In reviewing the navigational aspects of this case, the words of the Court of Inquiry which considered all of the evidence, provide the best commentary. As to the direct cause of the disaster the court said:
"In the opinion of the court, the disaster which resulted in the stranding of seven destroyers on Pedernales Point, and the grounding of two others in the same vicinity is, in the first instance, directly attributable to bad errors of judgment and faulty navigation…"
The court was not persuaded that the radio bearings sent out by the radio compass station at Point Arguello were in error.
"After considering carefully the testimony adduced, the Court finds nothing which reflects upon the efficiency of the radio compass installation…Out of this testimony shines the clear fact that it was not the compass bearings sent to the Delphy which were wrong, but the judgment of the men who interpreted these bearings and who used them wrongly." The court adds that the 32nd Division which brought up the rear of the destroyer column and turned westward to safety, cruised north and south of Arguello all night in a heavy fog using radio compass bearings and the lead.
The court did not consider a speed of 20 knots excessive prior to 8: 30 P.M. under the existing weather and traffic conditions. It found that: "The D. R. course and speed as shown by revolutions were not made good, but the Squadron during this time was set in to the coast and north of the D. R. position at 9:00 P.M. by a very appreciable amount. The court is of the opinion that no unusual current condition existed, but that this set to the north and east was caused by bad steering, together with a certain amount of current which…may be expected at any time in any direction and should be guarded against by the careful navigator."
However, the court emphasized the necessity for obtaining a fix at Point Arguello in view of the contemplated entrance into Santa Barbara Channel where fog might be expected.
"After 8:30 P.M., speed should have been reduced in order to take soundings; and after 9:00 P.M., if it had been necessary to head into the land in order to get a fix off Arguello, speed should have been reduced to a minimum until the light was sighted or heard, or an approximate fix obtained through the agency of radio compass hearings, checked with soundings."
The court presented a strong indictment of blindly relying on the "follow-the-leader" principle. It stated that: "A departure from policy, plan, or even a strategic conception is rarely permissible; but in the tactical execution of the above, much latitude must be allowed the subordinate…The matter of navigational procedure comes more nearly under the head of tactical procedure. The Division Commanders and individual ship Captains are always charged with the safety of the unit under their command no matter who leads, unless in the presence of the enemy, when destruction of the enemy and not the safety of your own unit are the guiding factors…Nothing can replace the use of sound common sense on the part of the subordinate…"
Pursuing this general line of reasoning, the court indicated awareness of the navigational handicaps when it said of the Division Commanders:
"It is true that they were following in column, that they could not slow, that they could not sound, that they could not ask for compass bearings. But the fact remains that they did too blindly follow the judgment of the Squadron Commander…"
The court used similar words in connection with the commanding officers but added that:
"Their position was a trying one and there are many extenuating circumstances. They had two leaders whom they must go through before they could slow, take soundings, change course or even ask for radio bearings."
Perhaps the best summary of the navigational aspects of the situation preceding the fateful turn are the words of the court.
"In reviewing the testimony, the Court is forced to the conclusion that no unusual conditions existed. It is true that there was fog and that the lights which served as navigational aids were difficult to make. It would have been better practice to have made Point Sur and thus to have obtained a later fix,…but the sound navigator never trusts entirely to the obvious. The price of good navigation is constant vigilance. The unusual is always to be guarded against and when the expected has not eventualized, a doubtful situation always arises which must be guarded against by every precaution known to navigators…"
The foregoing words of the court, italicized by this writer, appear to hint at the really basic cause of the disaster; i.e.,that incredible as it may seem, no one aboard any of the wrecked ships visualized that an uncertain and even dangerous situation existed.
Captain McClench was formerly an instructor in Navigation, U. S. Naval Academy. He is now Head of the Navigation Branch of the Division of Navigational Science, U. S. Navy Hydrographic Office.