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The Old Dominion Mariner is one of the Mariner-class, completely postwar in conception and design. With speeds well in excess of 20 knots and deadweight tonnages of 13,000, members of this new fleet of dry cargo ships comprise the fastest and largest cargo-carriers of the world’s merchant marines. The following commentaries discuss some of the problems of the U. S. Merchant Marine.
The U. S. Merchant Marine and Obsolescence
(See pages 62-69, January, 1958 Proceedings)
Captain Robert T. Sutherland, Jr., usn (ret.).—It is unfortunately inevitable that Captain Perry’s article will contribute to readers’ judgment of Maritime Administration performance. For that reason, if no other, inaccuracies in the article should not be left unnoted, nor opinions go unchallenged and permitted to masquerade as facts.
The article states that “when the emphasis was first placed on obsolescence based on age, the shipyards had just about completed the Mariner program and they were hungry for work.” One might assume that shipyards had recently had a hand in setting up the “straw man, Obsolescence.” Not so! Twenty-year obsolescence is not news. Public Law 835, of the 74th Congress, which first established the U. S. Maritime Commission, provided that operating-differential subsidies should be restricted to vessels less than twenty years old unless plainly in the public interest to make exceptions.
The twenty-year figure for obsolescence is, the author insists, “arbitrary.” Correctly, he seems to classify an “arbitrary” decision as unreasoned or arrived at by caprice. But, there is another and a preferred definition of “arbitrary.” It may be used to identify a decision arrived at by the exercise of will or discretion. As taxpayers we may dislike to believe that our Congress was being capricious in establishing the twenty-year figure.
No one has said that the “obsolete” replaced vessel is necessarily useless. The above- mentioned law provided for the purchase of old or inadequate vessels from owners at a reasonable price, the money to be applied as a portion of the cost of the new vessel to be paid by the applicant. If the old ship purchased is of limited commercial or military value, she may be sold under certain conditions, or scrapped. Otherwise, she goes to a reserve fleet.
The author assures us that, as applied, obsolescence “has nothing at all to do with the condition of the vessel, her design, construction, or her ability to do the job in which she is engaged.” Who else, acquainted with the situation, would make such a statement? What supports the bald claim: “Each and every subsidized vessel is, today, undoubtedly a better vessel than it was the day it was delivered to the owner?” Anyone can find for himself the multitude of exceptions to that statement. An expert would be hard put to identify one ship that could illustrate its truth.
We are told of vessels fifty years in age, faithfully going about their business in the Great Lakes and in coastal service. In neither place are those old ships operating against foreign competition. In both locales they enjoy shelter and protection under our laws— if you will, another method of subsidization. Fresh water routes have their advantages from a corrosion point of view; some voyage hazards are reduced or eliminated in such service.
We seem expected to believe that only subsidized vessels are ever replaced by bigger, faster, and better ships. The fact of the matter ls that many unsubsidized operators have built new tankers, ocean-going ore carriers and other types, in the interest of improving profit potential.
It is not necessarily so that “the replacement vessel must seek the same general run of cargo which is being lifted by the vessel 'vhich it replaces, and at the same rates.” Logically, a replacement ship might hope to carry cargoes denied her predecessor because of lack of speed, refrigerated capacity, suitable tankage, proper handling facilities, or the inability to safely meet the physical limitations of a port. Nor is it quite true that the typical American shipper is only interested that “his commodities shall be moved at the least cost to him per ton-mile.” His problems are seldom so simple.
Unnecessary tears are shed for the subsidized ship owner and operator who, over a 20-year period has to pay approximately half of the cost of new ships. He has received a reasonable value for his old ship while insuring that it will not be employed in competition against him. He has a “capital reserve fund,” required by law, in which out of gross earnings while subsidized he has been obliged to annually deposit depreciation charges based on the 20-year expectancy of his old ship, supplemented by insurance proceeds he has received. In addition, the contractor may be able to draw on a “special reserve fund” in which he has been obliged to annually deposit any excess profits he has made. Public Law 835 provided that the contractor had to make a down payment aggregating 25% of the owner’s share of the cost of the vessel, and could secure a 20-year mortgage for the remainder at 3J% interest annually. Now, to encourage public investment in the Merchant Marine, the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 has been amended to provide 100% federal insurance on the mortgage of vessels built under the Act’s subsidy provisions. What other industries can finance capital investments on better terms or at less risk? Why, if conditions are so onerous, do steamship lines seek to maintain a subsidized position, and others try to justify subsidies for themselves? It is not, as the article states, “clearly evident that something—or someone—has got to give if the owner is to stay in business.”
The article lauds the merits of merchant ships in service—and in almost the same breath cautions us against the very government program which fostered their construction and helped to meet their operating expenses. Every thinking taxpayer shares the desire to avoid subsidies and government regulation of private industry whenever practical. But, it is hard to see how any true service is rendered the Merchant Marine, the Navy, or the nation by counseling that our present ships should be run until they fall apart, instead of being replaced by new after reasonable service and put in reserve while still useful. Without a subsidy system and its built-in obsolescence rules we would have neither a going Merchant Marine nor a potentially invaluable reserve of merchant ships.
Mr. If. Hobart Holly, Braintree, Massachusetts.—Without implying disagreement with all the points made in this interesting article, I feel that there are some additional ones which must be considered before such definite conclusions are reached.
1. The accuracy of the statement that twenty years as the useful life of a merchant vessel is an “arbitrary determination” of the Maritime Administration is questioned.
Twenty years as the nominal life of a steel vessel was in use for many years before Maritime came into existence. In matters of insurance, financing, and construction, it has proved to be a useful yardstick. It should not be construed to mean that every vessel actually becomes obsolete at exactly the same age.
2. Captain Perry has discussed technological obsolescence at length. There are also two other kinds which cannot be ignored. One may be called material obsolescence i.e., the wearing out of any article or machine. The second may be called economic obsolescence, which is a combination of the other two.
Material obsolescence starts the day a machine goes into service. Its rate is normally slow at first and increases with age. For a ship, as for any other machine, operation becomes less efficient and maintenance costs rise with age.
Economic obsolescence is the process by which a vessel, or any other machine, becomes submarginal as a commercial unit. In other words, it reaches a point where it can no longer make money, be the reason technological obsolescence, material obsolescence, market conditions, other factors, or a combination thereof.
3. It is a basic economic rule that a worker cannot compete economically with one who is paid less, unless he has the means of more or better production. Due to the wage disparity, the higher paid American crew can offset the operating cost differential only if it can deliver more pay load or command higher rates. It is hard to see how American seamen today could compete in world trade using ships inferior to those of their foreign rivals. Assuming a sound choice of replacement %'essels, it would be a complete reversal of normal American industrial experience if such vessels did not prove to be more competitive than the older vessels they replace.
Of course, the selection of the optimum moment to replace an old productive machine with a new one will always be one of the hardest decisions which any management has to make. This fact, however, does not change the principle involved.
Mr. David J. Barry, Arlington, Va. (Mr. Barry is in charge of the Conversion Design Branch of the Bureau of Ships.)—The author, interested in steamship operation, indicated that perhaps the twenty-year life of merchant ships should be extended so as to allow owners operating certain ships to postpone refinancing problems. This attitude evidently was based on an operator’s review of the financial situation, resulting from the acquisition of new tonnage at the higher figures under which construction is now being replaced in the merchant fleet.
From a national defense point of view, it would appear that obsolescence as applied to merchant ships is one of the most beneficial requirements that can be written into any of the shipping laws of this country. Only by the retirement of older and slower ships from active participation in the Merchant Marine can the Navy hope to keep up its potential auxiliary strength in the event of major emergencies.
In every major war in which this country has been engaged, the merchant ships have constituted a large percentage of the ships which comprised the auxiliary vessels of the fleet.
In World War I, the building programs which were carried out by the Shipping Board are well known. It is remarkable that of the over three billion dollars expended on the building of merchant ships, only about ten per cent of these ships were constructed prior to the end of hostilities in November, 1918. Had it not been for the large tonnage taken over from foreign interests, the American war effort would have been severely crippled.
Most of us are familiar with the role merchant ships played in World War II. Here again, not enough merchant ships were in being at the start of hostilities, and it was not until 1944 that merchant ship replacement and building became effective. It therefore seems obvious to conclude that merchant ships actually in being at the start of hostilities are an invaluable source for conversion to naval auxiliary use.
The total damage that was inflicted upon the merchant fleet by submarines in World War I and World War II was much greater than the damage they received from surface vessels. Yet it is well known that the speeds of underwater craft have been practically doubled in the last twenty years. This fact alone has a terrific impact upon the survival and safety of the merchant ships which will be employed as adjuncts to the naval forces in future wars. It may be anticipated that future submarines will have a minimum speed of twenty knots. The United States Merchant Fleet at the end of 1957 included about 1,600 Liberty-type (EC’s) ships. These ships have a speed of about ten knots and for all practical purposes they should be considered obsolete for national defense use.
Of the cargo merchant ships under effective United States control, only the Mariners (C4- S-la design) have speeds in excess of twenty knots. In the general cargo category, all the others such as the Victorys, the C2’s and the C3’s, have speeds of about sixteen to seventeen knots.
Extreme care should be utilized to differentiate between naval and merchant requirements when the term “obsolescence” is used. For many types of auxiliaries which will be converted from merchant ships, it would seem that a twenty year limit should be the absolute maximum for the life of the merchant ship. It is well recognized that merchant ships of less than twenty knots speed could be used for those auxiliaries which do not require speed as one of their principal characteristics and do not operate with the fleet. However, if the Navy is to have a potential reserve of suitable merchant ships for use in another war, then it is mandatory to replace these slow ships, which are in the Merchant Marine fleet, with new fast ships.
Examining the situation from a replacement point of view, it is not too comforting to observe that the majority of the cargo ships, with the exception of the Mariner-class, that are in the present day Merchant Marine were built in the early 1940’s and are fifteen years of age. Therefore, even if we started on a replacement building program now, most of these ships would be twenty years old before new ships became available for naval auxiliary use.
Aside from the use of the merchant ships as naval auxiliaries, another important facet of national defense was uncovered during World War II. This was that the national economy for approximately 170,000,000 Americans is closely tied up with materials which can be obtained only from overseas. During World War II the maintenance of the civilian economy of the nation was a severe drain on the merchant ships. Unless we have some assurance in the future that merchant ships are fast enough to bring in the supplies which we know will be required, there will be a severe deterioration in the efficiency of our fighting forces.
Although the article differentiated between subsidized and non-subsidized lines, it is obvious that in the event of war this differential will vanish. As in the past, when the chips are down, the Navy will have to rely on the merchant ships that are in being at the outbreak of hostilities to build up their auxiliary fleet. For this reason, the Maritime Administration should be backed to the utmost in its effort to bring new and fast ships into the merchant service. Their crusade to increase the basic speeds of merchant ships should be given every assistance.
Probably the most potent assets to a good ship replacement program are in the contracts which the Maritime Administration is making with the large ship operating companies in the United States. These contracts are based on the requirements and objectives of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and at the present time the enactment of these fleet replacement contracts is practically our only hope of obtaining new fast ships. While unsubsidized lines have played an important part in the American shipping picture, unless these operators themselves come forward with proposals to operate fast cargo ships as tramp steamers, which is sometimes financially impossible, then the only solution to a strong Merchant Navy is the building of ships under these replacement contracts which the Maritime Administration is entering into with the subsidized operators. It is obvious that the ships in the present day merchant fleet are, by and large, obsolete from a practical national point of view.
The“Victoria” and the“Camperdown”
(See pages 53-61, January, 1958 Proceedings)
Mr. Irving Parmeter, Three Mile Bay, New York.—Commander Lipscomb’s article on this catastrophe naturally concluded with the findings of the court martial that exonerated Rear Admiral Markham and Captain Bourke. The Admiralty approved these results, but in the minutes in which the commissioners reviewed the findings of the court they were critical of the part taken by Captain Johnstone, commanding the Camperdown.
Pointing out that Rear Admiral Markham had taken all responsibility for the Camper- doum, their lordships contended that this did not relieve Captain Johnstone from his responsibility as captain of the ship. While appreciating Rear Admiral Markham’s belief that Admiral Tryon intended to circle the second division well might have delayed the former’s preparations for avoiding a collision, the commissioners contended that when the rear admiral ordered preparations for a collision, Captain Johnstone did not carry out the orders “with due rapidity and efficiency.” Although relieving him of blame for not going full speed astern, the commissioners further expressed regret that he did not “manifest the promptitude and decision which the occasion demanded for the security of the ship under his command.”
Mr. Frank Uhlig, Jr., Brooklyn, New York.—Admiral Tryon’s memorandum
made possible a rational, if not particularly convincing, explanation of his insistence on six cables between columns; that is, he expected Rear Admiral Markham to exercise judgment independently in this instance and attain the object of the order by other means when he saw that literal obedience to the detail of the order would bring disaster. This is the only way I can see in which Tryon’s insistence on the six cables can be interpreted with reason.
TRAGIC LOSS OF HMS VICTORIA
Mr. Joseph A. Young, Bristol, England. —Survivors from the crew of the Victoria are shown clinging to the hull of the sinking battleship, with HMS Nile in the background. This disaster illustrated the weakness of centralized control in the Victorian navy, whereby no opportunity was provided for initiative in individual commanders.
The Battle of the Pips
(Sec pages 49-56, February, 1958 Proceedings)
Commander I. L. McNally, usn (ret.).— The possibility of multiple sweep echo returns was recognized before the war by the Naval Research Laboratory and a pulse repetition rate (PRR) control was incorporated in the CXAM radar. When the PRR was changed, multiple sweep echoes could be recognized by their movement in range. A limited number of personnel received training on the CXAM. However, the MK4 fire control radar did not have this control and its operators could not check for multiple sweep returns. The San Francisco was provided with a SG radar and a PRR control and its use was understood by the radarman.
Both the CXAM and MK4 emitted pulses every 610 microseconds which provided an unambiguous range display of 100,000 yards. Although it is not possible to set a maximum range of detection with any degree of certainty, in the particular instance being discussed it was not at all unreasonable for a target at a range of 420,000 yards to have been picked up. All three radars would have displayed the pip at 20,000 yards.
Compass Trouble
(See page 350. March. 1957 Proceedings and page 895, August, 1957 Proceedings)
Commander J. Van der Meer, rnnr (ret.).—This article on useless magnetic compasses reminds me of the case when both compasses on my ship, the Kola Gede, of the Royal Rotterdam Lloyd, were disturbed. In the afternoon of May 28, 1940, we left Boston Harbor for New York, by the Cape Cod Canal and Long Island Sound. The’ ship had no gyrocompass, but a first class magnetic, dry card standard compass, and special care had been given to its situation on the navigating bridge. The steering compass also was a very good instrument. When we proceeded through Buzzards Bay, our pilot drew my attention to the fact that lightbuoys were sighted on wrong bearings. He asked me whether there could be something the matter with our compasses. There was. When we were out of Buzzards Bay, and after the pilot had left us, I headed the ship for the ocean as soon as this could be done.
It was not difficult to explain this unexpected misbehavior of our compasses, when I remembered our berth in Boston Harbor. Instead of being at the usual place, Army Base, the ship had been for nearly two days at a berth where scrap iron was shipped by means of huge loading electromagnets. Although not in use, two of those magnets stood on the dock, close to the ship, while a number of steel railroad freight cars, fully loaded with scrap iron, were standing on the tracks, at a distance of less than thirty yards. Probably temporarily, the ship’s magnetism had suffered more or less serious interference.
As soon as possible we checked deviations.
On the middle watch we were far enough in the offing, but because of an overcast sky and limited visibility, bearings of stars or of shore- lights could not be taken. Nevertheless I was able to find what had happened to the ship’s magnetism because there was a magnetic deflector available. In less than an hour coefficients B, C, and D for the standard compass had been determined. B had altered 6 degrees and its sign reversed, C and D had also altered, though much less. With the new coefficients, new deviation tables for both compasses were soon computed, and in due time, without further trouble, we arrived at Bush Terminal, New York, N. Y. During our stay of about three weeks, the ship kept the same berth, in magnetic direction 135°. By regularly checking the directive force on the standard compass by means of the magnetic deflector, it was found that gradually the ship regained its normal magnetism, and when we were ready to sail, recompensation of the compasses was not considered necessary.
The magnetic deflector is an instrument for measuring the directive force acting on the compass needles, in order to correct the compass, when bearings of the sun, stars, or landmarks cannot be obtained. It can also be used, as we had done, to determine the compass coefficients B, C, and D, when this cannot be done otherwise, provided the coefficients A and E are to be considered negligible.
Although the magnetic deflector has reached a respectable age, it seems to remain an unknown, unused instrument. To my knowledge, only the official compass-adjusters at the port of Rotterdam, though not regularly, use it. Compensating a compass with aid of the deflector has the advantage that it can be performed at sea without aid of towboats, without much delay, at all hours, and even when visibility is zero. A description of this useful instrument is given in the British Admiralty Manual for the Deviation of the Compass, and its use is extensively described in Dutch books on navigation.
The instrument on my ship was furnished at my request and I have been able to use it several times satisfactorily since 1939, including war service. A magnetic compass and an accurate deviation table remain essential parts of the equipment of a ship with a gyrocompass, and the deflector still has its use.
Should the “Proceedings” Publish Fiction and Poetry?
Rear Admiral Colby G. Rucker, usn (ret.)-—When I was a boy, many periodicals flew their sentiments at the masthead, at the top of the first page with the name of the paper and the date. Underneath appeared a brief statement of its principles. The one periodical which still maintains the masthead in traditional fashion is the Naval Institute Proceedings.
Founded over eighty years ago, the Naval Institute has published its magazine ever since, and in every issue there appears a statement of its basic policy: “For the advancement of professional, literary, and scientific knowledge in the Navy”; a quotation from the constitutional objectives of the Institute itself. Those “sentiments” have flown from the magazine’s masthead from the day of its first appearance right up to the present moment.
The professional and scientific fields have been covered in noteworthy manner during the ensuing decades, but from my observations I would say that the Naval Institute Proceedings has not knowingly published a single literary article during all its existence.
Now when someone makes a statement like that, he ought to stand up and be counted. I am ready to do so. I can make my point clearer by telling about a ship I once commanded, the Raven, the first high-speed minesweeper built by the Navy. She was the first ship designed from the drawing board as such. She could do other things besides sweeping mines; escort as well as any DE and, due to her having built-in mine tracks, lay fifty to sixty mines. She was a triplethreat ship, with functions of minesweeping, minelaying, and antisubmarine escort.
But the way the War went, she was never called upon to perform more than two of her three designed functions. While she did so much escorting and minesweeping as to all but drive her people mad, she never did one day’s minelaying, even as a test. The Naval Institute Proceedings is like that. It has stressed professional and scientific, and entirely omitted literary articles.
When the Naval Institute was founded, such professional and technological subjects as sail versus steam, gunnery, and torpedoes were of primary interest and concern. But in both cases the end result was the same. By the time the War had reached the point where the Raven might have been used as a minelayer, no one even remembered that she could lay mines. And so also the Naval Institute Proceedings, by the time it had developed to the point where it could accept “literature,” no Board of Control would consider a piece of writing which was not factual.
When I was an instructor in the English Department at the Naval Academy I was always told to define my terms. In this particular case, what do you mean when you say literary? I quote from Funk and Wagnall’s Standard Dictionary. The definition is:
Literature: The written or printed productions of the human mind collectively, especially such productions as are marked by elevation, vigor and catholicity of thought, by fitness, by purity and grace of style, and by artistic construction. Literature, in its narrowest and strictest sense, belongs to the sphere of high art, and embodies thought that is power giving, or inspiring and elevating, rather than merely knowledge giving (excluding thus all purely scientific writings); catholic, or of interest to man as man (excluding writings that are merely technical, or for a class, trade profession or the like only); esthetic in its tone and style (excluding all writings violating the principles of correct taste); and shaped by the creative imagination or power of artistic construction (excluding all writings that are shapeless and without essential and organic unity).
This definition shows not only what literature is, but also what it is not. What has been published in the Proceedings throughout the years falls into the “is not” class.
If professional and scientific writings are literature (which they are not by the dictionary), then why add the word literature? To do so would be redundant. No, I can only conceive that the founders meant what they said. But from the first copy to the latest, not one bit of creative writing has appeared in the Proceedings. Never a scrap of poetry, never fiction if honestly labeled as such. I challenge the present Board of Control or any member of the Naval Institute to show that it has not been from the beginning the policy of the Board of Control to reject all poetry and fiction, even though the subject was closely related to the sea. Bluntly, would the policy of the Proceedings today permit the Board of Control to accept a poem of the sea written by, say, Carl Sandburg?
The policy of the Board does not absolutely bar fiction and poetry. Examples of each have from time to time appeared in the pages of the Proceedings. But the fiction usually appears under some such title as “Anecdote of Dewey at Manila Bay,” and the poetry, ‘A stirring poem recited by Sampson at Santiago de Cuba.”
I am not critical of the Proceedings. I have earnestly supported it ever since graduation, and would have supported it before that if I had known of its existence. It has consistently published telling articles. It has been widely copied, and justly so. As of today, tt is a publication of the first order. But it is the way of man to want to improve on perfection, and for thirty-odd years I have wished that some of the wonderful timely fiction ■written by naval officers might have appeared m our publication rather than in those niagazines known as “the slicks.”
What constructive solution can I propose to remedy the situation? I cannot think of a periodical in the country which has so unfailingly pursued an honest, open, and fair editorial policy. The Proceedings has been subjected to terrific pressures in the past, but has never retreated an inch, even though this stand threatened punishment of its officers and possible dissolution of the organization. The Proceedings has received letters along the lines of “You won’t dare print this,” but the replies have even gone so far as to say, ‘"State your side of the case and we will not only publish it but pay you for it.” They have done so more than once. The Proceedings is an honest and honorable publication.
That being the case, we come down to the Word literature in the masthead. As I see it, the Proceedings has two choices; to eliminate the word literature from the masthead to conform with present and past policy, or to change the policy of the Board to admit, from time to time, a little creative writing. I hope that the second choice will be the ultimate decision.
German Consternation Compounded
(See page 73 and pages 154-155,
February, 1958 Proceedings)
Captain G. Villiers, rn (ret.).—Captain Rood observes that the German response to the Dreadnought was delayed by more than twelve months by the consternation of German naval designers. The consternation of these German naval designers was as nothing compared to that of Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and his colleagues. They realized that any decision to build a German Dreadnought would entail the widening and deepening of the Kiel Canal at colossal expense and would also inform the British Admiralty of the earliest date by which Germany could be ready for a trial of strength at sea. It seemed obvious at this time that Germany would not risk a naval war unless she had use of her bolt-hole for interior communications between the North Sea and the Baltic.
British Naval Intelligence soon knew that June, 1914, was the earliest date for completion of the Canal enlargement. By this date Britain’s fleets were concentrated in home waters. In July the international celebrations at Kiel honored the completion of the Canal, and a few weeks later the great powers embarked upon war.
Should There Be a Government Home for Healthy Retireds?
Rear Admiral E. R. Durgin, usn (ret.). ■—I propose that the Navy go into the business of running an old man’s home for retired widowed and bachelor naval officers in reasonably good health. Retired officers all have pension checks which in most cases would be more than ample for paying their room, board, and upkeep of the home. If the government could not see fit to donate the initial cost of setting up this facility, it might pay the initial cost and then amortize it over a period of years.
Such a home for nostalgic reasons should be near the water and preferably in the general vicinity of a naval hospital. May we have a show of readers’ hands to see how much support there may be for this suggestion?
Last Active American Square-Rigger
(See page 95, April, 1958 Proceedings)
Mr. L. W. Lewis, Hendersonville, N.C. -—In the caption at the bottom of subject page there is reference to the ship Benjamin Packard as “the last square-rigged American merchant ship” and that she “ended her days by being towed to sea and sunk some two decades ago.”
In 1932, while on a lighthouse tending trip, the Panama Canal salvage vessel Favorite, while off Jicarita Island, received orders by radio to proceed toward Cocos Island to give a tow to the Tusitala which had been becalmed there for two weeks. She was on her last commercial voyage, bound for New York with a cargo of Hawaiian sugar. These two snapshots were taken as we rounded her to get a line aboard.
It was my understanding at the time that the Tusitala was the last square-rigger under the American flag operating in commercial service. I further believe she was operated by a Mr. Farrell of the U. S. Steel Corporation, and that the cost of her operation exceeding her revenues, together with the pinch of the depression, forced her retirement from commercial business. She was turned over to the State of New York for use as a training vessel.
Mr. Edouard A. Stackpole, Curator, Marine Historical Association, Inc., Mystic, Conn.—The Benjamin Packard was the last wooden square-rigger of original American registry to round Cape Horn on a merchant voyage, having taken a cargo of lumber from Seattle to New York in 1925. She was built at Bath, Maine, in 1883. After her final voyage she became a museum ship at Rye Beach, and in 1939 was towed out to sea and sunk.
The Tusitala was an iron square-rigger, built in Greenock, Scotland, also in 1883. Her early names were Sierra Lucena, Inveruglas, and Sophie. She became the Tusitala in 1923, having been rescued from oblivion by James A. Farrell of the Farrell Lines.
French Moving Bridges
(See page 97, January, 1958 Proceedings)
Mr. Russell Brooks, St. Petersburg, Florida.—The bridge to which Captain Meyer referred was a pont transbordeur or moving bridge, in use or formerly in use in Nantes and Rouen as well as Marseilles. In the latter port it served to transport light traffic from one side of the narrow entrance of the Vieux Port (Old Port) to the other. The Vieux Port is used by small craft only and has no value to ocean-going ships.
From a runway, a fragment of which is shown in the illustration accompanying Captain Meyer’s comment, a movable platform was suspended and supported by cables and capable of transporting limited weights. This platform was always at street level, three or four feet above the water, and made the crossing, moved by electric power, within two minutes. Pont transbordeurs are now almost extinct in France.
That Band of Brothers
Mrs. Margaret M. Zogbaum, Venice, Italy.—After the Battle of Aboukir Bay, a night action which the British had to fight without lights, signals or orders, Nelson was asked how he could achieve such a victory without all these. His famous reply was that they were all “a band of brothers.” This beautiful epithet still applies to all those bound in the great alliance of service on the seas. It applies not only to officers and men but to those dependent on them. It is an example of Christian spirit, of “do as you would be done by” that we should all follow.
There was a case illustrating this. The widow of a retired admiral was living in a foreign port. A division of the Sixth Fleet came into that port. She was thrilled to see the ships and the Stars and Stripes flying, but she thought, why should she bother them with making herself known—as neither the admiral nor his flag-captain were her personal acquaintances—she who’d been on board so many ships—and take up their limited time while in port? Then she received a letter saying she needed a certain power of attorney to draw her husband’s veterans’ pay, and she must “get her lawyer” to arrange this for her. But she had no lawyer, was not near an embassy and was at a loss. Finally, remembering that the Navy had legal officers, she timidly wrote the admiral of the flagship in port a note, asking it she might consult the fleet’s legal officer, if he had one aboard, and ended with apologies. She expected at best, a telephone message giving consent.
Next morning when she was expecting delivery of a package, her landlady came to tell her there was un signor to see her. She ran out rather dishevelled and—completely nonplussed—ran into the Admiral in uniform! He had come to tell her the legal officer was away that day, but would be back within twelve hours and would come over to see her at once. The Admiral stayed for a pleasant and comforting talk. He had not known her husband personally but knew all about him —admired him. Then she was taken with open arms into the family of the sea, boats were sent to take her to the ship, and she was included in the parties still to be given. As for the legal business, it was settled satisfactorily and without any fees to the Navy.
There must be countless instances of this kind where men of the service go out of their way and “beyond the call of duty”—as the phrase is for the bestowal of the highest honor for valor—are helpful, kind, and chivalrous to everyone within that “band of brothers.”
The Naval Scientist the Russians Wanted
Lieutenant Commander James Baylor Blackford, usnr.—On July 27, 1861, from St. Petersburg, Grand Duke Constantine, Grand Admiral of Russia, addressed a letter to Captain Matthew Fontaine Maury, recently resigned from the U. S. Navy where he had spent twenty years in charge of the U. S. Navy’s Depot of Charts and Instruments. The letter was delivered under a flag of truce to Richmond, capital of the Confederacy, where Captain Maury was chafing because the Confederate Navy had used him so little. He had fathered the sciences of oceanography and meteorology and his Sailing Directions, compiled from a study of thousands of ships’ logs and printed in many languages, had revolutionized ocean travel by taking advantage of the winds and currents of the sea. Decorated by most of the governments of the civilized world, he had been instrumental in organizing an international meteorological conference at Brussels in 1853.
The Grand Admiral, after paying compliments to Maury’s “Indefatigable researches” in oceanography, went on to say:
“That your name is well-known in Russia I need scarcely add, and though ‘barbarians,’ as we are still sometimes called, we have been taught to honour in your person disinterested and eminent services to science and mankind. Sincerely deploring the inactivity into which the present political whirlpool in your country has plunged you, I deem myself called upon to invite you to take up your residence in this country, where you may in peace continue your favorite and useful occupations.”
However, Maury would not leave the Confederacy and Russian hopes that he would “cast anchor” in their “remote corner of the Baltic” were unrealized.
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