There Must Have Been a Third Ship!

On Wednesday night, July 25, 1956, the westbound luxury liner Andrea Doria, out of Genoa, Italy, was racing toward New York at 21.85 knots, one hour behind schedule. And the motorship Stockholm, some ten hours out of New York, was knifing her way eastbound at 18.5 knots headed for Gothenburg, Sweden. At 11:09 P.M. the two ships exposed themselves to each other out of a pea soup fog. Two minutes later the Stockholm's sharp icebreaker bow plunged into the Andrea Doria's right side inflicting a mortal wound directly under her bridge.

The story of the Andrea Doria's final hours, during which time some fifty people died, can be told no more graphically than through the cryptic words of the principals involved in this tragic drama. Terse though the messages were they spoke volumes as the magnitude of the calamity unfolded.

The curtain rises on the night of July 25, 1956 at 11:22 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, 180 miles east of New York near Nantucket Lightship, with the Andrea Doria and Stockholm on stage. The ships, shrouded in fog, can faintly see the glow of each other’s lights but as yet remain unidentified to each other.

The mortally wounded Andrea Doria, with more than 1,500 persons on board, lists heavily to starboard. The list renders her port side lifeboats useless and the launching of her starboard side lifeboats a dangerous and hazardous operation.

The Stockholm is nearby with close to a thousand persons on board. With seventy-five feet of her bow stove in, she is in a precarious position. In addition, she is unable to move because her anchors had dropped in the collision and the machinery used to hoist them had been demolished. (It was several hours before the chains could be cut to release her.)

At 0322 GMT (Greenwich Meridian Time, 11:22 P.M. EDT) or collision time plus eleven minutes, United States Coast Guard Eastern Sea Frontier radio stations alerted by automatic alarm signals—followed by “SOS—SOS—DE—SEJT” (Stockholm's call letters). Coast Guard New York takes charge—clears, and alerts teletype wires—bridges Coast Guard radio network from Boston to New Orleans.

The curtain now lowers on a bright orange colored oil drum bobbing lazily in the bright sunlight on a quiet ocean. The drum serves as a headstone marking the final resting place of the once proud transatlantic queen—the Andrea Doria.

Throughout the foregoing the voice of the U. S. Coast Guard could be constantly heard directing and coordinating the rescue efforts. As always, the worth of the supporting cast lends credence and adds to the glory of the star players. The Coast Guard had eight cutters on the scene and three more racing to location when the area was cleared. The cutters on scene patrolled the waters searching for survivors and assisted the leading characters in every way possible in their effort to save human life.

The Coast Guard performed its duties in the true tradition of the Corps and it seeks neither gold nor glory for its effort. Nevertheless, this account would not be complete without a justly deserved “Well Done” to the U. S. Coast Guard.

During the days following the disaster, amid claims, counter-claims, and accusations of excessive speed in fog, negligence, and improper track routing, there came the legal aspect of the tragedy. The Andrea Doria’s owners sued the Stockholm’s owners for twenty-five million dollars, while the Stockholm’s owners countered with a suit for two million dollars. And, third party claims, filed against both owners for death, personal injury, and loss of property, amounted to more than eighty-five million dollars.

International complications arose because the Andrea Doria was an Italian ship, the Stockholm a Swedish ship, and the majority of third party claims were American in origin. Therefore, it was agreed to try the cases under the jurisdiction of American Admiralty Law.

Subsequently, on Wednesday, September 19, 1956, the official inquiry started in New York City to hear the testimony of the officers and crew members from both ships. The purpose of the inquiry was to take pre-trial depositions from witnesses who might not be available when the cases were tried. On Thursday, November 29, 1956, while the official inquiry was still in progress, U. S. Federal Judge Irving R. Kaufman, announced that the cases would go to trial on Monday, April 1, 1957.

The taking of these pre-trial depositions resolved itself mainly around the testimony of Third Officer Ernest Carstens-Johannsen, of the Stockholm, and Captain Piero Calamai, of the Andrea Doria. These are the men who were in charge of their respective bridges at the time of the collision. From their testimony and the testimony of lesser witnesses, there came a maze of contradiction, confusion, and accusations the like of which had never before been heard in a case of this nature. Then, on Tuesday, January 22,1957, the two steamship companies involved suddenly dropped their counter suits and both agreed to set up a fund toward the satisfactory settlement of all third party claims. The fund, said to be about six million dollars, would equal the total of their combined legal financial responsibilities. Thus the inquiry ended before all witnesses had been heard and the trial was cancelled. It is now well over a year since the inquiry ended and to date apparently nothing more has been done to determine exactly how the collision happened and where and when the fatal error (or errors) was made.

Contradiction in evidence started with the opening statements of the two key witnesses. Mr. Carstens-Johannsen of the Stockholm claimed that the entire radar approach and initial visual sighting was left-to-left and that if the Andrea Doria had maintained course and speed there never would have been a collision. While Captain Calamai of the Andrea Doria contradicted Mr. Carstens-Johannsen’s statements in their entirety by swearing that the entire radar approach and initial visual sighting was right-to-right and that if the Stockholm had maintained course and speed there never would have been a collision. Both witnesses were equally adamant in their stands on this matter when the inquiry terminated weeks later. Obviously an impossible situation has been created.

In analyzing the testimony it is plain to see that, barring perjury, there is only one possible conclusion—The original lights sighted by the Stockholm were not those of the Andrea Doria!

The inquiry was conducted in three languages, English, Italian, and Swedish, all of which helped to further complicate the situation. Nevertheless, following are all the pertinent facts as testified under oath by the key witnesses.

Mr. Ernest Carstens-Johannsen of the Stockholm said that:

• #1: He had a ship on his radar screen for about half an hour before he sighted her visually. The first observation showed the target to be twelve miles away bearing over the Stockholm's left bow. At each successive observation, as the target came closer, it always remained over the Stockholm's left bow.
• #2: He first sighted the ship visually at 11:05 P.M. at a distance of between 1.8 and 1.9 miles, bearing between 15 and 25 degrees over the Stockholm’s left bow.
• #3: The ship was showing her red left sidelight, with masthead navigational range lights open.*
• #4: The position of the navigational lights indicated to him that the ships were on parallel courses headed in opposite directions.
• #5: Upon sighting the lights at 11:05 P.M. he entered the wheelhouse. Here after consulting his radar he calculated that the beam on passing distance would be less than one mile. Therefore, he ordered a 22½-degree right turn.
• #6: While in the wheelhouse he conversed by telephone with the lookout in the crow’s nest who reported to him the presence of lights over the Stockholm's left bow.
• #7: After the Stockholm had made her right turn he went to the left side of the open bridge. #8: Now he discovered that, although the lights were still over the Stockholm’s left bow, their relative position had changed completely. The ship was now showing her right green sidelight and she was attempting to run across the Stockholm’s bow.
• #9: He now realized that a collision was inevitable. He then ordered a hard right turn and full speed astern on both engines.
• #10: He did not see the other ship turn. The ship was off to his left when he entered the wheelhouse. When he returned to the open bridge the ship was still off to his left but now was in a collision situation having changed relative positions completely.
• #11: Other than for very slight changes in course, to compensate for drift, he made no radical change in course until he saw the ship’s lights “with my own eyes.”
• #12: He said that five minutes time elapsed from the moment of initial visual sighting until the collision.
• #13: He admitted that the Andrea Doria could have been momentarily obscured from his vision in a fog bank or patch.
• #14: He estimated the time of collision was 11:09 P.M.
• #15: Captain Gunnar Nordenson, of the Stockholm, testified later that, in respect to the time of collision, his third officer had misjudged the time because the Stockholm's course recorder had logged the time of collision at 11:11 P.M.

Captain Piero Calamai, of the Andrea Doria, had this to say:

• #1: He first picked up the image of a ship on his radar screen at 10:45 P.M. The target was at a distance of 17 miles bearing 4 degrees over the Andrea Dona’s right bow.
• #2: At 11:05 P.M. the target was at a distance of between 3 and 4 miles bearing 14 degrees over the Andrea Doria’s right bow.
• #3: At this point a four degree fall off to left was ordered (slight change in course).
• #4: As the target came closer the angle of bearing continued to increase indicating to him that the ships were on parallel courses headed in opposite directions.
• #5: When the ship had not been sighted visually at a distance of 2 miles he left his second officer, with whom he had been observing the target on radar during the entire approach, and he joined his third officer on the wing of the open bridge.
• #6: Third Officer Eugene Giannini said to him, “Why don’t we hear him? Why doesn’t he whistle?”—Just then, the third officer, using binoculars, sighted the “glow” of lights. Then the Captain saw the “glow.”
• #7: The “glow” was at a distance of about 1.1 miles bearing between 20 and 25 degrees over the Andrea Doria’s right bow. Believing the ships to be on parallel courses he felt there was ample room for a safe right side to right side passage.
• #8: Seconds later he realized, to his horror, from the ship’s masthead navigational range lights which were now distinguishable, that the ship was swinging sharply to her right and toward the Andrea Doria. The ship’s lower masthead light was to the left of the upper masthead light (see previous footnote).
• #9: He then realized that a collision was unavoidable. In desperation he ordered a hard left turn in the hope that the Andrea Doria would run safely across the Stockholm’s bow.
• #10: Collision at about 11:10 P.M.

Attention is now directed to the illustrated plots. These plots have been faithfully produced from the sworn testimony of the witnesses and by calculations based upon testified speeds, times, distances, and degrees of bearing angles with the following points taken into consideration.

• #1: Where a witness said “about” or “between,” the mean has been used.
• #2: The Andrea Doria testified that she had passed one mile south of Nantucket Lightship and was headed for Ambrose Lightship, 197 miles to the west at the entrance to New York Harbor. And the Stockholm said she was headed from Ambrose Lightship aiming to pass between one and two miles south of Nantucket Lightship. Therefore, the ships have been plotted as starting out on identical courses headed in opposite directions.
• #3: The Stockholm testified that she had drifted nearly three miles to the left of her course and that during the hour prior to the collision she had made slight compensating changes in course to her right for the run on Nantucket Lightship. This, plus the fact that the Stockholm did not state the times, or bearing angle degrees of the target on the radar approach makes it impossible to plot the Stockholm’s course from her testimony. However, the Andrea Doria did make two positive statements concerning these necessary factors and the speeds of both ships are known. The accuracy of the Andrea Doria's 10:45 and 11:05 radar bearings is proved by the advance of the Stockholm during this twenty-minute period. Using the relative position of the ships at 10:45 and 11:05 calculations prove that the Stockholm was making 18.5 knots as testified. With these known factors the courses of both ships have been determined and are thusly plotted.
• #4: As previously stated the Stockholm did not give any details concerning her radar target. The only information available is that the target was always over the Stockholm’s left bow. Mr. Carstens-Johannsen said that upon sighting the ship visually her navigational range lights indicated that she was on a parallel course with the Stockholm and headed in the opposite direction. Without the required information the advance of the third ship can only be plotted approximately. However, this is not important because the only necessary detail in this respect is her relative position and direction of travel at the moment of initial visual sighting. These facts we do have and from them the postulated third ship has been accurately plotted from the Stockholm's testimony.
• #5: The plots are scaled at one large square to the mile and at this ratio the ships are inserted at twice their sizes.

Plot #1 is the Stockholm's version of the sequence of events. From points S to C and T to U the radar approach is given showing the entire approach as left side-to-left side. From point S to C the Stockholm’s advance is indicated at each five minute interval. 11:05 P.M. point C to U the Stockholm’s navigational watch sights ship’s lights bearing 20 degrees over the left bow at 1.85 miles. Ship showing the Stockholm her left side as indicated by the red left sidelight. The open range lights indicated that the ships were on parallel courses headed in opposite directions. Third Officer enters wheelhouse, checks radar, orders the 22\ degree right turn, and answers the telephone. 11:09 P.M. (or split seconds later) point K: Third Officer returns to left side of open bridge after the Stockholm had made her right turn. Now, he claimed, the other ship had turned in violation of the Rules of the Road. Ship had now changed relative position completely and was showing her right side as indicated by the green right sidelight. Collision now inevitable. Hard right turn ordered. Full speed astern (back) ordered on both engines. 11:11 P.M. point X: Collision with another ship.

Plot #2 is the Andrea Doria’s version of the sequence of events leading up to the collision. 10:45 P.M. point A to S: Andrea Doria picks up radar target at 17 miles bearing 4 degrees over Doria’s right bow. Points A to H and S to C is the radar approach indicating a right side- to-right side passing. From point A to H the Andrea Doria’s advance is shown at each five-minute interval. 11:05 P.M. point H to C: Radar target now bearing 14 degrees over Doria’s right bow at a distance of 3.75 miles. Four-degree fall off to left ordered by Captain Calamai. 11:09 P.M. point J to K: Captain Calamai and Third Officer Giannini sight the “glow” of lights bearing 22½ degrees over the Andrea Doria’s right bow at a distance of about 1.1 miles. Believing the ships to be on parallel courses no action was taken. Seconds later masthead range lights became distinguishable. Lights indicate ship is turning sharply to her right toward the Andrea Doria. Collsion is now unavoidable. Hard left turn ordered in the hope that the Andrea Doria would run safely across the Stockholm’s bow. 11:11 point X: Collision with another ship.

Plot #3: is a composite diagram of plots #1 and #2. From this diagram it is obvious that when the Stockholm’s navigational watch sighted lights at 11:05 P.M. (point C to U) the Stockholm was not looking at the Andrea Doria but rather at another ship. This is the point where the Stockholm's third officer entered the wheelhouse. When he returned to the left side of the open bridge at 11:09 P.M. (or split seconds later) (point K) he found a ship in a collision situation point K to J. Now he was looking at the Andrea Doria and not at the same ship he had seen some four minutes earlier. In the meantime the other ship had either turned right according to the Rules of the Road or she just maintained her normal course and speed points U to Y or U to V. 11:11 P.M. point X: Stockholm rams Andrea Doria entering the Doria's right side practically at a right angle.

The Andrea Doria testified that when the Stockholm's navigational lights became distinguishable she found that the Stockholm was in the act of making a sharp turn to the right and that the Stockholm’s navigational range lights showed the lower light to be left of the upper light. Consequently, the Stockholm was showing the Andrea Doria her red left sidelight while the Andrea Doria was showing the Stockholm her green right sidelight. This situation made the Andrea Doria the burdened ship. Because, according to the Rules of the Road, the laws say that the ship showing her red left sidelight will maintain course and speed and the ship showing her green right sidelight will turn in such a manner as to pass around the stern of the ship showing her red left sidelight. If this is not possible, then the burdened ship must slow down, stop, or reverse in order to avoid a collision. Therefore, the Andrea Doria should have executed a hard right turn instead of attempting the hard left turn as ordered. Captain Calamai testified that between the combined speed of the ships (one mile every ninety seconds) and the Stockholm's right turn it would have been impossible for him to have avoided a collision by executing a hard right turn.

Another point in support of the third ship: Does it not seem strange that two Andrea Doria navigators, one using binoculars, did not see the Stockholm’s lights until 11:09P.M. while the navigational watch on the Stockholm's bridge sighted lights four minutes earlier at 11:05? Considering the aggregate speed of the ships was forty knots, a distance of 2.66 miles was traveled in four minutes. The gap between the ships was closed at the rate of one mile every ninety seconds.

Another point: The Stockholm’s third officer testified that he did not make any radical change in course until he saw the lights “with my own eyes” at 11:05 P.M. It was then that he ordered the initial right turn of 22½ degrees. Captain Calamai testified that the Stockholm was turning to her right and toward the Andrea Doria when the Stockholm exposed herself to him and Third Officer Giannini, at 11:09 P.M. A possible explanation of these facts is that the ship which the Stockholm turned right to avoid was the “third ship” and that the Stockholm turned before she had actually sighted the Andrea Doria.

Finally: If the Stockholm had been correct in identifying the lights sighted at 11:05 P.M. as those of the Andrea Doria, then this diagram shows the maneuvers which the Andrea Doria would have been required to make in order to place herself in the position in which she was rammed by the Stockholm at 11:11 P.M. The diagram is plotted at four large squares to the mile and the ships are inserted proportionately. The Andrea Doria's advance of .364 miles per minute and the Stockholm's advance of .308 miles per minute are indicated. The third course shown indicates the tightest possible turn which a ship of the Andrea Doria's size and speed could make at full speed. The third course is based on information provided by several authorities in the field of shipbuilding and ship operations. From this diagram it is obvious that the Andrea Doria could not possibly have executed such a turn in the time and space available.

In this analysis it has been assumed that the Stockholm’s third officer was off the open bridge for about four minutes. This assumption was reached by the following method. Two facts are indisputable. One is that the Stockholm rammed the Andrea Doria, and the other is that the collision happened at 11:11 P.M. Mr. Carstens-Johannsen, of the Stockholm, testified that when he sighted lights, off to his left, at 11:05 P.M. he entered the wheelhouse. When he returned to the open bridge, he found the ships in such a position that a collision was unavoidable. But the Andrea Doria did not sight the “glow” of the Stockholm’s lights before 11:09 P.M. Therefore, the collision situation probably did not exist visually before 11:09 P.M. If that is so, then Mr. Carstens-Johannsen must have been off the Stockholm's open bridge for about four minutes.

From 11:05 P.M., when the Stockholm's navigational watch testified to sighting lights at 1.85 miles bearing 20 degrees over the Stockholm's left bow (at which point the Stockholm executed the 22\ degree right turn) until the collision six minutes later, the testimony as presented by both ships dovetails in every respect. That the Stockholm executed the 22½ degree right turn has been testified to by the ship’s navigational watch who certainly would not testify contrary to the information scribed on the tape of the Stockholm's course recorder which was submitted in evidence at the inquiry.

The testimony and calculations based upon it clearly show that the Andrea Doria did not sight the Stockholm's lights until 11:09 P.M. or four minutes after the Stockholm had sighted lights. The only logical conclusion, consequently, is that the lights sighted by the Stockholm at 11:05 P.M. could not possibly have been those of the Andrea Doria.

These facts raise the all important question which is the key to the entire maze of contradictory evidence given at the inquiry. Did the Stockholm's navigational watch actually sight lights at 11:05 P.M. bearing 20 degrees over the Stockholm's left bow at a distance of 1.85 miles as testified, and, if so, whose lights were they?

The second portion of this question may never be answered, but careful consideration of the first part certainly indicates that, in fact, the Stockholm's navigational watch did sight the lights as "testified. The following reasons are given for this conclusion.

• #1: It must be remembered that the Stockholm was on a very tight course aiming at a fog shrouded pin point, Nantucket Lightship, which was still some seventeen miles ahead at the time of the collision. Is it reasonable to believe that, under these circumstances, Mr. Carstens-Johannsen would execute a severe and radical change in course of 22½ degrees to his right without good reason?
• #2: Modern navigation dictates that a ship maintain a direct and accurate course. No navigator would consider such a maneuver without cause.
• #3: Mr. Carstens-Johannsen, the Stockholm's third officer, testified that he saw the lights “with my own eyes.” After days of grueling cross examination, the attorneys representing the opposition could not budge him on this point.
• #4: The bridge lookout and the helmsman both testified that they also saw the lights.
• #5: The lookout in the crow’s nest testified that he aaw the lights, and that upon sighting them he reported their presence by telephone to Mr. Carstens-Johannsen on the bridge. Mr. Carstens-Johannsen testified to receiving this telephone communication.

In view of points one and two and the testimony of the four men (the Stockholm's entire navigational watch), there should be no doubt whatsoever in the minds of even the severest skeptics that the navigational watch on the Stockholm did, in fact, sight lights at 11:05 P.M. bearing 20 degrees over the Stockholm's left bow at a distance of 1.85 miles.

The third ship theory raises many points. Before entering into this phase of the matter one important point should be taken into consideration and that is the location of the accident. The scene of the collision was at a navigational crossroad known in maritime circles as “Times Square.” Nantucket Lightship is used as a bearing point by all traffic to and from New York and Philadelphia and all points in Europe north of Gibraltar. Also, all coastwise traffic to and from points north of Nantucket and points as far south as the Panama Canal uses the lightship as a focal point. This, plus the conflicting testimony', makes the presence of another ship in the vicinity more than a possibility.

Incredible as it may sound, a mariner knows that it is quite possible for a ship to expose herself out of the haze momentarily then disappear into oblivion completely ignorant of the fact that she had been so close to an accident. The visibility on the night of the disaster at its best was poor. The Stockholm claimed there were fog banks, or patches, with visibility in certain directions reduced to less than two miles. The Andrea Doria said the fog was thick and blanketing with visibility' in certain directions reduced to one-half mile.

One wonders how a ship could be so close and not hear the collision. After all, the crash must have resounded over the quiet waters like a salvo of 16-inch guns. The crash could have been heard on this ship (which by calculations was no more than three or four miles northwest of the scene), but not listening for the noise of a collision, the men could have discounted the sound of the crash as thunder. Or, at the moment of the accident, the ship could well have been blowing her own fog horn which, for the moment, would drown out completely any other noise.

Mr. Carstens-Johannsen of the Stockholm identified the lights sighted by him at 11:05 P.M. as those displayed by power-driven ships. The location of all liners at the time of the accident is well known and none were in the immediate vicinity. Therefore, the third ship could have been a freighter, or it could have been a tanker; it could have been a large ship, or it could have been a small ship; it could have been a deep sea ship, or it could have been a coaster. The possibility of the third ship being a pleasure craft, a fishing boat, or a tug with or without a tow, is eliminated because craft of these types do not carry navigational lights that conform with those described by Mr. Carstens-Johannsen. Naval and Coast Guard ships can be eliminated because they maintain a twenty-four hour alert radio watch. If the third ship had been one of these Government craft, she would have been at the scene of the accident in a matter of moments.

Many merchant ships do not require any more than three men to handle the navigational responsibilities at night. The three men are the mate or officer in charge, the lookout on the fo’c’sle head at the bow of the ship, and the helmsman at the wheel. The helmsman can be discounted because from his position at the wheel his outside vision and hearing would be practically nil. The time of the crash has been fixed at 11:11 P.M. This is about the time that the lookout would notify the bridge that he was leaving his post to call the 12 to 4 watch to relieve the 8 to 12 watch at midnight. Thus the outside navigational responsibilities may be thinned down to one man who, at the moment, could have been engaged in any one of the half dozen activities pertinent to his duties which would take him off the outside bridge. Under these circumstances it is quite possible that the third ship never saw the Stockholm visually.

The question of radio communication comes to mind. Why did this ship not respond to the Andrea Doria's and Stockholm's distress calls? Ships in the category mentioned in the preceding paragraph carry but one radio operator who stands an alert watch at specified times. For the periods when he is off duty, the ship is equipped with an automatic alarm which is actuated by a distressed ship. In this case the ship in trouble transmits a distinctive signal, the signal being a four-second dash, a one-second break, a four-second dash, etc. The signal is continued for one minute, and any sequence of three out of the twelve dashes transmitted is supposed to set off alarm bells in the radio room and on the bridge of all ships within range of the transmitter.

Since the disaster, many officers and radio operators have been questioned as to their ship’s location on the night of the disaster and as to what happened concerning their automatic alarms. Some said that the alarms sounded and after checking found they were much too far away to be of assistance. The alarms were reset and the ships continued on their respective ways. Others said their alarms did not sound. In this respect, it should be noted, that the automatic alarm is an extremely sensitive instrument and that static electricity frequently sets it ringing. When this happens, the power energizing the instrument is turned down low, thus reducing much of its efficiency. In one case, the radio operator of one of the rescue ships said that his automatic alarm had sounded falsely about fifty times during his tour of duty on the ship. When his alarm sounded at the time of the disaster, he tuned in his set fully expecting it to be another false alarm.

In wondering why the third ship has never been mentioned, it must be remembered that only four men (the Stockholm's entire navigational watch) have actually testified to seeing the lights over the Stockholm's left bow. In addition to the third officer these men were the two lookouts and the helmsman. Mr. Carstens-Johannsen testified that after he sighted the lights at 11:05 P.M. he entered the wheelhouse. He also testified that he did not actually see the other ship make any radical change in course. There is no report that the lookouts, or the helmsman, were ever questioned on this point. Calculations show that Mr. Carstens-Johannsen may have been off the open bridge for at least four minutes. How can he be positive that, when he returned to the open bridge and found a ship in a collision situation, he was looking at the same ship he had observed possibly four minutes earlier? Mr. Carstens-Johannsen also testified that the other ship could have been momentarily obscured from his vision in a fog bank or patch. Under these circumstances of fog and night, it is quite possible that the lights of a ship could be obscured and that when lights are again seen they are of a different ship and not those of that ship which had been seen a few minutes earlier.

The question of radar is raised. The maneuvering board illustrated here is a facsimile of a radar screen. For clarity the plot on this board is laid out with each circle representing one-half mile. The plot shows how the relative positions of the three ships must have appeared on the Stockholm’s radar screen at 11:05 P.M. With the Stockholm at point A the third ship is shown at point B, bearing 20 degrees over the Stockholm’s left bow at a distance of 1.85 miles. At 11:05 P.M. the Andrea Doria testified that the Stockholm was bearing 14 degrees over the Andrea Doria’s right bow at a distance of 3.75 miles. Therefore the Andrea Doria would have been showing on the Stockholm’s radar screen at point C. With this it becomes clear that at 11:05 P.M. the Stockholm was watching the third ship while the Andrea Doria was actually watching the Stockholm. That the Andrea Doria was correct is proved by the fact that her target plunged into her side. The third ship, traveling in the same direction as the Andrea Doria, was doubtlessly being overtaken by the Andrea Doria. Once the third ship’s direction of travel had been determined, the Andrea Doria would have paid little attention to this target thereafter.

Mr. Carstens-Johannsen testified that he picked up the image of the Andrea Doria by radar about thirty-five minutes before the collision. The target was bearing twelve miles over the Stockholm’s left bow. Again considering the aggregate speed of the ships, the Andrea Doria must have been at least 23 miles away from the Stockholm thirty-five minutes before the accident. His testimony concerning the target included the distances but not the times or the bearing angles. The only positive statement made by Mr. Carstens-Johannsen, which included all the necessary factors, is this 11:05 P.M. plotted observation made after he had sighted the target visually.

At Mr. Carstens-Johannsen’s 11:05 P.M. observation, made six minutes before the collision, the third ship, at a distance of 1.85 miles, was the nearest target showing on the Stockholm’s radar screen. At this point the Andrea Doria was 3.75 miles away. And the 11:05 P.M. observation, made six minutes before the collision, was the last radar observation made by the Stockholm before the accident, according to the testimony.

Radar to be effective must be watched constantly with the observer plotting all targets at regular intervals. The recommended method is to plot every three minutes. Captain Calamai has testified that, although his radar screen was watched constantly during the Stockholm’s approach, the Stockholm’s course and speed was not plotted by the Andrea Doria. The lone officer on the Stockholm’s bridge had many other duties beside radar observation pertaining to his position as officer in charge.

In reviewing the testimony, as published in the New York Times, there is no mention of the attorneys ever asking the officers involved this all important question, “Did you have other targets showing on your radar screen while you were supposedly observing each other?”

It is a propos at this point to call attention to the alarming announcement recently made by Lloyds of London in which it is stated that during the six year period ending on December 31, 1956, there have been 6,110 collisions involving 12,220 ships of 500 gross tons or over. They accentuate the fact that the majority of these ships were equipped with radar and stress the point that radar is an aid to navigation and not a form of navigation.

In considering Captain Calamai’s decision to make the hard left turn when the Stockholm’s, lights indicated that she was turning into the Andrea Doria, several points should be considered. A period of two minutes elapsed from the time the “glow” of the Stockholm’s lights was sighted until the collision. At the Andrea Doria’s speed of 21.85 knots, she was advancing one ship length (697 feet) every nineteen seconds. Therefore she traveled only six and one-third lengths from the sighting of the “glow” until the collision two minutes later. The Andrea Doria no doubt had advanced at least two ship lengths from the time of sighting the “glow” until the Stockholm’s lights became distinguishable. This reduced the maneuverable space, left for Captain Calamai to operate in, to about four ship lengths. Translated into time, it was seventy-six seconds. At her speed the Andrea Doria would advance at least a full ship length before even beginning to answer her helm. Thus it becomes obvious that the Andrea Doria had no more than begun to answer her helm when she was rammed. Captain Calamai’s only hope and prayer, when the situation was made clear to him, was that by ordering the hard left turn a miracle would carry him safely across the Stockholm’s bow. Fifteen seconds more and he would have made it. (By comparison: The Stockholm was advancing one ship length—525 feet—every seventeen seconds, and she traveled seven lengths during the final two minutes.)

The third ship can in no way be held responsible for the accident. The mere fact that she was so close by is what triggered off the fatal sequence of events.

Every effort should be made to identify this third ship. Her identity would clear up the impossible situation which has been created. However—far more important—why did this ship not respond to the distress calls? She could not have been more than five or six miles away when the Stockholm flashed her distress signal at 11:22 P.M. and the Andrea Doria broadcast hers at 11:23 P.M. Was this ship equipped with an automatic alarm? If so, did the alarm sound? If not, why not?

There were at least sixteen ships within a one hundred mile radius of the disaster. This area has been declared as the critical zone by the experts. They feel that every ship within this zone should have responded immediately. The approximate locations of the ships in this zone are known and the count shows that only about seventy per cent responded. What about the other thirty per cent? Did their automatic alarms sound?

The answers to these questions could well establish the inadequacy of the automatic alarm system currently used on ships which carry but one radio operator.

Lack of proper radio communications when the Andrea Doria sank could have caused, under slightly different circumstances, a repeat in the history of the Titanic disaster. The Titanic sank at 2:30 a.m. on the morning of April 15, 1912, with 1,701 persons on board. All during the sinking people on the Titanic’s decks could see the lights of the SS Californian some five or six miles away. Desperately they tried to raise her attention but to no avail, and the Titanic sank while the Californian’s lone radio operator slept soundly in his bunk.

Excerpts from Radio Logs

Collision time plus:
12 Minutes:	S.S. Andrea Doria:	SOS—SOS—DE—ICEH.
13 “	Doria:	Collision with another ship.
13 “	M. V. Stockholm:	CQ—CQ—(attention all stations) Collided with another ship—Message follows.
17 “	S.S. Robert E. Hopkins (to Doria):	Roger.
17 “	Doria (to Hopkins):	Roger.
18 “	Doria:	CQ—CQ—0325 GMT—Latitude 40-30N, Longitude 69-53W.
21 “	S.S. Cape Ann (to Stockholm):	My position 69-36W—40-35N.
22 “	S.S. Lionne (to Doria):	Are you getting assistance—we are about 150 miles east.
29 “	Doria:	Need immediate medical assistance.
33 “	S.S. Ile de France (to Doria):	Position 40-28N, 68-56W—do you need assistance?
33 “	Hopkins (to Doria):	Position 40-3 7N 69-00W Standing by.
40 “	Doria:	CQ—CQ—SOS—SOS—SOS—position 40-30N—69-53W—need immediate assistance.
42 “	U.S.N.S. Private Wm. H. Thomas (to Doria):	We are 7 miles south of Nantucket and proceeding.
42 “	Doria (to Thomas):	Roger.
45 “	Ile de France (to Doria):	Am going to assist—will arrive 0545 GMT—are you sinking—what assistance do you need—signed—Captain.
52 “	Cape Ann (to Doria):	8 miles from you—arrive 45 minutes.
52 “	Doria (to Cape Ann):	Roger.
57 “	Stockholm:	CQ—CQ—collided with Andrea Doria at 0310 GMT—position 40-34N—69-45W—Still investigating our damage.
59 “	Stockholm:	Foggy but can see Andrea Doria sometimes.
59 “	Thomas:	10 miles south of Nantucket—proceeding in dense fog.
1 Hr. 11 Min.:	Stockholm (to Doria):	Badly damaged—whole bow crushed—#1 hold filling—have to stay in our position—if you can lower lifeboats we can pick you up—you have to row to us.
1 “ 12 “	Cape Ann (to Doria):	3 miles from you now—have 2 lifeboats—no motor-boats.
1 “ 18 “	Doria (to Stockholm):	We are too bending [listing]—impossible to put lifeboats at sea—please send immediate assistance—lifeboats.
1 “ 19 “	Stockholm (to Doria):	Preparing lifeboats.
1 “ 26 “	Cape Ann:	Arrived on scene—standing by between ships in collision.
1 “ 33 “	Cape Ann:	Lifeboats launched.
1 “ 34 “	Thomas (to Doria):	Have you in radar 10 miles—have 8 boats.
1 “ 49 “	Stockholm:	No boats in water—we are waiting—#1 hold full of water.
1 “ 52 “	Ile de France (to Cape Ann):	Arrive scene 0545 GMT—what can I do to help—several boats ready.
1 “ 54 “	Cape Ann (to Ile de France):	Doria says she immediately needs lifeboats for about 1,000 passengers and 500 crew.
1 “ 56 “	Stockholm:	Heavy damage—have about 500 passengers—200 crew.
1 “ 58 “	Stockholm (to Doria):	Now launching lifeboats—headed for you.
2 Hr. 9 Min.:	Thomas:	Closing in—have boats ready.
2 “ 15 “	Doria:	CQ—CQ—danger immediate—need lifeboats—as many as possible—cannot use our life boats.
2 “ 17 “	Stockholm:	Now launching all 12 lifeboats—position Lat. 40-34N Long. 69-45W—close to Doria.
2 “ 29 “	Nantucket Lightship:	Weather foggy—visibility 15 yards.
2 “ 35 “	Thomas (to Doria):	Two lifeboats on way over now.
2 “ 36 “	Doria (to Thomas):	Roger—Tell other ships thousand passengers.
2 “ 38 “	Doria:	Don’t know how long can use radio—I am listing too much.
2 “ 43 “	S.S. Manaqui:	Will arrive 0900 GMT—Have 2 lifeboats.
2 “ 43 “	Cape Ann:	Actuates automatic alarm on 500 kilocycles and rebroadcasts Andrea Doria’s distress signal and position.
2 “ 45 “	S.S. Free State:	Will arrive 1100 GMT.
2 “ 51 “	Hopkins:	Am about 18 miles east—will arrive in one hour—have four boats.
3 “ 02 “	S.S. Taranlia:	Will arrive in about four hours.
3 “ 08 “	Ile de France:	Now have ten boats in water.
3 “ 11 “	Cape Ann:	First boat with survivors now on board.
3 “ 15 “	Hopkins:	Asks ships in collision if fog is heavy.
3 “ 16 “	Stockholm (to Hopkins):	No—Not bad.
3 “ 17 “	Thomas (to Hopkins):	Visibility on scene about 3 miles.
3 “ 23 “	Stockholm (to Ile de France):	Our foreship damaged—#1 hold flooded—otherwise ship tight—will try to proceed New York slow speed—if you are going there with survivors could we as a precaution keep company?
3 “ 29 “	Doria:	Need immediate tug assistance.
3 “ 36 “	Ile de France (to Stockholm):	Will proceed New York full speed when all rescued—please ask another ship—my schedule imperative.
3 “ 38 “	Cape Ann:	Require medical assistance urgently for survivor.
4 “ 27 “	Hopkins (to Ile de France):	Are you handling distress traffic?
4 “ 27 “	Ile de France (to Hopkins):	Affirmative.
4 “ 28 “	Cape Ann:	Have about 120 survivors on board—more coming.
4 “ 30 “	Thomas:	Have about 50 survivors on board—more coming.
4 “ 40 “	Stockholm:	Urgent—nearest Coast Guard Station—Have three serious casualties aboard—need immediate attention—please send helicopter to our position—40-34N—69-46W.
5 “ 15 “	Stockholm:	Have approximately 425 survivors aboard.
5 “ 26 “	U.S.N.S. Sgt. Jonah E. Kelley:	Have one doctor aboard ETA one hour.
5 “ 42 “	Manaqui:	Arriving distress position now.
5 “ 47 “	Ile de France (to Stockholm):	All passengers rescued—proceeding New York full speed—Thomas standing by Andrea Doria—no more help needed, signed—Master.
5 “ 54 “	Cape Ann:	Have approximately 175 passenger survivors aboard.
6 “ 01 “	Cape Ann:	Proceeding New York.
6 “ 24 “	Stockholm:	Please—any word of helicopter?
6 “ 32 “	Manaqui (to Thomas):	Request release from scene.
6 “ 32 “	Thomas (to Manaqui):	Release granted.
6 “ 56 “	Thomas:	CQ—CQ—plenty ships now—no further assistance needed.
6 “ 57 “	Thomas:	Present weather—wind 3 MPH—sea slight swell—moderate visibility—3 miles.
7 “ 27 “	Hopkins:	Picked up one survivor.
7 “ 36 “	Coast Guard New York:	No radio contact with Andrea Doria since 1000 GMT—believe off the air.
8 Hr. 07 Min.:	Cape Ann:	Have 168 survivors—2 doctors in attendance—proceeding Ambrose ETA 2100Z.
8 “ 23 “	Coast Guard Cutter:	Andrea Doria now has 45-degree starboard list—master and eleven of crew believed still aboard.
8 “ 34 “	Coast Guard Cutter:	Helicopters arrived at scene.
8 “ 42 “	Ile de France:	Have about 730 survivors on board.
8 “ 53 “	Coast Guard Cutter:	Helicopter with two patients from Stockholm leaving for Nantucket.
9 “ 04 “	Coast Guard Cutter:	U. S. Air Force helicopter with three patients proceeding Nantucket.
9 “ 33 “	Thomas:	CQ—CQ—We have been released—U. S. Coast Guard Cutter Evergreen has now taken command of this distress.
9 “ 44 “	C.G.C. Hornbeam:	Picked up 45 crew members and master from Andrea Doria.
10 “ 35 “	Thomas:	Have 156 survivors on board.
10 “ 48 “	Evergreen:	Andrea Doria settling rapidly.
10 “ 49 “	C.G.C. Owasco:	Escorting Stockholm to New York.
10 “ 58 “	Evergreen:	Andrea Doria sank in 225 feet of water—position 40-29.4N, 69-50.5W.
11 “ 22 “	Evergreen:	Area cleared.

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