 310,007 tons, followed by Kretschmer’s U-99, with 241,523.

The most successful submarine captains included all those that sank more than 90,000 tons of cargo shipping space. Germany had three of the first ten; Kretschmer, first, H. Schulze, sixth, and Prien, tenth. Of the forty- four listed, all but three are Germans.

Germany likewise is credited with domina­tion of the most successful commerce raiding patrols. Of the 124 patrols listed, only nine were achieved by submariners other than German.

On the basis of these statistics it appears evident that German submarines were by far the most successful in sinking merchantmen in World War II. However, this is at least par­tially explained by the fact that in general there was little seaborne trade for the Allies to attack, except in the Mediterranean during the African Campaign, and in the Western Pacific. In contrast, the main effort of U-boats was made against the well-traveled North Atlantic supply route. However, against com­batant surface vessels, Axis submarines were less successful than those of the Allies, al­though they had more targets of opportunity.

In the fifth and final tabulation, ninety en­counters between opposing submarines are listed. Eighty resulted in authenticated sink­ings. An analysis reveals some very one-sided results. United States submarines triumphed over Japan’s, 20-1, Britain’s over Italy’s, 18-1, and Germany’s, 16-3. In contrast, Russia lost eight submarines to various foes while sinking none.

Two logical conclusions may be derived from a study of Dr. Rohwer’s articles. First, in general the submarines of both sides achieved expected results. Second, those of the Allies were the better fighters in individual duels, with the notable exception of Russia’s poor record.

Notes on Handling Ships with Con­trollable Pitch Propellers

Lieutenant Commander Edward F. Mc- Cartan, usn.—Strange commands can be heard on the bridges of some of the Navy’s new ships these days; such novel terms as, “All ahead six feet,” “All zero pitch,” “Port back two feet, six inches,” might well baffle a seasoned mariner. The explanation is quite simple; those ships are equipped with con­trollable pitch propellers. Any new system or technique is bound to develop its own par­ticular terminology and this one is well on the way toward enriching naval phraseology.

The controllable pitch propeller is not a brand new idea; it has been tried with vary­ing degrees of success in several forms. A cy­cloidal type, for example, was used in many German minesweepers in World War II. Les­sons learned in that conflict together with the impetus lent by the extensive use of mines in Korean waters more recently led to its instal­lation in a new class of non-magnetic ocean minesweepers. The MSO’s of the 421-, the 488-, and the 508-class are now an integral part of the fleet but there still remains a lot to learn about the use of the controllable pitch system in order to realize the full bene­fits of its performance. None of the standard works on seamanship and shiphandling deal with it, and even the newer works give it only passing mention. Yet with its accompanying remote control from the pilot house, the con­trollable pitch propeller system is the answer to a shiphandler’s prayer; dead time is elimi­nated and the exact degree of power neces­sary can be applied at will.

This system, incorporating remote control equipment for bridge operation, permits, ac­cording to the technical manual, “independ­ent control of port and starboard propellers by hydraulic means for variation and reversal of the propeller blades. In order to provide optimum operating conditions for the main engines, shaft RPM may be held constant.” More simply stated, this means engine speed can be set to the most efficient RPM for the conditions anticipated, the shafts will turn at the same speed in the same direction contin­uously, and the angle of the propeller blades can be changed from the pilot house in order to move the ship ahead, stop it, or send it astern. Under cruising conditions, for in­stance, a vessel’s shaft revolutions can be set low and maximum pitch used for the sake of economy; when towing minesweeping gear or maneuvering in restricted waters, shaft revolutions can be set high and lower pitch used in order to have instant power available.

With twin screws and rudders, the forces acting on the MSO are the same as for one with conventional props (Knight’s Modern Seamanship and Crenshaw’s Naval Shiphandling contain excellent discussions of these forces). Even though the shafts always turn in the same direction, the flow of water directed against the rudders changes as the propeller blades are rotated on individual axes to alter speed and direction. This rotary motion is imparted by the action of a piston on linkages to the blades; the piston is moved horizon­tally by a hydraulically operated servo sys­tem and it is this motion which prompts the terminology “feet of the pitch” ahead or astern. Through a solenoid system operated from a console in the pilot house, the pitch can be changed almost instantaneously; for example, the time for changing from six feet ahead to five feet astern—the maximum travel—is about ten seconds. Normal changes of a foot or two of pitch take only a second.

Maneuverability imported by this control is astounding—the minesweeper can come to a stop from ahead at full power in just a little over one shiplength. Shaft revolu­tions can be controlled from the same con­sole by means of air-pressured throttles. Only one console operator is required since it is not necessary to operate the throttles and the pitch control simultaneously (although radi­cal pitch changes impose a sudden load on the engines and demand prompt readjust­ment of the RPM to prevent bogging down). The twin rudders are activated by an electro­hydraulic system which permits shifting from one extreme to the other in fifteen seconds, from midships to full rudder in seven seconds, and which brings immediate response from the rudder and propellers in only slightly more time than it takes to give the order. Dead time is virtually eliminated. This re­quires some mental adjustment on the part of officers who have learned shiphandling in other types (even destroyers).

The light displacement of the MSO classes makes them highly sensitive to the effect of current. Further, the high freeboard forward and the large superstructure present a tre­mendous sail area relative to the size of the ship. As a result, the MSO will back smartly into the wind, and is difficult to turn through the wind unless there is considerable way on or plenty of power is available.

As with any new system, mechanical diffi­culties have afflicted the variable pitch ships, and the conning officer must know his own vessel and allow for its idiosyncrasies. As these are corrected, it is hoped and expected that further refinements and operating pro­cedures will be discovered, tested, and adopted in order to utilize the extremely flexible controllable pitch system to its full­est possible extent.

“Pure, Enlightened, and Modern Marxism”

(See pages 45-52, January, 1958 Proceedings)

Mr. Edmund A. Gibson, Washington, D. C.—Wing Commander Gellner’s euphe­misms on “pure, enlightened, and modern Marxism,” the “correct interpretation of real Marxism,” “humanized Marxism presented in a refined manner,” “socialist democracy,” etc., are strongly reminiscent of Mr. Latti- more’s essays on the Chinese “agrarian re­formers.” In particular, both of these gentle­men apply a brand of logic which is, to say the least, peculiar.

“Enlightened Marxism,” according to the Commander, “equates democracy with per­sonal freedom . . . but not necessarily with private enterprise.” How, one may ask, is personal freedom to be distinguished from private enterprise? Personal freedom and private enterprise are the same thing. Later in the article we are told that, under en­lightened Marxism, “political freedom as we know it” is “severely circumscribed.” By some astonishing process of reasoning, the Commander concludes that, as a result of this, “the exercise of the citizen’s rights in the administrative and in the economic fields be­comes exceedingly important.” Once again, how can the “exercise of the citizen’s rights” be distinguished from “political freedom?” And how can anything in the nature of ab­stract, indefeasible “citizen’s rights” exist in any type whatever of Marxian system?

“The Catholic Church,” says the Com­mander, “had advocated some form of Christian socialism ever since Leo XIII’s en­cyclical Rerum Novarum.” The socialistic na­ture of this encyclical may perhaps be in­ferred from the following direct quotation.

Man precedes the State, and possesses, prior to the formation of any State, the right of providing for the sustenance of his body. The fact that God has given the earth for the use and enjoyment of the whole human race can in no way be a bar to the owning of private property . . . the practice of all ages has consecrated the principle of private ownership, as being pre-eminently in conformity with human nature, and as conducting in the most unmistakable manner to the peace and tran­quillity of human existence.

The Catholic Church, in point of fact, takes no position pro or con any of the standard forms of government as such. The sole test applied by the Church is whether or not the government in question governs in accordance with the moral principles derived from the system of Natural Law. Natural Law, in the Church’s view, derives from Divine Law, and since atheistic Marxism presupposes the non-existence of the Divinity, the Church cannot in logic do anything but oppose it.

In the American system of constitutional democracy, and in that system alone, the great principles of Natural Law have been set up permanently, and made more or less effectively binding upon all future govern­ments. Consequently, far from being an ex­ponent of “Christian socialism,” the Catholic Church, if it espoused any of the existing systems, would be required by its own logic to hold the American system in the highest favor, and the Church does, in fact, view that system with peculiar complacency.

The present correspondent fervently hopes that American naval officers will tenaciously bear in mind the fact that any Marxian sys­tem, however “enlightened” it may be, must subsume the abolishment of the American constitutional system.

Postwar British Naval Estimates

Revised British Figures

(See pages 75-83, May, 1958 Proceedings)

Vice Admiral B. B. Schofield, rn(ret.).— My attention has been drawn to the fact that the figures given for the naval estimates in the table accompanying my article, “Britain’s Postwar Naval Policy,” do not agree in all re­spects with those of the Admiralty.

The above revised table shows the net figures which the Admiralty kindly has supplied me, and which reflect more exactly the amount of money Parliament has been asked to vote for expenditure on the Royal Navy.

The revised figures do not materially affect the conclusions arrived at in my article, except in one instance where I showed an increase in the gross estimates of £25.5 million for 1955 whereas there was a net decrease of £20 mil­lion when American aid is taken into account. These revised figures show that naval expendi­ture for the last seven years has remained practically unchanged, despite the great in­crease in the cost of goods and services which has taken place during that time.

Fiction Foreshadows Fact

(See pages 478-485, May, 1953 Proceedings)

Captain J. W. McElroy, usnr.—Captain Layton’s “Rendezvous in Reverse” published six years ago, first made me wonder just how many operation orders of brilliant naval strategists originally may have been con­ceived in a flight of fancy by some author of fiction. Captain Layton’s article discussed the similarity, in reverse, between the Japanese second attack on Pearl Harbor, May 4, 1942, and Alec Hudson’s “Rendezvous,” an article that appeared in a national magazine during the summer of 1941.

Half a century ago, The Riddle of the Sands described the essential features of Operation Neptune-Overlord. Camouflaged landing barges, hidden in shallow North Sea estuaries and small canals crossing the Low Countries’ tidelands, were to be towed across to invade England. Erskine Childers almost foresaw our staggered departures from blacked-out British ports to hit Omaha and Utah beaches. The Valor of Ignorance was another amphibious operation order in reverse. Complete with annexes and large-scale maps, this showed the Japanese in 1909 just how to seize California, Oregon, and Washington. “Rendezvous in Reverse” handed the enemy ready-made plans to bomb Pearl Harbor. Within a year, and strictly following the story, two Emily sea planes refueled from submarines 7-75 and 7-79 off French Frigate Shoal, dropped their bombs over Oahu, and returned safely to Truk.

Food for thought is Felix Riesenberg’s lat­est adventure story for boys, The Vanishing Steamer. Fighting espionage and treason, Mid­shipman Bill Barrett and associates locate three enemy U-boats planning missile bases in the West Indies. The evil genius and OTC flies his flag in a modern “Q” ship, fitted out with Buck Rogers paraphernalia to change rigging and silhouette instantly, when neces­sary. The author’s realism either could set up another reverse operation or alert unfriendly naval planners that such nefarious schemes stand no chance of success.

* * *