The visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to South Asia during the fall of 1955, followed by the significant revisions of Stalinist dogma undertaken at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party with respect to the non-aligned states “both socialist and non-socialist,” dramatically emphasizes the importance of these under-developed, non-committed countries to Soviet strategy. Of the three countries visited, Afghanistan is probably the least known, and because of its peripheral location, too casually regarded in the West. Though long over-shadowed by Western preoccupation with more immediate and pressing challenges of South Asian political developments, Afghanistan has not been overlooked, nor has its importance been under-estimated by the Soviet leaders. Indeed, in their deliberate and skillful efforts to promote closer economic, cultural, and technical assistance ties with this landlocked kingdom, the full measure of Soviet political astuteness can be seen. The new “collective leadership” has developed an uncanny ability to seize an opportunity and exploit it rapidly. Geographical contiguity, historical interest dating back to Czarist days, and a keenly attuned sensitivity to the nuances of Central and South Asian political relations, have helped motivate Soviet concern with the peculiar problems of Afghanistan and enabled the Kremlin to profit commensurately. More perceptively than the West, the Soviet Union seems to appreciate that this semi-feudal, fiercely independent kingdom is an important key to control of the sub-continent of South Asia. As such, Afghanistan’s political allegiance is a prize worth seeking.
In the bygone era of British colonialism, Afghanistan was effectively maintained as a buffer between Britain’s Indian Empire and Russia’s Central Asian counterpart. With the emergence of India and Pakistan as independent, mutually antagonistic states, Afghanistan’s role was significantly altered. Its passivity and politics could no longer be determined by Great Power fiat. Afghanistan now appears on the international stage, intent on becoming a modern state, eager to be courted, and seeking to exact the highest possible price for its favor.
The Afghan Government desires to pursue its traditional policy of non-involvement and political neutrality, while accepting Great Power largess. However, changes in the international balance of power since 1945 preclude the success of such a course of deft diplomatic maneuvering for very long. Afghanistan must inevitably orient itself toward one of the three competing power groups involved in this area: conceivably, it could choose from among “non-aligned” India, Western supported Pakistan, or the Soviet Union. At this juncture, India does not appear sufficiently interested in attracting the Afghans to warrant serious consideration. However, this foreign policy myopia might change, particularly if the Soviets manifest more invidious intentions toward the mountain kingdom and the Kashmir problem is satisfactorily settled. At present, the likelihood of an Afghan rapprochement with Pakistan, and a subsequently greater pro-Western orientation, is negligible. The Afghan feud with Pakistan, which has hovered precariously close to war several times in recent years, militates against this alternative. Finally, there is the colossus of the north.
The Soviet-Afghan frontier is delineated by the Oxus River and extends along 900 miles of the largely unexplored and inaccessible Hindu Kush mountain range. There is one road from Kabul to the Soviet Union, which was completed during the past few years. This route is expected to receive an increasing amount of traffic, for the USSR is now taking an active interest in the economic future of Afghanistan. At present, for the first time, Afghanistan is proving receptive to overtures from the north. Although the Soviet Union eventually seeks to establish its hegemony over Afghanistan, observers do not expect the Soviets to subvert its neighbor and turn Afghanistan into a satellite in the near future. Rather, if possible, Soviet strategy would prefer to have Afghanistan become analogous to a Finland of Central Asia; internally independent, yet inevitably influenced in important foreign policy decisions by its powerful neighbor. This objective is well on the way to being realized.
The roots of Russian interest in Afghanistan can be traced to Czarist struggles against Britain. The “Great Game” of power politics between these two giants, so vividly immortalized by Kipling, started in 1807. The Treaty of Tilsit temporarily wedded Czar Alexander and Napoleon in a military alliance. The British, fearing a French invasion of India through Persia, sought to conclude an alliance with the decaying Durrani Empire. However, Afghanistan was then in a state of ferment, and such agreement proved impossible. With the defeat of Napoleon, the need for an Anglo- Afghan accord disappeared.
The early decades of the nineteenth century were characterized by rapid Russian and British expansion. Russian influence extended first into the Caucasus. After a period of intensified pressure, Persia reluctantly acknowledged Russia’s annexation of Georgia and most of the Caucasus. A series of complex political developments in Europe, and the impetus of imperial and commercial aspirations, led to the temporary suspension of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Britain’s favor in 1838, when the Russian-inspired Persian effort to capture the strategic center of Herat in Afghanistan terminated in failure. But continuing their advance into Central Asia, the Russians pacified the Kirghiz and Turkmen regions and conquered the feudal kingdoms of Khiva, Bokhara, and Samarkand. Meanwhile, British power brought Sind, the Punjab, and Kashmir under control. By late 1897, the Russian drive had advanced to the Oxus River, the northern border of Afghanistan. British concern for the security of its Indian Empire grew, dominating its military thinking in this area until the partition of 1947.
Immeasurably aided by the presence of a capable ruler, Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, on the Afghan throne during the latter decades of the century, Britain succeeded in obtaining Russia’s tacit agreement to respect a buffer role for Afghanistan. The Japanese victory in 1905, the abortive revolution in Russia in the same year, and the growing fear of Germany, finally influenced the Czar to negotiate a far-reaching detente with Britain. Accordingly, the Convention of St. Petersburg was signed in 1907. It not only confirmed the status quo with respect to Afghanistan, but along the entire Central Asian periphery as well. The demarcated boundaries still endure, though the power relationships have drastically changed. No longer does the “Great Game” involve merely two Great Powers competing across the land mass of Afghanistan. The aftermaths of two World Wars have wrought an altered alignment, which accords the Soviet Union a particularly advantageous power position. On the other hand, the United States has come to assume something similar to Britain’s former role, under distinctly less favorable circumstances.
The partition of India also contributed to the drastically changed position and attitude of Afghanistan, by unwittingly initiating a course of action culminating in the present hostility between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The heart of this antagonism centers on the tribal question, a complex problem concerning some five million Pathans semi-nomadically residing in the northwest area of Pakistan. Though this problem came to the fore after the tragic dismemberment of the subcontinent, it is a legacy of British rule. The boundary between Afghanistan and what is today Pakistan was negotiated in 1893. Known as the Durand Line, it is a casually- conceived offspring of colonial diplomacy, devoid of elementary considerations of geopolitical, economic, and ethnographic logic, and remains to plague Afghan-Pakistan relations. This Line was established arbitrarily, motivated solely by the British desire to safeguard more effectively the northern approaches to India. In the process, about half of the Pathan tribes were left on the Indian side of the boundary. An astute combination of subsidy and strength kept the tribes quiescent. With the departure of the British, Pakistan has continued to follow, and even expand, this formula.
However, taking advantage of the partition and its attendant ramifications, in addition to the Kashmir squabble, Afghanistan acted to incite these nomadic Pathan tribes to revolt and now presses their claim to the right of forming an independent state, to be known as Pushtunistan. Afghanistan’s professed concern for the principle of self-determination raises some questions as to the motivations behind Kabul’s action. For there is reason to doubt the appreciable existence of national consciousness among the tribes. Their allegiance remains primarily to the clan. But the Afghan Government would undoubtedly benefit from the creation of an autonomous, Pushtu-speaking state in several ways; politically, Pushtunistan might be expected to look to Kabul for guidance, since the linguistic and ethnic ties between them would be strong; economically and strategically, land-locked Afghanistan would then be afforded a much desired access to the Arabian Sea.
It is conceivable that the initial impetus behind Afghanistan’s support for Pushtunistan may have been encouraged by Indian elements during the early post-partition days as a way of weakening Pakistan. Regardless of the original catalyst, there is no doubt that the Soviet Union has been the main beneficiary. To gain Afghan favor, it has come out in support of an independent Pushtunistan. By this maneuver, the Soviets seek to strengthen their position in Kabul and encourage Pakistan’s dissatisfaction with SEATO. They have managed to blend skillfully their political support with concrete offers of economic assistance.
The Soviet Government started to court Afghanistan in earnest in early 1954. Ignoring their frequent denunciations of America’s Point Four program and its supposed imperialistic overtones, the Soviets undertook a similar program for Afghanistan with a small grant of credits and technical assistance. These were designed to help defray costs of building several grain elevators, a petroleum pipeline, and a cement factory, projects vitally needed and approved by the Afghan Government.
Ushering in the start of a flexible, imaginative, and constructive approach to the extension of Soviet influence in non-Communist under-developed areas, this period coincided with the consolidation of the “collective leadership” principle in the USSR and the abandonment of Stalinist rigidity in foreign policy. In addition to intensive bilateral overtures of a similar character, the Soviets became active participants, for the first time, in the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, UNESCO, the International Labor Organization, and other international groups intimately concerned with the undeveloped areas of the Middle East and South Asia.
Sensitive to the understandable fears of its weak, suspicious, semi-feudal neighbor, the Soviet Government has proceeded adroitly to promote its position. It has taken advantage of Afghanistan’s bitter and potentially explosive feud with Pakistan to offer armed assistance. Though it is not known to what extent this offer has been accepted, Afghan military missions have visited Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. On August 25, 1956, Premier Mohammed Daud announced that Afghanistan had signed a military aid agreement with the USSR. Though exact figures are unavailable, it is believed to call for §100,000,000 in military equipment.
For the West, the problem of arms assistance is a particularly vexing one. Pakistan, as a member of SEATO, is an ally of the West, receiving significant quantities of arms from the United States. Afghanistan has indicated that it regards this as a threat “to the security and peace of Afghanistan” and accused Pakistan of diverting these arms for use in the dispute over Pushtunistan. The West desires to maintain its friendly ties with Afghanistan, but neutrality is not easily maintained. Should Afghanistan accept large quantities of Soviet arms, as well as economic assistance, it is likely that its Soviet ties would become pronounced to such an extent that its foreign policy could no longer be considered independent. In addition, the increase in military strength might further exacerbate relations with Pakistan, precipitating a war none can afford and which the West prefers to avoid.
The dramatic, and highly effective, South Asian tour of Bulganin and Khrushchev greatly aided the high-powered Soviet campaign of political salesmanship. Important economic agreements were negotiated with all the countries visited. On December 18, 1955, a series of treaties, supplemented by an important economic accord, were signed between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. The existing Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-aggression of June 24, 1931, was extended for an additional ten years. In addition, the governments agreed to expand economic relations between the two countries and examine:
“questions pertaining to cooperation in the sphere of developing agriculture, construction of hydroelectric power stations, irrigation installations and automobile repair shops in Afghanistan, as well as the construction of the Kabul airfield.
The Government of the U.S.S.R. reported its agreement in principle to render to Afghanistan both technical and financial aid to take the form of credit in respect of the implementation of a program of work in the development of the economy of Afghanistan in the above-mentioned spheres, which is to be agreed subsequently.
The amount of credit granted in connection with this by the U.S.S.R. is laid down to the amount of $100,000,000 as a long-term credit.”
These agreements were ratified by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on December 31, 1955, and by King Zahir Shah in January, 1956. Little time has been squandered in implementing their provisions. Soviet economic penetration is well underway and, judging by its accomplishments and appeal, will tend increasingly to draw Afghanistan to the north. In a memorandum outlining Russian objectives in Central Asia, Prince Gorchakov, clearly anticipating the Soviet tactics of almost a century later, wrote in 1864, “The progress of civilization has no more efficacious ally than commercial relations.” The Soviets have acted on this proposition, intent on expanding all facets of economic relations, and currently absorb almost forty per cent of Afghanistan’s exports. Afghan wool, karakul furs, and dried fruits are exchanged for Soviet cement, cloth, steel products, and oil. In time, as the unknown mineral potential of Afghanistan is developed, the basis of trade may correspondingly widen. Meanwhile, the Soviets have been aided unexpectedly by an irreparable and grievous Pakistani policy blunder.
The decision to merge all the provinces of West Pakistan, including the Northwest Frontier Province, into a single administrative unit precipitated a series of violent demonstrations against the Pakistani consulates in Afghanistan. Soon after, the Afghan consulate at Peshawar was attacked. Amidst mounting tension, Pakistan retaliated in July, 1955, by abruptly sealing the Kyber Pass-Karachi trade artery, Afghanistan’s traditional lifeline to the outside world. It continued this virtual blockade for five months. Vitally needed supplies of oil, material for the American financed Helmand River Valley project, and Pakistani cement were cut off. This near economic strangulation had broad political consequences. Premier Sardar Mohammed Daud, realizing the precariousness of his country’s position, quickly and gratefully accepted the promptly suggested Soviet offer of a five-year transit agreement. Though the former route is open now, the Afghan Government is channeling most of its trade through the Soviet Union. Since then, Premier Daud’s actions indicate that he is more fearful of a Pakistan repetition than of the possible dangers inherent in too intimate an association with the Soviet Union. He is apparently quite confident of his ability to preserve Afghan independence, while obtaining desired economic aid not only from the Soviet Union but from the West as well.
The Afghan drift toward the Soviet Union should not be considered merely in terms of dollars, though economic necessity is an important determinant. Strategic considerations, centering on the tenuous lifeline through Pakistan, are significant factors. Thus, it would be an error to assume that this drift could be arrested by a sudden and expanded infusion of American economic aid. The substantial amounts of military and economic assistance given to Pakistan completely overshadow the sums available for Afghanistan. No reversal of this pattern is likely or feasible.
Afghan policy is molded by a few men, intent on rapidly bringing the twentieth century to this under-developed kingdom. Ostensibly a constitutional monarchy, Afghanistan is actually ruled by the royal clan. Its leading government figures are, in many cases, linked by blood and marriage. Largely Western educated and eager to modernize their country, economically if not politically, they are not averse to exploiting Afghanistan’s strategic position, playing one power bloc against the other and taking from both. That they feel confident of their ability to tread this difficult path with success is at once an indication of their overweening confidence as well as their political immaturity. The new Soviet affability and the intensity of the dispute with Pakistan have made such a course seem logical, attractive, and the alternative, permitting Kabul the maximum of maneuverability. But the risk is great and apt to cost more than Afghanistan expects to pay.
However, given the continued existence of the Afghan-Pakistan border problem, there is little that the West can do to prevent the present inroads of Soviet influence. Despite an ambitious American-supported economic development effort in the Helmand River Valley, Western interests have not been pushed with perception or vigor. The understandable preoccupation of the United States with the establishment of an effective security belt, both along the “northern tier” of the Middle East and in Southeast Asia, has resulted in a certain lack of urgency concerning the danger symptoms in Afghanistan. Given the importance of the area, it is unfortunate that American efforts to encourage negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have, thus far, proved unsuccessful. Intimate SEATO ties with Pakistan have served to make American relations with Afghanistan more difficult. Indeed, at the conclusion of the March, 1956, meeting of the SEATO powers in Karachi, the Executive Council upheld Pakistan in its dispute with its northern neighbor. Deploring Soviet intervention and divisive efforts in South Asia, the Council members “declared that their Governments recognized that the sovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the Durand Line, the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. . . It thus affirmed Pakistan’s sovereignty over the border region “inhabited by Pushtu speaking tribes that Afghanistan seeks to separate from Pakistan.”
Afghanistan’s reaction was immediate and sharp. It declared that any decision taken by the SEATO powers with respect to its territorial claims would not be regarded as valid. Relations continue to deteriorate. The United States has de facto committed its support to one side in a dispute between two nations with which it maintains friendly relations, thus adding to its diplomatic problems in this area. Given Pakistan’s key position in the Western system of military alliances, no other alternative was politically possible. The tragedy stems from the fact that the quarrel had been permitted to fester so long. For Pakistan, the proposal for a Pushtunistan is unthinkable. To accede to Afghan demands would deprive West Pakistan of more than a third of its territory, everything west of the Indus River. This would be a prelude to national extinction. Yet, as long as the dispute continues to smolder, erupting periodically into violence, the grim harvest of immature and irrational nationalism will dominate the diplomatic atmosphere, rendering prospects for a settlement bleak indeed.
Afghanistan is a nation lacking a cohesive institutional framework. Its small ruling class, though an enlightened and responsible one by contrast with the feudal oligarchies, dominates the judiciary, as well as the religious hierarchy. Ethnic diversity is partially counter-balanced by religious homogeneity. Islamic precepts permeate all facets of life. Western ideas and institutions are virtually unknown, except to a few, in this long isolated Muslim land of orthodoxy, traditionalism, illiteracy, and poverty.
Under no circumstances should the West resignedly abandon Afghanistan. Strategically important, though to what extent in this era of nuclear weapons and long range bombers is a matter of military argument, Afghanistan, is essential to the continued safety of South Asia. Soviet power must be contained north of the Oxus River.
The prevalence of American influence is encouraging. During the past decade, the United States was Afghanistan’s most important customer, having taken over Germany’s pre-war prominence. These important economic links must not be loosened. Economic and technical assistance should be continued and possibly expanded, but much depends upon the healthy absorptive capacity of Afghan society. While long-range projects such as the Helmand River project are necessary for the future development of Afghanistan’s economy, greater consideration should be given to more limited, readily usable undertakings.
The attitude of India is a factor of possible future importance. Though not actively wooing Afghanistan, it has tacitly lent its support against Pakistan. Nehru’s views are highly regarded in Kabul, where anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and the principles of Bandung are accorded much support. The Afghan-Indian treaty of friendship signed in January, 1950, was indicative of a desire to minimize Great Power influence, but in the absence of any broad economic ties the influence of India must remain of questionable significance.
Finally, and most important, the full scope of American diplomacy must be directed, with patience, perception, and a measure of imagination, toward a permanent settlement not only of the Afghan-Pakistan quarrel, but of the entire complex of tensions besetting the sub-continent. Nothing less can ensure the containment of Soviet power and safeguard the democratic development of South Asian nationalism.