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Greek Training Ship Ares
(See page 1145, October, 1955 Proceedings)
Commander Epam. G. Panas, r.ii.n., Royal Hellenic Naval Cadet College, Athens.—The data concerning sailing vessels used for training is slightly in error regarding the Greek training ship .Ires. By order of the Greek government she was built in Toulon in 1927 as a training ship for the Royal Hellenic Navy. She was commissioned in 1928 and made her first training cruise the same year.
The Ares made regular summer cruises every year until 1940 in the waters of the Black Sea, Mediterranean, and Atlantic, training naval cadets and boys of the Royal Hellenic Navy. She made short winter cruises in home waters. She also was attached to the Navigation School for officers’ long and short courses, petty officers’ courses, and seamanship training for regular and conscript seamen ratings. When Greece entered World War II she was converted into a hospital ship according to plan, but proved unsuitable because of her slow speed of about nine knots. The Ares finally was sunk in 1943 somewhere in the Straits of Tunisia.
British Monitors
(See page 550, May, 1957 Proceedings)
Commander Jens Nilsen, usnr.—HMS Glatton was one of two Norwegian coast defense ships laid down in Britain in 1913 and launched in July of the following year. Along with all other warships building for foreign governments, they were taken over by the Royal Navy in 1915 and completed during the summer of 1918. The British added blisters for better protection to these ships.
The Glallon’s original name was Bjoergvin, and her sister ship was called Nidaros. These two vessels could not quite be termed monitors, inasmuch as they were designed for almost full seagoing capability, with a speed of 15 knots, and could quite properly be termed slow-speed armored cruisers.
I note that your accompanying article says that these ships were “considerably modified for naval service.” However, according to a plan of the ships in Xorges Sjoeforsvar, 18141914, the only alterations made to these vessels by the British were the aforementioned blisters (bulges) and the increased elevation of their 9.4-inch guns.
U. S. Armed Forces Institute
(See pages 401-105, April, 1956 Proceedings and also Rear Admiral McCandless’ book review on retirement, November, 1957 Proceedings.)
Lieutenant J. R„ Walker, usn.—I greatly enjoyed reading Commander Arm- knecht’s “The Retired Officer in Education.” I suspect there are a great many officers who are not familiar with the remarkable educational opportunity offered service people by the U. S. Armed Forces Institute. A study of NAVPERS Information and Education Manual and the US A FI Catalog will provide a fruitful start.
USAl'I will furnish teaching materials and is anxious to be of assistance whenever possible. They supply “Foundationsof Education” direct and other subjects in the field of education are available as correspondence courses from participating colleges and universities.
In the light of recent demands for more tangible evidences of officer interest in the enlisted man’s personal welfare, it would seem that voluntary service of officers at all levels in this excellent program can fill a very real need as well as provide practical experience in education, a career that Commander Armknecht clearly has shown to be very attractive for the retired officer.
Moffett Field
(See page 1117, October, 1957 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral C. E. Rosendahl, usn (Ret).—Admiral “Jerry” Land has contributed one of the lighter facets of the story of Moffett Field that never previously came to my attention. Lest the casual reader gather that this fine base was acquired rather easily, I should like to add a few comments from my own knowledge.
Beginning back in 1925, the Navy had sought an airship base on the Pacific Coast. In March, 1929, the Congress directed the Secretary of the Navy to have an investigation made of sites suitable for that purpose. A board known as the Moffett Board accordingly surveyed the entire Pacific seaboard most painstakingly from Canada to Mexico. Headed by Admiral Moffett, the board also included Rear Admiral J. M. Reeves, Commander Garland Fulton (CC), Commander E. L. Marshall (CEC), and myself.
Four of us unhesitatingly recommended the Sunnyvale site, and Admiral Reeves held out strongly for Camp Kearney near San Diego. After careful hearings by the General Board, the House Naval Affairs Committee of the Congress also conducted exhaustive hearings on the subject, and by ah overwhelming vote reported in favor of Sunnyvale. The 70th Congress accepted the Committee’s report, and voted the free acceptance of 1,000 acres of choice land donated by the citizens of that vicinity.
The resulting base, probably the only one the Navy was ever able up to that time to start from scratch and build as desired, became known as the Naval Air Station Sunnyvale, Mountain View, California. Following the loss of the rigid airship Macon on February 12, 1935, NAS Sunnyvale became an instrument of exchange.
Only some seven months later, and hard on the heels of the adjournment of the Congress, through the magic of the initials “FDR” on a piece of paper, Sunnyvale was transferred to the Army in return for Rockwell field on North Island, San Diego; Ford Island in Pearl Harbor; and a portion of the old Army Bolling Field at Anacostia. It was an odd deal, and far more deep-seated than can be related herein. The resultant story of Sunnyvale will be covered at its deserved length in a coming book of mine nearing completion.
Strings attached to the deal paved the way for the return of Sunnyvale to the Navy for our use by blimps during World War II I was one of the naval officers who had to negotiate with the Army for its return. It then became redesignated as Moffett Field. Upon cessation of blimp activities there, it became a heavier-than-air base, retained by the Navy, of course.
At the time of its selection, Admiral Moffett had a far-seeing idea that by dredging and acquisition of a bit more area, Sunnyvale could have become a joint base for airships, seaplanes, carriers and their craft. At that time, it was a feasibility. Now that we are acquiring and building a brand new, huge “jet complex” at Lemore, it is anybody’s guess what the Navy’s planners may have in mind for this fine Moffett Field. The least likely, though the most logical from every possible standpoint, would be its return to its original purpose as an airship base.
Panama Canal Problem Calls for Action
(Editor’s Note: Throughout the past half century and more the Proceedings has carried articles and comments discussing the strategic and engineering aspects of the Panama Canal. E.xperts have testified that something should be done to keep the canal in step with growth and functions of the U. S. Navy. There is a growing body of ships (our carriers) which cannot use the canal. There is also a growing demand that something be done about this problem. The following comment comes from a former Deputy Governor of the Canal Zone and the current Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority.)
Herbert 1). Vogei..—It is hardly enough to say that 1 am greatly impressed by the arguments set forth by Captain DuVal. Not only is his plan plausible, it is sound. I have been and I remain cool toward the plans for a sea level canal. Cost alone would preclude building it as a commercial venture, and I have never heard it authoritatively proclaimed a military necessity. That leaves the choice between the third locks and the terminal lakes plans. The former would probably cost less considering what has already been accomplished, but the latter is more adequate to meet the needs of the future. A combination of these two plans is, of course, possible, and optimum results might be obtained thereby. Modern construction permits greater lifts than were formerly considered reasonable or economical. Consideration might well be given greater lifts in any new locks to be built at Miraflores.
An Evaluation of Commodore Bainbridge
(See pages 686-687, June, 1957 Proceedings)
Mrs. Alexander L. Redon, Arlington, Virginia.—The article on Commodore William Bainbridge seems to be open to question in several of its aspects. Appraising Bainbridge as such an outstanding example of technical proficiency and of unusual valor and skill in battle does not quite agree with fact. True, much of his career seemed to be dogged by bad luck. But some of it may have been of his own making.
Your article omitted one contribution Bainbridge made to the Navy which might well be his most important. At the onset of the War of 1812 he, together with Charles Stewart, was successful in changing the war plans for the use of naval vessels. The President and his Cabinet had decided to employ our ships to guard our harbors, virtually bottling up the American Navy. Some of those who opposed the Navy in principle, and there were men of this opinion within the Cabinet, saw this as a way to destroy the prestige of the Service. Bainbridge and Stewart not only convinced the government of the necessity of keeping these public ships on the high seas, but also urged that they must be ordered to sea immediately to gain the advantage of the offensive. Considering the record the Navy achieved in the War of 1812, it becomes quite evident how significant this reversal of policy actually was. Without these naval successes, the United States today might be a Dominion with the Commonwealth. Definitely the Navy aided the bargaining position of the peace envoys.
The life of Bainbridge is much more interesting than a mere listing of accomplishments. He tenaciously fought to overcome obstacle after obstacle in a long life of service to the Navy. That the glory somehow eluded him was perhaps because his goal was so high and his competitors so gifted. No aura of glamour ever surrounded him; he was not a dashing warrior, but an able administrator. The pity is he never quite reconciled himself
0 his own role.
The Future of the Battleship
Norman C. Polmar.—With much interest
1 have recently noted that the Navy Department has scheduled the 45,000-ton battleships Wisconsin and Iowa for deactivation later this year and in 1958, respectively. The removal from active duty of these battleships, the largest afloat today, will mark the first time since the commissioning of the Indiana in 1895, Battleship No. 1, that no U. S. battleships are in active service.
I believe this truly marks the end of the era of conventional naval war—in view of the Navy’s recently ordering nuclear reactors for the guided missile, nuclear-powered cruiser, Long Beach (14,000 tons) and an 85,000-ton nuclear-powered attack carrier.
Currently only one other “modern” battleship remains in active service, the 38,500- ton French Richelieu as a training ship. The French Jean Bart, a 38,750-ton near-sister, was retired from active duty earlier this year.[1] The only other nation possessing modern battleships is Great Britain with one 44,500-ton ship (Vanguard) and four 35,000- ton ships (Anson, Duke of York, Howe, and King George V), all now in reserve. Six older types are retained by foreign navies:
Chile: Almirante Latorre
Italy: Andrea Doria
Caio Duilio
Soviet Union: Novorossisk
Oktyabrskaya Revolutsiya Sevastopol
The U. S. “mothball” fleet includes eight World War II era battleships: Missouri and New Jersey, both 45,000 tons; North Carolina, Washington, South Dakota, Indiana, Alabama, and Massachusetts, all 35,000 tons; and the older (completed 1921— 1923) Colorado (32,500 tons), Maryland (31,500 tons), and West Virginia (31,800 tons). In addition there is the uncompleted hull of the Kentucky which the Navy Department has announced will not be completed as a guided missile capital ship (BBG).
Also three “big gun” battle cruisers are in service: the U. S. Navy’s modern Guam and Alaska (both 27,500 tons), both in reserve, and the old Turkish Yavuz (22.734 tons). A third U. S. battle cruiser, the Hawaii, is suspended.
It is interesting to note as a possible clue to the future of the “big gun” ship that the Navy reclassified the uncompleted Hawaii as a large tactical command ship (CBC-1) from 1952 through 1954. Conversion, was however, cancelled before the actual work started (now in reserve as CB-3). Vice Admiral John F. Shafroth, usn (Ret.) has stated that he believes the future place of the battleship will be to act as a radar-control ship with fast carrier task forces. According to Admiral Shafroth a carrier’s decks, being needed for aircraft operations, allow no space for the.huge radar installations necessary for detection' of enemy forces and guidance of our own weapons, f
In apparent support of the argument for using fast battleships (the Iowa’s maximum service speed is 35 knots) as fleet command ships it is noted that the Iowa and Wisconsin have recently received new SPS-8 air search radar installations. Also, in 1953 an unfinished World War II type heavy cruiser completed as a tactical command ship, the Northampton (CLC-1). The employment of the 17,200-ton, conventionally armed and powered vessel as a fast command ship has proved most successful.
Conversion of fast battleships, or at least the uncompleted Kentucky and Hawaii, to fast tactical command ships might include installation of twin (or even quad) “Terrier” type anti-aircraft missile launchers (in lieu of their designed triple turreted main battery). Thus armed and fitted with additional search and control radar, supported by the necessary combat information centers, etc., at least a few battleships could find successful “employment” in the nuclear age navy.
f The Sunday Star, Washington, D. C., June 9, 1957,
[1] Editor’s Note: See page 1055, October, 1956 Proceedings for an article on the World War II career of the Jean Bart.