On 1 April 1958, Antisubmarine Defense Group Alfa was established by the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet under the operational control of Commander Antisubmarine Defense Force, Atlantic. Its commander had additional duties as Commander Carrier Division Sixteen and Commander Hunter-Killer Force. It consisted of an augmented Hunter-Killer Group and had a primary mission of advancing antisubmarine defense readiness in the Atlantic Fleet. Forces assigned were to operate with the Group on a semi-permanent basis. Under the original directive, the group was set up for an eighteen-month period, although present indications are that it will be continued for an indefinite period.
This probability is reinforced by the establishment of Task Groups Bravo and Charlie. These Groups have the same permanency of forces as Alfa but differ in forces assigned and missions. Bravo is to concentrate on hunter-killer tactics and Charlie on escort of convoy.
Logically the first step in accelerating antisubmarine defense was the establishment of a group with a single mission and forces assigned for a long enough period to permit determination of the full potential of the antisubmarine vehicles and equipments available. From such a group might be determined a standard of antisubmarine performance for all fleet units.
In the process new and improved doctrines would be developed. Because of its compactness and the variety of equipment and vehicles that could be included, the antisubmarine carrier group appeared an ideal agency for such development.
Forces Assigned
In addition to the forces normally comprising a Hunter-Killer Group (a carrier, destroyers, carrier fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters) Task Group Alfa was augmented by two antisubmarine submarines and a patrol plane element. All were under the operational control of the Task Group Commander. Task Group Alfa consisted on its establishment of the Valley Forge (CVS-45) with Air Antisubmarine Squadron 36 and Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron 7 embarked; Destroyer Squadron 28, Patrol Squadron 8, and the submarines Sea Leopard and Cubera. Later a detachment of AD-5W aircraft was added, Detachment 52 of VAW-12. Alfa’s permanence of forces has been only relative. Because of naval shipyard overhauls and other considerations, Destroyer Squadron 28 was replaced by Squadron 36 on 1 October 1958 but returned on 1 May 1959. Patrol Squadron 21 replaced Squadron 8 during May and June 1959. The Randolph will replace the Valley Forge about 1 September 1959. Changes in units resulted in some slowing down in tactical development but have had certain advantages. Units detached and returned have newer equipment installed, thus bringing increased capability to the group. Additionally, development of methods of achieving maximum continuity during changeover have been developed. Such methods should be of considerable value to the fleet, where continual change of units is experienced. Singleness of mission and relative permanency of forces have been factors in progress achieved. A group without them cannot concentrate the effort and attention required to depart from established doctrine and project concepts into the future. The additional elements, ASW submarine, patrol planes, and AD-5W’s, have enabled operations to be conducted on a broader basis than would have been possible with the normal forces of an antisubmarine carrier group alone. Finally, by temporarily operating with nuclear submarines, it has been possible to gain experience against the ultimate opponent: nuclear powered, missile-launching submarines.
Since the assigned objective was too broad to permit translation into operations, it was broken down into major missions. Logically, these missions were team development, tactical development, and equipment improvement. By further breaking these down into finite phases, it was possible to translate plans into operations. Successful completion of each phase would provide a measure of progress toward realizing the objective.
Team Development
In initial operations, major effort had to be concentrated on bringing all units up to a high level of individual competence. Throughout the past year a sizable percentage of time was expended to maintain this competence. No technique, tactic, or doctrine can be adequately tested by an incompetent force. In addition to this basic training, which is a prerequisite for tactical development, it was necessary to determine the best utilization of the SSK, VP, and AD-5W when operating with an antisubmarine carrier task group. Finally, it was necessary to train all units in working together. This required, first, ensuring that the crew of each vehicle learned the capabilities and limitations of all other vehicles; second, providing the necessary communications; and third, requiring types to work together in increasingly greater combinations until in advanced operations all units were being employed simultaneously. This development has resulted in formation of a co-ordinated team which can now use exercises generally considered advanced, for basic training. All this has resulted in the conviction that every antisubmarine vehicle has inherent limitations, which can best be compensated for by using other vehicles in combination. Thus, it is possible to balance the limitations of one vehicle by using it with another having compensating capabilities. In other situations, the capabilities of two types can be combined to provide a greater cumulative capability than the sum of the individual capabilities of the units involved. The full exploitation of this cumulative potential becomes one of the basic principles governing tactical development.
Tactical Development
The eventual antisubmarine defense of the United States will probably become a closely integrated complex of detection and warning devices, with ready mobile forces to gain contact on, hold, and (if necessary) destroy any submarine not known to be friendly within the defense perimeter. No burglar alarm ever caught a burglar. Hence no matter how effective future warning systems may become, they will need to be backed by mobile forces. Determination of how best to utilize such mobile forces was selected as the first objective of Task Group Alfa tactical development. Therefore, tactics and doctrine had to be developed to permit capitalizing on intelligence available and utilizing forces in areas of highest probability.
The result has been the formulation of doctrine for area search, for control of forces in a wide area, for necessary communications and co-ordination on an area basis, and for concentration and operations of all these forces in the contact area when the area of probability has been reduced to a solid contact. Such tactics require a new approach to utilization of forces. The carrier becomes a mobile air base, logistics center, and command post to control and supply forces throughout the area. At most times it must remain outside the area to avoid interference with investigative forces and for its own safety. The destroyers, except for the carrier’s minimum screening and plane guard requirements, must be dispersed where they can be near probable contacts, conduct searches, and can be used for deception and gambit. Fixed-wing aircraft must cover the area visually and by radar. VW aircraft must keep track of surface contacts, furnish radar and communications links, and vector aircraft to investigate contacts. Helicopters are utilized in visual search until aircraft make contact, then to assist in localization.
Equipment Improvement
No matter how great improvement can result from better tactics and co-ordination, eventually there must be a point beyond which further progress can only come from better equipment. Task Group Alfa is not in any way an operational developmental force. It does not evaluate equipment and cannot devote the time and services required by controlled tests or obtaining results that could be statistically significant. Efforts in equipment improvement must be limited. Task Group Alfa has obtained existing equipment that would give an immediate increase in capability to any vehicle. It has adapted existing equipment to meet obvious needs, such as placing aircraft communications equipment in destroyers. It has gone to laboratories and manufacturers to determine how to obtain highest performance for installed equipment. This has resulted in obtaining even greater than designed performance from aircraft Magnetic Anomaly Detection equipment and better performance and reliability from all equipment. It has and continues to recommend installation in its units of new equipment as these are proved ready for fleet use. Beyond this the Task Group can only closely follow research and development programs. This is done in order that tentative tactics can be developed for new equipment in advance, that operational requirements developed from Alfa’s operations can be applied to these programs, and so that the direction’ of tactical development will be consonant with the direction of equipment development.
Operations
The directive setting up the Task Group indicated that fifty percent of total time was to be spent at sea. On an annual basis this requirement has been met. Time in port provides units with the time necessary for material upkeep. Equally important, it allows time for evaluation of operations conducted during the preceding period and planning for the succeeding period at sea. This permits cumulative progression from one sea period to the next. Operations do not cease when in port. All units have been based at Norfolk except VP-8 (which moved to Norfolk in March 1959), and the facilities of the ASW Tactical School at Norfolk are available to the Task Group. This school possesses a tactical simulator that can be used to try out tactics and also to train in Task Group Operations. Ability to place operating teams from all units in this device and realistically simulate operations at sea has been a great time-saver and permits ironing out many bugs ashore. While permitting maximum utilization of time at sea, this also allows many potentially dangerous situations to be avoided. A collision in the trainer costs nothing except revision of the procedure that allowed it to occur. In sea operations, standard fleet exercises have not proved sufficiently economical of submarine time or flexible enough for Alfa’s purposes. It has been found that two types of operations, varied as necessary to attain the purpose desired, have proved to be most suitable. One, the hold-down type exercise provides fullest utilization of submarine time and permits simultaneous training of several elements of the Task Group. This last factor is of great importance; in destroyers and submarines, any ASW operation trains the entire ship’s team, but in aircraft squadrons the problem is more complex. Since they are composed of many small individual crews, training a squadron requires much more submarine time. Therefore, being able to utilize several types on the same submarine is the only way to obtain requisite competence. Operating in this manner promotes co-ordination and teamwork. The other type of operation has as its object the conversion of an area of probability. For exercise purposes this area is normally fixed by assuming a target speed and reasonable time lag. Such an exercise is designed to strain the detection capability of the Task Group to the limit, utilize all types, introduce the endurance factor, and permit development of tactics for use with any warning and detection system that are assumed available.
A necessary prerequisite for co-ordination and teamwork is the knowledge by each type vehicle of the capabilities and limitations of all other types. This has led to an active cross-pollination program. All units are directed to send officers and equipment operators to observe and work with all other units. Staffs are included in this program, and the Task Group Commander regularly visits units at sea. Working together ashore in the Tactical School Simulator has been an important factor in the success of this effort.
Submarine Operations
The Cubera and Sea Leopard are assigned to the operational control of Commander Task Group Alfa. This is the first time submarines have been so assigned. These submarines are integral units of the Task Group and consequently are used in their antisubmarine role almost exclusively.
For the submarine, classification is an especially serious consideration. To permit effective detection by passive listening it was imperative that the submarine have a means of confirming and identifying contacts obtained. This has been accomplished by teaming the submarine with aircraft. In practice, when submarines are on station, an aircraft is often stationed in the vicinity to act as communications relay and to investigate contacts. The plane, under war conditions, would also give the submarine a rapid means of delivering an attack.
To permit effective use of submarines, it must be assured that the operations of the other units do not interfere with the submarines’ listening. This requires that in our tactical dispositions surface forces maintain sufficient distance to avoid blanking the submarines, or operate at low speed to reduce noise output when close. Accurate knowledge of the submarine position at all times is a requisite for avoiding interference.
A second broad category of submarine operations has been with assigned submarines acting as targets in their traditional offensive role. The Task Group commander continually stresses that these submarines are the teachers, not the “enemy.” Like any good teacher, it is expected that they will extend their pupils to the utmost, but also will take pride in their pupil’s accomplishments and progress. In operations, target submarines have been restricted as little as possible in order to add realism and provide maximum benefit to both Alfa units and the opposing submarines. In order to improve tactics and correct mistakes, target submarines have been encouraged to criticize. Operation orders direct submarines to attempt to obtain intelligence on tactics and forces used and report how they were able to use information gained. This indicated changes required to improve security. Great benefit has been gained from the reports of target submarines, and the zeal of these units has been a definite factor in developing and improving tactics.
The third category of submarine operations has been those conducted with nuclear submarines. In operating with them, Alfa has concentrated on determining their capabilities as antisubmarine ships; they have been used as targets only about 10% of the time. They have been successfully teamed with destroyers, aircraft, and conventional SSKs. Using the SSN as a target, invaluable experience was gained against high performance submarines.
General Observations
While concepts of operations and tactical solutions have been discussed to this point, it has been apparent that these cannot furnish the complete answer. Co-ordination and teamwork can give even more than designed results from existing equipment and vehicles, but to approach the solution to the antisubmarine defense problem, much greater capabilities must be realized.
Alfa’s operations have repeatedly demonstrated that no equipment or unit can do the job alone. To gain a significant capability for effective area surveillance in the near future, every existing equipment and technique must be exploited to the utmost. It is not enough to obtain the designed maximum from each equipment and vehicle. The cumulative capabilities of such equipment must be realized by using them in combinations. Finally, the capabilities developed must be given maximum effectiveness by applying the best tactics that can be devised. Such tactics must take full advantages of all weaknesses and limitations of the target, including the human factors of impatience, boredom, and curiosity. The increase in over-all effectiveness will improve not as arithmetical but as geometrical progression. As each new piece of equipment becomes available, it must be integrated into the weapons system in the same steps: maximum effectiveness by itself, in combination, and in tactical application.
In Alfa, personnel are proud of their status as destroyermen, submariners, and aviators, but they know that primarily they are submarine hunters and every other consideration must be subordinated to this objective. Although Alfa has relative permanence of forces, it has only a controlled instability of personnel. Personnel are assigned and handled as in other fleet units, in accordance with BuPers and Fleet policies. Longer tours and turn-overs with staggered reliefs on station provide a measure of continuity. Singleness of mission and a conviction of the importance of the job have been extremely important factors in such success as has been attained. As a result of being in this Task Group, the personnel have become better destroyermen, submariners, and aviators. There is no room for parochialism in ASW.
The importance of knowing and utilizing oceanographic information has been continuously emphasized. As new systems give the ability to vary depths of sound sources and receivers, knowledge of water conditions will become of even greater importance. Antisubmarine personnel must be educated to interpret and use oceanographic information. Knowledge of and ability to use this information can enable us to overcome one of the greatest obstacles to detection, the temperature structure of the ocean itself.
Conclusions
The results of the year’s operations of Task Group Alfa lead to these conclusions:
First: Antisubmarine defense is as big a problem as continental air defense and must be approached on as broad a basis. Until both are equally effective the defense of the United States will not be complete.
Second: Antisubmarine defense must be approached on an area basis. The defense of the United States, defense of a Task Force, or defense of a convoy is becoming the same type problem. Whether the area is fixed or moving will not effect the validity of tactics or doctrines involved. If surveillance of a fixed area can be accomplished successfully, many of the methods developed will be equally applicable to a moving area. Approach to detection on other than an area basis will probably ensure permanent lag of ASW in relation to development in submarines. This is apparent when it is realized that missiles eventually will become the primary submarine weapon. It is necessary to work in the present, but plans and developments must be shaped to the future.
Third: An antisubmarine group must not be limited to the carrier group alone. It is any combination of vehicles whose primary mission is antisubmarine warfare. It may be a standard Hunter-Killer group, an augmented group such as Alfa, destroyers and patrol planes, airships and patrol planes, or any grouping of destroyers, submarines, aircraft, helicopters, airships or patrol craft. The vehicles comprising the group must be tailored to forces available, the area of operations, availability of intelligence systems, weather, and the situation. The important thing is that such a group be operated as an integrated whole to gain the fullest potential.
Fourth: The antisubmarine group, whether a carrier group, an escort group, or a support group, must be considered as a weapons system with all elements completely integrated. At present, Alfa gains this integration through co-ordination and teamwork. In the future this weapons system must be integrated by means other than people.
This will require automatic systems to provide precise navigation, adequate communications, and means of data presentation and analysis. Every unit must know where it is, where every other unit is, and the command center must know the location of all units. The commander must have quick, secure means of gaining information and transmitting orders. Information gained must be presented in a form to permit rapid decisions. Such systems must be designed and tailored to antisubmarine defense. Task Group Alfa is working toward such a system by developing best forms for data to make it adaptable to automatic transmission and processing, by recommending best configurations for command centers, and by determining the information required at various command levels for evaluating the situation to direct and control forces.
This first year’s operations of Task Group Alfa have been most interesting and overwhelming proof of the importance of antisubmarine defense. It is one of the most important and the most complex of the problems facing the U. S. Navy. A most encouraging feature is that there is so much room for progress. Task Group Alfa is a Hunter-Killer Group, but its greatest value has been as a seagoing laboratory for the development of antisubmarine tactics. The variety of equipment and vehicles available has enabled work to be accomplished on many aspects of the problem and attain results. Knowledge by all teammates of the capabilities of other vehicles, enthusiasm, and singleness of mission have resulted in a high level of teamwork and co-ordination. The results of these efforts have been definite progress in ASW. This progress needs to be accelerated.
Graduated from the Naval Academy in the Class of 1935, Captain McGrath is Chief of Staff, Commander Antisubmarine Defense Group Alfa. He has had extensive wartime experience as a destroyer commander and more recently as Commander, Destroyer Division Thirty-Two and as Commanding Officer, USS Chukawan (AO-100).
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EXPERT RADAR FORECASTING
Contributed by Lieutenant Commander Donald C. Hyde, USNR
The aircraft carrier USS Cabot (CVL-28) was returning from Trinidad on its shakedown cruise in 1943. Ensign Brown had the midwatch in CIC when a bogey was spotted by the surface-search radar some thirty miles dead ahead. Every two minutes the Ensign kept the Captain informed. The target closed on a collision course—twenty-nine miles—twenty-eight miles—twenty-seven miles, etc. Then, “Captain, this is Ensign Brown. We have now identified the contact as a heavily ionized cloud. It is traveling the course and speed of the wind.”
“Very well, Mr. Brown, keep me informed,” said the Captain.
The CIC reports kept coming to the bridge with the Ensign adding more professional weather advice to each report. Finally the CIC intercom received the following from the bridge, “Mr. Brown, this is the Captain speaking. You may cease reporting the target. Tour rain cloud just passed close aboard showing port and starboard running lights.”
(The Naval Institute will pay $5.00 for each anecdote accepted for publication in the Proceedings.)