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LINCOLN’S ADMIRALS. By Clarence Edward Macartney. Foreword by George Fielding Eliot. New York: Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1956. 335 pages, including bibliography and index. $5.00.
Reviewed by Capt. Samuel G. Kelly, usn (ret)
(Captain Kelly, before Ills retirement in October, 1055, served as Assistant Director of Naval History, U. S. Navy _fPartment. lie is Vice President of the Civil War Round * able of the District of Columbia.)
Dr. Macartney is well known to those who read the literature of the Civil War, for he has written six books dealing with this stormy and tragic phase of our national life. Particularly well known are Lincoln and his Generals and Little Mac—the Life of McClellan.
For such a prolific author (forty-seven books) whose interest has been captured by the Civil War, it was almost inevitable that a book about Lincoln’s “admirals” would follow eventually the one about Lincoln and his generals. While in no sense a scholarly work on the Civil War, this book is well worth reading even though it stresses the exploits, rather than the biographical highlights, of the Union naval officers who gained fame in the Civil War.
The five admirals were Farragut, Porter, Foote, Dahlgren, and Dupont. In chapters devoted to each their deeds and successes are recounted in a lively and interesting manner. It is of interest to note that the author has devoted some sixty pages to Porter, 55 to Farragut, 36 to Foote, and 27 each to Dahlgren and Dupont. This is a good indication of the relative accomplishments of these five and will, of course, please the supporters of Admiral Porter—a group which included General W. T. Sherman who liked to refer to Porter as the “Lord High Admiral of the U. S. Navy,” and also General Grant, who claimed Porter was a greater naval officer than Lord Nelson. But the author places Farragut in first place, and this rank will be accepted generally today.
In reading these five chapters one can gain a comprehensive picture of the accomplishments of the Union Navy from Foote’s morale-raising victory against Fort Henry on the Tennessee River in February, 1862, to Porter’s valuable aid to Grant before Vicksburg (later offset by his ill-starred excursion with his gunboats up the Red River with General Banks in March, 1864), and finally to Farragut’s epic victory at Mobile Bay in August, 1864.
Dupont’s initial naval victory against Port Royal in November, 1861, which lifted Union spirits from the depths of Bull Run, brought him sudden fame, which declined just as suddenly after his premature withdrawal from the fighting at Charleston in 1863. Dahlgren’s effort to succeed at Charleston where Dupont had failed was similarly blocked—not by the weakness of naval gun fire or the capability of the two admirals but simply because the naval guns could not crash through the fortifications and reach the guns of the forts. In the Civil War the ship-borne gun could only gain a victory if it could demolish the defensive shelter protecting the emplaced guns.
In addition to the five officers who attained the rank of rear admiral (Farragut and Porter eventually reached the rank of Admiral of the Navy) the author has chapters devoted to John Winslow, Napoleon Collins, William B. Cushing, and John Worden. The reader may be puzzled by the inclusion of these four officers who were not commissioned as rear admirals under Lincoln. Some may quarrel with this inclusion, but these officers accomplished deeds of renown during the Civil War which entitle them to have their efforts chronicled.
The chapter on Captain John A. Winslow relates the well known tale of the Sunday battle between the USS Kearsarge and the English-built, and partially English-manned, Confederate raider Alabama. The Union gunners aimed for the water line, and as shot after shot from the big Dahlgren guns struck home, the fight was not long in doubt. The Alabama surrendered and sank shortly thereafter.
The exploits of William B. Cushing, the young daredevil of the Union Navy, have thrilled hundreds of midshipmen during the past 90 years, and the chapter devoted to his exploits against the Confederate ram Albemarle will be read with equal interest by many young people outside of the naval service.
Commander Napoleon Collins is not today a well-known figure, even in naval circles, but during the Civil War he was admired and honored by his colleagues for one daring exploit. Falling in with the Confederate raider Florida, he chased it into the neutral harbor of Bahia, Brazil; flouting the neutrality of Brazil, he got underway quietly one dark night and seized the ship and towed it to sea while half the officers and crew were on shore leave. He finally got the tow to Hampton Roads, but outside of naval circles, got scant credit for his exploit.
John Worden, the first commanding officer of the Monitor, is the best known of the four non-admirals described in the book. He had fame thrust upon him by his Monitor's victory over the Merrimac. While the chapter on Worden is more descriptive of the Monitor and her famous battle, Worden was the victorious skipper. Temporarily blinded by a shot which struck the pilot house, he continued to give orders until the end of the battle.
To new students of the Civil War, Lincoln's Admirals will prove to be an interesting summary of the major accomplishments of the Union Navy and, as such, should be a welcome addition to naval libraries, both ashore and afloat.
THE WORLD’S TANKERS. By Laurence
Dunn. London: Adlard Coles Limited;
New York: John de Graff, Inc. 176 pages;
index. $6.95.
Reviewed by Colonel Lane C.
Kendall, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
{Colonel Kendall is Head of the Department of Ship Management and Professor of Marine Transportation, New York Maritime Academy.)
Laurence Dunn has performed a prodigious feat in writing The World’s Tankers. He has traced the history of tankers from 1861, when the brig Elizabeth sailed from Philadelphia with a cargo of barreled oil, to 1955, when the super-tanker Spyros Niarchos was launched. In the process, he includes many fascinating stories of almost forgotten ships which were of more than passing im portance.
It is a wonderful story of almost a century of change and progress which Mr. Dunn accurately and painstakingly unfolds in his well-written, profusely illustrated, and carefully-indexed little volume. The narrative is almost wholly of ships, but there is sufficient detail about owners and commerce to give significance to the chronicle.
Particularly impressive are the 154 photographs and fifty drawings which provide an excellent pictorial history of tankers, whal ing factory-ships, ore-oil carriers, and supertankers. The captions contain full technical data, including changes of ownership and name, and the ultimate fate of the individual vessels.
There are chapters on whaling factory- shlPs, the first of which were converted tankers; coastal and inland waterways petroleum carriers; and special types of tankers. This last grouping includes wine tankers, liquefied petroleum-gas ships, chem- lcal tankers, and molasses carriers. There also is a good commentary on the development of the ore-oil carriers. Brief accounts °f ten major tanker-owning companies complete the book.
Super-tankers are described in a special chapter. Mr. Dunn considers that the 24,500-ton C. J. Ilambro of 1949 “marked the beginning of a new phase in large tanker construction.” He ignores the 23,910-ton Phoenix, built in 1944 and considered by many to be the prototype of the big oil carriers. On the other hand, he does give appropriate attention to the World Glory 11954), first of the 45,000-ton tankers.
Anyone who has worked with, around, or aboard tankers will find this book most interesting reading. The pictures alone make the volume worth owning; the authoritative text is a handsome bonus.
STILWELL’S command problems.
(u. s. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II—THE CHINA, Burma, India theater.) By Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1956. 518 pages. $6.25.
Reviewed by Major William P.
Moody, usaf
(A member of the Historical Section, Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1952 to 1956, Major Moody is now Associate Professor of History, United Stales Air Force Academy.)
This is a drama-packed history of the China-Burma-India Theater for the year beginning October, 1943. It focuses on Stilwell’s command problems, the Allied campaign in north Burma, Sino-American relations, and the principal policy decisions that affected Stilwell and his mission.
The authors have maintained the same high standards they set in Stilwell’s Mission to China. Their research is remarkably thorough; their narrative, clear and dispassionate. They do not state a thesis, but their two volumes clearly suggest one: if Chiang Kai- shek had followed Stilwell’s advice; if he had concentrated on reforming his Army and on building an elite force of sixty to ninety divisions instead of supporting Chen- nault’s pleas for additional air power; if he had sent his Army into Burma in March 1943, when Stilwell wanted him to, instead of refusing to take the risk; if he had done all these things promptly and with vigor— then the history of China might have been different. Chiang instead of Mao Tse-tung would probably control China today.
Naval and Air Force readers seem sure to quarrel with Stilwell’s views on strategy, especially with his insistence on the importance of ground operations in China. They will follow with interest the authors’ account of the Cairo Conference, which adopted the general concept that “the main effort against Japan should be made in the Pacific.”
Stilwell’s command problems were formidable indeed, involving five command and staff positions in four Allied or national theaters of operations. He was Commanding General, Chinese Army in India; Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command; Commanding General, United States Army Forces, China, Burma, and India; Commanding General, Northern Combat Area Command; and Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander, China Theater, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. As Mount- batten’s Deputy and Chiang’s Chief of Staff, Stilwell was caught between their frequently conflicting directives. And he always had to remember that his main responsibility was to his own government.
Inevitably, Stilwell became embroiled in controversies with other commanders. Mountbatten persuaded the War Department to replace him as his Deputy. Stilwell sought unsuccessfully to have Chennault relieved for insubordination. Ultimately, Stilwell’s “enemies” in Chungking and Washington managed to have him recalled from China.
Ironically, it was the combination of Mountbatten’s request for Stilwell’s relief and Vice President Wallace’s recommendation for his recall from China that led to his promotion to full general. Both proposals came in June, 1944, after Stilwell’s dramatic seizure of the airstrip at Myitkyina at a time when the Japanese Army was sweeping inexorably toward Chennault’s air bases in east China.
Exerting their great wartime influence on Stilwell’s behalf, the Joint Chiefs of Staff persuaded the President to promote him and to ask the Generalissimo to place him in command of all armed forces in China. The Chiefs bluntly reminded the President how he had rejected Stilwell’s proposal to improve the Chinese Army in favor of Chennault’s plan for expanding air operations against the Japanese. The subject of their memo to the President might easily have been “Stilwell was right.”
Chiang agreed “in principle” to Stilwell’s appointment; however, he apparently began at once to rally all his diplomatic resources to prevent it. Authors Romanus and Sunderland have provided the definitive account of the events that led to Stilwell’s recall, and Stilwell emerges as a victim of circumstance.
When Stilwell returned to Washington, he wanted to issue a statement defending himself. But the War Department refused permission. It is just as well. Romanus and Sunderland have made a far better case for Stilwell than he could have made for himself.
MILITARY HERITAGE OF AMERICA. By Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy, U. S. Army (Ret.) and Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, U. S. Army. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956. 794 pages, including maps, diagrams, and index. $10.00.
Reviewed by Brigadier General Herman Beukema, U. S. Army (Ret.)
(A West Pointer in the Class of 1915, General Beukema was West Point's Professor of Social Science from 1930 until his retirement in 1954. Since 1954 he has been Director of the University of Maryland’s Overseas Program.)
In the preface of their study, the authors comment: “War, being no affair of mutual contract, needs but one willing party for its launching, regardless of the wishes of the other party. Every American, then, should examine war—its past, its present, and above all the method of its waging.” With that statement the Colonels Dupuy, pbre et fils, place themselves near dead center of the continuing controversy over the respective roles and obligations of the soldier and the civilian in the formulation and execution of military policy. Their position rejects both the Clausewitz-Ludendorff concept of essential control of policy by the military and its opposite, epitomized in the Clemenceau quip that “war is much too important a business to be left to the generals.” Instead, this study supports the policy under which selected civilian specialists of the Executive Establishment are enrolled in our top level military schools, while on the other hand promising young officers of the Armed Forces undergo graduate training in the universities.
The authors, however, go one step further, an important step, in addressing their ideas not only to the man in uniform but also to every intelligent member of the electorate. Their materials, originally used in outline form by Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy in the ROTC course at Harvard University, have been drawn from various sources, among them texts and maps prepared by the Department of Military Art and Engineering at the U. S. Military Academy.
The principles of war, as applied in the campaigns of the “great captains” from Alexander to Frederick II, are noted at the outset. Thereafter the reader is shown the very considerable inheritance of military knowledge which the “Minute Men” of 1775 had acquired from their previous contact with both the British and French forces, during the period of Colonial Wars, in addition to first-hand experience with the new, man-to-man combat of the North American frontier. Down through the wars that followed, including the last gory “police action” in Korea, the picture of our military evolution is followed. One ugly feature of the uniform pattern is disclosed—the blindness of the public and their elected representatives in peace time to each succeeding emergency until shooting war had opened their eyes, the subsequent expiation of folly in the waste of blood and treasure, and the final record of no major military defeat. The conclusion implicit in the dreary picture is hinted rather than spelled out—that the United States never evolved a sustained military policy until after the full lesson of the Korean experience had been driven home to the American electorate.
This book .should be on the shelves of every school and public library. Its readability will invite attention. Its truths could , e P to reverse the greatest obstacle that .as faced our policy makers from 1775 to 1957.
1HE CENTRAL BLUE: Recollections and Reflections. By Marshal of the Royal Air force Sir John Slessor. London: Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1956. 709 pages, photographs, appendices, and index. 30/-; American Edition published February, 1957 by F. A. Praeger, New York. $7.50.
Reviewed by Robin D. S. Higham
(Professor Higham, a member of the University of Massachusetts’ History Department, served with the Royal Air b°rce during World War II.)
Sir John Slessor’s autobiography is readable, amusing, and provocative, as well as didactic. Author of the recent Strategy for the West, he is an airman who recognizes that the other services also have vital roles to Play in modern war, though he is sometimes critical of their self-importance in an air age. Nevertheless, wardroom readers will find his book of more interest than most memoirs f°r Sir John was at various times associated Wlth planning at the Air Ministry, liaison officer in Washington both before and after Pearl Harbor, Air Officer Commanding Coastal Command during the critical period °f the World War II battle against the U- boats, and more recently Chief of the Air Staff in London.
As he says in his preface, Slessor has always been interested in the higher direction °f military policy and has been intermittently associated with it since his first appointment under Sir Hugh Trenchard, the first Chief of the Air Staff and founding father of the modern Royal Air Force. He is a warm advocate of the Chiefs of Staff Committee established in 1923 and firmly believes that this is one of those workable British compromises which should endure because it has survived the test of war.
Naval officers and men will find the three chapters on Coastal Command of interest, particularly with reference to the co-ordination of shore-based aircraft with surface vessels. On the other hand, a navy, which is engaged in the expensive task of creating a super-carrier force, will not view with great pleasure another airman’s opinion that carriers are a waste of money except for convoy work, though a phase of naval development which oceanic-minded powers must suffer through. Yet, despite this outward similarity with American air power advocates, his remarks are worth reading because he has had the naval experience which many of his U. S. Air Force contemporaries lack.
SAIL TRAINING AND CADET SHIPS. By Harold A. Underhill. Glasgow: Brown, Son and Ferguson, Ltd., 1956. 335 pages, plus appendix, 45 plans, index. 60 shillings.
Reviewed by Commander Francis E. Clark, usn
(Commander Clark is the author of the article “ Training in Sailing Vessels Carries On," which appeared in the October, 1955 Proceedings.)
Although sail training vessels have played highly useful roles in the navies and merchant marines of the maritime world during the years since steam began to supplant the winds as motive power, and are still widely used, no writer has previously attempted to compile the histories of these interesting vessels in full length book form. The news that Mr. Underhill, an English—I should probably say Scottish—lover of sail, had undertaken such a work was therefore received with anticipation by sailing ship enthusiasts, in view of Mr. Underhill’s previous authoritative works on masting, rigging, and related subjects. Unfortunately the result, wherein the author has tried to include both “anatomical” (to use his own word) details and history, is not quite up to his customary standard. As usual, Mr. Underhill is superb in presenting structural features, but his history is uneven in quality.
In evaluating Sail Training and Cadet Ships, two points must be kept in mind. First, Mr. Underhill is admittedly more interested in merchant marine vessels. Hence, naval training vessels are frequently treated somewhat summarily. For his own country, he frankly omits (due to overabundance of material) such interesting naval relics as Conway, Worcester, Arethusa (I), Implacable, and others (even as merchant training institutions), plus the turn of the century Royal Navy Training Squadrons, leaving them for a promised future volume to themselves. However, outside the United Kingdom, he has attempted completeness but without full success. The United States Navy has fared particularly badly. For example, USS Chesapeake (later Severn) is incorrectly classified as a bark (she was a ship in her training years) and her naval history is condensed into two lines, with no mention of her service to the Naval Academy; in fact, no Naval Academy sail practice ship is mentioned as such. Of the Naval Academy yachts, only Highland Light receives mention, although most of the comparable craft in other navies are included. For our Coast Guard, Eagle and Salmon P. Chase are covered, but Dobbin, Itasca, and Alexander Hamilton are missing. Other naval omissions include the Japanese Ishikawa, Tateyama, Manju, and Kanju of the nineteenth century, Chile’s new Esmeralda, and a number of smaller craft. In fairness, however, Mr. Underhill has quite admirably and with reasonable comprehensiveness dealt with the various European navies, particularly Germany and Scandinavia. Moreover, when discussing the more numerous merchant marine training vessels he has achieved a satisfying degree of completeness, both geographically and historically. Here again the treatment of northern European vessels in general, and Scandinavian in particular, is outstanding. Mr. Underhill has not only traced the vessels thoroughly in Lloyds’ records, and other official sources, but has done much research and accumulated much data from primary sources hitherto only slightly tapped. Since this area has been and is a stronghold of sail training, Mr. Underhill has rightly done his best by it. Outside of northern Europe, he is also reasonably successful, although one or two minor omissions, and a few questionable dates, could be noted. Also, Mr. Underhill is apparently unaware of the wartime fate of several vessels, such as the Soviet Tovarisch (I), and the Greek Ares, which are known in outline, if not in detail.
The second point to consider is Mr. Under- Ilill’s selected method of organization for his material. Except for a general opening chapter, he has chosen to divide the vessels by their rig (ships, barks, barkentines, etc.) and then treat them alphabetically within this basic classification. There is therefore a complete lack of continuity. For example, opening the book at random, under “Ships” 've find USS Saratoga (State of Pennsylvania schoolship at the turn of the century), f°l' lowed by Sobraon (merely a cross-reference to her later name, HMAS Tingira), then Norway’s modern Sorlandel, and so on. Thus, for one who is already familiar with recent sailing ship history, Sail Training and Cadet Ships is a valuable reference work. But for the average reader, it would appear preferable to have arranged the material chronologically (the appendix attempts this), or by nationalities, and thus achieve greater clarity. However, this is admittedly a matter of opinion, and there are many other indications that Mr. Underhill has deliberately chosen to provide a reference work for sailing ship lovers and maritime historians who have adequate basic knowledge of the subject, and not merely a “popular” summary, which Alan Villiers and others have previously done in article form. On this basis, he has succeeded.
Having commented on relatively minor discrepancies, it is time to say that there is much to praise, in addition to the generally adequate and often excellent comprehensiveness of this book. The mere fact that he has written about more than 200 vessels, and as completely as possible about the more obscure, is indicative of the thoroughness of the author’s effort, as is the inclusion of some border-line “training” vessels. And it is worth emphasizing again that, when writing of the structural features of his subject, Mr. Underhill is outstanding. This is enhanced by the 45 plates, detailing the plans of sixteen vessels from schooner to four-masted bark; these are executed with Mr. Underhill’s customary clarity, attention to detail, and authoritativeness, and will delight both the student and the model builder. Moreover, the book is magnificently and profusely illustrated; over half of the vessels described are also pictured, and many of the photos are from private collections never, as far as this reviewer knows, previously published. Another happy point is the almost total absence of typographical errors (I found
only two names misspelled) and the helpful , orial device of cross-references in the text to illustrations and plates.
In summary, then, Sail Training and Cadet kips is not for casual fireside reading. But °r those who already know something about the history of sail during the last seventy-five years, Mr. Underhill has drawn together many previously scattered facts, and much new material, resulting in a valuable contribution to the available literature ln the field.
what to do about the draft
and MILITARY SERVICE. Edited by John Gourlie. Washington: Washington Data Service, 2319, M St., NW, Washington, D.C., 1956. 26 pages, plus chart. $2.95.
Reviewed by Commander D. J.
Carrison, usn
(Commander Carrison is the Commanding Officer of the SS Wilkinson (DL-5) which has recently been trans- J erred to the Pacific Fleet.)
This publication is an interpretation of the current laws and regulations affecting the Selective Service System and Military Serv- lce. Addressed primarily to teachers, parents, employers and youth counselors, it presents a timely and accurate summary of the complex options now available to our young men.
From past experience on the Washington scene I would think that the publishers erred m not printing the book in loose-leaf form to facilitate future revisions. To be useful it must be up-to-date—a fact recognized by the editor who proposes to revise it “whenever • ■ • the need arises.” While it is correct and Pertinent now, any treatise on so many varied and changing subjects is headed for certain (and frequent) revision.
Military readers may feel that the authors Place too much emphasis on ways for young men to avoid military service. Nevertheless, the laws relating to military obligations rec- °gnize youth’s reluctance to serve and include severe penalties to ensure compliance. It follows then, that draft procedures, deferments, appeals, and a complete listing of disqualifying defects will have high readership appeal to a cross-section of the population.
The primary purpose of the book is to present information which will enable a young man to decide how to fulfill his military obligation and at the same time lay a foundation for a productive life career. It contains a frank estimate of youth’s chances in the draft and reaches the conclusion that at best the future is uncertain. After a thorough discussion of the means to avoid active duty, the theme departs to a presentation of the many options for military service now in existence. These are divided into four broad headings:
Choices for Minimum Active Service;
Choices for Minimum Actual Military Duty;
Choices for Career Benefits; and,
Becoming an Officer.
With the exception of the description of the pilot-training programs, all data appear to be correct. The error in pilot-training would lead one to think that only enlisted men are accepted. This error appears only once, and it is corrected later in a colored chart which summarizes all information.
The authors’ primary accomplishment with this text is to publicize once again the requirements of youth’s obligation for defense. They can not and do not claim originality of thought or presentation. Their main service has been one of collection. They present, under one cover, a mass of information that is readily available to the public, but which is sometimes difficult to obtain. I would summarize it as a handy guide for background information, but I would still caution parents to check their decisions with the nearest appropriate government office.
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