The General Staff Of The German Army*

When warfare evolved to a stage at which a military commander could no longer attend to all the details of command (due to larger-scale, as well as more complex operations), it became imperative that the commander delegate certain of his functions to especially trained assistants who should act in his name and be held directly responsible to him. As this requirement began to be met on a steadily increasing scale, there developed a distinctive body of officers set apart, sometimes permanently, to perform the “staff” duties of a higher type, and from this practice have evolved all the modern military staff systems.

The primary purpose of this essay is to present a case study of the military staff system generally conceded to have most nearly approached perfection, in an effort to demonstrate the inherent shortcomings of a supreme, single-service general staff in the modern setting of multi-service warfare. The secondary purpose is to indicate how extremely difficult and unwise it would be to establish a single general staff system to serve the land, sea, and air forces as a group.

As a result of these two purposes, the essay is essentially a defense of the present American system of separate and equal service staffs designed to meet the peculiar needs of their respective services in the performance of their assigned missions. Despite continuing efforts toward further unification of the military services in such functions as supply management and intelligence, the fact remains that each service is eminently more qualified in its own area of operations than either of the other services might hope to be. This applies to staff arrangements as well as to many other internal matters of the separate services.

Certainly there must be unified direction. But the American Armed Forces have clearly demonstrated that such unity can best be achieved through joint staffing of planning bodies, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on a basis of equality. To attach a degree of primacy to the role of any single service and to accord that service a disproportionate voice in the direction of the Armed Forces would almost certainly result in a corresponding neglect of the other services, which could be disastrous to the national security.

On the surface it might appear that the answer lies in constructing a unified staff system from the ground up, but such would run counter to some of the very conditions creating the requirement for unified direction at the top, namely, the advancing technology which enables a nation to bring to bear all elements of its armed forces in a coordinated assault on an enemy. The advanced “state of the art” has resulted from specialization among its components, not generalization. The problem is to achieve maximum integration in the use and direction of highly specialized branches.

To support these conclusions, the bulk of this essay is devoted to a descriptive analysis of the German Army General Staff system. It deals with those factors primarily responsible for the German failure to achieve the desired balance in the use of the three services, as well as with those factors which tended to strengthen the internal staff system of the German Army. It is the contention of this writer that only through intense concern for the peculiar needs of its own service was the Army General Staff Corps able to achieve the degree of excellence with which it managed the German Army. But when the Army General Staff eventually achieved considerable control over the strategic role of the Navy, the inadequacy of a single-service supreme general staff for the direction of multi-service forces soon became apparent. In terms of our own setting, the contention is that a significant degree of unification among the separate internal staff systems in the American Armed Forces would be a mistake.

Although a prime objective of German military leaders was to fit together as smoothly as possible the areas of “planning” and “operations” while retaining the advantages of separate specialties, World War I brought to light the inherent difficulty of integrating land and sea operations under the direction of the supreme Army General Staff, the chief of which was also Commander-in-Chief of the Army. And subsequently this basic concept was abandoned in favor of three separate service general staffs, including the Air Force staff, with integration being sought at the combined-forces level through the employment of officers from all three services. Failure to achieve the desired harmony of planning and execution of operations under this latter arrangement is believed to have resulted largely from not having drawn Combined Forces staff officers from the three service headquarters, which subsequently were charged with executing plans developed by the Combined Forces staff.

Regardless of other lessons to be derived from German command and staff experience during World War II, the central lesson apparently is that one of the most distinctive features of the German staff system, the “Great General Staff,” along with its supporting substructure, was not suited to the performance of its basic functions in an era of multi-service military operations and total national mobilization. It was developed over a long period during which land operations monopolized the thought of Prussian and later German military leaders; and the tradition of the closed system of the General Staff Corps supporting this feature apparently was too rigid to permit its adaptation to the requirements of directing separate branches of the armed forces. This, at least, was indicated by the basic changes in high- level command arrangements instituted in Germany before and during World War II.

Historical Development of the German General Staff

The German General Staff was the product of a long historical evolution. Credited by some as having stemmed from the staff organization of Frederick William of Prussia in 1635, this staff system attained its full development during the latter half of the nineteenth century, at which time the Chief of the General Staff became the highest German military leader, and the General Staff itself achieved virtual independence from any civil authority save the Emperor.

This high position of the General Staff had gradually developed from the functions performed in the early years by the “Quartermaster General’s Staff,” which over a period of time expanded to include not only supply and quartering duties, but almost all staff duties connected with operational and intelligence functions. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the Quartermaster General’s Staff had become highly trained in military science and tactics, and in 1803 its supremacy within the Prussian Army was officially established by the King, who, among other things, decreed that only those matters approved by the Quartermaster General and three of his lieutenants should be submitted to the King for approval. This royal order granted the Quartermaster General a key position in the flow of business between the Army and the King, and within a few years the term “Quartermaster General’s Staff” came to mean “General Staff” throughout the Prussian military system.

The evolution of the Prussian (later German) General Staff over the next one hundred years was marked by the division of the General Staff into two distinct parts, one portion being located in Berlin and called the “Great General Staff” (Grosser General-stab), and the other being distributed among the various field commands under the term “Field Forces General Staff” (Truppengeneralstab). Both of these parts were under the direction of the War Ministry until 1821, at which time the entire General Staff was placed directly subordinate to the King. It was under these circumstances that the General Staff developed into the most important institution of the German military system after the War of 1866, the Chief of the General Staff eventually being recognized as the leader of the armies in wartime. Although the Emperor was the “Supreme War Lord,” it was understood that the Chief of the General Staff in wartime should exercise command of the armies in the name of the Emperor, submitting major decisions to the Emperor for approval. In effect, the Chief of the General Staff thus became head of the entire military system.

These were the basic arrangements of the German General Staff prior to World War I, during the course of which several fundamental changes were introduced. The period between the two world wars witnessed a great many developments which precluded the reestablishment of the German General Staff in any form approximating its previous status and make-up, and the peculiar arrangements instituted by the German chief of state for the conduct of World War II rendered the remains of the classic German General Staff hardly recognizable.

Basic Characteristics of the German General Staff Prior to 1914

At the close of the nineteenth century the German General Staff more closely resembled the ideal of its chief architects than it did at any other time. At this time it enjoyed its highest prestige and was marked by several outstanding characteristics: the highly competitive manner in which officers were selected and trained for the General Staff; a sharp distinction between routine staff functions and staff functions directly related to the planning and execution of field operations; the broad authority conferred on General Staff officers; the elite nature of the General Staff Corps; and finally, the General Staff privilege of appealing directly to the chief of state in matters affecting the military.

The educational system supporting the General Staff Corps officer training and selection program was significant not only because of its tendency to ensure the appointment of the best qualified officers to the General Staff, but also because it was a means of giving advanced training to future high commanders of the Army. This common experience also made possible a greater degree of cooperation between General Staff officers and other units of the Army in later years.

As a result of rigid competitive examinations, a few candidates (approximately 150 during the years immediately preceding World War I) were selected from the entire officer corps to begin a three-year course of intensive study at the famous Kriegsakademie. At the end of this course, roughly thirty per cent of the candidates passed a competitive examination covering, in addition to subjects of a military nature, such matters as personality, character, general education, and personal behavior. These successful candidates then were “commanded to the Great General Staff,” usually for a term of two years.

Selection for duty with the Great General Staff at this point, however, did not necessarily mean that a candidate would become a regular General Staff officer, although it was an almost indispensable step toward that goal. This was merely another phase of training preparatory to final selection. Those candidates commanded to the Great General Staff were distributed among the various sections, where they were trained to apply their military education to the solution of specific problems in three distinct phases: (1) weekly tactical exercises on maps; (2) more ambitious exercises directed by the departmental chiefs at the end of the winter; and (3) participation in the several strategic exercises personally conducted each year by the Chief of the General Staff himself.

Final selection for membership in the General Staff came as a result of the third competitive examination, which was conducted after this period of tentative service with the Great General Staff. Of the original class of about 150 accepted for entrance at the War Academy, four or five of those remaining at this stage were selected for definite assignment to the General Staff.

Rejection of candidates at various points in the selection process did not necessarily preclude them from ever serving on the General Staff, however, because there was a possibility that at a future date they would be “commanded” to serve as a consequence of having demonstrated unusual ability in other areas of military service. In actual fact, during wartime many General Staff officers were selected from among those candidates rejected at the final examination, this group being considered a reserve pool for General Staff officers.

In addition to this possibility of future selection to the General Staff, officers who had passed through the War Academy also enjoyed considerable advantage over other officers of the line in terms of promotion and assignments. One consequence of this situation, according to General William Ludlow, was “ . . . that as a matter of fact most of the prominent commanders [were] graduates of the War Academy, as would be the natural result of a method of selection where merit and efficiency are the sole standards.”

The duties of the General Staff dealt not only with strategical problems and tactical considerations, but also with the actual implementation of operations decided upon by the commanding generals. As a general rule, it was the function of the General Staff first to advise the commanding general and then to convert his decisions into orders and work out all details of operations. “A General Staff officer,” said General von Schellendorff, “cannot excuse himself of any neglect on his part on the plea that no order on the subject had been given him by his General. He should consider himself freed from responsibility only when his suggestion has been declined by the General.”

One essential characteristic of these broad duties was that, although the General Staff officer freely advised his general and shared responsibility for the outcome of operations, the final decision was always that of the general. The General Staff officer was expected always to resist any temptation to command. The big exception to this otherwise uniform arrangement was, of course, the top-command authority exercised by the Chief of the entire General Staff of the Army in the name of the Emperor; and even here the myth of the Emperor as “Supreme War Lord” was maintained by the practice of having major decisions submitted to the Emperor for approval.

The two major parts of the German Army General Staff, the Great General Staff at Berlin and the Field Forces General Staff, together were administered by a single head, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army. The entire body of General Staff officers usually numbered approximately 250, with fewer than 100 serving on the Great General Staff at any given time.

The Great General Staff was charged with all responsibilities connected with the drawing up of plans for possible future operations, including logistical and intelligence functions. This body, moreover, provided for the training and selection of younger members of the General Staff, and conducted studies of war and military history. It was here that the young General Staff officer usually received his final training prior to definite selection to the General Staff. Through intensive map exercises and other assignments, every officer was pressed almost to the limits of endurance in order to develop his capacity for hard work and to fit him for the strenuous General Staff work required in time of war.

The Chief of the General Staff was assisted in the supervision of this central body by three “Chief Quartermasters” who acted in the name of the Chief, both in directing the General Staff officers distributed among the field commands and in supervising the chiefs of the various sections of the Great General Staff.

General Staff officers serving with field, commands formed the Field Forces General Staff, and carried out their duties as recognized representatives of the Chief of the General Staff. As in the case of the central, or Great General Staff, the number of officers was kept to a minimum, the usual distribution being: at least two senior and several junior General Staff officers on the staff of an army; three to five General Staff officers for an army corps; and a single General Staff officer for a division.

At the army and army corps levels the senior General Staff officer carried the title “Chief of the General Staff,” and directed all operations of both the General Staff and the Routine Staff. Directly under the Chief at the army level was a “Quartermaster General,” who supervised the day-to-day work of the General Staff and served as the Chief’s substitute when necessary. At both the army and army corps levels the senior Routine Staff officer, under the direction of the Chief, supervised the work of the Routine Staff.

The division of staff work which was made between General Staff and Routine Staff officers at the army and corps levels was most important, and indicates in some measure the position enjoyed by the General Staff. Matters dealing with maneuvers, mobilization, communications, intelligence, maps, reconnaissances, and Army organization were assigned to General Staff officers, whereas staff functions of a routine nature, e.g., disciplinary actions, decorations, discharges, orders of the day, and reports, were carried out by Routine Staff officers. The work of the corps “Operations Officer,” who occupied a position just below the Chief, was characterized by Schellendorff as “the most extensive and responsible work done by the Army Corps Staff”; and it is significant that appointment to this position was restricted to those senior General Staff officers who had previously served with a division staff.

The importance attached to the position of Chief of the General Staff of an army corps is demonstrated by the broad powers conferred on the Chief with respect to the duties of the commanding general as well as the relations between the commanding general and the corps staff. Not only was the Chief of the General Staff empowered to sign on his own authority any orders or instructions deemed of sufficient urgency in the absence of the commanding general, but he was also in full charge of determining what business might be laid before the general. Moreover, all officers were required to obtain the permission of the Chief before interviewing the general. Similarly, no paper was submitted to the commanding general for signing until the Chief of the General Staff was fully convinced that all regulations had been complied with and that the decisions of the commanding general had been carried out.

At the divisional level, the single officer representing the General Staff carried no title corresponding to that of “Chief of the General Staff.” The general commanding the division was expected to supervise the work of the staff, which was much smaller than that of an army corps; and the work of the General Staff officer, as chief of one staff section, was concerned largely with executing orders of the general, rather than with planning operations. If he was senior in rank to the Routine Staff officers of the division, however, he was considered “first man” on the staff and was held responsible for getting out the work of the entire staff, even though he had no direct authority over any section other than that which he personally headed.

As illustrated above, the work of the General Staff officer included both service with the several field commands as well as assignment to a section of the Great General Staff, along with other special appointments in some instances. In addition to this special staff work, however, great emphasis was laid on periodically returning the General Staff officer to line duties. The result was that the usual line of development for General Staff officers was one rotating among: (1) service with the Field Forces General Staff, (2) command of troops, and (3) service on the Great General Staff itself. Usually the young General Staff officer, after completing two years tentative service with a section of the Great General Staff prior to final selection, began his General Staff career as aide to the Chief of the General Staff of an army corps. Subsequently he would be given command of a company, battalion, or regiment at various intervals as he rotated to the higher positions within the Great General Staff and the Field Forces General Staff. Usually, Chief of the General Staff of a corps was the highest position to which a General Staff officer might rise, except for command of a section of the Great General Staff.

Despite this system of rotation, the General Staff officer was always a member of a select, closed group. The distinguishing wine- red stripe was a permanent part of his uniform, even when assigned to regimental duty, and the informal ties among General Staff officers in all three areas of service were quite strong. Apparently these ties served a useful purpose in making the conversion of plans to operations a smoothly functioning process at higher levels of the German military system. Instead of creating dissatisfaction within the various commands of the Army, this network of General Staff officers tended to strengthen the command- staff relationship, largely because of the Prussian device of “co-responsibility.”

The so-called “co-responsibility” arrangement which existed in the Prussian, and later German, military system was simply a provision whereby the senior General Staff officer, e.g., the Chief of the General Staff of an army or an army corps, was held equally responsible with the commanding general for the success of the command; but at the same time, the General Staff officer had no authority. This served to insure the loyalty of the General Staff officer to his general and also tended to increase the confidence the general might have in his closest advisor and first assistant, his Chief of the General Staff. The direct responsibility of the Chief was often pointed up by the removal of this officer, rather than the commander, after a serious failure by the command to which he was attached.

One essential of this relationship was strict obedience by General Staff officers to the tenet of their code which required them to resist all temptations to assume command except in an emergency during the absence of the commander. The chief duty of the General Staff officer was to make available in a convenient form information which would enable the commander to grasp the situation at hand and make the necessary decisions, relying heavily on the advice of his senior General Staff officer. Once the commander reached a conclusion, it then became the task of the General Staff officer to translate his decision into concrete orders and supervise their implementation. The General Staff officer also would make judicious proposals for the consideration of the commander.

The nature of the General Staff duty was especially suited to the function of converting the wishes of a commander into concrete orders for troops. The General Staff officer was both planner and executor, to varying extents. His grasp of the broad considerations and his mastery of the many details of operations, together with his close association with the commander, aided him both in representing the situation to the commander and in carrying out decisions subsequently reached by the commander. At the same time, the task of the commander was made easier because the work of his General Staff officers relieved him of many duties which might otherwise have been associated with command responsibility.

At higher levels this dual role of the General Staff was of great importance in the implementation of plans drawn up by the Great General Staff. The Chief of the General Staff of an army or an army corps was intimately acquainted with the method and thinking of the Great General Staff due to his long experience as an operating member of that body. Moreover, his personal connections with the members of the Great General Staff and their immediate responsibility to a common chief, i.e., the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, were highly conducive to a full understanding of plans transmitted from the Great General Staff for execution.

It is clear, however, that this system was suitable only for the management of the Army. Every phase of General Staff Corps training and experience was based on the assumption that the Army would be the only major instrument of military action, and that, consequently, the General Staff should concern itself almost solely with Army affairs.

After 1821, when the Chief of the General Staff became free of any control by the Ministry of War, both the Chief of the General Staff and the generals in command of armies were considered directly under the Emperor, the “Supreme War Lord.” In practice, however, the Chief of the General Staff exercised virtually complete control. According to Schellendorff, the Emperor’s “ . . . first assistant, as regards the province of warlike operations, is the Chief of the General Staff of the Army. The latter submits to the Emperor the various measures it is desirable to take to meet the requirements of the military situation, asks for his decision, and then, by order of the Commander- in-Chief, issues them to the Generals Commanding Armies in the form of ‘dispositions,’ ‘instructions,’ etc.” Under these arrangements, the Emperor was reduced to a figurehead in military matters, the Chief of the General Staff eventually acquiring the position of “Commander-in-Chief.” The practice of submitting major plans and decisions to the Emperor, who retained the title of “Supreme War Lord,” however, continued even until the close of World War I.

The German General Staff During World War I

During World War I a basic change occurred in the nature of the German General Staff. The Great General Staff continued to be the center of the military system; its only possible rival, the Admiralty (Admiral Stab), being relegated to a minor role due to the continuing prestige of the long-established Army General Staff. But when the Chief of the General Staff, the younger Moltke, became ill early in the war the Emperor replaced him with his Minister of War, General von Falkenhayn, thus combining the post of War Minister and Chief of the General Staff for the first time.

With this merger the Emperor confined himself to the role of “royal observer.” The Minister of War, as Chief of the General Staff, directed the entire military system with virtually complete independence from outside interference. At a later date Falkenhayn characterized this arrangement in the following terms:

On the basis of the Imperial Constitution the control of the whole of Germany’s armed forces, and consequently the supreme command of the army, not only of that of the army in the field, but of all that could be regarded as belonging to the army—as well as of the navy—lay directly with the Emperor as Supreme War Lord. Thus the Supreme Command was centered in his person. His organs in the fulfilment of the duties of Supreme War Lord were the Prussian Chief of the General Staff of the Army for the land forces, and the German Chief of the Naval Staff for the sea forces, whereby it was tacitly accepted that the voice of the Chief of the General Staff would be the deciding factor in matters which touched the conduct of war, both on sea and land.

Despite the importance of sea power in German strategy during World War I, the Army General Staff maintained its control over the entire military effort under the mistaken belief that the excellence of the General Staff in Army matters qualified it for control over the direction of the Navy.

Under the supervision of the Chief of the General Staff, the department heads of the Great General Staff became the real directors of the war. In the field, the chiefs of staff of the various army commands tended to overshadow their commanding generals, and a great many of the commanding generals themselves were members of the General Staff. In the words of Goerlitz, “The era of rule by the General Staff had begun.”

Between the Wars, 1919-1938

German defeat in World War I ended the existence of the German General Staff in its classic form. Although the German military leaders did succeed in their efforts to circumvent the treaty provisions abolishing the General Staff, their success was only partial because the position and spirit of the pre- World War I General Staff were never regained. Some influences of the classic General Staff, however, persisted until the final collapse of Nazi Germany in 1945.

The Treaty of Versailles provided for the dissolution of the Great General Staff and attempted to prevent its reappearance by stipulating that the Army should be under the direction of a civilian minister and be divided into two Group Commands of equal authority, no military officer being in command of the entire Army. The Field Forces General Staff was permitted to remain intact.

Before the dissolution of the central body, however, General von Seeckt drew up plans according to which the new military system, under a civilian Minister of National Defense (Reichswehr Minister), would include a “Field Forces Agency” (Truppenamt) to perform the old functions of the Great General Staff. And when the new system was established Seeckt, himself, became head of the Field Forces Agency, which included about sixty officers.

Subsequently the entire Army was again controlled by a single military officer when the position of Chief of the Army Command {Chef der Heeresleitung) was established directly under the Defense Minister. The General Staff, however, did not regain its earlier right of direct appeal to the chief of state, and the doctrine of “co-responsibility” for General Staff officers was discontinued. But an effort was made to retain General Staff officers in the drastically reduced Army by greatly expanding the number of staff positions allotted to the various Army commands. The staff of a division, for example, was expanded to include nine General Staff officers, whereas prior to World War I it included only one.

One important feature of the old General Staff system which the German military leaders sought to salvage after Versailles was the educational and selection machinery for supplying the General Staff with young talent. To replace the famed Kriegsakademie, a decentralized system of schooling and selection was adopted. In seven different schools two-year courses were conducted at first, and later a third year was added. The competitive nature of the old system was maintained, despite the fact that final selection was less free from outside interference. The number of officers finally selected continued to be very small.

Following the Rearmament Proclamation of 1935, several organizational changes took place in the German military system. The Ministry of Defense became the War Ministry, with the occupant of the cabinet post, General von Blomberg, being promoted to

the rank of Field Marshal in command of all three services—Army, Navy and Air Force. At the same time the Chief of the Army Command became the Supreme Commander of the Army (the Army Command taking the name Oberkommando des Heeres— O.K.H.), and the General Staff discarded the term Truppenamt, taking on the title of General Staff of the Army.

The General Staff was quickly expanded during this period, and every effort was made by its Chief, General Beck, to regain its former position within the military system. The staff was expanded to 190 officers and the number of departments was increased from four to twelve, grouped under the direction of five Chief Quartermasters, who served as “sub-chiefs.” But the position of the joint staff operating within the War Ministry tended to prevent the reacquisition by the Army General Staff of its former position. The “Security Service” (Schulzstaffe, or S.S.), moreover, began infiltrating into the Army, its members occupying positions as high as general, and this tended to reduce the control of the General Staff over the Army itself. As a result of these and other influences of the Third Reich, the Army General Staff declined in importance within the military system to such an extent that the Chief of the General Staff is said to have had only one conversation with Chancellor Adolf Hitler between 1934 and 1938.

As a consequence of these and other similar developments, the General Staff of the Army lost many of its former characteristics as World War II approached. Due to an increased workload occasioned by organizational difficulties, even the custom of rotating General Staff officers to regimental duty was abandoned. By 1938 the status of the General Staff was reduced to the lowest level when Hitler ordered that body to cease preparing plans for future operations, confining its actions, instead, to the organization and training of the Army. Although later the role of this body was again expanded, it was clear from this point forward that there was little chance that the General Staff of the Army would ever achieve the status formerly occupied by the “Great General Staff.”

Significant Developments of World War II

The pattern of German military command arrangements for World War II was foreshadowed by the events of 1938. Hitler’s assumption of direct command of all the armed forces in that year, following the dismissal of Minister of War General von Blomberg, marked the beginning of direct personal control by the Fuehrer. Blomberg had attempted to build up in the War Ministry (Wehrmachtaml) a “coordinating” staff of officers drawn from all three services, but the staff of the new organization instituted by Hitler, the Okerkommando der Wehrmacht (O.K.W.), tended to become a “super-general staff” under Hitler’s private Chief of Staff, General Alfred Jodi. During the war this department was called the Wehrmacht Leader Staff (Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab), and was fully understood to be the politico-military office through which Hitler issued instructions and received information relating to the war effort.

The personal intervention of Hitler, however, was not the only influence tending to reduce the position of the former “Great General Staff.” The growth of German sea power, and its increased role in German strategy, combined with the advent of air power in modern warfare, made it apparent that the Army General Staff could no longer exercise extensive control over the entire war effort. These developments produced a situation in which the logical location for the functions of the old “Great General Staff” was no longer within the Army, but at a level encompassing the Navy and the Air Force as well as the Army. It became necessary for all three services to participate in the work of top-level planning. The creation of Hitler’s personal staff under Jodi, however, failed to meet this requirement due to the fact that it did not grant the individual services a real voice in the planning itself. The end result was the existence of four separate “General Staffs”—the Wehrmacht Leader Staff, the Army General Staff, the Luftwaffe General Staff, and the Navy Kommandoamt.

The collapse of the Third Reich brought to a close the formal history of the German General Staff. But by this time, the staff system generally considered responsible for the remarkable efficiency too often demonstrated by German armies during the past hundred years had long ceased to exist. It is clear that the Army General Staff which emerged from World War I and subsequently directed the German Army during World War II bore little resemblance to the earlier supreme General Staff. The advent of multi-service warfare in German strategy made impractical the supremacy of a singleservice General Staff, and the resultant position of the Army General Staff as a planning and directing group for only a limited area of German military operations deprived that body of any valid claim to the prestige and authority it formerly had enjoyed as the supreme General Staff.

Nor could the independent staff erected over the three service staffs during the World War II period lay claim to such status, for it was never able to attain the unity of military action formerly achieved by the German Great General Staff. It sought to direct the separate services from a position virtually divorced from the services themselves.

The central lesson to be derived from the German experience appears to be that a military staff can be successful only to the extent that it is used as an instrument of the military organization it is designed to serve. Its function is not one which can be performed by a system pushed down on an organization from above. It must, in every sense, be a product of its own organization. Projected to a level encompassing several military organizations with differing particular purposes, modes of operation, and staff requirements, it is clear that staff arrangements must mirror those differing characteristics in order to meet the peculiar requirements of those organizations as well as to make maximum use of their individual capabilities.