Book Reviews

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Air Spy: The Story of Photo Intelli­gence in World War II

By Constance Babington-Smith. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957. 256 pages with index and 53 illustrations. $4.00.

Reviewed by

Colonel Earl W. Thomson, GSC, USAR (Ret.)

{.Cel. Thomson was Chief of Flak Intelligence for the VIII Bomber Command in England in 1943, and from September, 1943, to March, 1944, was Chief Intelligence Officer at Headquarters of the VIII Bomber Command and then the 8th Air Force. Since 1942 he has been Senior Professor of the Department of Electrical Engineering at the Naval Academy.)

This is the account of British photo recon­naissance and photo interpretation, from the nnorthodox beginnings in 1939 to the full Judged accomplishment of 1944 and 1945. ^ne headaches, frustrations, victories, and achievements of P.R. and P.I. are recounted ’n a facile, conversational style by Flight Of­ficer Constance Babington-Smith, W.A.A.F., "'ho was chief of the enemy aircraft section of |fie Central Interpretation Unit at Medmen- ^ami on the Thames, just over the hills from th Air Force Headquarters at High Wy­combe in Bucks.

By the time the 8th Air Force entered the bombing picture in 1942, a pattern and pro­gram had been evolved in photo intelligence ^s° that we took good cover and accurate in­terpretation for granted and could depend ^uPon excellent enemy aircraft and anti-air­^Craft intelligence. Our whole system of flak fnalysis, which gave the best routes of travel ^lnto and away from a target area, presupposed accurate intelligence and was based 95% upon British photo intelligence, largely from Medmenham. This program, Miss Babing­ton-Smith relates, grew from the early un­authorized flights of a few enthusiastic, and quite individualistic, civilians and R.A.F. of­ficers, who through persistence and brilliance sold the idea to the Navy and the Army, and finally to the old man himself—Churchill.

From a Navy viewpoint there are many memories in the book, viewed through the stereoscope rather than the telescope,—the build up of Hitler’s Operation Sea Lion until there were counted 1,721 barges on the Channel coast from Calais to Antwerp,—the “escape” of the Bismarck, of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the intelligence of the harbors of North Africa and of the beaches of Nor­mandy. One story of American P.R. and P.I. tells of an ensign finding on a photo that the 15" guns of the Jean Bart in the harbor of Casablanca had not been damaged by the dive bombers of the Ranger, just as said guns opened fire on the Augusta, which hastily re­treated. The author continues: “From then on Admiral Hewitt always set great store by photographic intelligence.”

The honesty and accuracy of photo intelli­gence changed air tactics, cut down the claims of overzealous bomber crews, and proved the need of better methods of naviga­tion and bombing techniques. Nighttime bombing by the R.A.F. photographically was proved so inaccurate in early operations that Vice-Marshal Harris, the fiery C.O. of British Bomber Command, never quite forgave Medmenham. Damage assessment photos often proved that the claims of the 8th Air Force bombing and the actualities were far

apart. The destruction of the Focke-Wulf fac­tories at Marienburg in October, 1943, how­ever proved that daytime bombing could be accurate.

Of particular importance historically is the part played by the Central Intelligence Unit and the author in following the program of the V-l and the V-2 bombs from their devel­opment at Peenemunde to the firing from the sites in the Pas de Calais.

The present volume is not a textbook relat­ing the methods and techniques of photo in­terpretation. It is rather an extremely inter­esting narrative of the personalities, occur­rences, and triumphs of an intelligent division of British technical intelligence.

The Rebel Shore: The Story of Union Sea Power in the Civil War

By James M. Merrill. Boston: Little Brown

& Co., 1957. 246 pages. $4.75.

REVIEWED BY

George Fielding Eliot

(Major Eliot is internationally known as a writer and

lecturer on naval and military affairs. His articles and

comments frequently appear in the Proceedings.)

This book makes an interesting and very readable contribution to a field of Civil War history which has been too long neglected— the blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts of the Confederacy, and the amphibious op­erations which were connected with it. The author shows clearly the relation between the blockade and the various joint operations which deprived the South of one seaport af­ter another, and his battle scenes are painted with vigorous strokes. The disruptive effect of the coastal attacks on the relations between Southern governors and the central govern­ment at Richmond, and the bolstering of Northern morale by naval successes at periods when the prospects of the Union Army were gloomy are points which Mr. Merrill makes very effectively.

Unhappily, the tone of the book is marred by the author’s persistent belittling of almost every leading personality of the Navy—his emphasis on error rather than on accomplish­ment, his insistence on offering critiques set­ting forth his opinions as to how much more could have been accomplished had greater

energy and vision been displayed, discounting virtually every success except Farragut’s vic­tories at New Orleans and Mobile. Thus after Hatteras, Stringham should have seized “North Carolina’s defenseless towns,” but “refused to gamble his glory;” after Port Royal, Du Pont should have proceeded forth­with to capture Charleston and Savannah; after Roanoke Island, “Goldsborough and his gunboats, unaided by the military, should have steamed up the Cape Fear River and levelled hapless Wilmington.”

Mr. Merrill’s portraits of naval personali­ties tend to be mere caricatures. Thus we are told that when the South Atlantic Blockad­ing Squadron was being assembled at New York, “it took time for Du Pont, accustomed to the niceties of the wardroom, to side-step messy gear in the shipyards and supervise the workers”—Mr. Merrill being apparently un­aware that Du Pont had just left the Phila­delphia Navy Yard, where he had been Com­mandant for two years. Dahlgren, the author chides, “sat out the war at the Naval Ord­nance Bureau” until sent to relieve Du Pont off Charleston—though Dahlgren’s applica­tions for sea duty had in fact become so vio­lent as to verge on insubordination and his continued presence at the BuOrd was due to President Lincoln and Secretary Welles con­sidering him indispensable in that billet. The monitor captains off Charleston were “in­hibited by fear” and Du Pont was “timid.” We see John Rodgers in Wassaw Sound emerging “grudgingly” from his cabin when told the ram Atlanta had been sighted. Por­ter—for whom the author has more kind words than usual—was nevertheless sadly ¹⁰ error when, after being deserted by Ben But­ler’s troops in the first attack on Fort Fisher, he did not run past the forts and take Wil­mington anyway.

Mr. Merrill’s summation presents a curi­ous contradiction. He states, correctly, “The Navy Department and the forces afloat, de­spite the lack of men, ships, precedent and a sympathetic public, set a course which even­tually led to final victory at sea.” Yet he im­mediately goes on to say that the major °P^er” ations were conducted “in haphazard an<J oftentimes hesitant fashion. . . . There '^vaS no over-all plan ... no strategy to coordinaR the squadrons’ efforts.” While Mr. Merri

does seem to have heard of the board con­vened by Secretary Welles at the outset of the War for the specific purpose of devising such an over-all plan and coordinating strategy, he states that it was headed by Alexander D. Bache, the Director of the Coast Survey; ac­tually, though Bache was a member of the board, the strategical insight came from Du Pont (the chairman) and Commander Charles H. Davis, whose name nowhere ap­pears in Mr. Merrill’s book.

This reviewer also finds great difficulty in reconciling the inherent contradiction be­tween one of the closing paragraphs of the book and a paragraph found in the author’s Preface. Mr. Merrill leaves the reader with this thought:

“Most commanders lacked vigor and failed to pursue tactical advantages. Jealously guarding their reputations, ignorant of the might they wielded, fearful of defeat, the commanders hesitated, alibied and argued instead of attacking the enemy while he was still off balance.”

Yet by the time he came to write his pref­ace, Mr. Merrill had apparently changed this unfavorable view. “Union amphibious at­tacks,” he says, “spearheaded the offensive. They were, perhaps, more significant than the blockade itself. Old Abe’s Armada car­ded the flag first into the South, secured needed bases for the blockading squadrons, ^wiped out Confederate coastal commerce, scotched privateering activities, precipitated the ruckus between the secessionist states and the Confederate government, and . . .buoyed up a sagging Northern spirit and strengthened

the belief that the Union could crush the re­bellion.”

Who did all this? Commanders lacking in vigor who failed to pursue advantages and were “fearful of defeat”? It doesn’t add up.

Lieutenant in Algeria

By Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957. 231 pages. $3.50.

REVIEWED BY

Alvin J. Cottrell

(Mr. Cottrell is a research fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute and an instructor of Political Science, also assistant to the chairman, International Relations Group Committee, University of Pennsylvania.)

The Algerian rebellion which began on November 1, 1954, with a series of terrorist raids is in its fourth year with little immediate prospect of settlement. Much has been written about the political aspects of the conflict, but much less about the actual fighting: Lieutenant in Algeria will help to fill this gap. The author served as a reserve lieutenant with the French forces engaged in suppressing the rebellion. The book is based on a series of articles writ­ten for L Express, a pro-Mendes-France, i.e., anti-war Paris weekly of which Servan- Schreiber is editor. It supports the Mendesist view that the war is widening the breach be­tween France and the Moslem community of Algeria. The reader should bear in mind that the author was opposed to the Algerian war even before he was called back to active duty. Its burden is that what started as a terrorist campaign by several hundred Moslem fa­natics has been converted, by the overzealous tactics of the French Army, into a self-gen­erating revolutionary war. In the words of one of the book’s principal characters, Major Marcus, the army “could have been an in­strument of reconciliation with the ordinary people here. What the Arabs really hated was the colonial set-up; they didn’t really hate France. The army could have been independ­ent of the colonial set-up, it should have re­mained separate from the rottenness of the ad­ministration . . . from everything the colonial attitude represented. . . . The army could have done it: if it had acted as a referee . . . it did the very opposite. Everything’s going

on now as if this huge army [over 500,000] were simply here to protect the privileges of a handful of our fellow Frenchmen.”

Servan-Schreiber argues that all Moslems are being lumped together into one camp and treated as suspect, and that the French Army is losing contact with the Arab masses. Some French Army officers, such as Major Marcus, understood this and tried to do something about it. They favored a policy of weaning the Moslem masses away from the nationalists by experiments such as the “Nomad Com­mandos,” which represented an attempt to re­establish contact with the Moslem commu­nity through small bands of French soldiers who migrated to the Arab villages and lived among the people in order to regain their confidence and trust. It is not clear to this re­viewer, however, exactly how such a policy will supply a satisfactory answer to the prob­lem of defeating a guerrilla army which is now estimated to number between 20,000 and 60,000 men. From the outset the rebels have terrorized the Moslem community into sup­porting the independence movement. The author himself points out that where the “No­mad Commando” experiments showed signs of success the rebels saw their cause threatened and stepped up the terrorist campaigns. Few will forget the terrible massacre of Melouza where the National Liberation Front (FLN) murdered the entire male population of the village because it first supported the more moderate Algerian National Movement (MNA) and secondly called for French pro­tection. The massacre undoubtedly was in­tended to warn the other Moslem villages against cooperation with rival rebel move­ments or the French. In other words, while the objectives of the “Nomad Commando” ex­periments may have been sound, it is neverthe­less true that those tactics served in some cases to provoke even more severe terrorism.

This controversial book is permeated with too much soul-searching and moralizing. This reviewer cannot escape the suspicion that, despite the author’s billing as a soldier in de Gaulle’s Free French Forces in Africa during World War II, he saw little actual combat. The examples cited of French excesses in Al­geria, when compared with those of the rebels, appear relatively moderate. Two quotations will illustrate the point: (1) “A . . . uni-

formed fellagha [rebel] dashed down the slope on to the road and stripped them [the dead and wounded French troops] of their arms and their clothes, cut out their eyes and everything else on their bodies that could be mutilated . . . ; and (2) A [French soldier] “whose friend had just been killed, had vented his misery and anger on the still breathing body of a fellagha on the verge of death; he had torn the two little red woolen rank-badges off the rebel’s uniform, . . . and spat in his face.” Few civilized human beings will fail to be shocked by the beastly doings described in the former quotation, whereas the latter records an incident which will hardly startle seasoned combat soldiers to the same degree as it apparently did the author.

Unfortunately, the publication of this book cannot but aid the terrorist cause. Certainly movement which equates its ends (independ­ence) and means (terrorism) to the same de­gree as the National Liberation Front offers little hope that either the Algerian people or the international community would benefit from a change in sovereignty over Algeria. The overriding issue of the Algerian conflict is whether a precedent will be established which makes independence so exalted a goal as to legitimize the use of any means, no mat­ter how barbaric, to attain it. Now that Lieu­tenant in Algeria has been published, however, it should be read by students of politico- military affairs. In an age when discussions of world strategy and tactics deal almost exclu­sively with such questions as limited or total nuclear war and when the intercontinental ballistic missile seems about to replace the bomber, it is rather sobering to be reminded of the shadowy struggle in Algeria where the capture of two light machine guns by the guerrilla forces is deemed a “catastrophe.”

WORTH NOTING Rescue Tug

By Ewart Brookes. New York: E. P. Dutton

& Co., Inc., 1957. 192 pages, 13 illustra­tions. $3.50.

A dramatic narrative, with some evalua­tion, of modern deep-sea towage and salvage, focussed upon the gallant but unsuccessful at­tempt of the English tug Turmoil to save the storm-damaged American freighter Flying Enterprise, victim of sustained North Atlantic gales in the winter of 1951-52. Captain Parker almost succeeded, towing the freighter 245 miles, only to have her succumb to a final gale when only 43 miles from Falmouth. The several photographs help emphasize the inev­itable consequences which follow in the wake of loss of adequate buoyancy and stability.

Admiral Paris Souvenirs de Marine

Burg, Germany: Robert Loef, 1956. Amer­ican and Canadian agent: Karl F. Wede, Box 195-R, R.F.D. #3, Saugerties, New York. $5.00.

A beautiful selection of 26 ship plates and plans of merchant and naval ships reproduced from the celebrated six-volume collection of Admiral Paris, first compiled and produced ^lri 1882. These detailed and complete draw- Wgs of European ships, ranging in period from the seventeenth century to late nine­teenth, should be stimulating to many model builders. Although the descriptions are in French, the more important technical terms have been translated into both English and German.

Slack Triumvirate

By Charles Moran. New York: Exposition Press, 1957. 160 pages. $3.00.

A stimulating study of the great Negro colossi, Toussaint Louverture, Jean-Jacques Gessalines, and Henry Christophe, the three outstanding leaders in Haitian history. Lou- ^Verture is depicted as the one for whom for­^eigners had the most respect, although he '^vas not held in highest honor by his country­men because “he failed to hitch his wagon to the star of independence.” In contrast, Des­tines is the acknowledged national hero be­cause he liberated his nation. Christophe, the continuing giant figure of Haitian folk- *°^re, completes the triumvirate as an out­standing contributor to the island’s economic and educational progress.

H^ehind The Bamboo Curtain

By Fred P. Skomra. New York: Greenwich Book Publishers, 1957. 129 pages. $2.75.

An engrossing novel of the Korean air and ^Sea war, told from the viewpoint of a naval reservist pilot, revealing the author’s basic theme of the human horror and tragedy of war. It is a very candid and intimate ac­count of life afloat and ashore, relieved by some hilarious interludes, with many of the incidents based on events either experienced by or related to Mr. Skomra, who served in the Essex.

A Picture History of Ships

By C. Hamilton Ellis. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. 406 illustra­tions. $5.95.

Sixteen pages of text introduce the chrono­logical photographic sections which range from a motion picture reproduction of Noah’s Ark to the Nautilus. British merchant and naval ship and vessels predominate, since the collection is based principally on photo­graphs from the Hulton Pictorial Library, the National Maritime Museum, and the author’s own files. Mr. Ellis emphasizes such subjects as ship design and construction, technological progress, nautical life afloat and ashore, lead­ers and battles, and sea disasters. The cap­tions are accurate and frequently humorous.

Fabulous Admirals

By Commander Geoffrey L. Lowis, R.N. (Ret’d). London: Putnam & Company Limited, 1957. 292 pages and 8 illustra­tions. 21 shillings.

A delightful collection of Royal Navy anecdotes both general and specifically re­lated to ten senior officers of vintage genera­tions now once or twice removed. Com­mander Lowis has gathered a vast wealth of humor to illustrate the eccentricities of a van­ished “breed of men whose efficiency we may well question—they faced no competition— but whose characters were the joy of onlook­ers, and sometimes even of their shipmates.” Sketched caricatures and photographs en­hance the reader’s enjoyment of this amusing book.

A United Nations Peace Force

By William R. Frye. New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1957. 227 pages. Cloth- bound, $3.75, paper, $1.00.

A penetrating study of the value and pros­pects of organizing a permanent United Na-

tions peace force. After examining the his­tory, limitations, and potentialities of various kinds of international forces, the author con­cludes that the first step on the long road toward international order and stability could be and should be the establishment of a small, permanent peace force or at least the machinery for one. Mr. Frye further recom­mends the exclusion of the Big Five nations from any initial permanent peace force.

Combat Beneath the Sea

By Major Willy-Charles Brou. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1957. 240 pages, 14 illustrations. $3.95.

An engaging account of successful under­water warfare in World War II as conducted by frogmen, human torpedoes, and midget submarines. These warriors and their weap­ons destroyed or damaged nearly a half mil­lion tons of merchant and naval shipping. As is to be expected, there are many narratives of daring exploits of Italian, British, Ameri­can, German, and Japanese personnel, to­gether with considerable pertinent techno­logical and tactical information.

Into the Silk

By Ian Mackersey. NewYork: W. W. Norton & Company, 1958. 251 pages, 34 illustra­tions. $3.95.

A thrilling series of narratives expressed in sixteen chapters describing outstanding para­chute descents from aircraft since 1922. The author’s most amazing tale is of the combat survival of Flight Sergeant Alkemade after falling 18,000 feet without benefit of a chute. Mr. Mackersey winnowed thousands of re­ports from caterpillars (those whose lives have been saved by parachute) in order to include the best selected stories in this worthwhile vol­ume.

As Far As My Feet Will Carry Me

By Josef M. Bauer. Translated by Lawrence P. R. Wilson. New York: Random House, 1957. 347 pages. $4.50.

Another story of the amazing determina­tion and fortitude of man in seeking freedom, in this case the escape of a German prisoner from Siberia and his three-year flight to ulti-

mate safety. The epic of this man, whose anonymity has been preserved, led Mr. Bauer, after a series of interviews, to call it “so night­marish, the incidents and situations he claimed to be true so incredible, that I kept on raising doubts .... Time and again, when I did turn elsewhere for corroboration, his story was confirmed.”

Instrument Flying

6th revised edition. By P. V. H. Weems and C. A. Zweng. Annapolis, Weems System of Navigation, and North Hollywood, Pan American Navigation Service, Inc., 1957. 298 pages. Diagrams and photographs. $6.00. ¹

This book is designed for both the instruc­tor and student as well as for the active navi­gator. It is written for the private and commercial pilot and navigator rather than for military personnel. Content closely follows CAA required training and the text contains many questions and answers on civil air regu­lation and navigation, including radio and meteorology. A comprehensive supplement on the new government examinations is in­cluded with every volume. In the opinion of the authors, Instrument Flying should provide adequate means for student preparation for governmental examinations and licenses.

Trafalgar

By Rene Maine. Translated from the French by Rita Eldon and B. W. Robinson. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1957. 261 pages. 7 charts. $4.50.

A modern French analysis, tending to con­firm the earlier conclusions of British and other historians, of the significance of the his­toric campaign culminating in the naval bat­tle of October 21, 1805. “There was certainly Austerlitz, but then there was also Trafalgar, and Trafalgar was the prelude to Waterloo.” Author Maine discusses and cites three rea­sons why Napoleon was unable to invade Britain. These were: lack of a fleet sufficiently powerful to control the vital North Sea area; the French leader’s mistake of appointing Villeneuve squadron commander, whereas Missiessy or Ganteaume would have been better selections; and his ability to transform naval leaders into ineffective robots.