On April 2, 1959, the Foreign Ministers of the fifteen countries comprising the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will assemble in our nation's capital. This meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session will mark the Tenth Anniversary of the original signing of the Treaty.
NATO is the keystone of the supporting arch of United States foreign policy. Yet, public opinion polls have indicated that a majority of the American public have, at best, only a fragmentary knowledge of the Alliance upon which over 450 million peace-loving, free people depend for the protection of their territories and their institutions against the aggressive moves of imperialistic Communism.
The North Atlantic Alliance is in accord with the principles of the United Nations Charter, Article 51 of which recognizes the right of nations to enter into agreements for collective self-defense. By exerting a powerful influence for peace, NATO makes a vital contribution to the aims of the United Nations. There is, however, no organizational link between the two.
NATO came into being when events following World War II revealed the aggressive, expansionist policies of Soviet Russia. The seizure of Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade were the clinchers. The Soviet objective of world domination could only be countered through a collective effort.
The prime motivation of NATO is mutual defense. Therefore, it comes as a surprise that relatively few officers of the Services have a good working knowledge of the military machinery of NATO and the part NATO plays in the politico-military policy of the United States.
The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington on April 4, 1949. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States were the twelve original signatories. Through subsequent protocols, Greece and Turkey became members on February 18, 1952, and the Federal Republic of Germany joined on May 5, 1955.
The Treaty sets forth objectives in the political, cultural, and economic fields, but common defense is fundamental to the concept and development of NATO. The genesis of the military organization and activity of NATO is found in Article 5 of the Treaty, which states in part:
"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such armed attack occurs, each of them ... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."
History has known many alliances forged under the stress of war, but a coalition such as NATO is unprecedented in time of peace. Never before in peacetime have nations placed their forces under the overall command of foreign officers. Never before have so many nations signed a treaty to consider an attack on one an attack on all. This is the core that binds the NATO nations together.
Is NATO a powerful influence for peace? Do we get more security for our money by pooling our defense effort with Canada and the free nations of Europe, by allotting some of our defense expenditures to foreign military aid, by joining our NATO partners in an Allied military command structure? Are U. S. security interests better served by deploying U. S. forces a long Allied forward defensive lines—land, sea, and air—in Europe than by playing a lone hand under a "Fortress America" concept? The answer to all of these questions must certainly be—yes!
The unprecedented viability of this coalition in time of peace is all the more astounding in view of the technological revolution of the last decade. When the Alliance was formed, the United States had an atomic monopoly, and except for atomic bombs in the possession of the United States, the munitions and weapon delivery capabilities of the armed forces of the world were essentially those of World War II. The intervening ten years have seen the development of thermonuclear weapons, the rise of Russia as a nuclear power, the arrival of the missile age, the nuclear submarine, and the exploration of outer space. Yet NATO is more effective than ever in achieving its basic purpose. It is the prime factor in U. S. policy toward Europe. The evolution of NATO strategy has kept pace with the revolution in military technology.
Missions and Tasks
The broad mission of the NATO military is to safeguard the security of the NATO area—all of it—and its people. The mission has two basic parts:
a. To deter aggression and provide an environment of security;
b. Should the deterrent fail, to win the resultant war.
The deterrent is comprised of three elements; all are essential :
a. A massive retaliatory force;
b. A shield force;
c. The manifest will to use these forces.
The retaliatory force is, at present, comprised primarily of the Strategic Air Command, but also includes the U. S. Navy carrier striking forces, the U. K. Bomber Command, the IRBM's, and other strike forces of Allied Command Europe. The ICBM and Polaris systems will be added to U. S. national forces within the next two or three years, thereby augmenting the overall retaliatory capability of the entire Alliance.
The retaliatory force needs little discussion. It is the sword of NATO. To be effective, and since it must be assumed that the enemy will strike first, the retaliatory force must have survivability. Enough of it must escape destruction in any initial surprise attack to be capable of promptly penetrating the aggressor's defenses to strike substantially all targets of military significance.
The role of the shield force is less well understood. It is comprised of the primarily defensive land, naval, and air forces assigned to defend NATO Europe and the sea lines of communication in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. These are backed up by the national forces maintained by ·member nations to discharge national responsibilities; for example, the U. S. Continental Air Defense Command, the U.K. Fighter Command, and inshore minesweeping and patrol forces.
It is a common mistake to think of the shield forces as merely conventional forces in the traditional sense. They are not. These forces now have a tactical atomic capability.
In peacetime, the shield forces are an important part of the deterrent, since they add to the overall defense posture of NATO, thus helping to convince the Soviets that the price of an attempted aggression would be too high. The presence of these forces along the Iron Curtain makes it clear that any aggression against NATO territory would immediately result in armed conflict, with certain risk of involving the nuclear retaliatory force. The onus of responsibility would clearly be fixed on the aggressor. This reduces the possibility of general war through a miscalculation.
In event of aggression, shield forces would blunt and retard the enemy attack until the results of the massive retaliatory campaign could take hold.
The mere existence of retaliatory and shield forces will not deter war, however. There must be the manifest will and determination to use them in full measure if attacked. The governments of the NATO nations have made it abundantly clear that they are of a single mind in their manifest will to use nuclear retaliatory forces to repel aggression.
As to the second part of the NATO military mission, the successful accomplishment of three broad tasks would be essential:
a. Defend the area of NATO Europe;
b. Defend the NATO area of North America;
c. Defend the sea areas which link these two land theaters together.
All three tasks would be essential—all equal in importance and priority and interdependent. It is impossible to say that one would be more important than another. They are like the legs of a three-legged stool- remove one and the structure falls. Should our military forces fail to accomplish any one of these tasks, the Free World would almost surely be defeated.
Organization
The strength of NATO stems fundamentally from the fact that it is an alliance of free peoples. Characteristic of truly democratic systems, the NATO military structure is subordinate to the civilian political authority. Thus, we find the North Atlantic Council at the organizational pinnacle of the Alliance.
Twice a year, the member nations are represented on the Council at the Ministerial level. However, representation may be exercised by the Heads of Government, as was the case in December, 1957, in Paris. Regardless of the level on which it meets, the Council and all agencies of the Alliance operate on the principle of unanimous consent.
The Ministerial Council normally meets in Paris, but has met in Washington, New York, Ottawa, London, Copenhagen, Bonn, Brussels, Lisbon, and Rome.
Obviously, the Council can meet at such levels but infrequently. Therefore, to ensure the continuity of action required to cope with the unrelenting threat, the Council in Permanent Session was set up in Paris, with each nation represented by a Permanent Ambassador. The Permanent Council has a Permanent Chairman, who is also the Secretary-General of NATO. At present, he is Paul-Henri Spaak, a distinguished statesman and a former Prime Minister of Belgium. Mr. Spaak is also the Permanent Chairman of the Council in Ministerial Session.
It has been said of Mr. Spaak that he looks like Winston Churchill and sounds like Charles Boyer. Mr. Spaak has expressed regret that it is not the other way around.
The Council is assisted by a permanent International Staff, predominantly civilian but including some military personnel, with the Secretary-General at its head. There are two Deputy Secretaries-General; Assistant Secretaries General for Political Affairs, Economics and Finance, and Production and Logistics; a Scientific Adviser; an Executive Secretary; a Financial Controller; and a Personnel and Administration Service.
Several permanent committees function under the Council. The senior committees of particular concern to the military are: the Annual Review Committee (conducts annual review of defense posture and activities of NATO); the Armaments Committee (coordinates cooperative production of weapons and equipment within NATO); the Military Budget Committee (administers NATO common funds for military support); the Infrastructure Committee (monitors the NATO infrastructure program); and the Science Committee (advises on scientific and technological matters).
The headquarters facility of the NATO Council and International Staff in Paris is a temporary addition between the wings of the Palais de Chaillot. The Palais was built for the Paris Exposition of 1937. The "tempo" was added for the UN Assembly Meeting in 1951. From a distance, the architectural appearance of the group is impressive, but the creaky, sagging decks of the temporary building make one wonder whether it can continue to bear the burden of NATO affairs until the new permanent headquarters, on the edge of the Bois de Boulogne, will be ready for occupancy in the fall of 1959.
This past year, the Permanent Council has grown considerably in stature and influence, as it has become more and more the forum for consultation among the Allies in harmonizing their foreign policies and concerting political action in face of a threat which is not confined only to the NATO area but which is a challenge to the Free World everywhere. Through this process of consultation and discussion, the member nations are, to an increasing degree, keeping their fellow members informed as to their political thinking and possible courses of action before an event requiring counteraction occurs. This makes for better understanding, quicker and more decisive reaction, stronger mutual support, and greater unity of purpose.
Under the Council is the Military Committee, which is the highest military agency of NATO. Like the Council, the Military Committee also meets at different levels—in this case, two levels. The Military Committee meets as required, but at least twice a year, in Chiefs of Staff session, wherein each member nation, except Iceland which has no military establishment, is represented by the Chairman of its Joint Chiefs of Staff or equivalent, 2 or a special delegate appointed in his place. (At present, the U. S. Representative is the only special delegate so appointed.) The Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session averages about three meetings a year, usually in Paris. It met there four times in 1958. It has an international chairman who is appointed by the member nations in alphabetical rotation for a one-year term of office. The present chairman is General Beleza Ferraz, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Portugal.
Plenary action is required on military matters more often than the Military Committee can be assembled at the Chiefs of Staff level; hence the need, as in the case of the Council, for a Permanent Session of the Committee. Each country assigns a flag or general officer to the Military Committee in Permanent Session, except that the Belgian delegate represents both his own country and Luxembourg. The rank of these representatives varies from two- to four-star level; they are continuously available in Washington. They meet—usually twice a month but as often as required—in the Pentagon. The Military Committee in Permanent Session also has an international chairman, appointed by the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session, to serve for a term of two years. The appointment may be extended for one additional year. General Hasselman, formerly Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of The Netherlands, is the current chairman.
It is intended that the Military Committee in Permanent Session be competent to take prompt and decisive action in all military matters except those of the highest order, and, to a constantly increasing degree, it is fulfilling this function. This requires that the representatives be kept well informed as to the policies of their individual governments. In matters of major importance or where established policy is lacking, they seek guidance from their parent military establishments.
Briefly, the functions of the Military Committee are to recommend to the Council measures for the unified defense of the Treaty area, to advise the Council generally on military matters, and to provide military policy guidance to the Standing Group.
The military Committee (at both levels) is too unwieldy to carry on day-to-day executive action. Therefore, it has an executive agency—the Standing Group. The Standing Group also has certain statutory responsibilities directly to the Council.
The Standing Group acts as a corporate body under the rule of unanimous agreement. It is composed of one general or flag officer each from France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, usually at the four-star level. It has its headquarters in the Pentagon. Meetings are held as frequently as required, often several times a week. The chairmanship rotates every quarter.
Each of the three Standing Group principals is responsible to, and receives guidance from, his national military authorities. The U. S. Member is directly responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and receives his guidance from that body, but he also coordinates with various offices of the Department of Defense, with the individual Services, and with the Department of State.
The Standing Group is assisted by an International Secretariat under a Director (currently a French brigadier general). The Secretariat also serves the Military Committee. It includes officers fro in non-Standing Group countries, and is assigned space in the Pentagon.
Each principal of the Standing Group is supported by a national, joint staff. Each has a flag/general officer as a deputy. Most of the Standing Group staff work is accomplished in ad hoc international planning teams, each comprised of one planner from each Standing Group nation and one from a non-Standing Group nation, usually at the captain/colonel level.
Basically, the Standing Group, with the advice and guidance of the Military Committee, formulates a common NATO military doctrine and philosophy agreeable to the national governments. As the executive agent of the Military Committee, the Standing Group is responsible for "higher strategic direction" with respect to NATO forces and areas. By "higher strategic direction" is meant the exercise of command and control over the Major NATO Commanders within the framework of policies and plans established or approved by the Military Committee.
The Standing Group is the co-ordinating agency for the views, plans, and actions of the Major Commanders, taking into account the views of the NATO nations, as appropriate. It determines the military requirements of the integrated forces. It prepares and disseminates guidance in all of the fields of military activity of concern to the Major Commanders and other agencies directly under the Standing Group. It prepares plans and studies and recommends policies for approval by the Military Committee and/or the Council on all matters of a military nature referred to NATO by the Council, national or NATO Commanders, or by other agencies of NATO. The Standing Group is charged with the responsibility of advising the North Atlantic Council on matters of higher strategy, military command structure, and other related subjects.
Thus, the function of the Standing Group is really three-fold. It operates as an echelon in the military chain of command between the Military Committee and the Major Commanders. It furnishes military appreciations and advice directly to the North Atlantic Council when so requested. It is responsible for preparing the work of the Military Committee (both levels) in much the same way as a Chief of Staff would function. But generally speaking, in all capacities it acts in the name and under the authority of the Military Committee.
At the Ministerial Meetings of the Council, the Chairman of the Standing Group, together with the Chairman of the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session, normally sits at the Council table and is usually the spokesman for the Military Committee.
The Standing Group maintains a permanent Representative in Paris to provide continuous liaison with the Permanent Council. SGREP, as he is known, is of flag/ general officer rank, and has offices in the Palais de Chaillot. He is supported by a small international staff which includes officers from other than Standing Group countries. The representative billet rotates among the Standing Group countries.
The Standing Group Representative regularly sits with the Permanent Council and presents the views of the Standing Group and the Military Committee. Additionally, hereports to the Standing Group on the activities of the Council, its Committees, and the International Staff in the military field.
Under the Standing Group are the major allied commanders: Supreme Allied Commander Europe (General Norstad), Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (Admiral Wright), and the Channel Committee. The Channel Committee is composed of the Chiefs of Naval Staff of Belgium, France, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. It is the NATO authority for the Allied Command Channel, acting as the agent for the Standing Group. Under the Channel Committee, actual command is exercised jointly by the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Channel (Royal Navy), and the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Maritime Air, Channel (Royal Air Force), after the British system of dual command.
Of course, the continental territories of the United States and Canada are as much a part of the NATO area as is Western Europe. From the beginning of NATO, there has been, under the Standing Group, what is called the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group, whose function it is to co-ordinate for NATO the planning of the defense of the North American continent. It is composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Canada, and is supported by a small combined staff.
The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), an integrated command established by agreement between the governments of the United States and Canada, is not a NATO command, but plays an important role in the defense of NATO. CINCNORAD keeps the Standing Group apprised of his plans and capabilities through the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group.
The three major Allied commands—Europe, Atlantic, and Channel—make up the military field command structure of NATO. This is not to say that these commands constitute the entire military strength available to NATO. They are strongly supported by such national commands as the U. S. Strategic Air Command, the U.K. Bomber Command, and NORAD. However, the Major NATO Commanders are responsible fur planning and directing the operations of all those military forces which the several member nations have "committed" to NATO.
Generally speaking, "committed" forces are those which have been either "assigned" or "earmarked" for NATO. "Assigned" forces are those which have actually been placed under the operational command or control of a NATO commander. The degree of operational command or control over these forces exercised by the NATO Commanders is subject to the concurrence of the parent nations concerned. "Earmarked" forces are those which nations have agreed to "assign" to the operational command or control of a NATO commander (1) at some future date, (2) upon mobilization, or (3) at the outbreak of hostilities. "Earmarked" forces enter the command structure from time to time on a temporary basis, such as for training exercises or major maneuvers. SACEUR has forces actually assigned in peacetime. These are essentially Army and Air Force components. Naval forces, because of their mobility and their flexible role in meeting national responsibilities outside the NATO area as well as within, are not as a rule assigned in time of peace. SACLANT and the Channel Commanders-in-Chief have no forces assigned in peacetime. All major commanders, however, are responsible for planning and conducting training exercises as necessary to insure an adequate state of combat readiness of all forces, whether assigned or earmarked.
Problems and Progress
All things considered, it is somewhat of a miracle that an alliance such as NATO has hung together thus far, and in fact, without the impetus of war, continues to grow in strength and cohesiveness. Today, the NATO partners meet and agree on policy and concerted action to a degree that would have been unbelievable eight or ten years ago. But NATO is not without its internal stresses and strains. There are many problems yet to be solved, and probably always will be, if NATO is to continue to evolve with the changing world situation, and to grow stronger in pace with the implacable and ever-increasing Soviet threat.
First, there are political problems, and it might be said that these are at the root of nearly all of the problems, since the political thread runs through every piece of NATO cloth. Any successful alliance will involve the sacrifice of a degree of national sovereignty—the more cohesive the alliance, the greater the relinquishment of national prerogatives to the common cause. In addition to national sensibilities of pride and prestige to be overcome, it must be recognized that there are individual national economic interests which require much patience to be reconciled. There are remnants of old enmities, jealousies, and distrusts yet to be dispelled; bilateral clashes of interests such as the Iceland fishing dispute, to be resolved. Yet, such exceedingly knotty and complex problems among NATO partners have been solved—the Saar and Cyprus for example.
Sir Winston Churchill defined the NATO challenge when he said: "We must rise to a level above the passions which have laid all Europe in ruins. Old feuds must die, territorial ambitions must be set aside. National rivalries must be confined to proving who can render the truest service to the common cause."
The problem of unanimity is often an impediment to rapid decision and progress; yet, it is the democratic way and must be the rule of order in an alliance of free, independent nations. Agreement must be voluntary and unanimous in every case. There is no way to induce conformity except by demonstration of a mutuality of interest. Unanimity is sometimes a time-consuming basis for action, but it is inherent in an alliance of this nature.
At times, United States Government officials, both civil and military, and even the American public, become impatient that what they believe to be right, necessary, and equitable is not always readily accepted by our NATO partners. Some feel that because the United States is the largest and most powerful member, it should have a controlling voice. Not so. No country can dictate in NATO. Support and acceptance of one's ideas can only be gained through logical, persuasive argument, and compromise is the usual order of the day.
There are economic problems—the old, familiar shortages of men and money. Not only has the cost of things—materials and labor—greatly increased through a general inflation throughout the Alliance, but the new highly diversified, and enormously complex weapons systems, essential to meet the ever-growing threat, are fantastically expensive to produce, maintain, and operate. Technological progress is such that the expensive weapons of today must continually be replaced by the even more expensive weapons of tomorrow. In many cases, these new weapons systems, despite their degree of automation, require more men to operate them rather than fewer, contrary to popular conception, and these men must be highly trained.
The financial burden of developing and maintaining modern armaments is a heavy one to the member governments. Defense requirements must compete with an ever-mounting urge of populations for a higher standard of living. While the economic wellbeing of the NATO countries has improved considerably, it is nonetheless difficult for governments to find the money required to support the forces and infrastructure programs which are the minimum necessary to enable the military to discharge the defense responsibilities assigned by their political masters. With few exceptions, the forces of NATO countries in Europe can only be equipped with the new weapons systems through help from the U. S. Military Assistance Program.
The Heads of Government decided at their meeting in December, 1957, that the climbing cost of defense makes necessary a more efficient application of the aggregate of the resources available to the member nations. This gave expression to the Concept of Interdependence, which is now being translated into action. One facet of this basic principle is the doctrine of balanced collective forces, in which NATO as a whole would seek to achieve maximum economy, efficiency, and effectiveness by encouraging countries to furnish, on a collective basis, forces balanced to meet the security requirements of the Alliance. This concept would replace the old order wherein each nation has felt impelled to maintain a fully balanced force structure within its own military establishment. The transition will take time, but it is an essential goal.
Another application of the Concept of Interdependence lies in co-ordination of effort in the fields of research, development, and production of modern weapons systems within NATO. This is an enormously complex and difficult undertaking but, again, the effort is absolutely essential if NATO is to develop in pace with the threat. Organizational machinery is now being set up to monitor and guide—in effect, to manage—collective efforts in these fields, in order to bring the total scientific and industrial resources of the Alliance to bear in the most economical and effective way. Unnecessary duplication must be eliminated and better efficiency achieved so as to realize the absolute maximum return out of every NATO dollar spent for defense.
The obstacles to be overcome in this field are many, but are not insurmountable. There are problems of security, patent rights, cost sharing formulas, national pride, diverse national needs, and perhaps worst of all, the conflicts of commercial interests among the member nations. But a good start has been made in pooling talents and resources.
There are problems in the military field—strategical, organizational, tactical, in standardization and compatibility of forces and equipment, obsolescence of equipment, etc.
NATO planning must be based on the assumption that there will be little warning of a Soviet attack. Since the democracies would not deliberately start World War III, they must concede the factors of surprise and initiative to an aggressor. Few laymen realize the enormous advantage these factors give to a potential enemy.
The original NATO command structure was dictated as much by political sensibilities as by sound military principle. It could be considerably improved. But political obstacles to a proper command structure still exist. Nations are like people. It is difficult for nations to forget old enmities and to rise above traditional spheres of influence and national pride.
In embracing the Concept of Interdependence, the NATO Heads of Government called for as high a degree of standardization and integration as possible in all fields of defensive effort, and particularly in air defense. NORAD is a striking example of integrated air defense. An integrated air defense system in Europe would include early warning and communications facilities as well as air defense forces, missiles, and supporting installations, all to be fully ready and under the operational control of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in peacetime. To be effective, it would necessarily transcend national boundaries.
Then finally, there are psychological problems—the constant threat of complacency; belief that since war has not occurred, it will not occur; the pious hope that perhaps the Communist rulers are retreating from their goal of world domination. There are a few who seek a bargain basement defense- who think that there must be a cheaper way to provide an adequate defense of the Alliance. Most dangerous of all, perhaps, is a threatened letdown through sheer weariness of the cold war.
In the face of all these problems, one might question whether NATO is, or can be, a success. But problems engender moral strength and vitality. NATO is a success—make no mistake about it. The prime objective of NATO is to prevent war, and there has been no war in Europe since NATO was born.
Between the closing phases of World War II and the time NATO came into existence, seven European countries, with a population of some hundred million people, were annexed by Russia or disappeared behind the Iron Curtain as satellites. Since NATO was formed, not a square foot of NATO territory has passed under Soviet control. In addressing the Ministerial Council at their December, 1958 meeting, Secretary of Defense McElroy said: " ... adequate NATO military strength is the indispensable shield for our economic well-being and our political liberties."
When General Eisenhower was appointed in 1950 to be the first Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, he had at his disposal less than twenty divisions. The equivalent divisions which now would be available to General Norstad in continental Europe on D-Day, or a few days thereafter, represent a numerical increase by a factor of nearly four. He now would have over 6,000 aircraft, mostly jets, compared to about 400 available in 1950. It is difficult to cite meaningful figures as to naval vessels, but the naval forces which are now tabled for NATO are about eight times as large as in the beginning. Today, many NATO forces in Europe have a tactical atomic delivery capability.
IRBM'S and other surface-to-surface missiles are now operational in Europe. At their meeting in December, 1957, the NATO Heads of Government decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads to be readily available for the defense of the Alliance in case of need. Antiaircraft missiles are in place on the Continent and ready.
But even with a generous factor of calculated risk cranked in, the Alliance does not yet have all of the forces which, in the best military judgment, are required to provide an adequate defense against aggression. However, minimum force levels have now been fairly well recognized and accepted by the member governments.
The NATO supporting structure has been vastly strengthened. In 1950, there were fifteen airfields available to NATO in Europe. Today there are several hundred ready for use, commonly financed through the infrastructure program. In the past seven years, tens of thousands of miles of cables and land lines, and countless radio links, have been added. There are now several thousand miles of NATO pipelines in service where there were none in 1950.
In 1950, NATO nations expended some twenty billion dollars for defense; in 1957, the same nations spent about 56 billion security dollars. Some two billions have been expended on common infrastructure projects, including war headquarters, naval bases, and maritime airfields as well as others previously mentioned. Progress is being made toward the integration of transportation systems and logistic support.
Hand in hand with these numerical and material gains, there has been a steady improvement in the quality of NATO forces, so that there is now a much greater readiness, cohesiveness, and combat capability than in the early years of the Alliance. NATO commanders and supporting staffs all down the line know their jobs and, within the limits of resources provided, are fully prepared to go into action. Plans have been refined, tested, and rehearsed in many NATO training exercises, large-scale and small.
Best of all, the NATO partners are learning to understand and trust each other and to work smoothly and effectively together.
All this is progress. But progress in NATO is meaningful only as it is measured against the constantly increasing military capability of the Soviet Bloc. Military posture is purely a relative thing. The threat which brought NATO into being still exists.
Nevertheless, NATO may review its first ten years with a sense of solid accomplishment, and may enter the second decade with renewed confidence. NATO is working. It is working so well that the dissolution of the Alliance has become a prime political objective of the Kremlin. What better proof is needed that NATO is a success?
The photographs illustrating this article are official NATO and U. S. releases.