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An Early Submarine
Lieutenant Commander Alberto Jimenez, Peruvian Navy—I have just read the article about “Isaac Peral and his Submarine” in the November issue of the Proceedings. I think it may be of interest to give a brief description of an even earlier and less known submarine which, although of a more primitive design, did show a full understanding of the problems involved and was successfully tested. This submarine was designed and built by Mr. Federico Blume in Peru in 1879.
Blume’s submarine, which was intended to counteract Chilean naval preponderance in the Peru-Chile war of 1879, never did go into action due to a combination of circumstances in many respects resembling the problems that faced Mr. Peral. To avoid capture by the enemy, the submarine was scuttled before it saw action, and this no doubt accounts for the lack of any mention of it in most histories of naval submarine development. Recently, however, after considerable research, Lieutenant Commander Jose Valdizan, Peruvian Navy, has published an excellent article on the subject in the Revista de Marina del Peril, from which the following data and pictures are taken.
Blume’s submarine was 48 feet long and had a beam of seven feet. She had a primitive periscope, was engine-driven on the surface and had a hull thickness of For submerged propulsion, a special compressed air motor was under construction, but the submarine was scuttled before this motor could be installed. However, submerged operation was possible in the meanwhile by means of manual propulsion. The required crew was six, but ten could be carried without difficulty.
The submarine had a piston that stuck out of the hull and could be positioned at will, thus providing an accurate means of buoyancy control. The two “control turrets” had 4" thick glass windows. Two breathing tubes (see figure) served as air inlet and outlet so long as the depth did not exceed 10 feet. Was this, perhaps, the first snorkel?
With manual propulsion, the submarine was capable of making 3 knots submerged, and slightly more on the surface. This speed was maintained for half an hour at ten feet in one of the trials. The hull strength and pump capacity were tested at deeper depths (with the breathing tubes immersed) but the exact depth is not on record.
The cross-sectional view shows the manner in which the “Lay torpedoes” were carried. Blume developed a mechanism that released the torpedoes when under the target and made them “stick” to the underhull of the enemy. A powder time fuze started upon release and gave the submarine some time to clear the area.
The submarine cost Blume time, work (with very primitive tools), and money, yet he never requested any compensation. But his example was not in vain, and helped make Peru the most “submarine-conscious” country in South America. The first submarines built at the Groton, Connecticut yard of the old Electric Boat Company were four “R” boats for the Peruvian Navy. And since the end of World War II, Peru is the only other country in the continent (besides the United States) to buy new submarines: two were delivered a couple of years ago, and two more will be launched at the beginning of 1957. All four have been designed and built in the United States by the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics Corporation.
More on the Hammerlock Moor
(See page 521, May, 1956 Proceedings)
Editors Note: The author of this comment is the author of the Naval Institute publication Naval Shiphandling.
Commander R. E. Crenshaw, Jr., usn.— Captain Prince’s excellent article “The Hammerlock Moor” is a valuable contribution to the art of heavy weather seamanship. He proved conclusively that, when properly placed, two anchors are many times better than one.
The two-anchor or classic moor has fallen into disuse in this day of plentiful mooring buoys and piers, but it has advantages that apparently have been forgotten. Mooring with two anchors placed well across the line of wind or current can snub the ship’s bow to a particular position. If the bow of a ship is held firmly in one spot the ship will weathercock into the wind or current with little or no yawing. Captain Prince’s solution to the hurricane problem of using a long scope of chain to a “Riding Anchor” and a shorter scope to a second anchor appears excellent. Such an arrangement can be adjusted to insure the anchor with the short scope will drag as the wind veers and thus provides a controlled method of keeping the line between the anchors across the wind.
Inspired by Captain Prince’s article, we used one of the Navy’s newest mooring swivels to moor Forrest Sherman in the tideway at Nantasket Roads where ships have had trouble holding with one anchor. In spite of a gusty breeze and the strong current the shiji never yawed perceptibly and the anchors never budged. Regardless of the heading to which the ship rode, the pull on each anchor was always toward the mooring swivel and this nearly constant direction of pull insured the anchors digging in effectively. As a matter of fact, they dug in so securely that nearly half the bending shot on each anchor was caked with mud when we finally weighed anchor. It took nearly an hour’s work by the fo’c’s’le gang to make our first moor, and about half as long to break it, but there was never a moment of worry as we rode to our secure mooring.
It is hoped that Captain Prince will allow us to use his article as a basis for extending the sections on Heavy Weather and on Mooring when the first revision of Naval Shiphandling is made.
Rob. E. Hurst.—Referring to Captain Prince’s article, for whatever benefit they might be to shiphandlers in the future, I would like to recount an instance in which the moor worked very well, and a minor bit of deck knowledge learned thereby which might be useful if this moor resulted in a fouled hawse.
In 1944, USS Salem (CM-11), later to be renamed USS Shawmut, was discharging a cargo of dynamite in an open roadstead in Tinian, when a violent storm arose. As she was then riding to the starboard anchor, the commanding officer ordered a second anchor dropped, to remain at short stay. This resulted in the “tandem” condition Captain Prince mentions. It might be added here that it was thought advisable to keep the ship inside the anti-torpedo nets rather than send her to sea unescorted, particularly since the storm caught her half offloaded, with no time to reconstruct the temporary shoring for the dynamite.
In spite of the two anchors, the ship pitched and yawed violently. At midnight she dragged both anchors and fetched up on a reef with a resounding, solid jolt. We did not know it at the time, but the entire rudder was lost, and the blades of both screws were laid nearly flat. The after steering room was flooded immediately, and the man on watch managed to get out and close the water-tight hatch just in time to contain it there.
After the ship slid down off the reef, both anchors were heaved in and housed. Since the rudder would not answer, the ship was slowly steered by the screws. The maneuver attempted was to steam up as close to the net as possible and drop the starboard anchor. We were then to veer chain and attempt to maneuver her along the net until the other anchor could be dropped in a wide span arrangement.
However, when it came time to let go the starboard anchor, it flatly refused to let go. Apparently the violent pitching and rolling had pinned part of the chain in the chain locker. At this point, fearing to drift back, the commanding officer ordered the port anchor dropped. Eventually, the ship was worked back up to the net at a distance of about 500 yards from the first anchor. Here the starboard anchor was finally freed and was dropped.
This resulted, roughly, in a crossed hawse, with the starboard chain passing over the Port and tending at about 11 o’clock. With the starboard anchor at short stay and the Port chain at 2 o’clock and veered to about 200 fathoms, it resulted in a situation very similar to Captain Prince’s “Hammerlock Moor.” Although the storm got even worse, the ship had no rudder and very little assistance from the bent screws, USS Salem rode the entire night easily and without further incident. The starboard anchor dragged a bit, as it should do in the Hammerlock, but it kept the yawing to a minimum.
When it came time to recover the anchors, another problem arose. It was found that in its dragging, the starboard anchor had passed through and fouled the port chain. Apparently during the calmer period, the port chain had piled up, and the anchor had, by uncommonly bad luck, dragged right through this pile.
When the port chain was hove taut (with very heavy strain on the windlass) the starboard anchor was seen to be hopelessly entangled at the sixty-fathom mark. The chain was wrapped around the flukes and stock so securely the anchor actually dangled in midair as the chain broke water. No amount of jockeying with the windlasses would budge the tangle.
Finally, the starboard chain was heaved in until the offending tangle was nearly at the hawse. Then a wire mooring line was passed out a chock and “fished” through one bight of the chain around the anchor. It was then snagged with a grappling hook and brought back aboard and dropped over a bit. All the slack was heaved out of it, and the bitter end also secured. Then, by veering chain on both sides and holding fast with the mooring line, one bight was lifted off. After several such efforts, the anchor no longer was fouled, but its chain did lay atop the port chain. We steamed ahead slowly until there was slack in the port chain, then secured the deck stoppers on both chains. Then the ship was backed full.
As the strain came on the port chain heavily, the starboard anchor again cleared the water, but with a neat flip swung up and over and fell clear.
While there is no great principle involved, it was felt that the idea of clearing the hawse by use of the mooring line and grappling hook, and letting the weight of the anchor drop out from under the tangle rather than trying to heave it off from the deck, might be useful in other circumstances.
Captain R. B. Derickson, usn.—Captain Prince’s article, The Hammerlock Moor, appearing in the May, 1956 issue of the Proceedings was of particular interest to me— no doubt because at the present time I command a sister ship of the Muliphen and because the nearing hurricane season will find me a neophyte in the art of handling large ships in tropical storms. As I read the article a different but related solution to the problem of riding out a hurricane at anchor suggested itself to me. In the following paragraphs this idea is offered in the hope that it may elicit comments from others interested or experienced in this field of seamanship. The situation I have set down is one in which a ship is assigned a hurricane anchorage for a tropical storm which is expected to pass close to the eastward.
It is assumed that the track and position of the hurricane have been plotted during its approach. With this plot and the forecast positions the navigator can estimate the bearing and distance of the closest point of approach. Based on this information and hoping that the storm’s progress will not become erratic he can predict within a point or two the direction of the wind when it will be at its strongest.
The ship approaching her selected or assigned hurricane anchorage does so on a course ninety degrees to the right of the previously determined maximum wind direction. When she reaches the proper spot she lets go her port anchor, veering the chain and continuing ahead on the same course until she reaches the position where her starboard anchor is to be let go. The anchors should be so placed that when she is riding to both, each with the optimum scope of chain for holding, they subtend an angle of about forty degrees. When the scope used is one hundred fathoms the distance between the anchors will be about 130 yards.
In the typical case, and if the center of the storm is still some distance away, the approach and the line of anchors will be nearly into or a little to the right of the wind. This being so the ship will soon fall astern and ride to the starboard anchor with the port chain slack and tending slightly to port. When the condition becomes thus the port chain should be hove in until the strain on it is nearly but not quite equal to the strain on the starboard chain. If the wind at the time is two points left of the line of anchors and if one hundred fathoms of chain is out to the starboard anchor a mooring board plot shows thirty- five to forty fathoms of chain to the port anchor. At this point we have the “V-Hammer- lock” referred to in Captain Prince’s article.
As the storm approaches the wind will increase and shift to the left so that eventually when it is at its maximum strength it will be coming from a direction normal to the line of anchors. As this situation progresses the port anchor chain should be veered in increments such that the port anchor will not drag but will nevertheless take more and more of the load. This veering process should be adjusted so that when the wind has reached its maximum velocity and is normal to the span of anchors the amount of chain to each anchor is equal and at the optimum scope for holding. Thus, at the time of greatest stress and strain, you will have observed the sage advice, “—in case of extreme necessity when the greatest holding power is necessary, all anchors should be dropped and the chain veered the greatest possible scope” (Knight’s Modern Seamanship, 12th edition, page 161).
When the center of the storm has passed its closest point of approach and as the wind continues to back, the foregoing procedure should be continued in reverse. In other words, as the starboard anchor begins to take less and less strain its scope should be shortened, always keeping enough strain on it to provide an anti-yawing effect.
The plan as described above is specifically for a northern hemisphere situation where the storm will pass to the eastward. By applying the law of storms one can arrive at the necessary modifications for a tropical storm passing to the westward or a storm in the southern hemisphere.
Other modifications dictated by good seamanship may become necessary as when the storm makes an unexpected recurvature or if the center should pass directly over.
I believe that the foregoing plan, theoretical though it may be, embodies nearly all the advantages of Captain Prince’s Hammer- lock, plus the advantage of attaining maximum holding power during the greatest strength of the storm and at the same time eliminating the undesirable feature of dragging the short scope anchor over the bottom as the direction of the wind changes.
Ericsson, Stockton, and the USS Princeton
(See page 961, September 1956, Proceedings)
Captain Robert T. Sutherland, Jr., usn (ret).—Ensign Watts’ interesting and unusually well-written article prompted supplementary reading to learn more of the personalities and events described in his paper. As might be anticipated, a few very trivial discrepancies were found, quite possibly of typographical origin. That is unimportant. However, the following additions may be of interest to other readers who enjoyed Ensign Watts’ contribution.
Bare mention is made of a “Colonel Gardiner of New York” as one of those killed by the explosion of the “Peacemaker.” Captain Stockton had objected to firing the gun “just for fun” during the return trip to Washington, arguing that it had been thoroughly exercised earlier in the day. He yielded when the Secretary of the Navy suggested that he should let his guests have all the sport they wished. Air. David Gardiner, one of those grouped close to the gun, was descended from the “lords of manor” of Gardiner’s Island. His remains, while lying in state in the White House with the other victims, were visited by his attractive daughter Julia. She aroused such interest and sympathy in President Tyler that he subsequently married her. Post-mortem, Gardiner became father-in-law of a President.
The “Peacemaker” was reputed to be the largest forging in the world at the time of
its manufacture. Author Watts quotes a statement that confidence in its strength was based on presumed quality of American wrought iron. Others, taking full advantage °f hindsight, aver that quality of metal was overlooked in the effort to produce quantity. Production of such a massive forging had been hailed as a manufacturing triumph for a U. S. industry that but a few years earlier had been unable to forge shaft- lr>g for the second Fulton.
Watts reports the first Princeton removed from service in 1847 and broken up in 1848. Other writers state that she was reboilered in 1847, 20% additional heating surface being provided, then sent to the Mediterranean for two years service under command of Commander Frederick Engle before being scrapped in 1849, after survey. The engines, still serviceable, were taken to Baltimore for thorough overhaul and addition of Sickel’s adjustable cut-off. They, plus three new boilers of Lamb and Summer patent, and a new 4-bladed composition propeller later comprised the main propulsion units of the second Princeton. As indicated by Watts, Stockton was incensed about the condemnation of the first Princeton. Two years after, while serving in the United States Senate, he persuaded the Navy Department to replace his old ship. Many of the old ship’s timbers were built into the hull of the new Princeton, in Boston Navy Yard, the later ship being clipper-built and of somewhat increased dimensions.
Controversies as to whether machinery should be installed in Boston or Baltimore delayed completion of the ship, it finally being fitted in Baltimore in the summer of 1852. Tentatively scheduled to participate in the Japan expedition, she finally sailed from Annapolis in November of that year. While still in Chesapeake Bay, her machinery performed so poorly that she was held at Norfolk. A Board of Engineers investigated the situation, finding that while the addition of Sickel’s cut-off was probably unwise, the failures of the ship were primarily due to the patent boilers installed in her. A former engineer-in-chief, who had recommended Lamb and Summer boilers, was held responsible. The ship remained idle in Norfolk for a year or more before being moved to Philadelphia were she served as receiving ship until October, 1866, before being sold.
Commodore Stockton considered that the rebuilding of his ship had been horribly mishandled, perhaps with malicious intent. His views prompted a vigorous denunciation of the whole affair in the Senate, during which he referred to the second Princeton as “an abortion in the naval service.”
Watts ascribes certain derogatory remarks, made following towing of the Lords of Admiralty barge by the Ogden, to a “Sir William Edward Perry, Comptroller of Steam Machinery for the Royal Navy.” In a lecture delivered by John O. Sargent, before the Boston Lyceum in late 1843, it was indicated that Sir William Symonds, Surveyor of the Royal Navy, was responsible. Sir Edward Parry, the Commander of the 2nd British Expedition to the North Pole, was along for the ride, as was Captain Beaufort, then Hydrographer of the Royal Navy.
The small steamer built to Captain Stockton’s account was named the Robert F. Stockton. She was launched on July 7, 1838. Fitted with a pair of 6'-4" propellers, she was tried on January 12, 1839. Departing from England in April, under command of a Captain Crane, and manned by “four men and a boy,” she completed a transAtlantic crossing under sail in forty days. For his adventurous passage Captain Crane was given the “freedom of the city of New York.”
The Robert F. Stockton was fitted with twin screws, her machinery being so arranged that either or both could be used. In 1840, Captain Stockton sold her to the Delaware and Raritan Canal Company, after getting a special act of Congress permitting her to operate in American waters. Renamed the New Jersey, she saw long, uninterrupted service as a tug on the Schuylkill and Delaware rivers. She was considered the first screw- propelled vessel to be practically employed in the United States.
Though he received many honors from others, including knighthood in the order of Vasa by King Oscar of Sweden in 1852, recognition by our Navy was indeed long delayed, preceded by non-payment for his services in connection with the Princeton, ridicule and abuse. Fortunately, he lived long enough to receive the acclamation and respect he had earned. When death came, a final signal honor was paid him. The first important duty of the new protected cruiser Baltimore, during the summer of 1890, was to carry John Ericsson’s body back to Sweden, where he was born in Varmland in 1803. (See the cover of the July, 1955 Proceedings.)
Stockton, born seven years before Ericsson, died in 1866 in Princeton, New Jersey, the city of his birth, having resigned from the Navy on May 28, 1850. Though a controversial figure, even ordered court-martialed as a consequence to his difficulties with General Stephen Kearney over the conquest of California, he had a full, active and rewarding life. He many times received honorable notice for his action in battles. As a young lieutenant in 1821, he negotiated a treaty with African native chiefs and obtained the tract now comprising the Republic of Liberia. He captured many slavers, an Algerine warship, a Portuguese privateer, and was successful in breaking up several nests of pirates in the West Indies. He was active in politics from 1826-38 in behalf of General Jackson, while still a naval officer, and aided in obtaining internal improvements in New Jersey. Following his resignation from the Navy, he served a term as U. S. Senator, in 1851-53. He is credited as having been instrumental in the passage of the law abolishing flogging in the U. S. Navy.
Piloted Aircraft to Stay
(See page 809, August, 1956 Proceedings)
Commander Lloyd W. Garrison, usn.— I am not completely unaware of the technical advances of our time, even those promised for the future. However, I fail to see the necessity for choosing now between the piloted aircraft and the guided missile as suggested in the article “Time for Decision.” It would appear both will have a continued application in warfare for some time to come. The piloted aircraft will remain because it has one cardinal advantage over the missile whatever its guidance system. The piloted aircraft can carry to the combat area (and return) a logical, reasonable, trained (naval) observer capable of exercising command over his weapons system, altering an initial decision after he has been launched, observing the results of his efforts, and returning to his base more experienced for his next effort over the target. With all our frailty man is still the ultimate weapon, he provides desire and decision, and is the best “guidance” system yet devised. Our advancing technology has made war less personal but we still cannot win battles by remaining in remote isolation from the “moment of truth.”
Romeo or Roger
(See page 644, June, 1956 Proceedings)
Commander Warner W. Bayley, usn (ret.).—The article by Mr. Montross in the June issue is most interesting, but it contains one inaccuracy.
When he says that the Able-Baker-Charlie alphabet which replaced the Affirm-Boy- Cast alphabet in 1942 “just grew” he is not altogether accurate. What actually happened was that there was a pressing need for a phonetic alphabet which was adapted to the use of the British and ourselves for combined purposes. Their phonetic alphabet was not suitable for our use nor was ours acceptable to them. The use of indicators such as “Affirm,” “Interrogatory,” etc., in our alphabet meant nothing to them nor were they usable in the proposed combined signal system. There were also some problems connected with the pronunciation of certain words in our alphabet.
Perhaps this pronunciation difficulty can be illustrated by the story of the Cockney who was having difficulty in making a telephone call to Ealing, a district in London. Finally in exasperation he decided to spell it out for the telephone operator. “Listen, he said, E for ’eaven, ay for ’orses, L for where you’re going, I for me, N for what lays eggs, and G for Gawd’s sake keep your ears open!”
The Able-Baker-Charlie alphabet was worked out by Communications in the Navy Department and the Signal Division in the Admiralty. I do not recall that any phonetic experts were consulted. It was a phonetic alphabet adapted to the needs of the two Navies primarily.
In the new Alfa-Brave-Charlie alphabet >t seems apparent from the spelling of Alfa alone that the phonetic words have been chosen for their possible use by nations who speak languages other than English. Many words in the Able-Baker-Charlie alphabet would have cause confusion when pronounced by a person speaking a Romance language as Mr. Montross points out.
But despite the new alphabet it seems very likely that “Romeo” will have a hard time killing off “Roger.”
* * *
Lieutenant Otto F. Unsinn, uscg.—As a bunting-tosser of some long standing, I should like to add a few words to “Simple as Alfa-Bravo-Charlie.”
If Mr. Montross weeps for ROGER, let him hold back his tears. The proword, meaning, in effect, “I understand,” is still here and has not, as yet anyway, been discarded. It might have been further translated “And I obey,” but that’s taking quite a bit for granted. “Wilco” is something else again.
The so-called “old” alphabet had AFIRM for A (Two F’s was always a common mistake) and NEGAT for N. But the adoption of the “new” alphabet (Able-Baker-Charlie) was greeted with some fuss. The blame for this monstrosity was usually placed on either the British or the Reserves. Those Americans who found their ships part of the British Fleet were really bowled over by the “Apples, Beer, etc.” by which their flags were denoted. And signalmen for some while had to differentiate between the governing flags, which remained PREP, INTERROGATORY, AFIRM, NEGAT, OPTION, and the phonetics PETER, etc. Intended primarily for airmen indeed!
It might be pointed out that the new P is pronounced pah-pah!
During the halcyon Atlantic Squadron days between two wars the names of which I have forgotten, Admiral Pickens frequently lapsed into BOY, HAVE, QUACK, RUSH, VICE, and WATCH. He just couldn’t remember that upstart, ROGER.
In short, our phonetic alphabet was changed during the war better to converse with our British allies, and is now changed so that we may be understood by our global allies.
I fear I must answer two questions so enticingly asked in that article.
Q. What would an unrehearsed Frenchman do to Whiskey?
A. Drink it.
Q. Or a Swede to Julielt?
A. Kiss her. Those Swedes are as clever as the French.
* * *
Commander F. N. Colvin, usn.—As you have no doubt been reminded several hundred times by now, ALCOM 14 of March 1956 states that “ROGER” in radio telephone procedure would continue to be used to indicate receipt of a message by that means.
Nonetheless, Mr. Montross’s presentation was excellent. The primary objection to the new alphabet had been one of “Romeoing” in lieu of “Rogering” for a message. Now that it has been corrected, and despite groans at the thought of a new alphabet, a few years from now most of us will have difficulty remembering the old.
Other disadvantages outside of the additional syllables mentioned by Mr. Montross, the new alphabet added 22 additional letters to the aggregate, thus requiring 4.5 seconds longer to transmit the phonetic words by 6 wpm teletype, and 13.5 seconds to transmit by 2 wpm CW radio. Thus a certain amount of time and economy has been sacrificed. “C’est la vie.”
A lighter side to the new alphabet is the howl of outrage that went up from our rebel contingent the first time the word was passed to “Set condition Yankee throughout the ship.” There was an immediate campaign to substitute “Rebel” for ROMEO. Perhaps the NATO Nations forgot to consult South United States in reaching this momentous decision?
Editor’s Note: Commander Colvin is Communications Officer of the “USS New Jersey, Bravo Bravo 62.”
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