What is the role of sea power in contemporary Soviet strategy? Has the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles and thermonuclear weapons made the navy obsolete, in Soviet eyes? In answering these questions we can avail ourselves of recent Soviet writings on naval affairs, as well as surveying the evidence provided by what the Soviets are actually doing in terms of naval construction and deployment.
Soviet naval objectives and missions, forces and capabilities, and doctrine must, of course, be understood in terms of Soviet military strategy as a whole. Current Soviet strategic views reflect two important considerations: (1) continued Soviet attention to major continental theater campaigns on the Eurasian periphery and (2) new attention to the problems of intercontinental warfare against the United States. The Soviet Navy has been developed very largely in terms of its role as a supplement to the ground forces in continental land campaigns. Doctrine and practice have confirmed this view in the prewar, wartime, and postwar periods. The Soviets continue now to regard major campaigns—land, supported by sea and air—as one important element in future nuclear war. Accordingly, the Soviet Navy is gearing itself for its contributing role in combined operations all around the Eurasian periphery, with or without the use of nuclear weapons. But the significant belated Soviet shift of attention in the last four years to the crucial new problems of intercontinental strategy has also been reflected in the development of Soviet naval doctrine and capabilities.
The weapons of intercontinental warfare are presently two: strategic air power and strategic sea power. The phrase “strategic sea power” sounds strange to Western naval ears, because for us sea power has always been strategic. American forces fighting in the south Pacific, and in Europe in two wars, were fighting “intercontinentally.” But to the Soviets intercontinental warfare is a new experience. No longer since World War II is the enemy center of power within the range of a massive combined infantry-tank-tactical air team. If Eurasia were taken, the United States island ou osts off Eurasia and in Africa would still be available for striking the Soviet heartland and the United States would remain relatively secure from occupation. To be sure the power of air assaults with thermonuclear weapons could devastate much of the United States as well as the Soviet Union. But in the Soviet view, this would not ensure the ultimately decisive victorious seizure of the enemy territory, nor even fully neutralize it as a base for direct attacks on the Soviet Union. Hence sea power also joins with long- range air forces and missiles, both as a weapon for naval warfare and for intercontinental striking missions. We know the new view from the then authoritative words of Marshal Zhukov, who in 1956 said: “In the construction of the navy we proceed from the conception that combat in naval theaters in future war assumes more significance than it had in the recent war." Admiral Vladimirsky, in 1955, made clear that precisely the emergence of new weapons and technology “requires us to examine carefully anew the role of the navy.” And another Soviet military theoretician specified (also in 1955) that in particular nuclear energy, in all its various military uses, “significantly increases the power of the navy and widens the framework of the employment of the navy.'"
The Soviet Navy has, throughout its existence, alternated between being a separate service with cabinet representation and being subordinate to the Army. From 1950, when renewed postwar attention to the Navy began, until Stalin’s death in 1953, the Soviet Navy was an independent ministry. Since 1953 it has been one element (although still more autonomous than the air forces) in the unified Ministry of Defense. As we have noted, beginning in 1955 a new redefinition of the role of the navy was undertaken. Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy from 1939 to 1947, and again from 1951 to 1955, was relieved to make way for a conversion of the navy’s role. Admiral Gorshkov is presently the Commander-in-Chief.
What are the lines along which the Soviet Navy is being refashioned for the atomic age, in general, and for intercontinental warfare, in particular?
In the first place, there is the preparation of the entire navy for defense against nuclear weapons. It may be useful to cite one authoritative statement of this recognition, by senior Naval Captain Shavtsov, writing in the General Staff organ Military Thought (in 1955).
The employment of the atomic weapon in combat operations at sea requires raising the requirements for all means of operational security, and especially for reconnaissance and air defense. In addition, it makes necessary the organization of atomic defense of ships, aviation, and other naval forces in the theater. Without a well organized atomic defense, under contemporary conditions, one cannot win or maintain mastery of the sea.
The Soviet Navy has also put this into practice and has actively conducted atomic defense training, as well as publishing various articles on the subject for the guidance and instruction of naval officers.
Secondly, as Admiral Vladimirsky has noted (in 1956), “the advent of atomic weapons has already led to important changes in naval tactics.” Perhaps the most important of these changes noted in their writings have been the recognition of the need for dispersal and of the importance of tactical surprise.
Finally, we come to the most significant strategical development: the attempt to establish strategic missions and capabilities for the Soviet Navy in the era of nuclear warfare. Soviet naval strategy now calls for two new missions: (1) neutralization of the enemy’s naval and maritime transport capabilities and (2) strategic striking power for employment against the enemy’s military forces, bases, and ports, and military industry. One other important possible mission is still in the early stages of consideration, but would seem to loom large as a likely area of increased future Soviet naval interest: large-scale amphibious operations over long ranges, and the use of sea transport (including large submarines and seaplanes) for this purpose.
In developing capabilities for offensive operations against the enemy fleets and home targets, the Soviets have stressed two weapons systems: (1) submarines, particularly with missile-launchers, for nuclear attacks and (2) missile-launching cruisers. Defensively, missiles and naval aviation are regarded as important. As the above implies, the Soviets have decided that large surface vessels—battleships, heavy cruisers, and aircraft carriers—are obsolete in the nuclear era. This decision was doubtless facilitated by the virtual absence of Soviet warships in these categories. Until recently the Soviets maintained two old battleships (a third sank after striking a mine, in 1955) and three old cruisers, but these obsolete units have by now probably all been retired. The Soviets have never had an operational aircraft carrier. They do, however, have a strong surface fleet of modern design consisting of approximately twenty-seven cruisers, of which at least sixteen are of postwar construction, and about 125 to 150 sea-going destroyers, of which about a hundred are postwar.
It has been reported, though still unconfirmed, that one reason for the dismissal of Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov in 1955 was his continued strong support for the program of construction of a fleet of conventional gunbearing light cruisers, rather than stressing the conversion of Soviet cruisers to missile armament. Khrushchev has been quoted as saying at a Moscow diplomatic party that “Kuznetsov was trying to fight the next war with the weapons of the last,” and on another occasion said to General Twining that “admirals are always looking backward and living in the past.” On his visit to England, Khrushchev said that cruisers were good for carrying political leaders on visits, and their guns for “firing salutes,” but not for much else. Probably some of the present Soviet cruisers, and any future ones, will be converted or constructed as guided missile cruisers. Indeed, one or more such vessels may already exist.
Admiral Vladimirsky has frankly stated that the Soviets believe large surface vessels to be obsolete because of new weapons potentialities. “It has become clear that to construct large vessels—battleships, heavy cruisers—is unprofitable. ...”
Further, the powerful might of guided missiles, which with the aid of various systems can be guided precisely to the target, significantly reduces the role of large ships in naval combat, since even relatively not large ships armed with missile weapons can successfully conduct combat operations against the very largest battleships and cruisers armed with conventional artillery.
Captain Shavtsov also points out that: “ The most favorable targets for atomic blows under contemporary conditions are large naval vessels.'"
Aircraft carriers, the modern “capital ship” and in the West successor to the battleship, are totally absent from the Soviet Navy. Moreover, as Admiral Burke has publicly confirmed, there are no indications that the Soviets intend to build carriers. Evidently the Soviets consider the vulnerability of any large surface vessel to be too great and the striking power insufficient. Soviet discussions comment on the carrier’s “risk of being annihilated” and state that it is necessary “to note the great vulnerability of aircraft carriers to various contemporary weapons.”
In the prewar period, some naval circles strongly favored the construction of aircraft carriers. If the war had not interrupted the large naval construction program begun in 1938, the Soviets might have developed a carrier arm. Even now, the Soviets concede that the carrier weapons system is capable of “significantly increasing the operating radius of aviation.” Articles discuss U. S. Navy carriers, primarily in order to familiarize Soviet naval men with the enemy’s views and capabilities. But the Soviets have definitely concluded that because of their vulnerability to modern weapons the aircraft carrier is an unacceptable weapons system.
Another Soviet criticism of aircraft carriers is primarily propagandistic. They argue that carriers, because of their vulnerability, are useful only for a first-strike mission—and therefore are only of value to an aggressor. This argument has been used to justify American and British interest in carriers and Soviet lack of interest.
Despite rejection of the aircraft carrier, the Soviets are aware of the need for naval aviation and air superiority in naval theaters of operation. As Captain Shavtsov noted: “One cannot speak of mastery of the sea under contemporary conditions without mastery of the air,” and “Atomic weapons have significantly increased the potentialities of aviation in the struggle for mastery of the sea.” This restatement of the importance of naval aviation for the nuclear era underscores the continuing Soviet view. Moreover, the Soviet naval air force of approximately 3,500 aircraft is fully equipped with modern jet fighters and light bombers—although it is entirely shore-based. One of the substitutes for aircraft carriers which the Soviet foresee is the use of atomic- propelled aircraft for long-range sea patrol and attack missions. One military theoretician, writing in Military Thought in 1955, specifically noted that: “The use of atomic propulsion for naval aviation makes possible dealing blows on the enemy and in support of the fleet from land bases, without the use of aircraft carriers.''' The Soviets have followed U. S. Navy development of the Seamaster and Trade- wind and have also displayed considerable interest in nuclear-propelled seaplanes.
Thus we see that for attack missions and for gaining of supremacy of the seas the Soviets are not relying on aircraft carriers or large surface vessels, but stress missile-launching cruisers, modern light cruisers and destroyers, and naval aviation to the extent of its range from land bases (presently with conventional turbojet fighters and light bombers). There is, of course, one other key element in the Soviet offensive naval force: submarines.
Submarines have traditionally played both a “tactical” role of killing enemy combat ships and a “strategic” role of interdiction and blockade of the enemy’s sea communications lines. Since about the beginning of 1954, the Soviets have also shown an awareness of the value of submarines in the nuclear era as a delivery system for intercontinental strikes. The Soviet interest in submarines was already well developed by the time of the recent war, and in the postwar period the construction of conventional torpedo-firing submarines was (along with conventionally gunned light cruisers) the major part of the naval program. The Soviet submarine fleet presently numbers over thrice that of the United States, and nine times that of Germany in 1939. Approximately 200 of the estimated total of over 500 submarines in service are modern, long-range vessels.
Submarines have a dominant role in Soviet naval strategy and great importance in Soviet overall military strategy, due to their suitability for two key tasks. One is the strategic interdiction mission; the other is the intercontinental striking mission. The interdiction mission may seem to many Americans to be of decreased importance for a future thermonuclear war. But the Soviets continue to regard even future total war as likely to involve significant long campaigns in the Eurasian peripheral theaters, in particular, Europe. From this perspective, the interdiction of Western sea communications with North America is of major importance. Rear Admiral Andreev, in an article in 1957, has thus declared: “Contemporary wars are conducted with large armies and . . . under combat conditions such armed forces require constant reinforcement of men, weapons, ammunition, fuel, food, equipment, etc." American troops abroad and all the NATO allies, states Admiral Andreev, are so dependent upon transoceanic supply that we “cannot conduct wide-scale combat operations” without it. In fact, he states, “the essence of the matter is that for the imperialist states the very possibility of conducting war depends upon the support of uninterrupted operation of sea and ocean communications,” so that such communications “can have a serious influence on the course and outcome of a war.” Thus, in the particular circumstances of the NATO forces, the Soviets are bound to devote substantial efforts to the strategic interdiction mission.
The reasons for Soviet interest in submarines for intercontinental attacks on strategic targets of the enemy need no elaboration.
The Soviets see two methods for submarines to make strategic strikes both against enemy sea forces and communications and against enemy land targets. One is the use of torpedoes with nuclear warheads; the other is the launching of guided or ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads.
The Soviets have, ever since the end of 1953, referred on many occasions to the possibilities of employing torpedoes with atomic warheads. Admiral Vladimirsky (as early as 1955, and again in 1957) has noted the obviously greatly increased effectiveness of nuclear armed torpedoes for use against enemy ships, since a vessel need not even be hit in order to be sunk. Moreover, Admiral Vladimirsky also has explicitly pointed to the possibility of delivery of mines and underwater torpedoes with nuclear warheads into the harbors of major enemy ports and naval bases.
The ballistic or guided missile with atomic warhead is the second new weapon of the submarine fleet for naval engagements and strategic strikes. A number of Soviet naval writers have, since 1955, described the possible use of submarine launched missiles for attacks on naval bases and other strategic targets on land. To cite but one authoritative reference, again we read in a statement by Admiral Vladimirsky: “Submarines armed with guided missiles having atomic warheads can conduct powerful surprise blows on industrial centers, seaports, and enemy bases and thus fulfill tasks on a strategic scale.’'’ Vladimirsky noted in particular (taking into account limitations of accuracy of submarine launched missiles) “such targets are strong coastal objectives having a large area.” Other articles have extended the possibility to include targets “deep in the enemy’s territory.”
Most Soviet discussions refer to guided missiles; a few refer to ballistic rocket missiles, presumably at a later stage in development. Similarly, a few sources have revealed the Soviet interest in subsurface launched missiles. Rear Admiral Pavlevich, in 1957, has noted that precisely “the possibility of using submarines for action against industrial and administrative centers of the enemy by long- range guided missiles has . . . above all, raised the need for creating structures to permit submarines to launch their missiles without surfacing.” The Soviets have also shown an interest in the development of underwater containers holding ballistic rockets—containers which could be towed by a submarine and anchored at selected locations for timed or remote control launching of the missiles. Discussions of the future development of this weapons system also envisage the particular value of nuclear propulsion for the submarines which would be prepared for launching atomic missiles against strategic targets. The Soviets have evaluated the invulnerability of the submarine-missile weapons system as relatively good. (Nonetheless, in discussions of combatting the enemy’s missile-launching submarines or surface vessels, the Soviets stress the need for “pre-emptive blows” on the launching vessels.) Captain Shavtsov, cited earlier in this article, stated as early as 1955 that: “Submarines, in our view, are the least vulnerable to atomic weapons. In the first place, they are difficult to detect not only at sea, but even in bases, since in case of atomic threat to a base they can submerge. In the second place, in dispersion at base and still more in operations at sea, the destruction of more than a single vessel is very unlikely. ” In writing at that time, he concluded that a single submarine was “not such a tempting target for an atomic blow.” This may not tell us the size of the Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons in mid-1955, but it surely suggests that the working-level military planners had not at that time been led to believe that “nuclear plenty” had arrived. Since that time, the Soviets have recognized more fully the implications of “atomic plenty” and of the announced United States development of an atomic depth charge for antisubmarine operations. The Soviets themselves have (in 1957) observed that an atomic depth charge would kill a submarine at 600 meters distance. But the Soviet evaluation of the utility of a submarine-launched missile capability for strategic nuclear strikes of course remains undiminished by this changed view of the attractiveness of single vessels for atomic attack.
We have now surveyed the two new missions and the lines of development of the corresponding capabilities, (1) for neutralization of the enemy’s sea communications, and (2) for contributing to the strategic assault on the enemy’s home bases. As we noted, there is a third mission of great potential importance, although to date little explored. Amphibious operations have never been well developed in Soviet practice, either in training or in combat. The landings made in World War II were all either small-scale, or large river crossings, and frequently against negligible opposition.
Soviet naval writers have recently begun to investigate problems of seaborne landing operations and operations to counter attempted enemy amphibious assaults, with the use by both sides of nuclear weapons. The concentration of transports and accompanying naval vessels for a large landing is recognized as a valuable possible target for atomic attack and must therefore be accomplished “with a calculation so that a single atomic explosion will remove the least quantity of forces and weapons from action.” From the standpoint of the defender, it is similarly held that “the employment of atomic weapons in counter-landing operations creates exceptionally favorable conditions for the achievement of its objective in short time.”
“Strategic landings,” in the Soviet definition, “are usually made with the objective of invasion of the enemy’s territory and the creation of a new front.” The scale of effort identified by the Soviets for a strategic landing is one or several field armies. Airborne troops, as well as amphibious forces, may join to effect a strategic landing. The Soviets have begun to display some interest themselves in strategic landing operations, and they have a “naval infantry” (marines), but to date they have not developed major amphibious forces. It is possible that the future will see an increased Soviet effort to develop such a capability.
Let us turn now to the defensive missions of the J Soviet Navy. Defense of the Soviet coastal areas, including air defense, is in general a mission of the Navy. Both the numerous smaller surface units of the four Soviet fleets (Baltic, Black Sea, Northern, and Pacific), and the naval shore establishment, have this as their primary function. Admiral Levchenko, a deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy, devoted an entire article late in 1956 to the role of Soviet naval artillerymen of the fleets and on shore, stressing their equipment both with conventional guns, and with “rocket and missile weapons, and methods of their employment on land and at sea.” A subsequent article (in late 1956) declared specifically that coastal artillery “is at the present time being equipped with guided missiles.” Thus the missile promises to become an important defensive, as well as offensive, weapon of the Soviet Navy. The present relatively short range Soviet naval air force is, of course, largely limited to a defensive role. Defense of the Soviet border areas will necessarily remain a major preoccupation of the Soviet Navy in view of the strong enemy (Western) naval striking forces which it would have to attempt to ward off and destroy in a war. Defense of the Soviet sea communications would be a secondary mission in the light of the relatively small scale of such communication lines. One field in which the Russians have long excelled is mine warfare, and even Soviet cruisers are outfitted for minelaying. The experience of the U. S. Navy at Wonsan harbor in 1950 bears witness to the effectiveness of current Soviet minelaying techniques. The possibility of nuclear charged mines would be a serious obstacle to Western naval actions in Soviet waters, and even in our own home waters, since the mines can be laid by submarines and aircraft.
Thus we see that the new Soviet navy will consist primarily of light cruisers and destroyers (presently with conventional guns, probably later with missile armament), submarines armed with torpedoes and missiles bearing atomic warheads, jet defensive and supporting naval aviation, later long-range nuclear propelled strategic striking bombers, and defensive gun and rocket coastal and anti-aircraft artillery. The Soviets may or may not develop amphibious forces of strategic significance.
We have surveyed the development of Soviet naval doctrine and strategy for the nuclear age. What, precisely, would be the actual employment of Soviet naval forces in a future war?
The major part of the Soviet Navy would be assigned to actions in conjunction with land and air forces on the Scandinavian, European, Balkan-Middle Eastern, and Far Eastern fronts. The Soviet Navy, due to geographical considerations, is necessarily divided into four separated seas which generally correspond to these four land theaters. The largest Soviet sea force is the Baltic Fleet, with about a dozen modern cruisers, and a large share of all the other components of the Soviet Navy including submarines. The Black Sea Fleet has about a half dozen modern cruisers. Both of these fleets are located on inland seas, the accesses to which are, at least initially, controlled by the NATO powers. These Soviet forces are, however, stronger than those of the other states which maintain naval strength there (Sweden in the Baltic, and Turkey in the Black Sea). Although the Baltic Sea is least vulnerable to Western naval assault, the Soviets have placed primary stress upon fortifying the Baltic coasts, due to their proximity to the Soviet centers of power. The Northern Fleet, with about four modern cruisers and over a score of long-range submarines, faces no close enemy force in peacetime. The Far Eastern Fleet, with about five modern cruisers and a large submarine arm, is a potent local force, but no match for American naval forces in the Far East.
The wartime transferability among these fleets would be severely limited. The Black Sea has no egress, save through the Western controlled Dardanelles, Gibraltar, and Suez straits, except for possible transfer of small vessels via inland rivers and canals to the Baltic. The White Sea Canal permits transfer of vessels up to and possibly including cruisers between the Baltic and Northern Fleets. The Northern and Far Eastern Fleets may use the Northern Sea Route during part of the year, but this would take considerable time and at great risk, and would probably only be used on a small scale. Thus practical flexibility is restricted to transfers between the Baltic and White Seas (until, of course, such time as the Soviets might have secured all of Scandinavia, when the North Atlantic might be used to connect these fleets).
Let us now review the initial Soviet naval j strategy in a general war. The success of this strategy would of course depend upon many things, including in particular the Western defensive priorities.
In the Baltic Sea, the absolute control of the Gulf of Finland would swiftly be extended to the Gulf of Bothnia and probably to the whole of the Baltic (with the possibility that Sweden might temporarily be spared if she remained neutral). Denmark would be overrun by a land thrust supported by airborne and seaborne landings on the islands, and Norway assaulted from the north by land and sea, the south by airborne and possibly seaborne forces, and in the later stages perhaps by land through Sweden. A strategic plan on this order explains the otherwise relatively large proportion of surface vessels assigned to the Baltic Fleet. The major forces for amphibious and seaborne assault are located in the Baltic. Similarly, missile stations on the East German coast face Scandinavia.
The Northern Fleet would have as a priority mission participation in the subjugation of northern Scandinavia, in coordination with land thrusts through Finland and Denmark and probably with airborne assault of Spitzbergen. One objective would be securing of naval bases (especially for submarines) on the Norwegian coast, and (especially for air and missile bases) on Spitzbergen. Submarines would be committed at once to the North Atlantic. If the Scandinavian campaign succeeded, the Baltic and Northern Fleets would be available for actions in the Atlantic.
The Black Sea Fleet would presumably have the objectives of protecting the sea flanks of land thrusts toward the Straits and from the Caucasus, and of seeking to deny the Straits to Western naval forces. Their adequacy for this task would depend, of course, primarily upon the opposition met from the West. Western naval forces (including support from carriers located in the Mediterranean) would give the Black Sea Fleet a serious challenge, and probably destroy it or drive it into Crimean and Ukranian ports. If the Black Sea Fleet were to survive, and a Soviet land thrust to secure the Straits, it would become the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet, and at a later phase of the war share the mission of assaulting Crete, Cyprus, Suez and such other objectives as only the progress of the war could portend.
In the Far East the Soviets would probably assume the strategic defensive (although Chinese offensives in Southeast Asia and on the Korean peninsula would be expected). The Soviets might attack either Japan or Alaska with airborne troops, but from the sea could assault only Hokkaido. Except for its submarine arm, the Soviet Far Eastern Fleet would probably be bottled up rather quickly in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk.
Finally, we come to the naval contribution to the intercontinental strategic striking mission. The problems of avoiding detection of submarines before the strike and of attaining accuracy would probably limit the role of missile launching submarines to a supplement to the basic air and missile strikes. Nonetheless, it could be an important component in the overall Soviet war plan. Admiral Burke has said this capability “could constitute a serious threat to our ports and to our coastal cities,” and noted that over half the major cities of the United States lay within 100 miles of the coasts.
Soviet aims and capabilities must be considered in terms of Western aims and capabilities, and they would depend significantly on the outcome of the strategic thermonuclear offensive and counteroffensive between the United States and Soviet Union. While it is not feasible here to speculate on the outcome of contested objectives, we may assume that if the war has not ended in the initial thermonuclear exchange the Western naval forces will seek to deny the Soviet navy access to the open sea in the White and Barents Seas and in the Far East, perhaps invade the Black Sea, and contain the enemy in the Baltic Sea. As we have seen, the Soviet fleets would all be forced into the strategic defensive. Only submarine operations would be significant in the great oceans.
If this first phase were to succeed, there would be intermediary phases, which we shall not attempt to examine here because the situations would be too speculative. But let us for a moment turn to what may be termed “the ultimate phase,” if unfortunately it should ever be reached. This would be a situation of Soviet control of Eurasia, except perhaps for certain island strongholds such as Spitzbergen, Iceland, England, Central Africa (an “island” for this purpose), Australia, and Japan. This situation would be exceedingly dangerous to the West, but it would also represent a difficult problem to the Soviets, and we cannot doubt they are even now well aware of this. The fact of intercontinental warfare is overwhelming. The problem of effectively closing with the enemy would be truly enormous for both adversaries, but especially so for the Soviets. The Soviets are placing great effort into developing their strategic air and missile capability and submarine strength, but it is not conceivable that they could hope to match the West on the surface at sea, even granting capture of significant portions of European navies. To be sure, the problem which the West would face in trying to defeat the Soviets in such a situation would be almost as difficult. Hence, the West might be vulnerable to peace overtures which the Soviets could advance in order to consolidate their power and, with the resources of two continents, they could begin to gird for the later final clash after having built the necessary naval and other intercontinental capabilities to seize as well as to devastate the United States.
The discussion above has all concerned the role of the Soviet Navy in a major war. The Soviets may also have in mind the role their naval forces could play in limited and local wars. If there were a limitation on the use of nuclear weapons, for example, the role of the navy for interdiction of sea communications would become extremely important, even though the strategic striking role might fade away. In a local war, units of the appropriate fleet might either be loaned as “volunteers,” or openly committed, to local engagements. In such a war the absence of carriers might be strongly felt. But in general the Soviets presume that the type of modern surface and submarine fleet which they are building, and the development required by geo- graphic-strategic circumstances, would serve both for limited and local wars, and for general nuclear war.
Sea power is essential to the Soviets particularly because it is essential to us, the enemy. Reflecting this fact, the submarine capability for disruption of the opponents’ sea communications is particularly strong. Also, the surface, air, and coastal components are predominantly geared to defensive actions against possible Western naval assaults. But, in addition, a new strategic striking mission is now leading to the acquisition of capabilities (above all missile-launching submarines) for intercontinental strikes.
This is the challenge. Admiral Gorshkov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, made clear the significance attached by the Soviets to the role of sea power when he stated almost two years ago:
The Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government devote great attention to the development and perfection of the navy, which plays an important role in the composition of our armed forces. Combat in naval theaters assumes immeasurably greater significance in contemporary war than formerly.
Sea power, while it has not become the main element in Soviet strategy, has been accorded an important role both in theater and intercontinental operations and its significance must not be overlooked.
*The opinions or assertions in this article are the private ones of the writer and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the U. S. Naval Institute.