Professional Notes

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Joint Chiefs of Staff in Operation

By Admiral Arleigh A. Burke,

U. S. Navy[1]

| he Joint Chiefs of Staff are the men upon nich our government depends for military .v*ce. If their advice is good, our country ^W’h be able to survive and prosper. If the ^m>litary advice they give is bad—and it need be bad only once on an important matter our country may find itself in a ^Very precarious condition.

1 he Joint Chiefs of Staff system has forked successfully in time of emergency. It ¹⁸ important to the future of our Republic lhat we understand how the Joint Chiefs of ^taff operate and why our system is effective.

So much has been said and written re­cently about the Joint Chiefs of Staff that 't seems appropriate for someone who is ^actually a member of that organization to tell how it operates.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have sometimes been referred to as command-by-committee, ^So it may surprise some to know that they ho not command anything. The Joint Chiefs °f Staff, as a group, have no command author- dy. They are—by law—the principal mili­^tary advisers to the President of the United States, to the National Security Council, ^and to the Secretary of Defense. Over-all command authority is vested in the Presi­dent himself, who is designated by the Con­stitution as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. This is the essence of the American concept of civilian control - over­all command of the Armed Forces is vested in the politically responsible civilian head of the government.

The Secretary of Defense is appointed by the President and serves as his principal assistant in all matters relating to the De­partment of Defense. The Secretary of Defense is also a member of the National Security Council. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are principal military advisers to both—the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense.

Each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the exception of the Chairman, is the uniformed chief of his respective service. As such, he is directly responsible for the military operations and military readiness of his service. This dual role has proved by actual war experience to be a major source of strength of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff system. It is the means by which the Joint Chiefs of Staff are able to utilize all the military talent available to the nation— the combat experience—the staff support— and the operational capabilities—of the Services they represent, in the preparation of military plans and recommendations.

Each military chief of service is necessarily in constant touch with the day-to-day opera­tions of his own service as well as with day- to-day changes in the international situation. This information flows to him continuously— all day, every day, and occasionally through­out a good part of the night.

This flow of vital, detailed military in-

I

formation, which is the product of tremen­dous staff efforts, worldwide, on the part of each individual service, is indispensable to the Service Chiefs in the discharge of their Service responsibilities. It is also one of the reasons the Service Chiefs function effec­tively as members of the Toint Chiefs of Staff.

Another source of strength of our Joint Chiefs of Staff system is that the Service Chiefs are-the best authorities on the operat­ing capabilities of their individual Services. This insures that their advice is based on complete knowledge of the capabilities of the forces which would have to do the fighting. It insures that plans prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are workable plans, which can be executed successfully by the Services they represent.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff system is similar to the National Security Council organiza­tion in many respects. Neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the National Security Council controls, commands, or operates. Every individual member of the National Security Council is a responsible operating head of an important government agency. Each is in constant touch with reality. Each has access to complete, up-to-date informa­tion in his own particular area of government operations. Each bears some responsibility for the success of operations which results from National Security Council recommen­dations.The same is true of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have direct access to all the combat experience available in their service staffs to assist them in preparation of plans. Actual combat experi­ence, together with responsibility for future operations, are among the very few solid pillars upon which practical war planning for the future can be based.

With the latest day-to-day information at their immediate disposal, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are always in the best position to handle emergency problems quickly and directly when necessary. However, most problems submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff have already been thoroughly analyzed and discussed by the individual services and by lower-echelon joint committees. In most cases an agreed solution has already been developed. Differences of opinion on specific problems are actually few. In the great majority of cases they disappear entirely under the light of careful analysis.

On the other hand, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not easily convinced. Points have to be proved step by step- Valid evidence has to be presented or no­body is convinced. Agreement is not reached in the Joint Chiefs" of Staff merely for the sake of ending the discussion or avoiding controversy, nor are opinions held doggedly by an individual member just because his service presented them. Each member insists on examining all points—all views— so that the best possible decision can be reached on each problem.

Most of the very few differences of opinion among the Joint Chiefs of Staff concern the future—for which nobody can be sure he has the right answer.

The future in influenced by many im­ponderables, most of which are beyond the control of any individual, or even a single nation. The unforeseen emergence or eclipse of a single individual, for example, can bring about a complete upset of previous calcula­tions. Invention of a new technique, an unanticipated technological breakthrough, or a failure of a weapon to perform as expected, also create major upsets in future programs and plans.

The prudent thing to do when developing plans and programs is to maintain as much freedom of action as possible, making rigid commitments in advance only when they are desirable. Oftentimes the crux of the problem is determining just when a commitment is desirable and how far a commitment should go-

For example, many imponderables enter into a major weapon development program. If the weapon is still on the drawing board nobody can tell for certain how it will per­form, how it should best be used, or who is best qualified to control it. These are ques­tions which can only be answered by actual experience with the completed weapon.

The final test of a weapon is the test of combat. Actual performance in combat has never been an easy thing to predict. It would, therefore, be unwise in many cases to make advance commitments that could not be

quickly and gracefully discarded if later

experience showed it to be the best thing to do.

Differences of opinion, of course, make news, whether the differences occur in a Political campaign, in Congressional debate, in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, ' erences of opinion in government are the Principal means by which the people become ^acquainted with the major issues in matters ^which affect their future. Knowledge of the Existence of differences of opinion provides ussurance that opposing points of view can ^e beard and that differences of opinion are tolerated. When differences of opinion are discussed, the people know what is going on. ‘ government runs too smoothly, too quietly, and no differences of opinion become ^aPparent, free people would have reason to be upprehensive.

Because of the obvious necessity for security in most of the matters handled by |be Joint Chiefs of Staff, matters such as uture war plans and the technical perform­ance of weapons, it is not usually in the best mterests of the United States to air some ^maJor issues. However, even in these highly classified matters, which necessarily must be discussed behind closed doors, the presenta- b°n of important differences of opinion to fhe responsible civil heads of the government is the best way to acquaint them with the !ssues involved and the alternatives avail­able. It is impossible to examine all possible facets of a problem if you don’t know the major differences of opinion.

If complete agreement characterized all recommendations coming from the uni­formed services, the President and the Con­gress, as well as the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense, would have difficulty knowing what was actually going on inside the uniformed services. The result would be that the effectiveness of civilian control would be impaired.

The point is simply this. If the responsible government officials know the issues and the alternatives available before making deci­sions in important military matters, you have effective civilian control. If knowledge of the alternatives, as well as the main issues, is not regularly available to them, you do not have effective civilian control.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff system is, of course, not perfect. The Joint Chiefs some­times find themselves working on problems which could very well be handled by sub­ordinates. Occasionally they get involved in matters which contribute little to meeting their responsibilities as principal military advisers. But the faults of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are little faults, faults which can be, and are being corrected by responsible men of good will, working together toward a common goal.

To offset its minor deficiencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff system has major strengths.

It is an American system. It is as American in concept as the Congress, the Supreme Court, the National Security Council, and other American institutions. It has built-in checks against the excesses of any single individual, any single concept, or any single interest.

No member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is powerful enough to short-circuit the pains­taking debate and analysis which provides the only basis for sound, practical military recommendations. No member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is powerful enough to run roughshod over his colleagues in pursuit of some program or concept which cannot with­stand close scrutiny. As an additional safe­guard, every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is free to go to the President or the Secretary of Defense and present his views, anytime he considers it desirable.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff system enables the responsible, operating heads of the military services to present their views. It insures that all practical courses of action are carefully considered. It insures that Service responsibilities and capabilities are considered. It insures that military plans and programs are consistent with the ability of the combat forces to carry them out, because the people who prepare the plans and programs share responsibility for carrying them out.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff system is a safe­guard—a safeguard against hasty, arbitrary decisions which could commit our sons, our resources, and our country to some future defeat. It is the best safeguard known against the always-present danger of the fatal strategic blunder.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff system is unique among all known systems for the strategic direction of a war. It has brought victory where other systems have failed. It has withstood the all-important test of war.

Armed Services Legislative Preview of the 85th Congress

By J. R. Blandford[2]

An attempt to forecast possible legislative accomplishments in the 85th Congress must at best be speculative.

There are many unsolved problems re­maining in the Armed Services and many will receive the attention of this Congress.f

The report of the Cordiner Committee, dealing with pay and other related matters, will certainly receive the greatest amount of publicity from a Service viewpoint. What final action will be taken in connection with the report cannot now be predicted. Un­doubtedly a very substantial effort will be made by the Department of Defense to increase the attractiveness of a Service career.

Likewise, another effort can be anticipated to permit persons to occupy substandard quarters on a rental basis without loss of basic allowance for quarters. If further action is taken, the House Armed Services Committee may again require these sub­standard quarters to be improved or de­molished over a two-year period.

The Dual Compensation Act and the Dual Employment Statute may in all prob­ability be considered and corrective legisla­tion recommended.

The Navy and Marine Corps face a serious officer hump problem in their 1942 through 1945 classes. Studies are now being completed with the view toward recommend­ing legislation which would reduce the hump, on a temporary basis, but in a manner which would be as equitable as possible under the circumstances. The alternative is almost unacceptable forced attrition.

Some legislative action may be required in connection with the Doctors Draft Law which expires on July 1, 1957. Legislation may be required with regard to the potential induction of physicians and dentists deferred to complete medical or dental school, or to complete intern and residency training.

A bill authorizing the loan of naval vessels to friendly foreign nations undoubtedly will be considered by the Committee on Armed Services, together with a substantial public works bill which may well equal in magnitude those of previous years.

An effort can be anticipated to grant to enlisted personnel the right to count all service creditable for pay purposes in computing retired pay after otherwise quali­fying for retirement in the same manner as is now applicable to officers.

It is also possible that Committee action will be taken with regard to amending the Armed Services Procurement Act with a view toward eliminating the broad negotiat­ing power now contained in that Act, based upon a presidential emergency which was declared in 1950. The objective of such amendatory legislation would be two-fold— to increase emphasis on competitive bidding, and to require the use of specific statutory exceptions rather than the general exception for negotiated procurement.

The Department of Defense can also be expected to emphasize legislation which would provide increased opportunities for nurses and medical specialists of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Some action is possible with regard to compensatory leave with regard to Service personnel serving in isolated locations out­side the continental United States.

And finally, it is likely that amendments to the Uniform Code of Military Justice may be considered.

As usual, there will be numerous bills dealing with a relatively smaller number of people and more minor problems, but they are nevertheless important to the individuals and problems involved. As in every Congress, many of these bills will undoubtedly be con­sidered and enacted.

It appears that the Armed Services Com­mittees of the House and Senate will again be faced with a very heavy legislative work­load.

Anyone for Military Sports?

By Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Laughlin, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve[3]

Particularly since World War II we seem to have been stuck with the Duke of Well- ^lr>gton’s fatuous dictum that “Waterloo was "'on on the playing fields of Eton.” How many old Etonians stood in the British squares at Quatre Bras I don’t know- but since his Lordship habitually referred to his soldiers as “the scum of the earth,” the suggestion that victory over Napoleon Bonaparte rested on British public school rugby- -or any other athletic procedures—-is °Pen to considerable debate.

But we’ve gone for this bit of imperial folk-lore, hook, line, and sinker. Organized athletics, we are told, as applied to the troops, develop leadership, teamwork, aggressiveness, initiative, and physical stamina.

There’s very little question about this when you’re talking about the nine men on the baseball team who are actually playing t amp Lejeune vs. Cherry Point. In its search for platoon leaders in World War II, the -Marine Corps found that college athletes had exactly the qualities that were especially suitable for leading forty men across an early morning line of departure, to say nothing of the training period that preceded this act of faith. But what of the—out of a company of 180 men—171 who sit on the sidelines and cheer—as long as your MPs can keep them in the bleachers? What are they learning about leadership, teamwork, ag­gressiveness, initiative, and physical stamina?

These questions are asked with full appreciation of the try-outs, the play-offs, the championship ratings the nine stalwarts from Lejeune and the nine from Cherry Point represent. They’re the subtle distilla­tion resulting from a long process of elimina­tion which pits the best against the best—- the which, since Darwin, has been the way of the world.

But let’s get back to the 171 out of 180—- and what military benefit they’re deriving from the privilege of watching their cham­pions beat their brains out for the glory of Baker Company. To be concise about the problem—and reverting to our Britannic mood—not a single bloody thing.

More important than this consideration is another. American youth answers a call to the colors for a period that is now more or less stabilized at two years. Hence in twenty-four months the regular establishment must transform a reluctant individual drawn from a society enjoying the highest level of mate­rial prosperity in human history into a flat- bellied fighting man competent to stand off the one-razor-to-a-platoon, rice-eating, no- hot-meals-in-the-front-line enemy who never heard of “thirty-love,” or a “perfect” world series. He has no acquaintance with Roy Campanella—or even Grand Old Opry— but he can hike thirty miles and deliver an attack when he gets there. Somehow this seems to have something more to do with the successful application of force on the bodies of other men than the cry of “All out for organized athletics!”

And there’s our point. Can we afford the time we require our conscripts to devote to “football, swimming in a tank?” Consider. We have the young man for twenty-four months. He spends ten to twelve weeks in recruit training. After that he has leave. Then he gets sick. After that he’s in transit to his new station. When he arrives someone immediately has to take note of how long he’ll be available—and when his processing for discharge has to begin.

How many hours does he spend on gun watches? How many hours walking a post? How many hours on the range? How many hours sleeping in the rain? Riding a landing boat? Going hungry—but learning to func­tion even so?

The answer, of course, is that he spends too much of his time in administrative standing by to stand by—and too little in the intricacies of the profession he’s supposed to be learning. Why else do we have conscrip­tion?

This brings us back to athletics. We have a boy for twenty-four months, during which period we’re supposed to turn him into a fighting man who can take care of himself and the nation. With half of every training day devoted to organized athletics, what happens?

In Pork Chop Hill, military analyst

S.  L. A. Marshall tells some of the things that happen. In a combat situation, with soldiers of the greatest nation on earth face to face with the slaves of Communism, we have this. “Private Augustus T. Youngls BAR wouldn’t work; he didn’t know why. Corporal Terrill G. Parker’s BAR wouldn’t fire; the magazine was dirty. Private Richard L. Crookston’s BAR wouldn’t fire; he thought it was because the ammunition was too dirty.”

Does this sound like men who knew their weapons, knew their own roles in battle— knew how to stay alive? No, they don’t. And it’s barely possible that a little more em­phasis—in terms of time—on the absolute need for weapons to function when you need to have them function might have resulted in success for these soldiers—and greater security for their country.

In view of the limited time available for training, it’s equally possible that emphasis on military skills, rather than on those that derive from the play-yards of P.S. 79, in Greenpoint, might have some virtue.

We have the young man for only a short time. Why not jerk him completely away from Greenpoint—and the Bums? Instead of organized athletics in which the colonel’s will to win frequently gets to be collegiate in its intensity, why not military sports—which develop military skills and survival possibil­ities? Why not truck-driving contests, bayonet contests, knife fighting contests, horsemanship, canoe handling contests—arts that relate a man to the world in which he lives—and which might be useful to him as a fighting man? The Indian Moguls called such competitions gymkhanas, and they had a long military tradition based on the simple concept of the survival of their community. So with the fighting men of Europe’s Middle Ages—and their jousting.

If you want to indoctrinate the boy in the short time you have available, why not teach him techniques that might help him cross a river, win a bare-hands fight against an armed man, or make his way across country after an escape from a POW camp? We’ve read about baseball pitchers and cricket bowlers who threw grenades with “deadly accuracy.” But how many of us are pitchers or cricket bowlers? Astonishingly few, when you think about it. In any case, under cur­rent practices a good pitcher will be hurling for Opa Locka rather than risking his pre­cious arm tossing grenades. Hence, we need a training program that makes a virtue and a contest out of grenade throwing—and suit­ably rewards proficiency.

Purely military sports can develop the same qualities of leadership, teamwork, aggressiveness, initiative, and physical stamina that are attributed to participation in organized athletics—and to much more purpose. Would a tank captain who maneu­vered his tank to place the winning shot in a national festival of military skills feel any less proud than a baseball captain whose team won the East Coast softball champion­ship? I doubt it. Winning is winning—and the one accomplishment might stand a lot of people in good stead when Russian tanks come roaring across the plains of Westphalia •—as they will one of these days. The other would rapidly become a lost art in the slave camps of Siberia.

The playing fields of Eton, forsooth. My lord Duke, when he was leading the “scum of the earth” through Portugal and Spain took little notice of their excellence at cricket. He had more in common with Field Marshal Earl Wavell who on one occasion observed that “the combat infantryman should combine the arts of a successful poacher, a cat-burglar and a gunman.”

These were fighting men—not croquet champions. The one aggregation drove Napoleon’s best out of Spain. The Field Marshal did a lot to terminate the “thousand year Reich.” But whom did Private Augustus

T.  Young impress?

We might ponder the difference.

Superliner “United States”

100th Round Trip

Marine Journal, December, 1956.—Upon her arrival in New York last December 13 the superliner United States, the world’s fastest ship, completed her 100th voyage to and from the European ports of Le Havre and Southampton, and including Bremer- !aven in the winter months. This record has °^een compiled in less than four and one-half y^ears since the First Lady of the Seas’ record-breaking maiden voyage beginning Jnly 3, 1952.

A popular ship from the very beginning, the United States has carried 312,878 Passengers during the four and one-half year Period which is 95% of her total capacity, ohe has averaged 3,128 passengers for each round trip and her passenger lists have read !ke a veritable “Who’s Who” in every field

endeavor, including royalty, churchmen, diplomats from every corner of the earth, ^senators, congressmen, governors and mayors, scientists, stage and screen celebrities, business leaders, etc. The 70,104 Passengers she carried in 1955 was the largest number carried by any luxury liner during that year.

In winning the coveted Blue Ribbon de­noting speed supremacy on the North Atlantic, the United Stales sailed past Ambrose Lightship, July 3,1952, and in three days, ten hours and forty minutes arrived off Hishops Rock on the coast of England. This was an average speed of 35.5 knots. On her return crossing to New York she set the new westbound record of 3 days 12 hours, and 12 minutes and was the first American flag vessel to break the record in almost one hundred years.

During her two hundred trips across the Atlantic, the First Lady of the Seas has traveled 637,824 nautical miles between lightships, a distance equivalent to approxi­mately 25J times around the world, at an average speed of 30.64 knots.

A total of 2,815 pets of passengers have traveled in the superliner’s air-conditioned kennels. Of these 2,542 were dogs, 271 cats, one monkey, and one hamster. There were 5,384 automobiles and 11,480,000 sacks of mail carried to and from Europe.

During her four and one-half years of service the vessel’s engines have never been stopped or slowed down at sea because of machinery derangement, a tribute to the excellence of American shipbuilding tech­nique.

Comment on “The Maneuvering Board and Great Circle Sailing”

By Lieutenant Commander William V. Kielhorn, USCGR[4]

I was interested in the graphic solution of the great circle sailing problem as shown by Ensign John M. Cogan, uscg, in the January, 1957 Proceedings. It is indeed an interesting approach, and cleverly worked out, but I must disagree with his statement about its uniqueness and simplicity.

The United States Coast Guard has a publication entitled, Stereographic Projec­tions for the Identification of Stars and the Approximate Solution of the Astronomical Triangle, by Captain L. V. Kielhorn, USCG, lasted printed by the GPO sometime prior to World War II. I should like to illustrate whereby these stereographic pro­jections are even simpler and quicker to use than Ensign Cogan’s method, and although they suffer slightly more in accuracy because of their smaller size, still the results are quite sufficient to provide all that is necessary in ordinary marine navigation.

I shall take two examples; the first iden­tical with Mr. Cogan’s first example, and the second one of my own which shows the problem where the equator is crossed. One of the limitations of the stereographic pro­jection is that the great circle is limited in extent to 5,400 nautical miles. Composite sailing may be used for greater distances

Provided neither of the great circle legs by itself exceeds this distance.

'• Lat. Dep. 48°-S0'N Long. Dep. 6°-27'W Lat. Dest. 25°-30'N Long. Dest. 77°-00'W Required: The great circle initial course-and distance.

Solution: Select the projection nearest the de­parture latitude (48°), calculate the difference of ongitude (70°-33') and convert to time (4^h42^m). mce your destination is west, draw your line "est of your meridian through this angle to the atitude of the destination (255°).

Measuring on the altitude scale of the pro­ven we find this line to have a value of 90°- ⁼58°-45'. Multiplying this by 60 we get a great circle distance of 3,525 miles. The initial great circle course by inspection (the extension of

i.                     ne AB) is shown to be 275° T. The entire solu­tion has been found from a single line and has aXen at most a minute or two to accomplish.

²- Lat. Dep.°50°N Long. Dep. 15°E°

Lat. Dest. 10°S                   Long. Dest. 55°W

Difference of Longitude = 55°+15° =70° to

westward = 4^h40^m westward

Distance (AB) = 90°—4°30' = 85°-30'

= 5130 miles

Initial course = 248°T

You cross equator at a point 4^h10^m (62°—30') "est of the departure position, or in longitude

47^o-30'W.

I believe that the above illustrates the extreme simplicity of this method—even as compared with Mr. Cogan’s construction. 4 here are further advantages of the stereo­graphic projection worth mentioning here:

L Azimuths of any celestial body can be cal­culated very quickly to an accuracy com­mensurate with good compass work, or for plotting lines of position. The altitude of the body is shown at the same time as the azimuth.

2.       Identification of stars is very simple—not even requiring the use of time in most in­stances.

3.       The astronomical triangle is visualized to the extent that the “day’s work” in celestial navigation may be most intelligently planned.

In short, I believe that these projections should be “re-discovered” for the navigator. To be sure, Ensign Cogan might not have been tempted to provide us with his nice solu­tion using the maneuvering board had he the Projections to go by, and this would have been unfortunate. It is encouraging to know that young officers are thinking original thoughts in these matters. Still, it is hoped that his, and the method outlined above, may not be lost to navigators in a hurrying age of “modern” navigation.

FAWTUPAC Birthday

Douglas Aircraft Company Release.—The Navy’s Air Defense Division of the Fleet All Weather Training Unit, Pacific (fawtupac), celebrated its first anniversay with the Continental Air Defense Command re­cently.

The men and aircraft of fawtupac stood their usual ’round-the-clock alert at the Naval Air Station, at North Island, San Diego, California, ready to intercept any un­identified aircraft off the coast of Southern California.

Sleek Douglas F4D Skyrays and F3D Skyknights are the only Navy aircraft in fawtupac, the line Navy intercept unit operating under control of conad.

fawtupac’s Air Defense Division has the

southern sector of the California Identifica­tion Zone as its area of responsibility. It is under the operational control of the 27th Joint Air Defense Division at Norton Air Force Base, San Bernardino.

The men of fawtupac stand by in full flight gear to scramble to engage possible enemy aircraft and can be airborne within three minutes after receiving a warning from radar sites which are key links in the conad system.

One group of pilots and enlisted men relieves another for a 24-hour tour,[5]and an­other day begins. Pilots and crews check the status board in the ready room to determine whether they are on a five-minute or 60- minute alert; flight line crews and plane captains inspect the aircraft and make sure they are fueled and in momentary readiness for flight; ordnance men check the plane’s weapons and ammunition, and maintenance crews are busy in the hangars readying other aircraft to be moved onto the flight line when needed.

Tower operators man their station where alert warnings are received, always set to send aircraft aloft.

Meanwhile, in the officers’ and enlisted men’s lounges, which also serve as ready rooms, men in flight suits wearing bright yel­low Mae West jackets start the never-ending wait that is the lot of the Air Defense Divi­sion.

But the wait, constant though it may be, is usually not long, for alert scrambles, both real and practice, are numerous. Every unidentified aircraft in the area covered by fawtupac, extending from lower California almost to Los Angeles, must be checked out whether it be an airliner, private airplane, or other military aircraft which may have strayed from its intended course.

When the alert horn sounds, the men race on the double to the aircraft. Pilots and radar operators man the aircraft, ground crews start the ground compressor units that fire off the jet engines, wheel chocks are pulled, and aircraft taxi to take-off positions.

Within three minutes after the scramble signal is received they are airborne. The single-place F4D Skyrays, which are the Navy’s fastest interceptors, can be 10,000 feet over their base within less than a minute from the time they take off.

Only slightly less speedy, the two-plane F3D Sky knights, whose flight endurance has been a mainstay of the Navy air arm, are off after the unidentified quarry, too.

So far every alert has resulted in the interception of “friendly aircraft” but the men of fawtupac take to the air with the thought in mind that “this may be it.”

Puddle Navigation

By Lieutenant J. A. Youngquist,

U. S. Navy*

On a recent cruise in the Arctic the author had occasion to resort to a method of navi­gation not often used aboard ships, but admirably suited to conditions then often at hand. The conditions were these:

1)No landmarks or aids to navigation visible.

2)       Radar almost useless as a navigational aid because of one or more of the following:

a)       land too far away to be picked up by radar.

b)                    land inaccurately charted or uncharted.

c)       coast line too low and flat to return iden­tifiable echoes.

d)       floating and fast ice indistinguishable from land, or obscuring land.

3)       No more than one charted radio beacon within three hundred miles.

4) No loran available.

5) No accurate charted soundings.

6)       Horizon obscured by fog, or, in absence of fog, so distorted by mirage as to make dip undeterminable.

7)       Dead reckoning impossible because of con­stant, unpredictable, and unmeasurable changes in course and speed while negotiat­ing ice.

8)       Very calm seas, due mainly to the damping and preventing effect of ice.

9)       The sun or other celestial bodies visible.

Clearly, all these conditions are to the detriment of navigation, save the last two, which are the very features which make Possible the method about to be described.

The method is an old one, and is generally referred to as that of the artificial horizon. What was done was to measure by marine sextant the apparent altitude of the sun above its own reflection in a saucer of dark ^maple syrup, and thereby obtain a line of position.

Steps in this process are:

1)       In a clear space aboard set the saucer on a towel, cleaning rag, glove, scarf, or other cloth or cushion to lessen the vibration im­parted to it from the ship.

2)       Measure many—about eight or more— sextant altitudes of the body above its own reflection in the fluid, taking the time of each one. Be not surprised if the sun, for example, should sometimes appear to be rising in the afternoon or setting in the fore­noon. This should not be, but it cannot be helped.

3)       Find the averages (arithmetic means) of these sights and times.

4)       Apply the index and eccentricity correc­tions to the average sextant reading in the usual way.

5)       Divide the result by two. This step corrects for the fact that the altitude of a body above its own reflected image in a horizontal mir­ror (in this case the puddle of syrup) is equal, by geometric optics, to twice its alti­tude above the sensible horizon.

6)       Correct this value of altitude as though a bubble sextant of zero index correction had been used. The result is the final corrected observed altitude, h_Q.

I) Work out the sight by any convenient method, using the averaged time as the time of the sight, and plot or record as usual.

Some of these steps may be accomplished

in different sequence using slightly different procedure, but these have been found con­venient.

Any of a number of liquids might be used, for example fuel oil, molasses, mercury, or chocolate sauce. Syrup was chosen only be­cause it happened to be the most readily at hand. The more viscous the fluid, within rather obvious limits, the better, for then the surface will ripple less, and its sloshing will dampen out faster. Mercury is an excellent reflector, but is so non-viscous and “nervous” as to be a poor choice aboard ship.

A serious disadvantage in using the artificial horizon is that conditions at sea are hardly ever optimal for it, and seldom even suitable. Even a dead-calm sea—which the sea must almost be if the system is to be used at all—the fluid with its image is likely to be jiggling about so much as to make a single accurate observation impossible, and dismay the navigator who has too little faith in averages. His faith may be strengthened when he reflects (no pun intended) on what little effect a sight several minutes off has on an average of perhaps a dozen sights, and on how a sight is as likely to be in error in one direction as in another, and that if several sights are taken some sights should be off in each direction, tending to reduce the error of the average; and one more thing, that whatever error a given sextant reading may have is further divided in two later.

Planets and stars, if bright enough, are easy to shoot using an artificial horizon. All that need be done is to focus the sextant image on the reflected image. The sun and the moon seriously complicate the problem with their appreciable semidiameters.

H.O. 9, Bowditch (1943), suggests bringing the upper limb of one image to the lower limb of the other, and gives some rules for determining whether it is the altitude of the upper or lower limb which is thus observed. In the opinion of the writer, however, it is much easier if the fluid is moving at all (and on a ship it nearly always is) to superimpose the sun or moon’s images upon themselves. When the images are superimposed it is the body’s center, and not either limb, whose altitude is observed, and hence the altitude is corrected as though a bubble sextant had been used. In correcting sextant altitudes of the center of the sun or moon a number of methods may be used, most of them un­familiar to most marine navigators, and so something will be said about some of them here. In any marine-sextant horizon sight, once the instrumental and dip corrections have been applied, for practical purposes there may remain corrections for refraction, semidiameter, and parallax. Dip of the sea horizon is, of course, inapplicable to altitudes taken from an artificial horizon.

In the Nautical Almanac, refraction, semidiameter, parallax—and in the case of the sun’s upper limb an empirical correction •—are variously combined in the sextant altitude correction tables. Likewise, though combined differently and with upper limb corrections ignored, in II.O. 214.

Table 23, Bowditch, for use with the sun, corrects for refraction and parallax only, and so does the sun table on the first page inside the front cover of an appropriate volume of

II.O.    214. Either of these, then (Table 23, Bowditch; or II.O. 214) is the one to use with the artificial horizon in the case of the sun.

This navigator when shooting the moon by artificial horizon prefers to correct the altitude for parallax and refraction by the bubble sextant table in II.O. 214, which consolidates both corrections. The necessary horizontal parallax of the moon may be obtained from the Nautical Almanac by applying to 57.0 the difference between the corrections for zero degrees and ninety degrees tabulated on the daily page under additional altitude corrections for moon’s lower limb. In obtaining this difference, the ninety-degree value should always be sub­tracted from the zero-degree value, which­ever is the larger. This rule can always be recalled if it is but remembered that the moon’s lower limb correction table is designed to correct for the moon’s semi­diameter and the amount of her horizontal parallax which differs one way or the other from the roughly average value of 57.0, (which is used in the moon correction table on the inside back cover of the Almanac) and that parallax corrections are always additive.

French Set to Tap Sahara

By Egon Kaskeline

Christian Science Monitor, December 26, 1956.—France is preparing to tackle a difficult, and highly rewarding undertaking— exploitation of the newly discovered riches of the vast Sahara Desert.

France controls more than one-half of this gigantic region which stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea.

The French National Assembly has set up a single economic organization to start large-scale research and exploitation of the entire French desert regions, thus, elimi­nating the political subdivisions of Algeria, French Equatorial Africa, and French West Africa.

Indeed, one can understand France’s pres­ent vigorous policy in rebellious Algeria only by taking stock of the recent and startling discoveries in the sandblown dunes and mountains of the Sahara Desert.

France feels it necessary to keep a firm foothold in North Africa because recent geological surveys make it extremely likely that the French economic future may depend on it.

In fact, the Sahara has a good chance of becoming one of the world’s most prominent raw material producers, a new “Canada” on African soil. This is the result of several years of intensive geological investigation, mostly undertaken with the aid of aerial photography.

These methods have proved very success­ful. Drilling undertaken on the basis of the air reports has produced excellent results. Probing of the mountain region near Tin- douf, near the Moroccan border, disclosed enormous quantities of iron ore which in quality compares to that of the famous Swedish mines. This can be mined there as soon as the transportation problem is solved.

Copper, in equally large deposits, has been found in Mauritania. Other important minerals such as tungsten, manganese, tin, and uranium have been discovered in the Colomb-Bechar section. And coal is located conveniently in the neighborhood of the same desert outpost and has been mined there since the end of World War II.

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However, the crux of the matter is oil. It ^Js perhaps no accident that the new Sahara law, which had been opposed by some local interests, has been overwhelmingly voted by the French National Assembly at a moment when, due to the Suez crisis, France feels the pinch of an increasing petroleum and gas shortage.

The recent successful drillings in the south Algerian desert, where large deposits of petroleum were found, is probably the biggest boon in France’s new Sahara policy. If the Sahara oil could be exploited com­mercially and shipped to France through 600 miles of pipeline to Algerian or Tunisian ports, France’s oil shortage would vanish almost overnight.

According to the latest report, the Sahara oil deposit is estimated to contain at least

1,0,              000,000 tons of crude oil. The oil findings stretch from the Moroccan border through the Algerian and Tunisian deserts to the frontier of Libya. Today this region contains only exploratory wells, but once production starts on a large scale, the output, it is estimated, can be raised easily to

5,0,              000 tons of crude annually. France thus would become Europe’s largest oil pro­ducer.

Another important power resource for French North Africa is the rich natural gas deposit south of the Oran region in Algeria. As of today, it still offers the best chance for early industrial use.

Despite the potential wealth of the Sahara subsoil, its commercial exploitation seems still far off. Most of the raw materials of the Sahara are located hundreds of miles from the coastal ports where they can be shipped to France’s industrial centers. A trans­Saharan railway has been discussed for generations. The line now ends at Colomb- Bechar.

There have been talks, nevertheless, of building a new rail link from the Colomb- Bechar outpost to the Ougarta Mountains in Mauritania, where the most valuable min­erals have been found. Construction of the strategic Colomb-Bechar-Agadir highway is reported to be under way. Steps have also been taken to improve the desert trails so that automobile traffic can roll over them in all weather.

Port installations have also to be ex­panded and modernized in view of the ship­ment of large quantities of minerals of all kinds.

No doubt these far-reaching plans will cost plenty, and with France’s public finance increasingly strained by the cost of the Algerian war and the Suez adventure, there seems little chance that all or most of the funds needed for the exploitation of the Sahara can be found in France. The French Government has always hoped to attract foreign capital, and there has been even talk of an economic “Eurafrica” with France and West Germany as the senior partners.

Yet the greatest obstacle to a successful start of what may become one of the greatest economic ventures of the 20th century is the political unrest in North Africa. How can the new desert economy be built up if the existing Algerian economy is increasingly paralyzed by the exploit of a rebellious “liberation army”? How can the Maureta­nian Mountains become the new Pittsburgh of North Africa if the government of in­dependent Morocco and the leader of the

Istiqlal party, Si Allal el Fassi, claim this territory as part of Greater Morocco?

Moreover, French colonists as well as Algerian nationalists have gone on record against a law which would deprive Algeria of a large part of its hinterland.

The bill voted by the French Assembly attempts to give some satisfaction to its opponents. The unity of the Sahara would be for economic purposes only. The delegate- general appointed by the French Govern­ment would have control over only the economic program. He would be assisted by a directing committee, representing the French ministries as well as the overseas territories. There also would be a parlia­mentary commission, representing the French National Assembly, the Council of the Republic, the French Union Assembly, and the Economic Council.

Heading for Trouble

Proceedings of the Merchant Marine Coun­cil, U. S. Coast Guard, January 1957.—In any discussion of casualties there always exists the possibility, “There, but for the grace of God, go I.” There are times, how­ever, when an incident occurs which goes beyond the realm of such a conclusion. Here’s such a one.

Imagine, if you can, a new, full-bodied and well found T-2 tanker stranded on a beach more than 200 miles from its dead reckoning position! Three mates had stood their watches, and not one had checked the magnetic compasses located in the wheel- house and flying bridge. Not one had thought the sudden “shift of the wind” had had any bearing on the possibility that the ves­sel had made a radical change of course. Failure to cross the Gulf Stream as anti­cipated with its marked rise in water temperature caused no alarm. No one thought the presence of small fishing craft “so far at sea” unusual.

For twelve hours the vessel boiled along at fourteen knots from the Delaware River on what she thought was a trip to South America. In reality the vessel was headed for Long Island, New York! (See Chart page 351)

Shortly after taking departure the vessel steadied upon 118° by gyro compass, which, based on comparisons made under pilotage,

^was considered a true heading. Ten minutes ^after this course was set the gyrorepeater system failed. The repeaters froze on 118°. In approximately fifteen minutes the tem­porary derangement had corrected itself so the repeaters were again functioning, but ^were out of synchronism with the master gyro compass.

The repeaters continued to indicate a heading of 118° although the vessel had actually swung 111° to the left and was making 007° true—straight for Fire Island.

About the time of the malfunction the ship was in the neighborhood of the “Balti­more Canyon” where depths fall sharply from 50 to over 500 fathoms. A flip of the fathometer switch would instantly have revealed to the officers something was radically wrong. Such was not to be. The vessel plowed on.

A seaman steering by the gyro repeater had thought it was unusual that the heading did not change for almost fifteen minutes, but he failed to report it to the mate on watch. The wind now was logged from the starboard bow about two points forward of the beam. Previously the wind had been noticed on the port bow, but this vital clue to a large change of course was passed off as an unexpected change in wind direction. I he sky was overcast and the sun was not visible.

No use was made of the radio direction finder in the belief the ship was standing off­shore and in no danger. The Master had left specific instructions on this and previous voyages that the compasses “must be checked at least once each watch.” It was admitted at the hearing later that complete confidence was placed in the gyro repeaters, but it borders on the fantastic that not one of the mates made a comparison between the gyro and magnetic compasses.

The second mate stood the 12-4 watch without making a check and passed the watch along without mentioning the magnet­ic course. The 4-8 mate stood his watch for four hours and was relieved, and again the course being steered by magnetic compass was completely overlooked. The 12-4 officer returned for his 0000-0400 stint the follow­ing morning, and still not one man had peered into the hooded wheelhouse compass or checked the standard compass on the flying bridge.

It must have been something of a shock for the men in their bunks, dreaming of the bright lights and gay spots of South America, to be awakened by the crunching of their vessel ashore on Long Island.

The Master was a man with more than 29 years experience in the same company— twenty-fiveof them in command. He had been in this ship for fifteen months. The mates were making their second trip. The Master admitted they were all “good, bright boys,” and saw no reason to remind them about compass comparison.

The value of the lesson to be learned from this casualty is obvious. This vessel plunged through the dark February seas without the Master or deck officers exercising a funda­mental principle of good seamanship. DON’T LET IT HAPPEN TO YOU!

Navy Developing 1,500-Mile Missile

By James E. Warner

New York Herald Tribune, January 13, 1957.-—The Defense Department revealed that the Navy is developing a new 1,500- mile guided missile which can put the fleet in virtually the same atomic striking power

posture as the Air Force with inter­continental missiles.

Polaris, the new Navy weapon, is being developed by the Lockheed Aircraft Com­pany. When operational, as several other shorter-range Navy missiles already are in the 6th and 7th Fleets, it will enable the Navy to rival the Air Force, charged with responsibility for development of inter­continental missiles with ranges of 5,000 miles or better.

A Pentagon policy paper released Nov. 25 limited the Army to such weapons with a range of no more than two hundred miles, assigned the Air Force responsibility for

I.                    C.B.M.’s (Intercontinental Ballistic Mis­siles), but said operational employment of ship-based, intermediate-range missiles — like the Polaris—would be “the sole re­sponsibility of the United States Navy.”

The Navy has long contended that with carriers and atomic-powered submarines as launching platforms off enemy coasts it can deliver devastating atomic blows with such missiles.

Revelation that the Navy is developing the Polaris indicated that the Navy concept is accepted. There was disagreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, obviously prin­cipally from the Army, at the time the November paper was issued assigning roles and missions of the three services, which Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson re­solved personally.

A brief Pentagon announcement today said that the Defense Department now is “reviewing the over-all ballistic missile program to determine what changes, if any, may be desirable in view of the reorienta­tion of the Navy program.”

There was a decided inference in the announcement that the Army, which pre­viously had been working with the Navy on Jupiter, another intermediate range weapon, would continue with its development while the Navy concentrates on the new weapon.

For fleet use, the Navy likes solid, as opposed to highly explosive liquid, propel­lants, and presumably Polaris will be so propelled.

It is no secret to the Russians that the

U.   S. Navy is striving for a missile which can be launched from a submerged sub­marine, and Polaris may be it, though such a weapon presents huge problems, both in development and operational stages.

The Air Force’s giant intercontinental weapons under development are Titan and Atlas. There is another mid-range weapon called Thor, an Air Force project.

Already operational in Navy fleets and the Naval Air Arm are Petrel, Sparrow, Regulus, Terrier, and Sidewinder.

Both the Army and the Air Force have other missiles in operational use.

When the November paper was released, it was emphasized that while it was designed to end inter-service rivalry on the use and development of missiles, against which there is yet no known defense, the roles and opera­tional duties of the services would be con­stantly re-evaluated.

A3D “ Sky warrior” Modified for Tanker Use

Douglas Aircraft Company Release, Jan­uary 14, 1957.—-Combat range of jet fighter, interceptor, and bomber aircraft operating with the U. S. fleet will be greatly extended by modification of Douglas A3I) Skywarrior twin-jet bombers for aerial tanker use, it was disclosed by the U. S. Navy.

Navy officials said that a number of A3D aircraft are being modified into tanker ver­sions in order to provide the fleet with high performance, carrier-based, aerial-refueling capability.

A 600-700 mph class twin-jet bomber, the A3D is the Navy’s biggest carrier-based