Discussions, Comments and Notes

The Passing of the Mississippi

R. G. Dennis.—The retirement of men and ships rarely offers anything new. But when a man or vessel close to one of us hangs up the gloves for the last time the event is apt to bring forth a surge of nostalgia. Such was the case with this writer last July when the USS Mississippi went out of commis­sion. Built during the first World War, the Mississippi was the most powerful ship in the Navy when she was commissioned late in 1917. She was kept on long enough to have her 14-inch after turret replaced with a Terrier Guided Missile launcher and to have her once proud number BB-41 replaced with the designator EAG-128. The EAG stood for Experimental Gunnery Ship.

My own close association with the Mis­sissippi is of interest to no one other than myself, but a rousing “Well Done!” should be sounded by all hands of the “New Navy” for the faithful service rendered by this ship during both World Wars and for her pioneer­ing spirit in behalf of the U. S. Navy for tomorrow.

The current news also brings forth the forthcoming final curtain for another great ship on which I did not have the good for­tune to serve—USS Enterprise (CV-6). Completed in 1938, this veteran of so many heroic encounters of the Pacific War is the last of that string of pre-World War II “carrier greats.” I am unable to pay fitting tribute to this mighty lady, but I know enough of her record to express herewith a fervent plea that someone tell her story in full. That I would love to read.

Shipping and Hemispheric Cooperation

Jorge Navarre Custin, Master of the Cuban Motorsiiip Bahia del Mariel.—In all the discussion of the question of Pana­manian and Liberian registry the main points referred to seem to be operational problems, i.e., wages, ship repairs, etc. I wish to em­phasize another side of the problem.

I do not believe that “Hemispheric co­operation” is promoted by having such ships registered with “one good neighbor.” Perhaps the United States gains one point from Panama, but the unfair competition of a low wage, and in many concepts, an ill- management merchant fleet, creates a big disconformity among those Latin American countries who are trying to develop very modest but efficient merchant fleets based on American standards.

As a defense basis, it seems to me that the spreading of maritime interests among our sister countries would render more benefits than the concentration under one flag. That is the case, for example, in my own country, Cuba. During World War II, as always, we were a close ally of the United States. We made our best effort in the maritime side disposing of all means of transportation and suffering substantial losses in comparison to our tonnage afloat. But at that time, the lack of an adequate merchant fleet created serious transportation problems in the sugar and ore trade during the peak of the Axis sub­marine campaign around Cuba and in the Gulf of Mexico.

We have been trying to avert a similar situation in the near future, but our natural and national aspirations toward disposing of our own merchant fleet are discouraged by over-concentration on Panamanian registry.

What the United States ought to do in promoting “Hemispheric cooperation” is to encourage the creation and development of new industries and economic resources among us. In the case of the Cuban-American trade involving an appreciable tonnage transportation, the American and Cuban flags are nearly barred. Many arguments can be raised upon these facts, but the real solu­tion rests in the good understanding between our countries.

USSR Counterpart of The Bluejacket’s Manual

Russell S. Hibbs.—Assistance in Naval Matters by R. Kartashev is another mani­festation of a growing Soviet Navy. This book, which was published in the latter part of 1955, represents the Soviet counterpart of The Bluejacket’s Manual. Published by DOSAAF—Volunteer Society for Coopera­tion with the Soviet Air Forces, Army, and Navy—the work is intended for pre-induc­tion age members of the Society. However, in scope and presentation of subject matter the work is of a higher level than would be expected for this age group.

The introduction is clearly designed to build esprit and to fulfill Party obligations. In contrast to the excellent presentation of the remainder of the book, it sacrifices an objective presentation to eulogize Russian naval tradition. Russians are given credit for the first battleship, the first destroyer, the first submarine, and, of course, the first radio and airplane.

While the introduction spoke of the Navy as “a dependable helper of the Soviet Army” in the beginning of World War II, in Chap­ter I the missions of the Navy are more in concert with the U. S. concept. This indicates a basic change in naval strategy.

A description and illustrations of the basic ship types follow. It is significant that while the Soviet Navy is not known to possess any aircraft carriers, considerable detail is given to a discussion of this type. Amphibi­ous operations are also mentioned. Naval aviation, the Shore Defense (Beregovaya Oborona), and AA Defense (PVO) are con­sidered in the following sections.

The Shore Defense serves to protect naval bases, the shores and island regions from naval and land attacks of the enemy. The shore artillery and naval infantry are a part of the Shore De­fense.

The naval infantry is designed for land defense of naval shore installations, for the repulsion of enemy landings, and for participation in landing operations conducted by our forces.

Chapter IV, “Brief Information on Ship Layout and Theory,” is much more com­prehensive than the title would indicate. Within the forty pages of the chapter are discussed ship theory, compartmentation, armor, superstructures, tackles, rudders, steering apparatus, anchors, engines, and other related subjects. The material is sup­plemented by numerous illustrations. The chapter is excellent material for the Russian language aspirant who is seeking to perfect his naval terminology.

Ship armament is the subject of Chapter V. A reference to Soviet accomplishments during World War II in the rocket field fails to explicitly identify rockets with ship arma­ment. The last two pages of the chapter dis­cuss the concept of atomic weapons and the means of protection from their effects.

Lines, piloting, and Rules of the Road are treated in the following chapters. While of more narrow scope than the preceding chap­ters, these sections contain a wealth of Rus­sian naval terminology.

Having finished the book, one is left with the impression that he has read an American work. It is probable that foreign manuals were consulted in the writing of the Soviet book. There is not the slightest doubt that the Soviets would hesitate to make use of others’ experience, just as they have not hesitated to co-opt tsarist naval tradition. The twenty thousand copies of the work should be a significant aid in broadening the base of future Soviet naval personnel and are another manifestation of a growing naval power.

Japanese Strategy in 1941

(See pages 1198, November, 1955 Proceedings, and 202, February, 1956 Proceedings.)

(Editor’s Note : In the February, 1956 Proceedings, Army Historian Louis Morton offered detailed criticism of the November, 1955 Proceedings article “East Wind Rain.” The author of that article here replies to that criticism.)

Mr. Trumbull Higgins.—It is regret­table that the Japanese naval authorities recently published in the Proceedings should have implicitly continued to justify Japan’s national hara-kiri at Pearl Harbor; it is more surprising when so able an American historian as Dr. Louis Morton should deny that the Japanese had any other active al­ternative to this folly. Dr. Morton seems to identify himself with the view of the Jap­anese to the effect that the short-range gains available to Japan in this southern route outweighed in value the admittedly unap­pealing territories of the Russian Far East to her north; the point to a Japanese assault on Russia was not her immediate gains, but the possibility—and the only possibility— of an Axis coalition victory, without which no important Japanese gains anywhere would be lasting.

I believe Dr. Morton overestimates the chances of a strong American intervention against a Japanese aggression in Siberia— failing a Pearl Harbor the Roosevelt Ad­ministration would have had enough political difficulty intervening to assist the more popular British at Singapore. On the other hand, at no time does Dr. Morton evidently face the fact that the Soviets were close to defeat in Europe by the end of 1941 and that a Japanese assault, such as was feared by Stalin as late as 1942, would have pinned down the last effective Russian army in the Far East. Here was Japan’s only possible effective role, if not one attractive to the parochial opportunists who determined her her policies after October, 1941.

Since Dr. Morton feels Japan’s decision to attack south, if viewed in terms of Japan’s own background, “appears anything but stupid,” he is naturally troubled by my description of this move as “imbecilic”; yet he must be aware that this phrase is actually Samuel Eliot Morison’s (The Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 132). Moreover, is it not also the function of the military historian to consider great decisions out of what Dr. Morton calls their “proper domestic con­text”; so perceptive a critic of American policy in the Philippines as Dr. Morton would surely not suggest that the function of the official military historian is to justify whatever was as right. Certainly we must criticize other powers as well as the United States for mistakes induced by operating out of a proper domestic context. In the words of George Kennan, “A nation which excuses its own failure by the sacred un­touchableness of its own habits can excuse itself into complete disaster.”

I was also very careful to say only that the Japanese decided to move south in July, 1941. I do not see how Dr. Morton in his single criticism of fact obtained the impres­sion that I suggested the Japanese were definitely committed to including the United States in their attack at this time, although this possibility was always very present in their minds in connection with the dangers of a southern move.

In conclusion, to place the Japanese ac­tion at Pearl Harbor in its proper global context is not to see the Japanese decision simply “in terms of Hitler’s war on Europe.” Such “localitis” in thought, as General Marshall would have put it, is more worthy of the personal commitment of a theater commander such as General MacArthur than of an objective military historian.

Persian Gulf Turkeys

Captain Charles B. Lanman, usn.—• As the recent Commanding Officer of the USS Valcour (AVP-55), I should like to take this opportunity to clarify a parenthetical paragraph on page 1039, October U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, and contained in the article, “By the Shores of Araby: The Persian Gulf Command.” Actually there is no “mysterious disappearance of such items as frozen turkeys,” etc., since regulations governing the issue of naval commissary specifically provides for their sale by the Commanding Officers of naval vessels to other agencies of the United States Govern­ment while on foreign stations. As Mr. Hess- ler points out, it is a sound bit of inter-service cordiality in which all three Middle East Force Flagships constantly and gladly par­ticipate. May I add that this disbursement of luxury items, as Mr. Hessler has named them, are made without prejudice to the menus of the Flagships? Provision is made during the order of supplies and resupplies to provide for such issues to the maximum extent practicable. I offer this explanation simply because the strict accounting of all items aboard ship could not permit of such largesse except on a reimbursable basis as provided by regulation.

May I state that Mr. Hessler’s article is one of the best factual stories concerning the Middle East Command which I have ever had the pleasure of reading? He is to be congratulated for transmitting this vital information to others.