It is high time that the United States stopped blaming the Armed Forces for large-scale scientific failures, production slowdowns, international competition losses, and occasionally second-rate equipment. It has become standard procedure to use the words “Interservice Squabble,” or “Armed Forces Red Tape,” or even “The Pentagon Maize,” whenever any major national crisis arises which is even remotely connected with the Armed Forces. This type of criticism has already created a severe morale problem in the Armed Forces and, coupled with the pay discrepancies, it has given us a military organization consisting of people who are serving only because they are forced to do so. The military man who is dedicated to his work and to the preservation of his country is becoming harder and harder to find. The recent Soviet advances with their “Sputniks” and “Muttniks” brought out a rash of the statements indicated above. The lack of missile supremacy has been blamed upon the “Armed Forces Competition” by persons in high positions who are normally clear and level thinkers.
Let us examine the needs of the services to see how true this “Armed Forces Squabble” really is.
The Navy needs particular types of missiles. One of the fundamental requirements of a missile that is fired from a ship at sea is a constant stable platform reference level. This is a three-dimensional problem peculiar only to ships at sea. The Navy’s Submarine Forces desire missiles that can be fired from underwater positions, since exposure to the surface can mean the death of a submarine. The Navy’s Anti-Submarine Forces need air- or surface-launched missiles that can reach subsurface depths to kill the submarines that will not come to the surface to fire their missiles. The Navy’s Carrier-Based Aircraft need missiles that can be fired to the ground for the protection of Marines in front-line positions or to sink ships on the surface. These hits to be effective must be able to go slightly below the surface to get at the most vulnerable area of the ship. These missiles must be capable of withstanding the shock of catapult launches while strapped to the undersurface of the aircraft. The Navy’s missiles fired from ships should be normally of the short-range type, since the Navy intends to get fairly close to its target. In addition, almost all of the Navy’s missiles are fired at moving targets, that is to say, at ships moving at fairly high speeds on the surface, at tanks closing in on troops on the beach, at submarines moving underwater, and at enemy aircraft closing the formation. The Navy’s fighter aircraft also need small missiles to knock down bombers, fighter bombers, and even fighters approaching the task forces at sea.
The Army on the other hand normally fires its missiles from stable platforms and is not worried about a three-dimensional stable element. It is also very unlikely that the Army will ever have to fire missiles from underwater positions, nor is the Army interested in firing at targets beneath the surface of the sea. The Army missiles are designed primarily to hit fixed targets, such as pillboxes, troop concentration areas, supply depots and for the destruction of roadways, highways, and railways. Basically, the Army desires the artillery- type of missiles—some for long-range work and some for close-in support. In addition, the Army also desires to have ground-to-air missiles to protect its troops.
The Air Force, in its strategic air command role, needs the long-range, intercontinental ballistic missile type to hit targets far inland, to hit industrial areas, and to be able to fire from positions deep within its own homeland. The missiles carried by the fighters and interceptors do not necessarily have to withstand the shock of being catapulted from carriers. The bombers need missiles to knock down fighters attacking their formation and even anti-missiles to protect themselves.
From the above it can be seen that each of the military' services does have its own peculiarities and does need particular ty'pes of missiles. It is true also that many' of these missiles have components that are common to all missiles. However, let us examine the problem a bit further.
The first question to ask in this examination is “Who provides the Armed Forces with the missiles to meet the requirements stated above?” Certainly the Armed Forces themselves do not manufacture missiles. They rely almost entirely upon the aircraft industry' to provide them with the missiles needed to fulfill their roles. The fleet and area commanders make known their requirements to their respective headquarters, and headquarters in turn rely upon the Government to provide them with the armament needed by the Armed Forces. Each request is handled as a separate item, and in order to keep the prices as competitive as possible, each request is bid for by the aircraft industry. To be qualified to win the bid, the various companies must show that they have the capability of meeting the scientific requirements of the missile and also that they have the ability to produce it once the requirements have been met. To balance the books and to determine the cost of each item, each missile or each piece of armament is handled as a separate item within the Government and within the aircraft industry.
It can be readily seen that in addition to separate bookkeeping, budgeting and awarding of contracts, security regulations will play an important part in:
1. Keeping the project under wraps until it is time to expose it to the public.
2. Preventing it from falling into enemy hands.
3. Limiting all information gathered on the project to personnel who need to know.
4. Items 1, 2, and 3 above completely impede the flow of information between personnel in the company working on other projects and make impossible the flow of information between different aircraft companies even though they are concerned with similar problems.
The above situation can frequently lead to quite costly situations. For example, one aircraft company had at one time five separate and individual groups working under one roof and all studying the effects of the growth of barnacles upon aircraft on the water. One group was working on a contract in production. The second group was working on an experimental contract. The third group was working on an aircraft in the advanced stage of design. The fourth group was working on the support equipment associated with all aircraft in the water, and the fifth group was working in the company’s laboratory. It is highly doubtful if any of the groups knew of the existence of, or consulted with, any of the other groups since each was working under a separate contract, yet all were provided and paid for by the same Government agency.
If the above situation can take place within one company, it is easy to imagine the situations that might arise between various companies working on different but competitive aircraft and missiles. No one can reasonably expect one company to turn around and give away all of its latest advances and designs. Yet almost all of these companies are wholly supported by funds labeled Air Force, Army, or Navy.
One step which would help to clear away the “goat” label frequently attached to the Armed Services whenever the United States is overshadowed in aircraft and missiles, would be to label properly the responsibility as that of the U. S. Government and its people and not that of any one particular service, or to a squabble between the services.
Carry this examination one step further to determine the reason for the statements that the Armed Forces are constantly in competition with each other. It is very true that the Armed Forces as users of the equipment furnished to them by the Government and by the aircraft manufacturers, are in constant competition. They are in competition for speed records, for accuracy of equipment, for reliability of equipment, for low cost, simplicity, maintenance procedures, and the ability to defend this country, either by inflicting wounds upon the enemy or by the prevention of wounds being inflicted upon us. This type of competition is healthy and is needed by this country, for it is in the use of this equipment that new procedures, methods, skills, and tactics are devised. In putting the equipment furnished them to its maximum use, the Armed Forces are also uncovering flaws in peace time that would be most costly in war time. Competition also stimulates thinking, design, and further development of the equipment furnished to the users.
It also can be seen that by the use of equipment in the field, the armament is frequently shown to the public for the first time. Only then are its capabilities unveiled, only then can the manufacturer say “See here, this is what I have produced,” and only then can the competition say, “I can do all that and even more.” This may well be the reason that the terms “Armed Forces Squabbles,” “Armed Forces Competition,” and “Armed Forces Hassle” stick in the minds of the public.
If the individual manufacturer were held entirely responsible for discrepancies in his equipment, or held entirely responsible for being unable to accomplish the almost impossible tasks assigned to him by the users of the equipment, many of the manufacturers would be out of business, or else they would be afraid to take the risk which always arises in the development of new weapons.
Since Armed Forces is an all-encompassing word and since it is almost impossible to fix the blame on any one unit of the force, it is usually easy to blame the “Armed Forces” until this country either regains supremacy in the field in question, or the matter becomes obsolete, obsolescent, or dies the death of time.
Just as the overtripping or overuse of a safety valve in a boiler system can indicate that there is something basically wrong with the boiler itself, so can the overuse of the nation’s safety valve indicate that there is something internally wrong with the major system itself and not with the safety valve. The use of the Armed Forces as a means of letting off steam will be with us forever. However, if the need to use the Armed Forces as a safety valve occurs too frequently, then it will be time to sit down and take stock of our over-all structure.