I
The ultimate creation of an integrated deep water transportation system in the European sector of the Soviet Union,” was stated as one of the goals of the fifth Five-Year Plan, 1951-1955. The current completion of this internal waterway lends the world’s number two naval power a new omnipresence.
An inland waterway linking the Black, Caspian, Baltic, and White seas was realized only with the opening of the Volga-Don Canal in 1952; but the dream of such a waterway was born with the iron-willed founder of the first Russian wooden fleet, Peter the Great.
Having failed in the first attempt to seize Azov from the Turks, Peter built a fleet consisting of: “Two large ships, 23 galleys, four fireships and 1,300 barges.” Timber for the construction at Voronezh, on the Don, was floated down the Volga to the vicinity of present-day Stalingrad, then transported overland to the Don. Twenty thousand troops under the command of Lefort and Golovin accompanied the timber downstream and served as manpower for the portage. Russian efforts were rewarded by the capture of Azov the following year, 1696.
After conquering Azov, Peter was confronted with the necessity for supplying the garrison, and laid plans for a Volga-Don canal from the vicinity of Kamyshin (just west of Nikolaevsk), south along the small Uov River to the Don. This is the first known attempt to construct a Volga-Don canal. Although the Volga and the Don remained separated by terra firma, Peter initiated construction of Russian waterways, which by the middle of the 19th century connected the principal rivers of European Russia.
If there was lack of engineering skill to construct a Volga-Don canal, there was no lack of imagination. At the beginning of the 19th century, ships’ hulls were bored for axles; on reaching port on the lower Volga, calking was removed, axles emplaced and oxen hitched to the ships, ten to fifty pairs being employed depending upon the nature of the cargo. Under favorable wind conditions, sails were set. The Volga-Don “run” normally required five days but was reduced to four by a favorable wind.
Beginning with the 19th century, there was constantly one or more variants of a Volga-Don canal on the drawing board. Hence the Soviets first faced the construction of a Volga-Don canal with a wealth of previous studies at their disposal. Practically every aspect and all alternatives had been considered; some optimistic engineers had even suggested a tunnel linking the two rivers. In 1927-28, there was much talk of a canal, but no digging. The project was clearly beyond the Soviet capacity at that time. The second Five-Year Plan , 1932-37, also made • provision for a canal. Construction at a cost of 150 million rubles was designated to begin in 1934, and was to be completed in 1937.
During the period 1933-39, there were various differences of engineering opinion. One group proposed a canal whose main function would be navigational and the diversion of waters of the Don to the Volga basin. During spring flood, much of the Don’s water ran off to sea “unused.” On the other hand, the level of the Caspian Sea is falling rapidly. Diversion of waters from the Don would slow the recession of the Caspian and be a boon to its threatened fishing industry. Other groups opposed diversion of Don waters on the grounds that such action would increase the salinity of the Azov.
It was decided that the diversion of Don water alone would not significantly retard the fall of the Caspian, but must be coupled with other large scale projects if appreciable results were to be obtained. The diversity of opinions resulted in postponement of the Volga-Don project. Meanwhile, work on the Baltic-White Sea-Moscow complex was underway. The construction of the Ivankov Dam made possible the Moscow Canal, opened in 1937. The canal links Moscow with the Volga and assures the city of an adequate water supply.
Connection with the Neva and the Baltic through the Gulf of Finland was improved by modernization of the Mariinsk Waterway, built at the end of the 18th century. The Rybinsk reservoir is a part of the new Mariinsk system. Canals between Lake Onega and the White Sea, first built by the Soviets, together with improvements of the old system form a maritime link between the Volga and the White Sea.
In the late 1930’s, the Volga-Don canal remained the only uncompleted link in the Baltic-White-Sea-Caspian-Black Sea chain. At the XVIIIth Party Congress, 1939, V. M. Molotov said:
The question about the construction of the Volga-Don canal was raised. This is also one of the serious economic problems towards the solution of which we must work in the third Five- Year Plan [1938-WWII]. The solution of the Volga-Don canal was delayed, because it was complicated by a series of other problems, for example: the construction of giant hydro-electric stations. At the present time this question is being worked out in the GOSPLAN or the Union, and we will soon return to its concrete solution ....
There was more involved than the construction of 101 kilometers of canal. A canal by itself would not serve the final link in the waterway joining the Baltic and White with the Black and Caspian seas. The lower Don was not sufficiently deep.
The final plan was designed to fulfill irrigational, hydro-electrical, and transportational functions. The Soviets emphasize the integrated nature of their scheme as opposed to the basically navigational goal of earlier plans. Indeed, Peter the Great lacked clairvoyance to see the hydro-electric potential of Russia’s rivers! A series of dams on the Volga is designed to guarantee a minimum depth of fifteen feet. Canals connecting the Volga, Don, Neva and Dnieper provide the same minimum depth of water. Power generated at the dams is used to operate canals, to pump water for irrigation, and to support regional industry. When completed, the Kuibyshev and Stalingrad hydro-electric stations will transmit power to Moscow.
Work on the Volga-Don canal and supporting dams was begun as a part of the third Five-Year Plan, but construction was halted by the outbreak of World War II. Planning was quietly resumed in 1947; and in 1950, the Council of Ministers decreed:
1. To decrease construction time of the Volga- Don waterway by two years; construction to be completed in 1951. [The project was to include the following]:
a. A navigable Volga-Don canal connecting the Volga with the Don from the region of Stalingrad to the city of Kalach on the Don; with a length of 101 km., with 13 locks, 3 dams, pumping stations, bridges and other construction.
b. A hydro-electric complex on the Don in in the vicinity of Tsimlyansk . . . with a concrete dam 500 meters long and an earth dam 12.8 km., two navigable locks, a river port....
“31 May at 13 hours 55 minutes, the significant moment of the union of the waters of the Don and Volga at last took place.” The canal was officially opened 27 July," 1952, a quarter of a millennium after its conception.
II
The two principal engineering problems to be solved in the Volga-Don construction were the difference in elevation of the two rivers, 44 meters, and the lack of an adequate system of feeder streams between the Volga and the Don. A system of thirteen locks was designed to solve the first problem, lifting ships to the summit, 88 meters above the level of the Volga. The rise from the Volga to the crest is much steeper than from the Don whose level is 44 meters higher than that of the Volga. Nine of the thirteen locks lie on the Volga side where five locks are located within five miles. These are the so- called “Chapurnikov Stairs.” Two artificial lakes are formed on the summit by the Varvarov and Bereslav reservoirs. Four locks descend the Don slopes.
Recent Soviet publications, such as the book Volgo-Don, published by the Soviet Academy of Sciences, 1954, are careful to make no mention of lock size; but the Volga- Don locks are certainly not the limiting feature of the Volga Scheme. It is estimated that they are approximately 60'X 600', with a minimum of fifteen feet of water over the sills.
To solve the second problem, that of feeding water into the canal, three pumping stations, each with a capacity of 45 cubic meters per second, were constructed. The first station lifts water from the Tsimlyansk to the Karpov reservoir—capacity 155 million cubic meters. The second station pumps water from the Karpov to Bereslav reservoir, capacity 48 million cubic meters, and into a connecting branch of the canal between the tenth and eleventh locks. The third and final pumping station raises water yet higher into the Varvarov reservoir, capacity 125 million cubic meters.
While not designed primarily to augment the waters of the Volga, Soviet engineers rationalize that the canal also serves this purpose. Regardless of the direction of vessels transiting the canal, all water is flushed towards the Volga. It is also maintained that the creation of large bodies of water, such as the Tsimlyansk reservoir on the Don, increases precipitation in the Volga basin. The Tsimlyansk dam, built to raise the level of the lower Volga, also serves as a base for rail and highway routes across the Don.
III
What is the significance of the Volga-Don canal? Say the Soviets: “One must look at the Volga-Don canal not as a local transportation artery but as a link in an integrated waterway uniting the European Soviet Union.” The Soviet transportation system is considered by some Western analysts as the weakest link in the Soviet economic chain. The Volga Scheme greatly relieves European Soviet railroads. According to Soviet estimates, the volume of freight on the Volga- Don canal will soon equal the capacity of forty rail lines.
Grain and timber were for long the chief items of freight on the Volga. These products still compose a significant percentage of the total freight, but coal and oil have assumed a new importance. The Volga-Don canal is used extensively for the transport of Don Basin coal to the new industrial areas of the Volga. In a like manner, ore from the Urals is transported to the Don Basin.
From Baku, large tankers carry oil as far north as the shallow Volga delta where it is then pumped into Volga oil barges or smaller tankers. From this point a broad maritime highway leads in all directions. Units of the Black Sea, Baltic, and Northern fleets are connected directly to the oil fields by an inland water route.
The Soviet press is relatively reticent in speaking directly of the naval role of the Volga Scheme. One must interpret statements in light of Communist doctrine and implications. Notes the author of Volgo-Don:
The internal, “rear” [tylovoy] route, connecting the Soviet ports of the Baltic, White, Azov, and Black Seas is much shorter than the circuitous route through “external” seas and oceans. As, for example, the route from Leningrad to Rostov on the Don is more than twice shortened.
Soviet military doctrine places great emphasis on the protection of the rear, or tyl. The use of this word in the given context stresses the apparently intended military connotation of the phrase. The table of distances given on the next page is then presented by the author.
The naval implications of such a comparison are obvious. The new relation of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets is analogous to the relation of United States Fleet units in Providence, Rhode Island, and those in Pensacola, Florida.
|
By Internal Waterways |
By “External" Seas and Oceans |
||
|
Leningrad-Shcherbakov |
1136 km. |
Leningrad-London (via Kiel Canal) 2258 km. |
|
|
Shcherbakov-Stalingrad |
2254 km. |
London-Gibraltar |
2432 km. |
|
Volga-Don canal |
101 km. |
Gibraltar-Istanbul |
3315 km. |
|
Along Don to Rostov |
439 km. |
Istanbul-Rostov |
1194 km. |
|
IN ALL: |
About 3930 km. |
About 9199 km. |
|
Although not a part of the Volga Scheme, it is appropriate to mention the Northern Sea Route as another factor which belies the archaic concept of divided Soviet fleets. By Soviet figures, the distance from Leningrad to Vladivostok via the Suez or Panama Canal is 23,000 kilometers; by the Northern Route, 16,000 kilometers (9,000 nautical miles). Over a Map of the Motherland, a Soviet geography published in 1949, remarks:
Our country touches the open sea at numerous points: the Black Sea, the Baltic, the Arctic, Pacific. These areas were formerly disconnected; but now, under Soviet rule they are joined by the Dnieper-Bug Canal, by the Volga-Baltic route, reconstructed during this Five-Year Plan, the White Sea-Baltic Canal and the Northern Sea Route. . . .
Add the Volga-Don canal and all Soviet fleets are no longer divided but connected by internal water routes. The Northern Route is not navigable during considerable periods due to extreme ice; however, this alone does not justify disregarding its strategic implications. The Soviets began serious naval research in the Arctic before World War II. The Soviet Navy is today the world’s most experienced in Arctic operations. What boundless, stormless passages lie below the Arctic is a story yet untold. The Geographic Atlas of the USSR, for 7th and 8th Classes of Middle School, published in Moscow in 1954, devotes one entire page to depicting the internal waterways of the Soviet Union. The caption reads: “Moscow, the port of five seas.” Indeed, the Northern Sea Route links Moscow with the Pacific Ocean.
Navigation in the Volga Scheme is also limited by ice during winter months. Here, as in the Arctic, the Soviets are making great efforts to maintain maximum operations. The March, 1953, issue of The Soviet Union, monthly Moscow-published magazine, comments on this subject:
New icebreakers, built in the Red Sormovo yard . . . permit winter navigation at Gorki. The escort of ships in the river under conditions of ice is becoming a common phenomenon. ... In spite of temperatures 30 degrees below freezing [20 degrees below zero Fahrenheit] and heavy snow, the icebreaker “Don” made a run from Gorki to Il’ink and return—a distance of 500 kilometers.
A careful analysis is required before categorically stating which Soviet naval units could be redeployed via the Volga System. Changes in Soviet naval architecture have been initiated to cope with the greater strain placed on hulls by ice. In estimating Soviet naval capabilities it is well to remember that naval vessels are designed not only to obtain a desirable combination of maximum speed, range, maneuverability, and armament, but also with a view of meeting any unique demands of their maritime environment: ice on the Northern Route or five meters of water in the Volga. It is not the purpose of this discussion to make a detailed study but rather to note general trends and capabilities.
The Soviet Navy’s strength lies in a great number of modern, medium, and light surface units and submarines. At present these units number approximately: 350-400 submarines, 125-150 destroyers, 25-30 cruisers and numerous patrol, minelaying and other light craft. There are three battleships and no known aircraft carriers. Baltic and Black Sea fleets are believed to contain the strongest surface units. What proportion of these vessels is capable of navigating the Volga System? The restricting factors are draft and to a much lesser degree lock width. It was the original Soviet goal to insure a minimum of fifteen feet of water the length of the Volga System. With the adaptation of pontoons and/or structural changes, both the numerical and strategic preponderance of the Soviet Fleet can be redeployed between the Baltic, Northern, Black Sea, and Far Eastern Heels via unobserved, internal routes.
Although frequent redeployment of heavier units may prove impractical, the “one shot” potentiality of such redeployment could be decisive. The Soviets are cognizant of their potential, a fact well illustrated by statements direct from the bear’s mouth:
The canal opened wide possibilities for the deployment of ships under their own power, or hulls under construction, from such northern or internal shipbuilding centers as Leningrad, Arkhangelsk or Gorki to seas of the south: and on the other hand—for the deployment of ships from southern waters to northern waters. Thus, the canal permits a greater maneuverability in the use of productive powers for the Soviet shipbuilding industry.
And again in Volgo-Don:
Already in the course of 1952, the first navigation in the canal allowed the transit of a group of naval ships [morskie suda] from one sea basin to the other. Our press communicates the deployment of motor ships from the Black to the Caspian Sea, of the use of the Volga-Don, Volga- Baltic and White Sea routes for the transfer to the north of maritime ships of the fishing fleet.
The naval significance of fishing vessels should not be overlooked. These craft are seaworthy, manned by experienced crews, and would make excellent transports over short distances for amphibious troops. In the June, 1955, issue of the Proceedings, Commander A. Grønningsaeter, Royal Norwegian Navy, estimated that the Soviet Baltic fishing fleet is capable of lifting two assault divisions complete with light equipment. Norway does well to keep an eye on these vessels which have the potential of materializing out of the fog without warning and with more than codfish aboard! The Volga-Don canal permits redeployment and concentration of Caspian, Baltic and Black Sea fishing fleets in any one of the three seas.
IV
“The internal net opens the possibility of a water route between our northern and internal ports with the industrial centers of the Black Sea and the Danube. ... In this manner the Volga-Don canal assumes an international significance.” Only too often Soviet back-patting and self-praise are regarded merely as propaganda. The year nineteen hundred and fifty-five marked more than the end of the fifth Five-Year Plan. It symbolized a new era in Russian and Soviet naval history. The completion of the Volga Scheme and advances in Arctic navigation give the world’s most rapidly expanding navy a new omnipresence. The concept of divided fleets has no meaning except in comparison with other navies. Soviet Baltic, Black Sea, Northern and Far Eastern fleets are no more divided than United States Fleet units at Providence, Rhode Island, Jacksonville, Florida; San Francisco, California; and Pearl Harbor.
A Russian proverb states: “A fisherman recognizes another from afar.” As a naval power let us recognize another in its true light and let us plan accordingly.