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Soviet Criticism of “Der Seekrieg” and Author’s Reply
Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge, German Federal Navy.—Last summer the press reported that Vice Admiral Ruge’s Der Seekrieg, the history of the German Navy, 1939-1945, had been sharply criticized by the Soviets. They stated baldly and without proof that the truth had been shamelessly distorted, particularly in the chapters concerning the battle of the Soviet Army and Navy.
When Der Seekrieg appeared in 1954, the Soviets took no notice of the book. Now that it has been published in France, England, and the United States, they suddenly insist that “it was written from the point of view of an advocate of revanche.” This is pure invention since nowhere in the book can one find the slightest basis for such an accusation. Obviously they are trying to cast doubt on the book’s reliability. It is embarrassing to them that this book, based on incontestable material, proves that the Soviet conduct of naval warfare from 1941-1945 was anything but brilliant, despite many good individual performances and deeds of valor.
The Soviets are especially incensed that Der Seekrieg attributes the collapse of the German advance on Moscow in 1941 to a lack of supplies rather than Soviet resistance. That General Colonel Guderian in his memoirs came independently to the same conclusion gives them no pause for reflection. They simply
unjustly classify both authors as liars.
Any other reaction would be out of keeping with their concept of unrestricted glorification of the Soviet Armed Forces. Hence they go on to celebrate achievements which never really took place. They still maintain with might and main that in the conquest of the Baltic Islands 27 naval craft were sunk. In reality only one German vessel was sunk, a fishing steamer rebuilt as a minesweeper. Similarly they insist that a Soviet U-boat torpedoed the Tirpitz in the Arctic. The battleship Tir- pitz was never hit by a torpedo. Since the U-boat skipper was decorated as a “Hero of the Soviet Union” when his success was reported, it is a bit difficult for the Soviets to accept the truth at this time.
Every soldier knows that errors and incorrect observations can occur in battle. This is no disgrace. It is, however, a bad sign when the leaders of a country and its armed forces cannot bring themselves after fifteen years to check events objectively and put them straight historically.
Critics in Western countries have taken pains to stress the great objectivity of Der Seekrieg. A completely neutral person, Mr. Jurg Meister, a native Swiss now living in France, came to the same conclusion as Vice Admiral Ruge on the basis of his studies for his recent book, The Naval War In East European Waters 1941-1945. While preparing this book he wrote to the Soviet government requesting information on a number of points. He failed to receive any answer.
Those individuals or governments who refuse the usual historical research cooperation have no right later on to complain about the attitude or statements of a writer to whom they have denied valuable historical information. No historian reasonably can expect unsupported claims or statements about the accomplishments of his armed forces to be fully accepted by the critidal reader. Truth should be the handmaiden of history.
Officer Training in the Russian Navy
Lieutenant Commander Wilson Valentine, usnr.—Officer training is offered at two levels. The first level includes the naval preparatory and intermediate schools and concludes at the end of ten years of school. Students in the preparatory schools receive political indoctrination and general military training, and are usually permitted their choice of a specialty when they go to the higher schools.
The intermediate naval schools, designed to prepare junior officers for the technical branches of the navy, offer a three-year course ending with the tenth grade. Training is highly specialized, enabling the students to qualify for the work of their particular course, but leaving them handicapped if they are transferred into another branch of work. They usually graduate with the rank of lieutenant, but their chances of advancement are limited. Further training is essential to promotion.
Advanced schools are numerous. Higher training of combat officers is conducted at schools in Archangel, Leningrad, Kaliningrad and Sevastopol which graduate about fourteen hundred officers a year. The Naval Ministry reorganized the schools in 1951 to provide for specialized instruction. Courses are given in artillery and mine and torpedo warfare, while the Russian development of the H-bomb brought an increased emphasis on submarine warfare instruction. The Leningrad and Kaliningrad schools concentrate exclusively in that field, while graduates of the lesser schools are given an additional eight months of submarine warfare training.
There exist also Higher Marine Engineering Schools, two in the Leningrad area and a third near Sevastopol. These offer courses in steam, diesel, and electrical engineering, gas turbines, and in shipbuilding. The course lasts five years and eight months, culminating with state examinations and the preparation and defense of a thesis. This course follows the completion of a secondary education, assuring its graduates a thorough training program before entering on their duties.
Also in Leningrad are a Higher Engineering School for Construction Corps officers, and a Naval Medical School. The programs at both institutions cover six years of work. Graduates of secondary medical schools are accepted by the Higher Medical School. Students are promoted several times prior to graduation, and honor graduates are given the rank of commander, junior grade, on reporting for duty. Medical officers may also be commissioned directly from civilian medical schools.
Radar and Radio Schools are located at Leningrad and Pushkino, respectively. Their entrance requirements include a secondary school diploma. The course requirements parallel those of the Higher Engineering Schools and graduates receive the rank of lieutenant-engineer.
The Naval Quartermaster School at Vyborg offers three years of training to secondary school graduates who are commissioned as lieutenants on graduation. Studies are conducted at sea and ashore and include all forms of supply and finance.
Other specialized schools include Higher Naval Aviation Schools with a five-year course, graduating pilot-lieutenants, and the Engels Higher Naval Political School in Leningrad, which provides a four-year course but whose graduates, former enlisted ratings, often receive better positions than graduates of other schools; a not surprising development when one remembers the important role assigned to political officers by the Soviet Union. Hydrographic Schools with a five- year and eight-month curriculum graduate their students with the rank of lieutenant- engineer. Arrangements are made with civilian institutions for the training of foreign language and legal officers.
Generally, the USSR has an extensive and effective program of training for the men who will lead the Soviet navy. Weaknesses do appear, particularly in the lower schools, but constant reorganization seems to be eliminating the weaker links. Their progress warrants the continuous attention of American naval personnel.
The Garibaldi, originally completed in 1937, recently has been converted into an antiaircraft cruiser with new armament, including surface-to- air guided missiles.
Opportunities and Challenges of a Naval Career
(See pages 97-100, March, 1958 Proceedings and pages 102-106, August, 1958 Proceedings)
Captain N. Burt Davis, Jr., usn.—I was one of those who graduated in June of 1933 but was not commissioned in the regular Navy. The immediate future appeared both gloomy and frustrating. Jobs were scarce and our country was still experiencing a depression. This was indeed a staggering blow to one who had left a Quaker heritage to become a naval officer. Three months later I sailed with Admiral Byrd to the Antarctic as Second Mate of the barkentine Bear of Oakland. It was a turning point in my life and also a step forward toward returning to active duty.
Today, after a quarter of a century of following the sea, I am a Captain. The trials and tribulations that may be ahead incident to retention appear no greater than those of the past. As expectant midshipmen, my class had been decimated through competitive entrance examinations. Four years later, only two out of three who had entered the Academy were graduated. Then down through the years pitfalls disguised as probationary commissions, disciplinary action, selection, World War II, Korea, and Physical Evaluation Boards, all took their toll. It has been a constant challenge to remain an active naval officer. The 1958 Naval Register indicates slightly more than two hundred members of my class are on active duty. All were commissioned by and with the consent of the U. S. Senate. A total of thirty years’ service appeared to be a sinecure until White Charger reared its head.
Yet the rewards of a naval career are many, and to each his own. I believe that people, or rather individuals, make this world. Nineteen years of sea duty have convinced me that it is the ship’s company who make or break a command. Know your men, their personal problems, their talents and their limitations, and you can overcome most hurdles.
I have had four different commands at sea and served in nearly all types of craft from motor torpedo boats to battleships. Each has been a challenge. I love my career as a naval officer. To me the Navy is an honorable profession. As of this date, ten of my class have been nominated for flag or general rank. Two officers of the lower half received the Congressional Medal of Honor during World War II. There is incentive enough for those who remain on active duty to conquer any additional complexities that may arise in the future. I recommend the Navy to all young Americans who are willing to work and fight throughout their career for success.
The Compass Deflector
Captain D. Daragan, former Russian Imperial Navy.—Compass deviation is caused by dissimilarity of the size and direction of the magnetic directive force on different courses. In most navies, compasses are adjusted by observation and alteration of compass readings on magnetic courses. This requires the presence of suitable land or astronomical bearings. However, the same result can be obtained by observation and alteration of the directive force by means of a deflector on compass courses.
The first deflector was invented by Professor Thomson (Lord Kelvin) about 1880, and was based on the concept that the unknown directive force of the compass can be fully compensated by a measurable force of opposite direction, produced by the deflector. When the card is neutralized it keeps unmoved in any position, even if deflected at 90° from the meridian. This deflection is produced by a weak perpendicular force.
In the Thomson deflector, the perpendicular force is obtained by turning the whole deflector 30° from the meridian, which provides a perpendicular component controlling the position of the neutralized card. This method, also used in different types of deflector besides Thomson’s, is not quite correct and has many practical inconveniences. In the Russian deflector, designed by Lieutenant De Colong, Russian Imperial Navy, about 1890, the perpendicular force is obtained by a small magnet in the foot of the deflector. This perpendicular magnet has no influence upon the measurement of the directive force and produces a smooth swing of the card, which is not the case with Thomson’s instrument.
After any compass adjustment, it is advisable to control the result obtained. This can
be done by a swing, if you have land or astronomical bearings, or by a deflector. In the latter case you measure four forces, calculate coefficients B, C, and D, take A and E from old observations, and calculate the final table of deviation, which is in no way less reliable than a table obtained after a usual swing. The deflector observations are made on compass courses and the further calculation does not take much time, because all necessary schemes are printed in advance.
The De Colong deflector still is used in Russia. Every new compass is supplied with a suitable instrument. The grand old Russian compass man, Professor Ogloblinsky, moved to France after the Revolution and there produced an improved type of the De Colong deflector which featured several short magnets instead of one long one. Unfortunately it seems that even this instrument is not used and that many navigators deprive themselves of the available utility of compass deflectors.
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