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Admiral Oldendorf Comments on the Battle of Surigao Strait
(Sec pages 31-53, December, 1958 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf, usn (ret.).—Since the account of the operations during the Battle of Surigao Strait was written from available records which are not always complete or which contain information gleaned from many sources many months or years after the event, it might be of interest to future historians to know how the picture looked to the officer in command from information available to him at the time.
Radio contact reports from our aircraft and submarines had definitely alerted me to the possible intentions and to the composition of the Central and Southern Forces of Admirals Kurita and Nishimura, so that Admiral Kinkaid’s order to prepare for night action came as no surprise. Admiral Kinkaid’s order stated that a force of approximately two bat- deships, three heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and ten destroyers could be at the northern end of Surigao Strait by midnight. (I did not know until several months later that there were actually two separate commands in this Southern Force.) It was obvious that the objective of the Japanese Forces was the destruction of our transports and that my mission was to protect them at all costs. In order to accomplish my mission, the force under my command must be interposed between the enemy and the transports. I realized that I must not lose sight of my mission no matter how much I might be tempted to engage in a gunnery duel with him.
I selected the position of the battle line off Ffingatungan Point because it gave me the maximum sea room available and restricted the enemy’s movements. This position also permitted me to swing my battle line to cover the eastern entrance to the Gulf should the Central Force under Admiral Kurita arrive ahead of the Southern Force. I selected the battle plan from the General Tactical Instructions and modified it to meet the conditions existing, i.e., lack of sea room to maneuver and possible enemy action. I was quite sure that the Japanese commander knew the size and composition of my force as enemy planes had been present over the area since shortly after our arrival. With this knowledge, I supposed that he had a plan to circumvent me.
I thought that quite possibly he planned to slip some of his light forces into the Gulf by passing them to the eastward of Hibuson Island after the battle line was engaged. For that reason I stationed the preponderance of my light forces on the left flank. One duty which was never delegated to my staff was the drafting of battle plans.
When the dispositions and functions of the various types had been determined, it would be necessary to make the maximum use of my destroyers, major weapon—torpedoes— because of the shortage of major caliber service ammunition and for that reason the gun battle should be fought at short ranges in order to obtain the maximum number of hits. I sent for Admirals Weyler and Berkey and explained my plan in detail and asked for their comment. I met with their unqualified approval. I then turned the plan over to my staff to be put into despatch form to be sent out by visual signal as there was insufficient time to code and decode if sent by radio. The various units of my force were in position by shortly after sundown and the patrol of the twelve and a half mile east-west line at five knots commenced. This very low speed was selected to avoid more frequent reversals of course by simultaneous ship turns. The problem of handling this large force in these narrow waters with its swift and changing currents and ships keeping in position could not have been accomplished without excellent radar (SG) and high frequency radio telephone (TBS). The navigation problem was expertly handled by Commander John Sylvester, usn, of my staff—now Vice Admiral Sylvester.
To the best of my recollection, after I had informed Admirals Kinkaid and Wilkinson of my intentions, Admiral Wilkinson placed Desron 54 (Captain Coward) under my command and so informed him. I then directed Captain Coward to patrol an east-west line about 40,000 yards south of the battle line and upon the approach of the Japanese force to report its formation, course, and speed. Captain Coward then informed me that he expected to attack with torpedoes after getting off his report. He was directed to submit his battle plan, which was to attack in two sections, one from the east and one from the west. I approved his plan, but directed that each section retire to its own side of the Strait after delivering its attack and then proceed north. There were two reasons for these instructions: first, I did not believe that the Japanese radar could follow his ships against the high background of the Strait and, second, I did not want his ships to foul the range for other attacks. In a night action the movements of the various components of a command must be accurately known or the action will develop into a melee with individual units unable to determine friend from foe. How capably Captain Coward, his commanding officers, and men performed their tasks is too well known to require from me more than a very “well done.”
At about the same time as Admiral Wilkinson’s message to Captain Coward and me, Admiral Kinkaid informed me that he had sent all of the Seventh Fleet Motor Torpedo Squadrons, under Commander S. S. Bowling, down the Strait. They were to remain south of a line latitude 10 degrees 10 minutes, to report enemy progress, and to attack if opportunity presented. Intermingled with contact reports from the MTBs was one reporting that his boat had hit something hard, which he believed to be a submarine. His position as given was near the head of the Japanese column. This report led me to consider the possibility that the enemy had submarines in advance of his column. I now think it quite possible that the young skipper did not know his position accurately and that he hit either a rock or some other obstruction.
In the version of the battle as printed in the Proceedings is this sentence: “Admiral Oldendorf still had another destroyer squadron to throw at Nishimura before opening gun fire. This was Captain Smoot’s Destroyer
Squadron 56, which had the duty of screening the left flank cruisers” (italics supplied). This squadron was concentrated in an approach formation stationed between the left flank cruisers and the battle line so as to be out of gun range and available to the OTC for a torpedo attack when ordered. If this squadron had been intended as a screen, it would hardly have been concentrated and only on one side (the wrong one from where a possible attack would come).
My one anxiety during the early stages of the battle was that the enemy would not keep coming toward me. If his radar located the position of my battle line, he might reverse course before coming within gun range. If he did so, I knew that I would be strongly tempted to go after him. By doing so, I would give up the advantage of my position and might uncover the Strait for one or more of his ships to slip through.
After ordering Desron 56 to attack, but before the division under Captain Smoot’s personal command (Newcomb, Leary and Grant) could reach its firing point, which was directly ahead of the enemy column, it was taken under very heavy fire by the leading ship in that column. To cover Smoot’s attack,
I gave the order to commence firing. The gunnery officers must have been riding the triggers of their guns, because hardly had the words left my lips to be repeated over the telephone by my flag lieutenant, than the Louisville (my flagship) let fly with her first salvo without waiting to give the usual warning buzzer. The gun fire phase of the battle was on, and quite a pyrotechnic display it was. By increasing speed to fifteen knots the leading battleship, West Virginia, had reached a position so that her first salvo passed directly over the Louisville. It sounded like a train of box cars passing over a high trestle. Following this salvo with my binoculars, I had the satisfaction of seeing it land squarely on the forecastle of the leading ship (Tama- shiro) of the enemy’s column. The six-inch cruisers, using flashless powder, were firing so rapidly that the whole sky surrounding them was one incandescent glow.
I gave the order to cease firing at 0409 when I learned that some of our own ships were firing on the A. W. Grant and as we were rapidly running out of enemy ships within range. I did not like the idea of using our own ships as substitute targets. Consulting the radar screen, I determined that the enemy force, made up mostly of cripples, was retiring. I ordered Division Xray to assemble, then to proceed down the Strait and attack with torpedoes. Before proceeding down the Strait with the left flank cruisers, I directed the battle line (Admiral Weyler) to remain in position. Division Xray could not be located on my radar screen and I did not know whether it was ahead or astern of me. I could see gunfire ahead at each side of the Strait which I thought was destroyers firing. If friendly, I did not want to fire on them; if enemy, I was running into a perfect torpedo set-up. My staff was keeping a running check to warn me when my ships were getting into torpedo areas. When so informed, I ordered column right to course 250 and after firing on the Mogami and a destroyer which was standing by at 0537, I ordered ships right 18 to dodge torpedoes if they had been fired and to wait for daylight.
It might not be out of place to remark at this point that I could never understand how the Nachi managed to collide with the Mogami. The Mogami was on fire and burning like a gigantic torch. That collision was worse than running ashore in clear weather at the base of a lighthouse.
Shortly before or just after I turned south with my left flank force in pursuit of the retiring enemy remnants, I learned that Ku- rita’s Central Force had passed out of San Bernardino Strait about midnight. Whether this information came from a patrol plane (Black Cat) or a submarine, I do not remember. It is not mentioned in Admiral Morison’s book Leyte and I suppose not in the War College Analysis, although I have never seen that paper. I feel sure that I had this information from some source because it influenced my actions. I did not want to expose my ships needlessly to torpedo attacks or to proceed too far from the eastern entrance to the Gulf.
At 0732, when I received the report that battle had been joined off Samar between Kurita’s Central Force and Admiral Sprague’s escort carriers, I was ordered to concentrate my force as soon as possible at the northern end of Surigao Strait, to report when concentrated and the amount of ammunition remaining by ships. My staff was put to work assembling this much needed information. When it had been reported, I received orders to go to the relief or assistance of Sprague. I was to divide my force and to take only the ships with the greatest amount of ammunition augmented by destroyers from the amphibious command (they had their full quota of torpedoes) plus the light cruiser Nashville. After a couple of false starts, my force proceeded out of the eastern entrance for quite some distance when it was recalled by Admiral Kinkaid because Kurita’s Central Force had had enough from Admiral Sprague and was retiring north. I then took station with my force patrolling the eastern entrance (inside) where I had intended to be before the diversion in support of the escort carriers.
When, despite the vocal dissent of my chief of staff, I proceeded out of the Strait in obedience to Admiral Kinkaid’s order, I felt that the Commander of the Seventh Fleet knew as well as I that we were committing a strategical error. There was no choice on my part, nor on his. An important segment of his command was being badly mauled by a greatly superior force. Though I have never discussed this point with Admiral Kinkaid, I believe that he was in much the same position as a gendeman who comes upon a thug beating a woman. He may be reluctant to become involved in a brawl, but he cannot stand idly by and see a woman beaten.
I agree with Admiral Morison’s comment that the most intelligent act of any Japanese commander in the entire batde was Admiral Shima’s retirement. Departing from what did happen to what might have happened: Supposing that Admiral Sprague had intercepted the messages (or hunch) which I did that Admiral Kurita’s Central Force had passed out of San Bernardino Strait at midnight, he would undoubtedly have withdrawn his command of escort carriers from the direct line between San Bernardino and Surigao Straits. Kurita, then encountering no opposition, might have continued on south until he met my force with its greatly depleted ammunition supply at or near the eastern entrance to the Gulf of Leyte. I had planned to greet him in much the same manner as I had Nishimura, use the torpedoes of my light forces covering them with gun fire while the service ammunition lasted, then to shift to H.E. and hope for the best. While thus occupied, it would have been a comparatively simple matter for Shima to return for a go at the transports. Needless to say, I was very glad that this situation did not develop.
The Gulf of Aqaba
(See pages 75-81, January, 1959 Proceedings)
Mr. Joel I. Judovich, Philadelphia, Pa. —I read with some interest Commander Malcolm W. Cagle’s article. While I certainly agree with Commander Cagle that the Gulf of Aqaba is a trigger for conflict, I am not sure he has placed the situation in its proper perspective. The Israeli attempt to convert Elath into a major seaport, with overland routes to the Mediterranean by road, rail, and pipeline so that she may share in East African and Oriental trade is a direct consequence of being denied the use of the Suez Canal. It is a fact that only Israel and Egypt have access to both the Mediterranean and the Red Sea by virtue of geography. Had Israel been permitted to use the Suez Canal for normal trade she would have had no need to invest resources in developing an alternative route. Voting in the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council has
stressed the illegality of the Egyptian prohibition on Israeli shipping in the Canal and the Gulf. Ships of other flags have been blacklisted for trading with Israel and denied port facilities as well as the use of the Canal. It is evident that the blockade conditions created by Egypt began to impinge on many maritime nations as well as Israel.
Again, as a result of and reaction to blockade by land and sea, Israel has been forced to create what is now the largest and most modern Merchant Marine in the Middle East, and a growing Navy. If by boycott the Arabs intimidate ships of other flags, Israel alternatively must depend on its own maritime industry. For a similar reason Israel developed its national airline, El Al.
A primary Arab objection to Israeli use of the Gulf is that in providing an alternative line of communication between the Indian Ocean, East Africa and the Mediterranean, the use of the Suez Canal as a political lever against the Western nations by the Arab bloc has been considerably weakened. As long as this technical alternative to transportation exists, the Arab bargaining position vis-a-vis the West is less effective. Conversely, it is to the advantage of the West that such an alternative exists.
With the acquisition of Russian destroyers, minesweepers, MTBs, and submarines by Egypt and Syria, the naval balance in the area was seriously affected. While Israel did receive two “Z”-class destroyers from Britain, it should be noted that Egypt received two of the same class of vessel at the same time. Of greater interest is the fact that the Israeli and French Navies have held joint antisubmarine warfare maneuvers, emphasizing the importance of Israel’s Navy to the Western nations. The capture of the Egyptian destroyer Ibrahim Awal by a boarding party during the 1956 Sinai Peninsula operation added this former British Hunt-class destroyer to the Israel Navy. It is interesting to note in comparing the technical levels of the Egyptian and Israel Navies that one of the primary reasons for the capture of this vessel was the fact that a few normally inconclusive hits destroyed its battle efficiency because there was no damage control organization functioning on board. In addition, two modernized British “S”-class submarines were transferred to Israel in October, 1958, and Israel possesses a number of MTBs powered with the modern Napier Deltic diesel engines. Naval strength in the Gulf of Aqaba includes two River-class frigates, a number of MTBs, and small landing craft.
Volga-Don Canal
(See pages 104-105, October, 1958 Proceedings and pages 627-633, June, 1956 Proceedings)
Mr. George E. Hill, II, Geneva, Switzerland.—[Editor’s Note: Mr. Hill’s visit was made in a totally private capacity, as an interested tourist.] In July, 1958, I went by river steamer from Rostov-on-Don to Stalingrad as one of what purported to be the first large group of Americans to pass through the Volga-Don Canal. The approach seems less than 100 yards wide but the sides are well graded and covered with flat stones. The locks seen from within appear smaller than the 60 by 600 feet reported and I would reduce the figure for water over the sills from 15 to nine feet. Four locks raised us 44 meters in the course of 54 kilometers.
The reservoirs between certain of the locks and at the summit are surprisingly large bodies of water, the last being a full 26 kilometers across. Our ship was in transit for nearly 36 hours and made three stops in daylight. Visible port facilities consisted of either plain wooden piles or a barge moored to the shore and surmounted by a two story building with galleries. Once and at a distance we saw some small cranes and what looked like grain elevators. Unfortunately, the descent of 88 meters through nine locks in a distance of 21 kilometers was made after dusk and little was seen although the huge statue of Stalin was identified in the early morning hours.
We saw nothing but a few barges, a dredge and some other steamers in the way of shipping. Our own vessel was a side-wheeler but the newer ones are screw-propelled. Warships probably could be forced through the Canal. But, Commander Kassell’s view that such an operation would of necessity have to be tied to high water in the rivers plus some means either to increase the depth of water at the sills or to raise ships in cramped quarters is correct. I doubt that the possibility has been or would be seriously considered.