The stated basic objective of the Military Pay Bill, HR 11470, as finally passed, is to provide a military pay system designed to attract and retain qualified personnel for active career service. This is to be accomplished in five different ways. Perhaps the most remarkable of these methods for improving retention is the one that represents the greatest departure from the Cordiner Committee’s recommended principles—i.e., the proposal embodied within Section 210, entitled “Special Pay—Certain Designated Officers.” The section is short and is quoted, as follows:
“Sec. 210. (a) The Secretary concerned may designate positions of unusual responsibility which are of a critical nature to the service concerned, and is authorized to pay special pay, in addition to any other pay prescribed by law, to any officer of an armed force who is entitled to the basic pay grade 0-3, 0-4,0-5, or 0-6 and is performing the duties of such a position, at a monthly rate as follows:
Pay grade |
Monthly rate |
O-3 |
$50.00 |
O-4 |
50.00 |
O-5 |
100.00 |
O-6 |
150.00 |
The Secretary shall prescribe the criteria and circumstances under which officers of the armed forces under his jurisdiction are eligible for pay under this section and may, whenever he considers it necessary, abolish such special pay.
“(b) Not more than 5 per cent of the number of officers on active duty in any armed force in pay grade 0-3 and not more than 10 per cent of the number of officers on active duty in any armed force in any of pay grades 0-4, 0-5, or 0-6, may receive special pay under this section.
“(c) This section shall be administered under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense for the armed forces under his jurisdiction, and by the Secretary of the Treasury for the Coast Guard when the Coast Guard is not operating as a service in the Navy.
“(d) This section does not apply to any person who is entitled to special pay under section 203 of this Act.
“(e) The Secretary of Defense shall report to Congress by March 1 of each year on the administration of this section within each military department during the preceding calendar year. The Secretary of the Treasury shall make a similar report for the Coast Guard when the Coast Guard is not operating as a service in the Navy.”
It is my opinion that special responsibility pay stems directly from two separate streams of Congressional thought. The first of these is Congressional concern over the high percentage of officers in the more senior grades. The second is the interest which the Cordiner Committee created in the general area of proficiency pay. In this regard the Cordiner Committee gave careful consideration to and then recommended against differential pay for critical officer technical skills. Some members of the House and Senate Committees hearing the bill initially had gained the impression that proficiency pay advocated by Cordiner for enlisted personnel was actually intended for officers as well. When it became clear that such was not the case, there remained a residual belief that the pay legislation should indeed provide for some form of proficiency pay for officers. This conviction remained.
Throughout the hearings, the armed forces endorsed the Cordiner Committee conclusion that there is no place in the officer corps for special pay for technical skills and stressed the fact that the greatest specialty of all was qualification for command leadership. The net result was that while retaining the conviction as to the need for special pay for critical technical billets, the Senate Committee apparently became satisfied with the justification of leadership as one of the technical skills. The ultimate Bill was worded in such a way that command responsibility can be awarded special pay.
Since responsibility pay in its final form was not discussed directly in the hearings before either the Kilday or Stennis Committees, we must turn to the Senate Report accompanying HR 11470 for definitive legislative history, wherein the objective of the Bill is stated as follows:
“The bill establishes for the first time on a permissive basis a special pay for a limited percentage of officers who hold critical positions of unusual responsibility. The eligible assignments could include command, staff, or any other position. This is intended to afford a means of making a monetary recognition of the contribution of those officers holding such positions. This provision would tend to correct a deficiency in the present pay and promotion system.”
Under a general discussion, the following appears:
“The committee recommended a provision which introduces a new feature to the military pay system. It provides that a limited number of officers in grades of captain, major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel, or equivalent grades, may be paid special additional pay if they hold a position of unusual responsibility as determined by the Secretary concerned.”
This Senate Report gives the following reasons in explanation of the addition by the Senate Committee of a responsibility pay feature:
“(1) Under the present pay system, an officer’s pay is determined principally by his rank. It is recognized that both the abilities and responsibilities of officers within a particular grade vary to a considerable degree.
“(2) The changing nature and complexity of our weapons systems are creating demands for unusual responsibility in both staff and command assignments, or a combination of both. These responsibilities, in many cases, may be distinguishable from the bulk of others held by those in that rank.
“ (3) Neither the present pay system nor the promotion system adequately acknowledges this type of individual. An example is shown by the fact that even though an officer may be occupying and adequately performing in a position of unusual responsibility, he nevertheless may be prohibited from receiving additional pay because of the fact that he is not within a so-called zone of consideration for promotion, which is based solely on the length of service in the particular grade.
“(4) The changing nature of our military services is requiring greater leadership in the scientific fields, as' well as command leadership in the usual sense. In the Air Force, for instance, the proportion of officers in the technical fields will grow from 55 per cent in a B-52 wing to approximately 75 per cent in an intercontinental ballistic missile unit.”
With regard to the operation of the system, the Senate Report had the following to say:
“This provision is permissive in nature and places wide discretionary authority in the secretary concerned for its administration. The committee realizes the difficult problems as a result of this innovation and recognizes that careful administration will be required. The value of this provision, which the committee considers sound in principle, will depend almost entirely upon the wisdom of its administration. The administration of this provision, however, poses no greater problems than those already being met in administering the system for selection of the most outstanding officers for responsible positions.”
It is interesting that the estimated cost of administering this provision is rather small. For Fiscal Year 1959, Congress’ estimate for all services was $12,092,000.
The legislative history further reveals that in some measure the final decision to write in a responsibility pay feature was related to the strong efforts on the part of the American Bar Association and others to achieve a special pay for law specialists. Among the reasons cited in the Senate Report for the rejection of special pay for officers assigned as Judge Advocate Generals and legal specialists appears the following:
“(3) Moreover, the committee adopted a provision which would allow officers holding assignments of unusual responsibility of a critical nature to the service concerned to receive additional pay in the amount of $150 for colonel; $100 for lieutenant colonel; and $50 for those in the grade of major and captain. In the event the secretary of the service concerned should determine that a member of the Judge Advocate Corps should meet this criteria he would be eligible for such pay and would thereby receive this amount in addition to the increases otherwise granted under the bill.”
The final piece of legislative evidence with regard to responsibility pay is the Conference Report of Mr. Kilday from the Committee of Conference, submitted following the adjudication of differences in the House and Senate versions of the Military Pay Bill. The original Senate version of the responsibility pay clause had read that an officer might be designated for responsibility pay “because of assignment and duties being performed, as holding a command or staff position of unusual responsibility and of a critical nature to the service concerned. . . The conference report, in discussing the Senate responsibility pay amendment, had the following to say:
“The House managers agreed to the Senate amendment with the deletion of the words ‘command or staff’ insofar as it pertains to the position of ‘unusual responsibility and of a critical nature to the service concerned.’ This change is intended to emphasize the intent that if this provision is implemented by the services it will be utilized only for positions of unusual responsibility and of a critical nature without limitation as to whether the person occupying that position is serving in a command or staff billet. The conferees further revised the wording of the proposed provision so as to place emphasis upon the importance of the position occupied by the individual as well as the performance of the individual in that position.” (italics supplied)
As a result, the final wording is as quoted under Section 210 at the beginning of this article.
With this background, we can speculate on various possibilities for the use of responsibility pay. The first big question is whether it is going to be used at all. A number of factors could result in the permissive responsibility pay lying dormant for the immediate future. It is possible that the Bureau of the Budget would oppose any expenditure of money under the responsibility clause in view of the austere budget situation.
Next, the Secretary of Defense, who is given authority under the bill to prescribe regulations for the three Armed Services, will have to make a decision on the matter. This would raise the question as to whether or not each Service will be given permissive authority to initiate responsibility pay on its own or whether the Secretary of Defense would require that the three Services take actions similar in nature.
Finally, the Secretary of the Navy would have to make a decision, if and when the Bureau of Budget and the Secretary of Defense made it possible for him to do so, as to whether or not the Naval Service will utilize responsibility pay.
Since all of the foregoing considerations at this writing remain uncertain, anybody can pick up pencil and paper and speculate over the possibilities for the use of this clause. My own thought would be that, regardless of the original opposition of the Services to the creation of this statutory departure from tradition, now that it is on the books it will not remain unused very long. The natural pressure to take advantage of every possible opportunity to increase remuneration of the commissioned officer will inevitably come into play. It therefore seems wise for all of the Services to plan now for the best possible utilization of a system which cannot possibly please everyone. Some of the questions to be resolved are as follows:
1. Should responsibility pay be authorized for staff, restricted line, and unrestricted line categories in pro rata shares, or should it go in large measure to the unrestricted line?
A variation of this question is a policy decision as to whether responsibility pay should be limited exclusively, or nearly exclusively, to sea-going billets which, in effect, would make it an unrestricted line perquisite.
2. How are the specific billets for which responsibility pay is authorized to be determined?
The law clearly intends that responsibility pay is to go with the job or billet. These jobs must be identified. The Committee, however, also emphasized that jobs within a particular grade in the same service and of an identical type might have different responsibilities, depending on geographical location, or other conditions. Therefore, there is a strong basis for limiting responsibility pay to a certain percentage of any particular kind of billet. As an example, it would appear to be legal to find that only 20% of the billets for commanding officers of destroyers were of such critical responsibility as to qualify for responsibility pay.
3. How are the individuals to be ordered into responsibility pay billets to be determined?
The legislative history of Section 210 clearly indicates that the purpose of responsibility pay is to provide incentive as a reward for superior individuals. Are present “detailing procedures” sufficient to meet the intent of law or is a more formal selection necessary? If responsibility pay billets for unrestricted line officers are going to be largely command at sea, present detailing procedure would certainly suffice. If the individuals to be designated for responsibility pay are limited to the senior year groups in each grade on the theory that by and large the more responsible job go to the more senior in the grade, the problem might not be too complicated. If the individuals to be designated for such pay are apportioned throughout the entire grade as a reward for superior achievement, the problem would be more knotty.
4. Is responsibility pay to be used in large magnitude, or is it to be severely limited?
If a decision should be made that only extremely unusual cases will qualify for responsibility pay—i.e., a captain not yet selected for rear admiral is ordered to fill a flag billet—the problems of administration and morale should be relatively small. On the other hand, if the full percentages authorized in law in the grades of lieutenant through captain are to be paid responsibility pay, major headaches in both the manner of billet determination and individual qualification are going to be encountered.
The foregoing are samples of the kind of problems which will produce strong pro and con argument among all categories of officers. At this formative stage in the history of responsibility pay, I think there is one significant point to keep in mind. The decisions as to the use of this new pay tool should be so made as to provide the broadest possible future support of the principle among the various groups within the officer corps of the Services. If Congress can be shown that its own creation has been wisely used, has merit, and that expanded application is desirable and logical, the Services might hope at a later time to enlarge the percentages authorized for responsibility pay to a figure which could more nearly include the many outstanding officers on active duty filling billets of critical responsibility. Could this be done, in the future, the rates of pay recommended by the Cordiner Committee might become a reality for a significant portion of our officer corps.