Comment and Discussion

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Honorable Mention Essay, 1959

(See pages 41-46, June, 1959 Proceedings)

Vice Admiral L. S. Sabin, usn.—I was impressed with Lieutenant Beavers’ essay, “Seapower and Geopolitics in the Missile Age.” It was concise and well organized and presented.

The importance of sea power in the missile age probably is not the brain child of the author. Thinking people in the Navy Depart­ment and the Navy itself have recognized from the beginning of missile development the tremendous impact on strategic principles of the use of sea-borne missiles. The advantages of mobility, flexibility, and relative immunity from wholesale destruction of seagoing missile platforms has been repeatedly stressed in both military and public circles. Where Lieutenant Beavers scored a hit, in my opinion, was in marrying the fundamentals of sea power in the missile age to geopolitical considerations. This, to me, is a novel and highly engaging thesis.

It is also a presentation that will be difficult to refute. It will be refuted in one form or another, without too much regard for logic, by people who will see in it another attempt by the Navy to grab the spotlight in the na­tion’s defense and, more important, the big­gest share of the monetary defense pie.

Students of geopolitics should be interested in Lieutenant Beavers’ approach, whether or not they agree. I am simply delighted to know that a young officer is taking an interest in geopolitical theories as they relate to military and naval strategy. In my opinion, we spend too little time and effort in the services on geopolitics. We ought to make time for our “brains” to get into this subject. I believe that only a small percentage of our officers could even offer a lucid definition of geopolitics.

Are We Afraid of Privilege?

Lieutenant Commander Philip H. Kle- pak, usn.—I believe there will be a continuing shortage of qualified command officers and

that the old-fashioned view of training junior officers at sea is correct. Comparatively few officers are presently working directly toward command at sea, and this is particularly true as it applies to surface ships.

A great measure of our difficulties can be traced to the unusual fear of privilege that has developed within the last twenty years. In the “old Navy,” captains demanded and, through discipline under law, received obedi­ence and efficiency. The shipboard space allotted captains provided far from modest appointments, but large cabins and expensive furnishings. These were privileges, commen­surate with their position and power.

Such privileges are still worthwhile. A sub­mariner who receives extra pay has relative privilege. For command at sea, privilege must be apparent and have meaning. But the privileges of command and wardroom are maintained in all other navies and a visit to a comparable or lesser foreign ship is apt to leave our captains nonplussed. The ships we give away have more evidence of command discretion and privilege than those we keep. So many of our leaders have given up privi­leges or permitted them to be taken away that it will be a slow process to regain them.

Two events caused the fear of privilege to arise. The influx of reserve officers resulted in a challenge of privilege. Second, the advent of electronics on shipboard reduced the size and extent of seniors’ quarters. Each new ship becomes like the older ones on the first over­haul. During my recent sea command, squeez­ing of the electronic bulkhead made my clothes closet too narrow to hang clothes. My predecessor kept his clothes in the shower, for lack of space. My cabin, however, compared favorably with most. Some new ships do not fare any better, even in design.

Weight and moment notwithstanding, we do ourselves an injustice. This is not simply a problem of habitability.

USS “Bogue”

(See page 109, January, 1959 Proceedings)

Ralph L. Hiestand, TDC, usn.—If the photograph of the German submarine on war patrol had not been cropped, then the two depth charges could have been seen plunging toward their target. This submarine was only one of several kills made by the escort carrier Bogue and her group during the period 1-2 May 1943. I believe we “guested” Germans from this particular boat on board the Bogue.

Although the Bogue, her aircraft, and es­corts accounted for twelve kills, she is prob­ably the least known of her class, perhaps be­cause her accomplishments, although method­ical and deadly, were not spectacular.

Unexploded Projectiles

(See pages 102-103, March, 1959 Proceedings)

Mr. Russell Brooks, St. Petersburg, Florida—Commander W. C. Chewning’s discussion of unexploded projectiles from the Massachusetts and Texas during the North African landings recalled to me the proud disposition made by the French Admiralty at Casablanca of some of the unexploded 14- inch A.P.s from the Massachusetts.

Having business at the Admiralty on No­vember 10, 1942, I was surprised to see in the garden, flanking the several steps leading to the veranda, two large caliber projectiles which had not been there three days before. I am not quite certain, but I believe it was Capitaine de vaisseau Stikka, commander of a destroyer sunk by American naval gunfire November 8th, who told me that the new “decorations” were “gifts” from the Massa­chusetts and advised me that we had better find out quickly what had prevented their exploding. “Of course,” he said, “you can’t have our souvenirs. One doesn’t take back what has been given!” The projectiles were turned over to our experts in exchange for two others from the Massachusetts.

Fourteen years later I attended a cocktail party on the Jean Bart, at St. Raphael, France. At the entrance to the main passage­way leading to the wardroom was another 14" projectile, this one suitably identified as of Massachusetts origin. The Commander of the Bart laughed when I said that I had no need to read the inscription to know the donor. “We keep it,” he said, “as a visible sign of the union which exists between pro­fessional naval men of all nations. If you had sunk the Bart it would not have affected this fellowship of the sea.” I know personally of no stronger ties, including those of blood, than the ones which make all naval men kin.

Centennial and New Design of Italian Naval Periodical

Professor C. P. Lemieux, U. S. Naval Academy.—The first issue of the Rivista Marittima carried the dateline 1 April, 1868. It was described as a modest fascicule with a sky-blue cover, whose only embellishment was a drawing of a button bearing the insignia of the Italian Navy.

Since its inauguration 90 years ago, the Italian naval periodical has undergone nu­merous changes in format, and its various sections on news, editorial comment, pro­fessional articles, and reviews have received emphasis in proportion to the needs of the day. Our generation has found within the buff-colored covers of the Rivista many stimu­lating professional articles and an extensive coverage of foreign news and publications.

In honor of this 90th birthday, the Rivista Marittima has been completely redesigned, and is now being printed on a fine glossy paper which will bring out the best features of the many photographs and drawings so im­portant to the periodicals of our day.

Foreign Language Training

Commander G. B. Tamburello, usn.— During the past year, with the President’s emphasis on the People to People Program, and a general awakening in America of the value of foreign language training, there has been a resurgence of interest in the schools to place more curriculum emphasis on foreign languages.

The Navy has been placing more emphasis on language training to meet its varied opera­tional and administrative requirements within the limits imposed by a tight budget by giving naval attaches, as well as heads of naval mis­sions and assistance groups, as much language as possible prior to transfer to an activity in a foreign country. Such policy is commendable.

However, many more personnel who are to be stationed in foreign countries should also be afforded the opportunity to study lan­guages. Records and conversation booklets are helpful but do not really serve the pur­pose except to teach a few phrases with which one may struggle to survive from day to day. What is more important to Americans is the realization that the impact on foreign na­tionals lies not in saying a badly mispro­nounced phrase of questionable communica­tion value, but the ability to converse in more intelligible terms to give foreigners an op­portunity to gain an insight into American thinking and behavior patterns.

Knowledge of a foreign language for the average navy man would mean excitement and interest in foreign duty, rather than boredom and passiveness because of a lan­guage barrier. This boredom applies equally to the wives and families of naval personnel, many of whom can not wait until they return to the United States. Limited subsidized language training for navy personnel and families prior to their departure for a foreign country and a continuing program upon their arrival at their ultimate destination, would result in less disciplinary problems, higher reenlistment rates, and fewer family domestic problems.

Future of the Carrier?

(See pages 46-51, July, 1958 Proceedings)

Lieutenant L. H. Bibby, usn.—I have read Commander Green’s very interesting article, “A Case for the Attack Carrier in the Missile Age.” I can not help but feel that the implied position of the attack carrier in the modern navy is overemphasized.

“The large ship with the long-range weapon was, and still is, the very basis upon which control of the sea is built.” The author cites this sentence as a basic tenet and states his tenet as a postulate. Who would be so bold as to ride a carrier, or one of sixty carriers, unescorted into an ocean possibly occupied by five hundred enemy submarines? Obviously the carrier will not be unescorted, but just as obviously the point can be made that it is not the carrier but the escort that controls the sea. The carrier must depend upon ASW forces to control the seas before it can even venture to leave port.

Commander Green explores the position of the attack carrier in the event of general war. He makes the good point that air power at sea may well be the only fighting air power remaining. I feel it is reasonable to suggest that the only carriers which would be of much use as a retaliatory force would be those car-

riers within aircraft range of their targets, or at least able to reach such a position within a reasonable length of time. It would seem to me that for the attack carrier to be effec­tive in time of nuclear unlimited war, our country would have to keep a prohibitive number of carrier task forces on, or near, station. How many missile submarines could be kept on patrol for the same amount of money?

Commander Green is on much more de­fensible ground when he discusses the attack carrier’s position in the event of limited war, but I suggest that he again overstates the carrier’s case. “The attack carrier can meet, with the exact amount of power required, any local conflict endangering the United States.” Did we not in Korea find ourselves with somewhat less than the exact amount of power required? Do we not now have all the attack carriers necessary to engage in limited war?

Japanese Security Treaty

(See pages 74-82, September, 1958 Proceedings)

Commander H. B. Seim, usn.—Dr. Barber’s article, “United States Alliance Policy,” is an excellent resume of the foreign policy re­orientation which has taken place in Ameri­can attitudes since World War II. It should help readers of the Proceedings, and partic­ularly those in active service in our armed forces, to appreciate America’s need to ac­cept commitments which may at times appear overly burdensome. In this connection, it may be desirable to expand on his discussion of the Japanese Security Treaty.

Dr. Barber characterized the security treaty between the United States and Japan as “fundamentally simply a bases and station­ing of forces agreement, with mutual defense only implied.” While it is true that the mu­tual defense aspect is omitted, the treaty does more than grant the United States the right to station forces in Japan. In acquiring this right, we have also assumed some obligations relating to the defense of Japan.

The preamble to the treaty states that “ . .. Japan desires. .. that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan. ’ ’ Article I states that

Japan grants, and the United States accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. It con­tinues: “Such forces may be utilized to con­tribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the ex­press request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and dis­turbances in Japan, caused through instiga­tion or intervention by an outside power or powers.”

Although the permissive expression “may” is used in the foregoing article, the words of the treaty carry a rather definite implication of a United States obligation to go to the defense of Japan, in the event of an overt attack against her, or foreign-inspired rebel­lion. In common prudence, naval officers should recognize this possibility, since naval forces would carry a large share of the United States effort.

Norwegian Defense Problems:

The Role of the Navy

(See pages 38-47, October, 1958 Proceedings)

Captain Roland E. Krause, usn (ret.)— Captain Araldsen leaves the impression that the Germans occupied Denmark and Norway in order to improve their strategic position in the naval war. Admiral Wegener’s studies, which had found wide acceptance, pointed up the importance of Norwegian bases for offen­sive naval operations against Great Britain, but this presupposed the existence of a Ger­man fleet which could contest enemy su­premacy of the seas. Grand Admiral Raeder did expect certain naval advantages incident to having bases in Norway. But his basic con­sideration in espousing the invasion was to forestall an occupation of Norway by the Allies, which would interrupt the iron ore traffic by steamer from Narvik and perhaps stop all ore importation due to Allied seizure of the mines. Raeder had good intelligence and keen insight into the intentions of the Allies in this instance.

I agree with the author as to Russian con­centration on, and capacity for, local and static coast defense, but I must take issue with the statement, “Even with superior surface

and submarine forces, the Germans could not operate in the waters where Russians were in possession of the coast.” In the Baltic and Black Seas, the Germans conducted naval operations with inferior forces. In the Baltic, it is true they might, if needed, have called up reinforcements to give them superiority, but it was not necessary. The Germans com­menced minelaying operations in the Gulf of Finland—some 300 miles from their bases, while the Russians still had possession of the Esthonian coast and their base, Hanko, off Finland. One would have thought the Rus­sians would attack and keep on attacking vigorously such forces to keep from being bottled up in the inner Gulf. The relatively strong Russian forces (battleships and cruis­ers) either were not employed at all or in­effectively employed. The Germans ac­complished the laying of strong mine and net barrages, so that eventually they were suc­cessful in containing the enemy naval forces.

Admiral Codrington

(See pages 92-97, January, 1959 Proceedings)

H. Pirie-Gordon of Buthlaw, Crawley, Sussex, England.—Mr. Abshire’s excellent account of “The Naval Battle of Navarino, 1827” ends dramatically with the sentence, “And Admiral Codrington, along with his remarkable diplomacy and leadership, slipped into thankless oblivion.”

Three weeks after the battle the Vice Ad­miral was promoted from Knight Com­mander to Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath. In January, 1828, the British Government which, for diplomatic reasons considered it necessary to deplore “this un­toward event” (the battle of Navarino) officially, announced in the House of Com­mons that it “did not make the slightest charge, nor cast the least imputation upon the gallant officer who commanded at Nava­rino.” Although Sir Edward was recalled in June he did not cease to be the British Com­mander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station, un­til September, 1828. While on half-pay after his return to England he went in September, 1830, to Russia where he was received and decorated by Czar Nicholas I. The following January he visited France and was received by King Louis Philippe, who made him a

Grand Cross (as it was then styled) of the Legion of Honour: he was the first English­man to receive the first class of that Order. Later, when the Greek Government had finally achieved independence, Sir Edward was given the Grand Cross in gold of the Order of the Redeemer. From June to Oc­tober, 1831, he was on full pay while in command of the Channel fleet for an experi­mental cruise. In August, 1832, he was made a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Michael and St. George. At that time, mem­bership in the Order was conferred only in recognition of distinguished services in the Mediterranean.

The following December he was elected a member of the first reformed Parliament for Devonport and continued to represent that borough in two more Parliaments. Then he gave up his seat in order to return to the active list as Commander-in-Chief, Ports­mouth, the senior command in the Royal Navy, to which he was appointed in Novem­ber, 1839. While a member of the House of Commons he had been promoted to Admiral in January, 1837, and it was as Admiral that he flew his flag until his retirement on De­cember 31, 1842.

The Schooner “Swift”

(See pages 144-146, April, 1959 Proceedings)

Lieutenant Commander K. D. Iain Murray, rnr (ret.)—The present day rep­lica of the Swift now enjoys a permanent anchorage at Newport Dunes, California. Here she is being set up as a show piece. She is presently rerigged as a brigantine, and eventually will contain a fine maritime mu­seum, while her spar deck will be set out as that of a “pirate” brigantine of 1700-1750.

Back in the early 1940’s the present Swift, which has been built at Ipswich, Mass., was purchased by Mr. James Cagney. Because of World War II, the ship did little sailing. However, the few times she stood out to sea from Newport, California, the ship performed very well. She was rigged then as the photo­graph in the Proceedings shows, as a tops’l schooner.

In the early summer of 1958 the schooner was sold to a large recreational and aquatic project named Newport Dunes, Inc.

Handling Distress Calls

(See page 105, November, 1958 Proceedings)

Matt Hensley, Koloa, Kauai, T.H.—- The comments of Mr. C. E. Watson regard­ing the autoalarm are timely because this equipment cannot be considered dependable enough. It is entirely too complicated and expensive for the purpose it is supposed to serve.

During the forty-six years I have been a radio operator, I have depended on a properly planned loud speaker system that can be switched to any locality I may frequent when necessity takes me away from the radio room. This, of course, applies to those vessels where only one radio officer is provided.

It is realized that three operators cannot always be maintained on smaller vessels. When this is the case, outlets for speakers could provide almost complete 24-hour dis­tress frequency guard, provided the solo operator plugs in the speaker at the proper location. Even a separate speaker for as many as four different remote locations away from the radio room would serve the purpose of guarding distress frequencies by a single operator.

The expense of such an installation would be considerably less than the present autoalarm system, and relatively simple to maintain. Even during the time the operator is asleep, a certain measure of security is assured, be­cause an experienced operator will be roused

immediately by a distress signal.

Naturally, these speakers would not be turned on except when necessary. In fact, a Single speaker could be utilized for all four locations, being taken by the operator where needed, and plugged in to cover such periods as meal times and sundry daily chores that take the operator away from his desk.

In connection with distress frequencies, it would be well to utilize at least three in addi­tion to the old 600-meter band; namely, one in each of the 4,000, 8,000, and 12,000 kc bands. Compact transmitters for sending dis­tress messages on all four of these bands could practically insure a loud signal anywhere at sea and at any hour of the day or night. By simultaneous transmission on all four bands, a readable signal would be assured on one of these frequencies.

Naturally, the distress receiver would be tuned to all four frequencies, and kept con­stantly on the appropriate loud speaker. It is most difficult for a vessel to send a distress call from anywhere in the world that would not be picked up on one or another of these fre­quencies, with a signal loud enough to elimi­nate the use of headphones.

To assure continual transmission for hom­ing rescuers, the distress call and also the senders’ call letters could be punched on tape and allowed to run continuously, except for necessary intervals to receive replies. It does not appear that sufficient attention has been paid in the past to this.