There is no such thing as a typical officer in today’s Navy. Each officer has his own unique combination of educational background and professional experience. Diversified procurement programs and more specialized billets have done away with the rather standard qualifications held by most officers of the pre-war Navy.
The Navy requires a greater depth and breadth of technical knowledge from its officers than ever before. It is shocking to find that surprisingly few of our line officers have either the academic background or the professional experience necessary to acquire such knowledge.
Prior to World War II, virtually all line officers received identical undergraduate education in academic and professional subjects before being commissioned. This was possible since the Navy was small and the single source of line officers was the Naval Academy. Due to the Navy’s rapid expansion during the wartime years, many fine officers were commissioned with only a high school education and limited indoctrination in naval professional subjects.
After the war, many of these officers were accepted for transfer to the Regular Navy. In an attempt to equalize the academic and professional educational backgrounds of all line officers, the Navy inaugurated a six- months General Line School course for all transferees and an undergraduate educational program whereby officers lacking a baccalaureate degree could obtain up to five terms of academic education at a civilian college.
It was anticipated that by about 1953 it would be possible to return to a graduate level General Line School course and that the Five- Term Program of undergraduate studies could be discontinued. The impact of postwar officer procurement programs, however, had not been fully anticipated.
Originally it had been intended that most post-war line officers in the Regular Navy would come from the Naval Academy and the NROTC Program, with limited additions from the Naval Aviation Cadet Program and the Enlisted Integration Program. However, in 1956, the Weakley-Daniel Board, in its report on the Postgraduate Educational Programs of the Navy, disclosed that only 55 per cent of each year-group of post-war line officers being commissioned were Naval Academy or NROTC graduates. The balance were former Naval Aviation Cadets, ex- enlisted integratees or officers augmented from several Reserve Officer procurement programs. Most of these latter officers do not have a baccalaureate degree, and few have had more than limited indoctrination in professional subjects prior to commissioning.
As a consequence of post-war procurement practices, we now find that over one-third of the commanders, two-thirds of the lieutenant commanders, and nearly a third of the lieutenants in the Regular Navy line do not have college degrees. And this does not include the Limited Duty Officers. Additionally, many of the officers with a baccalaureate degree majored in fields other than engineering or science.
Recently, the Secretary of the Navy, in a letter approving recommendations contained in the Report of the Committee on Organization of the Navy Department, stated:
As we explore space, delve under the ice and the oceans, live with the startling advances of science, and share the work of command and foreign policy, our officers must become scientists, economists, ambassadors, as well as sailors. They must work with the design and operation of the advanced technical aspects of new systems.
The basic and central theme of the Committees’ recommendations with which I am in complete agreement is that there is need for increased postgraduate education of unrestricted line officers who should by sub-specialization in their fields make a greater contribution to the Navy by assignments to jobs related to their sub-specialties and appropriate to their rank.
It is pertinent to note that forty years ago the Knox-King-Pye Board, as a result of its study of the instruction and training of line officers, similarly reported that:
The requirements of the naval profession are found to be such that provision must not only be made (a) for the progressive education of officers at recurring periods—but also (b) for the specialization of all officers in at least one branch of the profession, in order that full knowledge and use may be made of the constant progress in all of the arts, industries, and sciences, which can in any way contribute to the advancement of efficiency in naval warfare in any of its manifold aspects and requirements.
The report of the Knox-King-Pye Board resulted in the establishment of a postgraduate department at the Naval Academy. Although the records indicate that a numerical shortage of officers has always been a problem in the Navy in implementing education and training programs, the annual Reports to the Secretary of the Navy show that in 1927 two per cent of the Navy’s Officer Corps was enrolled in technical postgraduate education. By 1937 this had increased to approximately three-and-one-half per cent. However, after the war there was a marked decline. In 1947 this had dropped to one-and-one-half per cent, and by 1957 only one per cent of the total officer strength was enrolled in postgraduate courses.
In 1956 the Weakley-Daniel Board determined that the Navy’s requirements for officers with postgraduate education vastly exceeded the numbers of officers with this background. In addition, it was determined that many line officers educated to the baccalaureate level lacked the necessary prerequisite undergraduate background in engineering and the basic sciences to matriculate in technical postgraduate courses. This was true even in the case of Naval Academy graduates. Consequently, most of the Navy’s postgraduate engineering courses had had to be lengthened by approximately one year in order to provide the necessary foundation for truly graduate work. Thus most courses leading to a master’s degree in engineering were increased to three years in duration.
Although the number of officers eligible to enter technical postgraduate courses annually has been severely curtailed by the educational backgrounds of our post-war groups, this is not the only major obstacle to be overcome in complying with the Secretary of the Navy’s desire that increased postgraduate education be provided for line officers. Two equally thorny problems are the limitation of funds allocated for education and training, and an over-all limitation of the number of officers who at any one time can be made available for this purpose from other duties.
In recent years budgetary restrictions have tended to maintain training funds at a fixed figure. However, due to rising costs of training, including higher tuition rates, the lack of increased funds has had the effect of materially reducing the number of students who may be accommodated annually within the funds allocated unless course lengths are reduced. However, as has already been indicated, there are cogent reasons for increasing rather than decreasing many technical postgraduate courses due to deficiencies in the students’ academic backgrounds and the increased scope of the material to be covered.
In addition to the competition between educational programs created by the over-all shortage of training funds which tends to limit the number of officers in any one program, there is also the severe restriction imposed by an over-all limitation in the total number of officers who may be spared from other duties in order to attend schools. Thus technical postgraduate education must compete within these ceilings with professional education at the General Line School and the War Colleges as well as undergraduate academic education at civilian colleges for officers commissioned prior to obtaining their baccalaureate degree. If a higher percentage of the overall Navy strength were permitted to be in an officer status, some relief from this limitation might be obtained. Although total active duty officer strength was formerly regulated by the Secretary of the Navy, this allowance is presently rigidly controlled by the Secretary of Defense for each of the services. In recent years it has been kept at approximately eleven per cent for the Army and the Navy and fifteen per cent for the Air Force. Attempts on the part of the Navy to obtain an increase have been unsuccessful. Were release from this restriction obtainable in the immediate future, however, it appears likely that the increased members could only be obtained from personnel educated to less than the baccalaureate level.
At this point the reader might well question if there is a solution to the problem of the education of the Line. Although there is a need for more line officers educated to a higher level, post-war procurement measures, found necessary in order to obtain sufficient numbers, have only succeeded in further diluting the over-all educational level of the Regular Navy Line. Efforts to correct this situation after commissioning have been so hampered by limitations in funds and manpower as to fall far short of their objective.
The writer believes that an acceptable solution is feasible, operating within existing parameters. However, a change in the basic concept of line officer professional development is essential to this solution. It is necessary that we accept the fact that no longer is it possible to expect all line officers to be well rounded in all professional areas by virtue of training and experience and additionally to have an area of superimposed specialization. Although the Navy has tenaciously clung to this ideal since its conception by the Knox-King-Pye Board forty years ago, it has not been feasible of accomplishment for certain categories of line officers for nearly twenty years. For those officers continuing to be commissioned prior to obtaining academic education to the baccalaureate level and professional grounding in the basic naval science subjects, this ideal will continue to be infeasible of implementation. Acceptance of this fact, accompanied by a change in career patterns and professional development concepts for most products of our Enlisted Integration and Limited Duty Officer Programs and the Naval Aviation Cadet Program, is both realistic and necessary. These officers may be expected to continue to comprise at least one-third of our post-war Regular Navy year-group strength for the foreseeable future.
Officers commissioned through the Enlisted Integrated Program have had a minimum of four years enlisted service, while those commissioned through the Limited Duty Officer Program have had a minimum of ten years enlisted service ending in the grade of Chief or First Class Petty Officer. Because of this prior service these officers have accumulated a wealth of detailed knowledge and experience in the specialized area of their enlisted rating group. This should be built upon rather than disregarded, as is now too often the case.
It is proposed that the basic career pattern for this group of officers emphasize line duties in the operating forces, aviation or non-aviation as appropriate, in the general area of their enlisted background—i.e. operation, gunnery, electronics or engineering—generally culminating in retirement after twenty years total service. In lieu of the current ten to sixteen weeks indoctrination course prior to commissioning would be substituted a six to ten months course in operations, gunnery, electronics or engineering to extend their enlisted training and experience well beyond the enlisted Class B School level. These officers would be invaluable in many shipboard and aviation ground officer billets. Limited numbers, selected for lieutenant commander and commander, would continue for up to thirty years total service prior to retirement. However, upon selection for lieutenant commander, they would be given an additional six months to one year of schooling at either an advanced technical school in their primary area of specialization or at a War College junior course.
The Naval Aviation Cadet Program would be modified to become a reserve officer procurement program. The primary quantitative need for naval pilots extends through the grade of lieutenant for naval aviators with up to ten years flight experience. The career pattern for reserve officers procured under this program would be ten years active duty in operational flying billets after obtaining their wings. Upon transfer to the inactive reserve after ten years of active flying they would receive a $10,000 tax-free gratuity. Limited numbers selected for lieutenant commander would continue on active duty for up to twenty years total service. Officers separated prior to retirement would receive a $1,000 tax-free gratuity for each year of commissioned service in a flight status after obtaining their initial designation as a naval aviator. If selected for the grade of lieutenant commander, these officers would attend either the General Line School or a junior War College course. There would be no other formal education, professional or academic, programmed for this category of officers.
Career patterns for officers procured through the Naval Academy and the NROTC Regular program would follow the Knox-King-Pye concept of generalization with a superimposed area of specialization. Postgraduate education in technical areas, after four to six years commissioned service, would be stressed for officers whose baccalaureate degree was in science or engineering. Those officers whose undergraduate education had been in other fields would primarily be channeled into either the General Line School or a junior War College course at this phase of their professional development. Eligibility for the senior War College courses and for graduate courses in the management field would follow current patterns for both categories of these officers.
During the crucial years ahead it is essential that the Navy’s personnel planners recognize that procurement policies, officer career patterns, and training and education concepts are inextricably related. Each must be so coordinated and oriented that it supports the others in the attainment of a common objective—the development of a truly professional officer corps fully responsive to the Navy’s changing needs despite the limitations of funds and manpower. Post-war policies and concepts of procurement and professional development thus far have fallen short of attaining this goal. Upon the ability of the Line to achieve this goal during the decade of transition ahead rests the future of our Navy.