The little known Gulf of Aqaba—that elongated strip of sea which separates the Egyptian Sinai from Saudi Arabia—is one of the principal and perennial causes of hostilities between Arabs and Jews and was one of the major motives for the Israeli attack upon Egypt in October, 1956. This crisis, which threatened to be a detonator of World War III, is obviously far from settled. In fact, the fuse is still sputtering. For this reason and because the cherished principle of freedom of the seas is at stake (plus the fact that at least one American merchantman has been taken under fire in this disputed area), it behooves the World’s Number One Sea Power to know something about this body of water.
The Gulf of Aqaba (also spelled Akaba) is the Red Sea’s northeastern finger. The 98-mile long, seven-to-fourteen mile wide strip of water washes four countries: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Two ports lie inside the Gulf, the Israeli port of Elath (or Eilat) and the Jordanian port of Aqaba1— only four miles apart. Inside the Gulfs narrow mouth, the coastlines are rough and uninhabited, the surrounding areas are desert, and the waters offshore deep, a maximum of 778 fathoms. On each side of the Gulf, rocky and barren mountains rise abruptly some seven or eight thousand feet.
The entrance into the Gulf of Aqaba is extremely narrow and constricted by both islands and coral reefs. At the mouth of the Gulf, called the straits of Tiran, are two fairly large islands—Tiran and Sanafiri. From the Egyptian shore to the larger island of Tiran, the distance is only three miles. Coral formations further constrict the seaway into two channels. The western one, called Enterprise Passage, is only 1,300 yards wide, while the Eastern Channel, known as Grafton Passage, is a scant 900 yards wide.
Navigation inside the Gulf is complicated by sudden squalls which sweep down from the high mountains, often without warning.
It is appropriate to note here that both Egypt and Saudi Arabia claim their territorial waters extend six miles offshore. Thus, the Straits of Tiran, portions of the Gulf itself, wherever the width is less than twelve miles, and the head of the Gulf where the towns of Elath and Aqaba are located, are considered by both the Egyptians and the Saudis to be their territorial waters. Israel holds that since both the Red Sea and the Gulf are international waters, the Straits themselves are free for passage between the two international bodies of water. This dispute is the root of the present trouble.2
The Gulf of Aqaba has been a highway of commerce and conflict for many centuries. In Old Testament times, the town of Ezion-geber (or Edom) was located at the northern end of the Gulf, and captured by King David about 1000 B.C.3
About sixteen miles north of Ezion-geber (at modern Timna) were the legendary copper mines of King Solomon. Copper ores from the Negev were crudely refined at the mine sites and the raw copper brought by camel and horse down the King’s Highway to Ezion-geber where the final smelting was performed. According to the archeologist, Dr. Nelson Glueck, King Solomon purposely located his furnaces at Ezion-geber in order to take advantage of the Gulf’s prevailing winds to give his smelting furnaces a natural forced draft.
From Ezion-geber, the copper was placed aboard ship and traded at such places as Ophir for gold, silver, ivory, spices, apes, mules, horses, and peacocks. It was through the Gulf of Aqaba and the port of Ezion-geber that the Queen of Sheba came to see King Solomon.
Ezion-geber was also the naval base of King Solomon’s fleet:
“And King Solomon made a navy of ships in Ezion-geber, which is beside Eloth, on the shore of the Red Sea, in the land of Edom.” (I Kings 9:26)
It should also be noted that during the time of King Solomon’s First Jewish Commonwealth, the Phoenicians and Philistines would not permit the Jews to have overland access to the Mediterranean; this restriction lasted until the time of the Maccabees, 175 B.C.
In Roman times, the Jewish seaport had the name of Aelana. It was a military port and was the southern anchor of the military road that led northward to Petra.
In Arabic literature, a Jewish fishing village on the Gulf of Aqaba (presumably Ezion-geber) is mentioned in the Koran itself. The reference is contained in a story that the fish of the Gulf only came to this Jewish fishing village on the Sabbath, since they knew the Jews could not work on their Holy day!
In later centuries, Ezion-geber was on the caravan route between Egypt and Arabia. In the 10th century, an Arab geographer described the town as the great port of Palestine.
In any event, Ezion-geber fell into decay after suffering at the hands of Saladin in the 12th century. The name does not appear again, except as an embarkation point for Moslem pilgrims en route to Mecca, until 1841 when the Turks recognized it as part of the Egyptian Sinai. In 1892, after Moslem pilgrims had ceased to use the Gulf, Turkey reclaimed the area and occupied Ezion-geber in 1906. Great Britain intervened and Turkey withdrew. A demarcation line was then drawn from the head of the Gulf of Aqaba to the Mediterranean port of Rafah. This line across Sinai explains the present northwest-southeast boundary between Israel and Egypt. Finally, Lawrence of Arabia seized the port of Aqaba during World War I and made it his base of operations.
From this historical capsule, it is apparent that the 20th century conflict over the Gulf, the towns at the northern end, and the right of Jewish access to the sea has been a matter of contention for three millennia.
The recent struggle over the Gulf of Aqaba dates back to May 14, 1948, when the British mandate in Palestine expired and the State of Israel was proclaimed. At the request of the Jordanian government, the British sent troops to Aqaba which, according to the London Times, were dispatched “for the specific purpose of dissuading the Israelis from taking it.”
During the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war, one of the principal Israeli objectives was the seizure of a toehold on the Gulf of Aqaba. This the Israelis succeeded in doing, quickly establishing an Army camp near a small fishing village on the edge of the barren red cliffs, and proclaimed it Elath. After the armistice lines were drawn, the new town of Elath was only four miles from the Jordanian town of Aqaba and only five miles from the Egyptian border. Israel’s coastline on the Gulf of Aqaba measured a scant eleven miles, that of Jordan seven miles.
Once situated on the Gulf, the Jews made no secret of their ambitions to build there a major port for trade with East Africa, the Persian Gulf, and the Asian area. A blueprint to make Elath into a modern harbor and naval base was unfolded and begun.
To the Egyptians and the Arabs, it was obvious what the Israelis had in mind—not fishing, but trade and lots of it. The sea route through the Gulf of Aqaba would provide a competitive and alternate route to the Suez Canal. Moreover, if the Israelis succeeded in building a modern highway across the barren wastes of the Negev, constructing a railroad and an oil pipeline from Elath to the Mediterranean port of Haifa—which they publicly announced they intended to do—the Suez passage fees, the Arabic oil royalties, and the transmission oil pipe profits would all be in jeopardy.
Thus, in late 1949, with the concurrence of Saudi Arabia, who claimed sovereignty over the uninhabited islands of Tiran and Sanafiri in the Straits of Tiran, Egypt occupied the islands “in order to protect them from possible damage or violation.” Egypt also erected a naval signalling station and a gun battery at nearby Ras Nusrani, stationed a detachment of troops at nearby Sharm el-Sheikh4 (also known as Solomon’s Bay) and announced that no ships to Israel could pass. However, on January 28, 1950, Egypt assured third parties interested in maintaining an international channel through the Straits that “innocent passage” would be respected “in conformity with international practice.”
The battle was on—with only words and threats at first, but before many years, with shot and shell.
Until the Israelis could improve the road over the rocky desert terrain between Beersheba and the port of Elath and make necessary improvements to the harbor itself, it was premature to contest control of the Straits of Tiran. In fact, between the Israeli occupation of Elath in 1949 and the Suez crisis of 1956, fewer than ten ships called at Elath—none of them Israeli. Even so, a series of incidents commenced, illustrating the Arabs’ extreme sensitivity concerning entrance into the Gulf.
The first one occurred in July, 1951, when the British freighter Empire Roach, bound not for Elath but for the Jordanian port of Aqaba, was fired upon in the Straits.
On September 6, 1953, the 3,000-ton Greek freighter Parnon, bound for Elath and carrying several vehicles and 500 tons of asphalt for the Elath-Beersheba road, was detained at Port Said for twelve days. She was the test case, but since she was Greek and carrying no military freight, she was allowed to proceed. Eighteen months later, a second Greek freighter, Konitsa, carrying a cargo of cement from Haifa to Elath, was also allowed to pass.
On December 4, 1953, an American freighter, the SS Albion, was involved in a shooting incident which highlighted the growing tension concerning the Gulf. Carrying a relief shipment of wheat to the Jordanian port of Aqaba, the Albion was fired on while transiting Enterprise Passage. In the narrow channel, Captain James Hassell of Philadelphia was forced to slow, then back and fill until he could retreat out of the channel. Meanwhile, he replaced his small American flag with a large one, and by blinker light, tried to communicate with Ras Nusrani. He received no reply. While the Albion was maneuvering clear, eight more shells whizzed by, but none struck. Albion proceeded clear and radioed for instructions. A flurry of messages between Cairo and Amman finally cleared the air, and, on December 5, the Albion was cleared to enter the Gulf.
But the most serious incident concerning the Straits of Tiran occurred on July 4, 1955, when the 6,224-ton British merchantman Anshun bound for Aqaba to embark pilgrims to Mecca was fired upon and struck near the waterline (no casualties). The Egyptians stated later that the Anshun had failed to identify herself and to state her destination.
A series of diplomatic notes were exchanged. Joint Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Reginald H. Turtin, characterized the first Egyptian reply as “most unsatisfactory.” Later, the British Foreign Office declared that the Gulf of Aqaba was an international waterway open to all ships. The fact that the Straits of Tiran lay inside territorial waters, the British note said sternly, gave the Egyptians the right to enforce only such control measures “as custom regulations and public health rules.” President Nasser, in an October 5 interview with the Cairo press stated, “We have a legal right to control shipping in Egyptian territorial waters in the Gulf of Aqaba.”
Finally, in November, 1955, Prime Minister MacMillan announced in the House of Commons that agreement with the Egyptians had been reached regarding the entry of British ships into the Gulf of Aqaba bound for Elath.
It was during this series of incidents that the intentions of the Israelis were spelled out in bold, black print. On July 10, 1955, in a major speech at Beersheba, Mr. David Ben- Gurion declared that the port of Elath was being completed so that passage into the Indian Ocean could be assured “if necessary with the help of the Israeli Navy, Air Force, and Army.” He also said that the railroad would be extended from Beersheba to Elath and a large number of settlements established along each side of the new highway.
Situated on this arid plain between the mountains of Saudi Arabia and Egyptian Sinai, the Israeli seaport of Elath (foreground) adjoins the Jordanian port of Aqaba four miles away. Conflicting claims over territorial rights to the waters of the Gulf of Aqaba have resulted in bitter hostility and a stubborn deadlock which defies amicable solution.
A few weeks later, on September 25, 1955, Mr. Ben-Gurion repeated his threat to use force to insure Israeli use of the Gulf. He emphasized that Israel’s future lay in trade with Asia and East Africa. “After all,” he said, “there is not much beside agricultural products we can sell to Belgium and England.”
The Prime Minister even set a time-limit for these actions—“in a year or less”—but he added that he would endeavor to open talks with President Nasser as soon as Elath’s port facilities were nearly complete.
Egypt’s answer to the threat was to tighten her rules for entry into the Gulf. Advance notice time was increased from 48 to 72 hours to be reported to the “Regional Boycotting Office for Israel” in Alexandria.
The Israelis, meanwhile, on July 15, 1955, purchased and took title to two Z-class surplus British destroyers5 and began refitting and overhauling them in British yards. By late summer of 1956, these two destroyers— renamed the Elath and the Yaffo—were ready, adding considerable strength to the three ex-Canadian River-class frigates6 which were the previous strength of the Israeli Navy.
It should not have been surprising, therefore, when the . Israelis began their invasion of the Sinai on October 29, 1956, that one of her principal military objectives was the opening of the Straits of Tiran. The Israeli Army captured and spiked the guns at Ras Nusrani, invaded the islands of Tiran and chased off the Egyptian garrison at Sharm el-Sheikh.
In less than a week, obviously with prearrangement, the Israeli merchant ship Queen of Sheba, hauling cargo from East Africa, anchored off Sharm el-Sheikh. Simultaneously, the Israeli frigate Miznak departed Haifa for a six weeks’ passage around Africa, arriving at Elath on December 26. The very next day, the new Elath naval base (Israel’s second one, the first being at Haifa) was officially opened.
Needless to say, the Straits of Tiran were now also open.
For the next several weeks while the UN haggled, the messages were exchanged between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, the burden of protecting the Straits fell to the Saudis. Several incidents were reported. On January 11, 1957, a Saudi Arabian coastal battery opened fire on an Israeli gunboat (presumably the Miznak), the Saudis saying that the Miznak had fired first. On January 13, the Cairo radio declared, “The Arabs will hunt down every single Israeli ship that will attempt to enter the Gulf of Aqaba and destroy it.” Later, on June 5, 1957, Saudi Arabia protested in the UN against Israeli bombardments on May 27 and 29 upon her coastal positions. The Israelis denied the charge. On June 12, Kings Saud and Hussein issued a joint statement saying that Moslem pilgrims should avoid using the “unsafe” waters of the Gulf of Aqaba.
Not until March, 1957, did the UN succeed in moving the Israeli troops out of the Straits. At present, part of the United Nations Emergency Force is still stationed at Sharm el-Sheikh. Merchant ships bound for Israel began transiting the Straits—only a few at first and these non-Israeli and carrying no contraband.7 The American oil tanker SS Kern Hills passed the Straits on April 6, 1957, bringing oil for Elath’s new oil storage tanks, which was later pumped through the new 8-inch pipeline from Elath to Beersheba. Both Lebanon and Iraq protested to the United States, since Iraqi oil passes through pipelines across Lebanon to Beirut. Iran also instructed its national oil company not to sell oil to Israel and requested other Middle East oil companies not to do so. Notwithstanding, as reported by Mr. Harry B. Ellis in his book Israel and the Middle East, “the (Israeli) line is scheduled to use oil from Iran and the Persian Gulf sheikdoms of Kuwait and Qatar thus avoiding the Arab League oil sources.” Through all this shooting and bickering, neither the Egyptians and the Saudis nor the Israelis have budged a millimeter from their declared positions. To the Egyptians and Saudi Arabia, Aqaba is a “closed Arab gulf,” part of Arab territorial waters. The presence of any Israeli ship violates their sovereignty and jeopardizes the safety of pilgrims using the traditional route to the holy city of Mecca. Saudi Arabia, moreover, has stated that the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force only facilitates “Israeli navigation in Arab territorial waters.”
Since both the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waters, Israel insists that the Straits of Tiran are also international since they offer the only passage between the two. She has repeatedly stated that her warships would “insure the passage of Israeli ships” if the blockade is reimposed.
The U. S. position, which is generally the position of all maritime states, is “that the Gulf of Aqaba comprehends international waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits giving access thereto.”
Since the Gulf was opened in 1957, Israel has been scurrying to finish and expand Elath and exploit her newly opened back door to Africa and Asia. In eighteen months time, the population of Elath has leaped from 500 to more than 4,000, with an additional 4,000 expected within another year. The two-lane, asphalt surfaced and well-engineered road from Elath to Beersheba was opened in February, 1958. The 8-inch pipeline was opened the following fall. New shops, warehouses, water distillation and cold-storage plants, new restaurants, a motion picture theater, a supermarket, a luxury hotel, and hundreds of homes are being built.
The Israelis are now planning to finish the railroad and to lay a 30-inch oil pipeline. What this will mean in the tangled jungle of Arab-Israeli relations is not hard to discern: increased tension, possibly conflict—but the Israelis are confident. Their hopes were spelled out in the Jewish magazine Economic Horizons recently:
“ . . . a single 30-inch pipeline across Israel carrying 350,000 barrels a day will give Europe 17,500,000 metric tons of crude oil a year . . . the construction of the pipeline would save a cost of thirty tankers, or over $300 million in capital investment . . . the cost of building a trans-Israel pipeline including pumping stations is placed at about $60 million ... it would free Persian Gulf oil producers from the present monopoly on oil transits held by Egypt and the other Arab countries . . . .”
When such plans and hopes are laid alongside Mr. Ben-Gurion’s dreams of Israel’s expanding trade with Africa and Asia and his jocular references to Elath being Israel’s “up and coming Los Angeles,” the Arabic world has convulsions. The oil that is now moving through the Gulf of Aqaba and up the 8-inch pipeline is presently a trickle. The first cargo of hides and cocoa from East Africa destined for Genoa, Italy, which was off-loaded at Elath and trucked to and transshipped at Haifa, is but a small beginning. But the handwriting on the wall is clear for all who wish to look.
Thus, blood pressures increase, temperatures climb, and a growing enmity becomes hard as granite. Elath’s first stage building program is almost finished; the next stage calls for a pier to handle 7,000-ton ships. In short, Israel is clearly embarked on a program to make Elath a second Haifa, and she intends to let nothing stop her. The Arabs are just as determined not to let it happen.
The most recent and sobering storm signal was Egypt’s purchase of three Soviet submarines in June, 1957. Immediately, the Israelis warned Egypt she would not tolerate the use of submarines to re-blockade the Gulf. The Jews, of course, see the submarines as an Egyptian attempt to substitute submarine attack for coastal gun attack upon Israeli shipping.
In the view of Columnist Joseph Alsop, “. . . if the Soviet submarines are used to halt ships bound through the Aqaba gulf to Elath, it will be immensely difficult and perhaps even impossible to prevent the Israelis from renewing their attack on Egypt.”
1. Saudi Arabia has not relinquished her claim to the town of Aqaba.
2. On April 27, 1958, in a 65 to 1 vote, a United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, meeting in Geneva, ruled that foreign ships had the right of innocent passage through Straits connecting international waters. Israel acclaimed the vote; Saudi Arabia said they would not recognize this article which must still be ratified.
3. According to the London Geographical Institute’s map of the Hebrew Kingdom under David and Solomon, the town of Ezion-geber was at approximately 29°41'N near the site of modern Elath. The Biblical town of Elath (approximately 29°30'N) is the same as the present day town of Aqaba.
4. Ras is Arabic for “cape” or “point”; Sharm means “cove” or “creek.”
5. 1,710 tons four 4.5-inch guns six 40-mm AA guns, eight torpedo tubes, 36¾ knots.
6. 1,445 tons, four 4-inch guns (one added during modification), ten 20-mm guns, 20 knots
7. In 1957, only 44,000 tons of dry cargo entered Elath.