The assertion has been made frequently that during World War II Japanese military and naval staffs were inflexible, that, unlike the Allies, they were not able to adjust themselves to changed conditions. Their strategy, many believed, was fixed on the highest level without much awareness of the realities of the battlefield and was followed blindly by subordinates. This trait was regarded by Americans as characteristic of Japanese national life and of the Japanese military system. Contrasted to American flexibility in planning and rapid response to new situations, this view was often advanced as proof of the inherent virtues of the democratic system and the superiority of the American over the Japanese way of life. That the Japanese lost the war was for many the final proof of Japanese inflexibility and rigidity.
Gratifying as this view is to national pride, it hardly accords with the facts. It is true that Tokyo kept a closer control over commanders in the field than did Washington, but Japanese commanders had fairly wide discretion in the execution of strategy, made their own operational plans, and on occasion initiated change in orders from Tokyo when local conditions warranted. Army and Navy general staffs in Tokyo were as fully informed of the situation in the field as their American counterparts as a result of reports, informal correspondence, and personal visits. On the basis of this information, the Japanese High Command adjusted its plans, modified its strategy, drew up tentative military plans for the future, and co-ordinated these plans with other governmental agencies concerned with the prosecution of the war.
In exceptional circumstances, when a basic shift in strategy or what the Japanese termed “war-direction” was involved, the Japanese military could initiate a full-scale review of national policy on the highest governmental level, including even the Emperor himself. One such occasion came in September, 1943 —midway in the war—after a series of dramatic reverses in the Solomons, New Guinea, and the Aleutians. Clearly foreshadowed was an Allied offensive of major proportions. How the Japanese High Command reacted to this situation, the appraisal it made of Japan’s plight, and the measures it proposed to meet the threat furnish an excellent case study of Japanese staff work and planning on the highest level and an opportunity to examine the structure of the High Command itself.
The Japanese High Command
Under the Japanese constitution, the civil and military functions of the Government were sharply separated. Only in the person of the Emperor himself, who had neither authority nor responsibility, were the two functions joined. Below him were two clearly delineated lines of authority—one through the Cabinet to the civil agencies of the Government, the other through the service chiefs to the military forces. Each was independent of the other and each acted in the name of the Emperor. In actual practice, however, the military exercised a veto over the civil government by virtue of the fact that the War and Navy Ministers, who were active officers nominated by the services, could force the resignation of the Prime Minister and the formation of a new Government simply by resigning, for no Cabinet could exist without the War and Navy Ministers.
Supreme Command of the military in Japan was vested in the Emperor and exercised in his name jointly by the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs. These officers were virtually the most important figures in Japan. As chiefs of their respective services, they controlled the armed forces, exercised a powerful influence over the War and Navy Ministers, and had direct access to the Emperor without reference to the Prime Minister or the Cabinet. No important decision affecting the size or employment of the military forces in Japan could be made without their consent. So great was their prestige and political power and so unlimited their capacity for independent action that they could virtually commit the nation to a course of action.
To provide effective direction and co-operation between the Army and Navy in time of war, a separate body known as Imperial General Headquarters was established in November, 1937, after the outbreak of war with China. Imperial General Headquarters was but the Supreme Command under another name. At its head was the Emperor and under him were the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs. Theoretically, this arrangement provided a unified command, but in actual practice the Army and Navy Sections of Imperial General Headquarters operated independently as separate, co-equal bodies. Strategy and policy were reached by agreement and co-operation, and no single group or individual could force decision.
The Japanese constitution made no provision for the co-ordination of political and military matters except in the person of the Emperor. To meet this need, the civil authorities and the Supreme Command established by informal agreement the Liaison Conference. The regular members of this Conference were the Prime Minister, the War and Navy Ministers, the Foreign Minister, and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs. When necessary, other officials were invited to attend. As an extraconstitutional body, the Liaison Conference had no legal authority and its decisions were merely agreements having no force in law. But by virtue of the authority and official position of its members, agreements reached at the Liaison Conference became, in effect, national policy decisions.
The role of the Emperor was a passive one. Ordinarily he did not participate in the deliberations of Imperial General Headquarters or the Liaison Conference, but was kept informed by his various Ministers and by the service chiefs. But when particularly vital decisions on national policy were formulated, it was necessary to secure the Emperor’s consent. Thus arose the institution of the Imperial Conference. This was nothing more than a meeting of the Liaison Conference, with the addition of the President of the Privy Council, in the presence of the Emperor. Its purpose was to inform His Majesty of the issues and of the decisions already reached by his chief advisers. Agreement was always obtained in advance, and no changes were ever made during the course of the conference.
Of all the institutions of wartime Japan, the most powerful was Imperial General Headquarters. Roughly comparable to the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in the military sphere, Imperial General Headquarters exercised a political influence that has no parallel in the American system. And even in the realm of military decision, Imperial General Headquarters differed significantly from the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. The Army and Navy Sections of Imperial General Headquarters operated independendy, each issuing orders to subordinate service commanders. Joint action could be attained only by compromise; no machinery existed to compel interservice co-operation. While this was true also, to some degree, of the U.S. Joint Chiefs, the American system provided a procedure for obtaining interservice agreement that worked in all but exceptional cases. And if these means did not suffice, the President had the authority to make the decision. In this respect, the President was a more potent force than the Japanese Emperor, who had the form but not the substance of power.
There were, of course, real differences between the Japanese system for conducting the war and the American. On the Axis side there was virtually no coordination among the partners and Japan fought her own war in her own way. The military in Japan enjoyed a much greater influence and prestige than did the military and naval forces of the United States, and Japanese generals and admirals exercised considerable political authority in their own right. General Hideki Tojo, for example, was not only Prime Minister but also War Minister and after February, 1944, Chief of the Army General Staff as well. His naval colleague, Admiral Shigetaro Shimada, was at once the Navy Minister and Chief of the Navy General Staff. Furthermore, the Japanese Diet was in no sense comparable to the American Congress, and its control over military policy and appropriations was virtually nil.
Neither the Japanese nor the American system provided a truly joint staff, but there was not in the Joint Chiefs organization as clear a delineation between the services as there was in Imperial General Headquarters. In the former, joint plans and action were achieved through a committee system; in the latter, each service prepared its own plans and then consulted with the other. Deadlocks were resolved by compromise, but since the Army was the more powerful of the services, it usually had its way where important Army interests were at stake.
In the area of unified command, the Americans—it would be more correct to say Allies— were far ahead of the Japanese. It is true that neither side attained a unified command on the highest level, except through the Chiefs of Staffs, but the Allies came much closer to this goal than the Japanese. At Rabaul, for example, the Japanese had two co-equal commanders. Admiral Mineichi Koga, commander of the Combined Fleet, could order the Navy commander at Rabaul to take a certain action, but he had no control over the corresponding Army commander, General Hitoshi Imamura. That officer’s orders came from the Army Section of Imperial General Headquarters, and it was there that a co-ordinated plan had to be drawn.
The Japanese system had its shortcomings —as did the American system—but lack of flexibility and responsiveness to change were not among them. In an emergency, Imperial General Headquarters was capable of swift and drastic action, unencumbered by the restraints of Congressional investigation or Presidential authority. This was demonstrated dramatically in December, 1941, when the Japanese put into execution their plan for war. The adjustments and revisions made in this plan during the months that followed give no evidence of inflexibility. In March, 1942, Imperial General Headquarters extended its objectives and broadened its strategy. Later, after the defeats at Midway and Guadalcanal, it altered and narrowed its strategy to bring into harmony means and ends. Each time it made an exhaustive study of the situation and based its new “operational policy” on a realistic estimate of its own and the enemy’s resources.
By September, 1943, twenty months after Pearl Harbor, Japan had reached a critical stage in the war. General MacArthur and Admiral Halsey had made serious inroads on the defenses of the strategic Southeast Area in the Solomons and eastern New Guinea, and showed every intention of continuing a drive from the south. In the north, American forces had taken Attu in May, 1943, and in July forced the Japanese to evacuate Kiska. And in the Central Pacific, American forces were becoming increasingly active. Only recently, fast carriers of the Pacific Fleet had struck Marcus Island, Wake, and Japanese bases in the Marshalls, and American forces had occupied islands in the Ellice Group, south of the Gilberts.
The Axis situation in Europe was no more encouraging. The German offensive in Eastern Europe had stalled and there was every sign of a Soviet counter-offensive. In the Mediterranean, the Allies had followed up their success in North Africa with the landing in Sicily and, on September 8, Italy had surrendered. Any hopes the Japanese may have entertained for a negotiated settlement with Great Britain and the United States, based on a stalemate in Europe, now vanished. It was in these circumstances that Imperial General Headquarters undertook to reassess Japan’s position in the global conflict, to appraise realistically the prospects for the future, and to adjust strategic plans to the new situation.
Strategic Planning
The review of Japan’s position in midwar opened early in September, 1943, with a comprehensive “Estimate of the Enemy Situation.” Forecasting the enemy’s intentions, even when his strength, dispositions, and capabilities are known, is usually little more than an educated guess. But this is a necessary part of military planning, and the Japanese planners at Imperial General Headquarters did not go far off the mark. During the remainder of 1943 and through 1944, the Allies, they thought, would make a concerted effort to capture Rabaul and other strategic positions in the south and Southwest Pacific, while opening offensives in Burma, Sumatra, and the Indian Ocean area. If the Allies succeeded in taking Rabaul, they would almost certainly drive next for the Philippines and the Mandated Islands. Oddly enough, the Japanese did not expect a “large-scale enemy offensive” in the Central Pacific that year because of the weakness in carrier strength. Just what the Japanese meant by a “large-scale” offensive is not clear. Certainly it did not mean operations against the Gilberts, Nauru, Wake, or Marcus, for these were definitely considered possible Allied moves to be undertaken in concert with the offensive against Rabaul. The Allies could be expected also, if the opportunity offered, to invade the Kuriles and the Netherlands East Indies, to disrupt Japanese sea communications, and to bomb the occupied areas and even Japan itself. Everywhere they turned, the Japanese faced the prospect of actual or potential Allied offensives. “In short,” General Hikosahuro Hada, Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff, predicted gloomily, “the situation will develop steadily toward the decisive stage and we are rapidly approaching a crucial stage which may well decide the fate of our country.”
The Japanese estimate of Allied forces gave little cause for optimism. “Front-line” strength they estimated at 23 divisions and 2,500 planes; total strength, including reserves, at 70 to 80 divisions and 6,000 aircraft. The rate of increase of these forces depended, the Japanese recognized, on a variety of factors: the situation in Europe, shipping, and U. S. production. But even assuming the Allies gave first priority to the war against Germany, the Tokyo planners reckoned that the Allies would have 4,000 aircraft and 35 divisions available for operations against Japan at the end of 1943. A year later, this total would have jumped to 7,000 aircraft and 60 divisions, assuming a shipping capacity of four to five million tons.
The main naval strength of the Allies, the Japanese knew, was concentrated in the U. S. Pacific Fleet operating out of Pearl Harbor. The nucleus of this fleet, they estimated correctly, consisted of about six aircraft carriers, fifteen battleships, and fifteen cruisers, organized into several forces. In addition, separate task forces, including ten converted aircraft carriers, were believed to be operating in the Alaska-Aleutians area and in the waters off Australia.
Japanese estimates of U. S. capability for the production of aircraft carriers showed a healthy respect for American industry. By the end of 1943, they estimated, the United States would have twelve carriers; at the end of the following year, eighteen. But it would be safer, the Japanese planners thought, to figure on a more rapid build-up of carrier strength by the United States than the number currently estimated.
Allied submarines, which were responsible for the bulk of their shipping losses, the Japanese placed at about 100. Of these, by far the greater number, about 80, were believed to be American; the remainder, British. Operating bases for the underwater craft were correctly located in Hawaii, Dutch Harbor, Alaska, and Ceylon. No mention was made of the Australian submarine base.
When they considered their own resources, the Japanese found little basis on which to predict an early change in the war. Their greatest weaknesses, they recognized, were in aircraft and in shipping, and without these they could not hope to halt the Allied drive, much less open an offensive of their own. The total number of aircraft that would be required by the Army and Navy during 1944, it was estimated, was 55,000, an impossible figure in view of the fact that total Japanese aircraft production in August, 1943, was only 1,360 and in September, 1,470. And even if the Japanese could produce as many as 55,000 planes, the effort would so strain the economy of the nation that it would be impossible to try to match American and British naval forces, or to build up the ground strength to a level adequate to meet a possible threat from the Soviet Union or to initiate large-scale offensive operations in China. But these the Japanese were apparently willing to sacrifice for air power, the Navy insisting only that it had to have special attack and antisubmarine craft.
The shipping problem was no less serious than the shortage of aircraft. Despite the best efforts of the Navy, ship losses had continued to mount. By the end of the year, the Japanese estimated, shipping losses from enemy submarines alone would be 100,000 tons a month. In a period of less than two years, 445 vessels totalling 1,754,400 tons had been sunk and another 414 (2,109,800 tons) damaged. By far the largest toll, over 2,000,000 tons, had been taken by Allied submarines; the action of Allied aircraft accounted for another 840,000 tons. (See Table.)
Caused by |
Sunk |
Damaged |
Total |
|||
|
No. of Vessels |
Tonnage (in thousands of tons) |
No. of Vessels |
Tonnage (in thousands of tons) |
No. of Vessels |
Tonnage (in thousands of tons) |
Submarines |
290 |
1,233.0 |
146 |
910.7 |
436 |
2,143.7 |
Aircraft |
75 |
303.7 |
97 |
536.2 |
172 |
839.9 |
Mines |
29 |
85.7 |
22 |
106.2 |
51 |
191.9 |
Sea Disaster |
51 |
135.0 |
149 |
556.7 |
200 |
691.7 |
Total |
445 |
1,757.4 |
414 |
2,109.8 |
859 |
3,867.2 |
And there was every reason to expect that the number of sinkings would increase sharply unless drastic measures were taken. Above all else, escort vessels and aircraft were required to reduce the loss of ships, and these could only be obtained by a major effort involving allocations of steel and other natural resources as well as the industrial facilities engaged in other war production. “The Navy,” declared Admiral Seiichi Ito, Deputy Chief of the Navy General Staff, “has been devoting all its efforts toward the speedy increase in escort vessels and planes . . . but it has sadly failed to reach the goal desired.” In urging a major national effort to meet the problem, Admiral Ito had the strong support of General Hada, his opposite Army number, who called for the concentration of the nation’s resources on the production of aircraft and ships. If this were done and if the Army and Navy cooperated closely, said Hada, then it might yet be possible to “crush the enemy counteroffensive and turn the tide of war.”
But the production of aircraft and ships would take time. The problem facing the Japanese High Command, therefore, was to gain this time with a minimum loss, to trade space for time on the most advantageous terms. The solution proposed by the planners at Imperial General Headquarters was embodied in the “New Operational Policy.” Convinced that the line eastern New Guinea- northern Solomons-Marshall and Gilbert Islands could not be held and was, indeed, on the verge of collapse, they recommended that a new line encompassing the “absolute national defense sphere” be established. Beyond this line there would-be no retreat; along it would be built impregnable defenses. And while the Allies fought their way to this line, the/Japanese could repair their losses in aircraft and shipping in preparation for a great counter-offensive.
The selection of a new defense line was based on the most careful calculation of Japan’s resources and Allied capabilities. Extending from the Kurile Islands southward through the Bonins, Marianas, and Carolines, thence south and west to western New Guinea, the Sunda Islands in the Netherlands East Indies, and finally to Burma, this line comprised the minimum area considered essential for the attainment of Japan’s war aims. Possession of this area would give Japan the advantage of interior lines and the raw materials and food she needed to meet military and civilian requirements. Since it corresponded also to the Greater East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere, its security was an essential prerequisite to the political and economic control of the nations included within the Japanese orbit. Any reduction of the area, or the acquisition by the Allies of bases from which to strike important political and industrial targets within it, were bound to affect seriously Japan’s political position and her capacity to wage war.
Based on these considerations, the Japanese planners formulated a strategy whose primary objective was the defense of this vital area. First, in recognition of their inability to hold the existing line in the Southeast Area, they would take a long backward step and establish a more restricted perimeter extending from the Carolines to western New Guinea. Next, they would erect an “undefeatable strategic position” along this new line, establishing advance bases in front of it to keep Allied air power at a safe distance and safeguard the line of communications. Finally, they would build up Japanese power within the absolute defense area, with special emphasis on air power. By utilizing the geographic advantages of this new line and their interior lines of communications, the Japanese hoped they would be able to repulse any large scale enemy offensive and ultimately launch a counteroffensive of their own.
In concrete terms, as enunciated by the Army Section of Imperial General Headquarters on September 15, 1943, this new strategy of “operational policy” would require:
1. Close co-operation with the Navy.
2. Strong delaying action in the Southeast Area. Allied forces advancing in this critical region were to be resisted fiercely and delayed as long as possible. The time thus gained was to be used to build up the defenses along the new line from the Banda Sea to the Caroline Islands and to marshal the forces for a counteroffensive.
3. All-out defense in the Southwest Area, the Japanese designation for the region extending from the Banda Sea to Burma. This area was part of the absolute national defense sphere; therefore the complete destruction of any enemy forces seeking to invade the region was absolutely essential to Japan’s successful prosecution of the war.
4. Preservation of the status quo in China, while increasing pressure against the enemy to destroy his will to fight. In North China, preparations would be made to meet the contingency of Soviet-American cooperation, but no step would be taken that might bring the Soviet Union into the war.
5. Strengthening the defenses of the home islands, the oil regions of the East Indies, and the shipping lanes to Japan. These measures were vital to the conduct of the war and the execution of the new operational policy.
6. Raiding operations deep behind enemy lines in every area.
7. All possible measures or operations that would bring into full play the combined fighting power of the air, ground, and naval forces; in short, any operation that promised success.
The Political Estimate
More than a revision of strategy was required to retrieve the losses Japan had suffered since the summer of 1942. A political and economic program to support this strategy was also needed. The basis of this program was a review of Japan’s position by the civilian agencies of the Government, and on September 25 this review came before the Liaison Conference.
The meeting of the Liaison Conference opened with an “Estimate of the World Situation,” the political counterpart of Imperial General Headquarters’ military estimate of the situation. First the Japanese considered the war aims of the Allies. The United States and Great Britain, they were convinced, would be satisfied with nothing less than the complete defeat of Germany and Japan, the United States concentrating on Japan and Great Britain on Germany. The American aim, the Japanese believed, was a world organization in which the United States would be a dominant member; the aim of the English was the preservation of the Empire and the restoration of British prestige and influence.
In the Japanese view, the United States was anxious to end the war quickly and would therefore make an all-out effort at the earliest possible moment, probably in 1944. This effort would be characterized by the full application of America’s overwhelming material superiority and by the co-operation of the British, Russians, and Chinese. The main offensive, the Japanese reasoned incorrectly but cautiously, would be made in East Asia. They concluded, therefore, that the United States would do everything possible to induce the Soviet Union to join the war against Japan and throw the weight of her military machine into the struggle for Asia. If this offensive failed or if the United States felt she could not gain a decisive victory over Germany and Japan, the Japanese thought the Americans might be willing to make peace. But the price, they believed, would be such as to leave the Axis Powers too weak to make war and the United States so strong that she could exercise a paramount influence on the policy of both the Axis and the Allied nations for years to come.
The Soviet Union loomed large in Japanese calculations. Peace with the Soviet Union was a basic goal of Japanese policy and a fundamental requirement for the prosecution of the war against the Allies. Fortunately, Soviet war aims thus far had favored Japan’s desire to remain at peace with the Soviet Union and, so far as the Japanese could anticipate, would continue to do so while the war lasted. Like the British, the Russians desired above all else the defeat of Germany and the recovery of their lost territory. To secure these, the Japanese were certain the Russians would concentrate all their resources in Europe while cooperating with the Americans and British as long as it suited their purpose. The Japanese were under no delusion that the Russian bear had changed its nature and predicted that the Soviet Union would utilize the war to unify the Slavs—an old dream of the Tsars—extend its influence into the Balkans and western Asia, and push its program for world revolution.
The capabilities of each of the Allies to achieve its war aims varied widely, but nowhere could the Japanese find any weakening of the will to fight or any sign of revolt against the political leadership of the nation. The position of President Roosevelt, they thought, would remain secure as long as the war situation remained favorable to the United States, but they thought his actions in 1944, an election year, needed to be watched carefully. Churchill’s position was even more solid. Unlike Roosevelt’s, it did not depend on optimistic war reports or on the improvement in the hard lot of the English people. The Japanese saw no evidence either that the influence and leadership of Stalin had been shaken in the least by the reverses suffered during the war. His position was considered extremely strong and not likely to change in the near future. The same was true for Hitler.
Realistically, the Japanese measured the capabilities of each nation to achieve its war aims largely in terms of industrial capacity and manpower. By these standards, the United States stood well on the top of the list, despite the limitations of its available manpower. According to Japanese calculations, the United States would reach its peak level of industrial production at the end of 1943. Thereafter, production would level off in all except certain critical war industries, such as aircraft and shipbuilding, where the rate of production would continue to mount. The Japanese did not foresee the development in the United States of any shortages so serious as to force the curtailment of the war production program. Raw materials and food were considered adequate, and even the manpower problem was not so serious as to prevent the United States from expanding its ground army to 123 divisions by the middle of 1944. American naval strength, the Japanese gloomily predicted, would also increase sharply, and in 1945 the United States could be expected to have 37 aircraft carriers and 23 battleships. These were figures that even the most optimistic Japanese could never hope to match. The following year would see a considerable increase in British ground, sea, and air forces, accomplished largely with the help of the United States and the Dominions.
On the basis of their estimate of the aims and capabilities of the Allies, the Japanese political and military leaders attempted to forecast the course of the war down to the end of 1944. From their point of view, there were three major theaters: the eastern front in Europe, the western front, and the Asiatic- Pacific front. In the first, they expected the Russians to continue their offensive and the Germans to withdraw gradually to the line of the Dnieper River and there to hold at all costs. The major effort of the western Allies— England and the United States—would be made in the Mediterranean area, the Japanese believed. The Allies could be expected also to support the Soviet offensive and intensify the air bombardment of Germany in an effort to weaken her ability to wage war. Nor did the Japanese overlook the possibility of an Anglo-American invasion of northwestern Europe sometime in 1944, probably during the spring or summer of the year. Beyond this they made no estimate as to the time and place of the invasion, for they recognized that the solution to these problems would depend largely on the “delicate relationship” between the western Allies and the Soviet Union.
The Japanese were under no illusion about the prospects for a German victory in Europe. That opportunity had been lost, and the best Germany could hope for was to keep the United States and England so engaged elsewhere that they would be unable to open the second front. When and if the Allies invaded, Germany would have to concentrate all its efforts on the destruction of the invading forces, for, in the view of the Japanese, the fate of Germany rested on the outcome of the war in western Europe.
The Japanese were not optimistic either about their own prospects. They fully expected that the United States and Great Britain acting under American pressure would push their advantage in the Far East and in the Pacific, no matter what happened in Europe, in order to defeat Japan at the earliest possible date. In this effort the Allies would utilize their resources to disrupt Japanese sea communications, destroy her shipping, bomb her cities and sources of raw materials, and isolate her by political means. But the immediate military threat, the Japanese believed, lay in the Southeast Area where the Allies (largely the Americans and Australians) had already begun a major offensive. This Allied effort, the Japanese expected, would be intensified during the late fall or winter of 1943 to coincide with large-scale operations in Burma and the Netherlands Indies.
There was one bright spot in this gloomy picture—the Soviet Union. According to Japanese calculations, there was little chance of Soviet intervention in the Far East during the coming year, either as an active participant or as a passive ally of the United States and Great Britain. Moreover the Japanese did not believe that the Russians would allow the Allies, either voluntarily or under pressure, to use Soviet airbases in the Maritime Provinces. This happy condition, the Japanese realized, might change suddenly, but they expected it to last while the war in Europe continued.
On the basis of this careful analysis of Allied war aims, capabilities, and intentions, the political leaders of Japan proposed a foreign policy to match the strategy of Imperial General Headquarters. First among the objectives of this policy was the preservation of peace with the Soviet Union. This was to be achieved in three ways: first, by maintaining Japanese military strength and, if possible, by winning military victories over the United States and Great Britain; second, by adopting positive measures designed to improve friendly relations between the two countries; and third, by exercising restraint but resolution in dealing with the Soviet Union over controversial matters.
To cope with the political offensive being waged by the Anglo-American allies in East Asia, the Japanese decided they must take stronger measures to convince the peoples of Asia that their destiny lay with Japan. The most effective argument, of course, was military victory, but the Japanese could not rely on that. They proposed therefore to secure the voluntary co-operation of the Asiatic people by fair and just treatment of the occupied nations and by propaganda emphasizing the evils of colonialism. The weakness in their argument, the Japanese realized, was the Japanese Army in China. Resistance by the Chungking government would by example encourage opposition to the Japanese everywhere in Asia. A primary aim of Japanese foreign policy, therefore, must be the settlement of the China Incident.
The possibility that Germany and the Soviet Union might suddenly conclude a separate peace treaty was a contingency the Japanese could not ignore. Such a move, they recognized, would undoubtedly have a profound effect on Japan’s situation. Therefore, to insure that the effect was favorable and the dangers minimized, the Japanese agreed that they must follow the situation closely and be prepared at the first sign of peace to move in with an offer of mediation. The timing of this offer was considered of the utmost importance by the experts in Japan’s Foreign Ministry. It should coincide, they said, with military success in the field, either by Germany or Japan, or with the successful completion of negotiations with Chungking.
Cooperation with Germany was a political rather than a military objective for the Japanese. What they wanted from Germany was war materials and technical information, and for these they were willing to make many concessions. One price they would not pay for this co-operation was a Japanese declaration of war against the Soviet Union. But they could not afford to reject such a proposal outright if it were made. Instead, they hoped to convince Hitler that Germany’s interests would not be served by a Soviet-Japanese war. If Hitler insisted and made “final demands,” the Japanese agreed that they would stand firm no matter what the consequences. Peace with the Soviet Union was evidently more important to Japan than co-operation with Germany.
The political program, in its final form, consisted of six points:
1. Japan will strive to the utmost to prevent the outbreak of war with the Soviet Union, will take the initiative in improving Soviet-Japanese relations, and endeavor to mediate for peace between the Soviet Union and Germany at the proper opportunity.
2. Japan will maintain unremitting pressure against Chungking and will take the earliest possible opportunity to settle the Chinese problem. . . .
3. Japan will take every possible measure to strengthen co-operation with Germany.
4. Japan will win the confidence of the nations and peoples of Greater East Asia and will guide them in order to receive and further encourage their co-operation with Japan’s war efforts.
5. Resolute measures will be taken to build up the decisive military capability, especially air power, and a dauntless spirit to face the national crisis will be encouraged in order to bring the total national power into full play.
6. A propaganda effort against the enemy will be conducted under a consistent policy, and will be directed mainly toward propagation of the Axis cause, diffusion of Japan’s policy in Greater East Asia, demoralizing our major enemy, the United States, alienation of the United States, Britain, China and the Soviet Union, and helping India achieve her independence.
The political program proposed by the Foreign Ministry and the comprehensive review and forecast on which it was based was accepted by the Liaison Conference of September 25 without dispute. At the same meeting, the assembled political and military chiefs approved the strategic policy presented by Imperial General Headquarters. These two, the military and political programs, were then blended into a single document called the “General Outline of War Direction Policy.”
With agreement on a basic policy and a political program and military strategy designed to support that policy, the leaders of Japan were ready to go before the Emperor. His assent would sanctify the decisions already made and give them the powerful sanction of Imperial decree.
The Decision—September 30, 1943
The Imperial Conference that fixed the course Japan would follow during the next year and a half opened at 10 o’clock on the morning of September 30, 1943. Assembled for this meeting with the Emperor, the “August Mind” of Japan, were the highest officials of the government—the Premier and War Minister, Hideki Tojo; the Navy, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Agriculture, and Commerce ministers; the chiefs and deputy chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs; the President of the Privy Council, Director of the Cabinet Planning Board, the Minister for Greater East Asia Affairs; and the heads of various government departments. In accordance with custom, Prime Minister Tojo presided.
For most if not all those present at the Imperial Conference, the proceedings offered nothing new. The purpose of the conference was to secure the Emperor’s assent to decisions already made, not to present various proposals and policies for his decision. As the personification of national unity and the supreme symbol of Japanese life and thought, the Emperor stood above party and faction. Tradition limited his action to approval of the decisions of his ministers; precedent dictated silence. But by his presence alone, he set upon these decisions a finality and authority that could be achieved in no other way. Thereafter, there was no turning back; only another Imperial Conference could alter or reverse the course approved by the Emperor. This was the significance of the meeting of September 30; it witnessed, in solemn and historic fashion, a major shift in Japanese policy and strategy for the conduct of the war.
General Tojo opened the Conference with a reading of the political estimate adopted at the Liaison Conference of September 25. The Emperor listened gravely; there was no discussion. Next, the Secretary read the proposed “General Outline of the War Direction Policy,” including the political, military, and economic measures required to support this policy. Then, with Tojo leading off, each of the more important officials stood up in turn to elaborate on the program and explain to Emperor Hirohito how his department expected to achieve the goals set out for it and pave the way to eventual victory.
Speaking for the Emperor as well as for several of the ministers, the Privy Council President, Yoshimichi Hara, asked a number of penetrating questions. What steps were being taken, he asked, to settle the outstanding issues between Japan and the Soviet Union specifically with regard to the dispute over Sakhalin and in the matter of fishing rights? The Foreign Minister, while admitting the importance of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union, could hold out no promise of any immediate settlement, whereupon Hara observed sharply that delay over minor details should not be permitted to interfere with negotiations. “The people are deeply concerned over the Soviet-Japanese relations,” he remarked. “I strongly urge that relations between the two countries be improved promptly so that the people may be put at ease and our armed forces may devote themselves to the prosecution of the Greater East Asia War.”
The Privy Council President emphasized also the great importance of aircraft production. In view of the fact that Japanese industry was currently building only about 17,000 planes annually, Hara wanted to know whether the goal of 40,000—the Army had asked for 55,000—was a realistic one. Both the President of the Planning Board and the Minister of Commerce and Industry asserted emphatically that it was, the latter claiming that he even expected to exceed that figure. Still somewhat skeptical, Hara observed dryly that there was a limit to a nation’s productivity and pointed to the example of the United States and Germany. But he made it clear that he expected both men to make every effort to reach the goals they had set.
President Hara turned next to the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs, and the Conference took a sudden, more dramatic turn. What exactly did the term “absolute national defense sphere” mean, he asked? And when this was explained to him he wanted to know whether it would require the abandonment of territory already held by Japanese troops. Assured that it would not, Hara then asked whether this absolute national defense sphere could be held even if the 40,000-plane goal was reached. The Army answer expressed a commendable confidence and a determination to make up in mobility what it lacked in numbers. But Admiral Osami Nagano, Chief of the Navy General Staff, expressed no such confidence. The Navy would do its best, he said, but it could not promise success; too much in war depended upon fortune. Pointing to the failure of German plans in the war against the Soviet Union, Nagano declared: “I cannot predict the outcome of our war with any degree of accuracy.”
This pessimistic view, realistic as it might be, came as a distinct surprise. Suddenly the atmosphere of the Conference became tense as everyone waited for the next move. Without hesitation, Tojo stepped into the breach. Japan, he declared, was engaged in a life and death struggle for its very existence. Whatever the future might hold and regardless of Germany’s fate, every Japanese subject must carry on, firm in the determination to fight the war to a successful conclusion. In effect, Tojo’s statement was a repudiation of Nagano, and the President of the Privy Council tactfully closed the incident with the remark that he was glad to note that Imperial General Headquarters seemed to have ample confidence in its ultimate success. It was on this note that the conference ended at 1530. There is no record that the Emperor spoke once during the entire meeting. His silence gave assent and placed the stamp of Imperial approval on the “New Operational Policy.”
The plans so painfully made in September were scarcely put into effect when it became evident that they would have to be revised. Before the end of the year, MacArthur and Nimitz’s forces had cracked through the outer defenses of the absolute national defense line and gave every indication of assaulting the line itself at an earlier date than the Japanese had estimated. The hopes for a great counteroffensive in the spring of 1944 were seen to be impossible, and the ambitious program for the production of planes and ships remained still to be achieved. By late December, Imperial General Headquarters had abandoned all plans for an early offensive and had accepted for the first time the possibility of an Allied penetration of the absolute national defense line. Time was running out for the Japanese.
The failure of the “New Operational Policy” should not blind us to the fact that it is often possible to learn as much from our former enemies as from our allies. The comprehensive review by the Japanese of their position in midwar was, perhaps, a futile gesture in view of the overwhelming superiority of American forces, but it should suffice to dispose once and for all of the myth of Japanese inflexibility. In a remarkably short time, the Japanese planners made a fairly correct reading of their own situation and of Allied intentions and on the basis of this review shaped for the nation new goals and a strategy designed to buy the time they so desperately needed. The process by which they arrived at the basic decisions underlying this new policy gives every indication of a high order of staff work by both military and civilian officials and a thorough appreciation of the political and military factors involved in the formulation of national policy. The fact that Japan lost the war should not prevent us from studying with profit a system which was able to produce quickly and efficiently reliable estimates and policy decisions on the very highest level.