The untimely demise of “The Spirit of Geneva” which coincided with the speech by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov on German reunification, has been described as “shocking” by various news commentators. It was no shock to anyone who has studied Communist philosophy and the weird foreign policy which the Soviet Union has pursued during the past thirty- eight years while under its influence.
The phrase “Spirit of Geneva” was applied to an accord reached during a meeting of the principal figures of contemporary history at Geneva in July, 1955. Probably its most accurate meaning is conveyed by the words “a will to peace.” Certainly, the agreement embodied nothing more than a resolution to seek a formula for the settlement of international differences without resort to force. To some extent, these great leaders solemnly declaring that they favor peace suggests a conclave of preachers who are against sin, or a convention of police chiefs opposing crime.
Nevertheless, it served to generate a wave of optimism in the people of the West, a hope that the world, at long last, might have surcease from tension. Possibly this effect was increased because the average man had previously entertained grave doubts as to whether all of the preachers were against sin and all of the police chiefs against crime; it was reassuring to him to hear them say that they were.
A universal will to peace would have a vital influence upon the armed services of the United States and upon the career of every man in them. It would, for example, mean moth-balling important elements of the fleet, a reduction in manpower, the release of reserves, and a slowing down of promotion.
Nevertheless, I know of no professional military man who would not welcome a reduction of these international tensions which, if too long sustained, could lead to war. However, the professional military man realizes that a unilateral reduction of American arms would be a very dangerous procedure and, if accomplished in the face of continued threat of aggression, would be more apt to lead immediately to conflict than to result in creating a lasting peace. From his viewpoint, any disarmament must be predicated not only upon corresponding Soviet reductions which have been verified by competent observers, but also upon the creation of stable international situations which are less provocative than those now obtaining.
Absence of aggressive intent is the principal condition necessary for stable international relationships. Past Soviet actions do not support a belief in their peaceful intentions. A long record exists of insincerity, of faithless observance of treaties, and of betrayal of allies the moment such treachery offers even ephemeral advantage to their cause of world domination. Mere declarations, whether oral or solemn treaty, cannot be trusted. To disarm without tangible evidence of change in their objectives might well prove to be an irrevocable act.
Unless we find such a basic change in Communist aspirations or in the internal situation which dictates Communist policy, we must view any peace offensive with grave suspicion. It is now obvious that “The Spirit of Geneva,” so far as Imperialistic Russia is concerned was a spirit of deceit. What motivated it? What will motivate future peace offensives? In the ensuing paragraphs are discussed some of the possible reasons why Red leaders undertake such operations.
The most sinister of these possible reasons is to beguile the free world into a false sense of security as a prelude to a surprise attack. In talking peace with Communists this dire possibility must always be considered. The writings of their doctrinaires prescribe just such a peace offensive prior to launching an attack. Such acts fit neatly into the Soviet concept of international morality, and furthermore have the sanction of successful usage many times in the past. History is replete with examples, from the wooden horse used by the Greeks to capture Troy after they had ostensibly made peace (i.e. withdrawn their besieging army) to the treacherous attack perpetrated on “a day that will live in infamy.” The Kremlin leaders themselves were victims of the same trick, and they must vividly remember the horror and the hopelessness with which they observed the effectiveness and devastation of the German onslaught.
The dissolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has long been a leading objective of Communist diplomacy. If they could bring about its termination in exchange for a promise, or some transitory concession, they would have achieved a most important diplomatic victory and would have materially improved their probability of realizing the major Marxist concept, a Communist- controlled world.
Germany, Korea, and Viet Nam are each historically, ethnically, and economically one nation. Each is now divided by the presence of a Communist puppet government in one portion of the nation and a free government in the other. The Kremlin is determined to make these nations Communist. The free nations of the world insist that the peoples shall choose the ideology under which they will live in “free and unfettered elections.” The Communists pay lip service to this, but insist on the same sort of “free and unfettered” elections that were held in Poland. A peace offensive might well have as a major objective an agreement to allow the Soviet Union to supervise elections in these divided states.
At the end of World War II, the Western allies had the greatest preponderance of military power ever held in the history of the world. Partially influenced by subversive propaganda at home, but mainly based upon the assumption that the Soviets would act in the same good faith as their allies, they precipitously demobilized their forces, leaving Russia the dominant military power. This power was used to compel the weak border states to accept communization by threatening invasion unless they did. The Western allies were hastily forced to rearm to prevent the world from being conquered by intimidation. This was the halcyon period of Soviet aggrandizement. Undoubtedly the Red leaders of today long for a similar situation to develop. This Geneva peace offensive may have been undertaken in the hope that the West would be seized by a wave of optimism and unilaterally disband its armed forces. Don’t forget that there was a great clamor from the so-called “liberals,” here and in Great Britain, for us to do just that.
The Soviets may have been seeking some strategical advantage. For example, it would strengthen their relative military potential if the United States could be persuaded to bring its troops home, 3,000 miles across the Atlantic, in exchange for a Russian withdrawal from East Germany a few miles to Poland, or even a few hundred miles to the Soviet border. The overseas air bases are vital elements of our retaliatory capabilities. If the USSR could persuade us to abandon them in exchange for the abandonment of a single fort in Finland, it would materially improve their strategic position. Unless they were apprehensive about a Finnish attack, this fort was of no possible value to the Russians.
The objective of the peace offensive may well have been to lull the free world into a sense of security wherein the safeguards against subversive activity would be relaxed. They could then again insinuate their creatures into positions of trust and confidence in government. The case of Donald Maclean illustrates the potential harm that these traitors in government can do. Maclean was Chief of the American section of the British Foreign Office, and hence was privy to the secret communications between the United States and Great Britain. It is strongly suspected that the Communists were advised by him that the United States would refrain from retaliatory bombing across the Yalu unless previously approved by the United Nations. From the Communist viewpoint it was therefore an excellent calculated risk for the Chinese Reds to enter the Korean conflict.
Such a lessening of security consciousness could also be the opportunity for increased penetration by subversives into business. They would then be in a position to spy out the secrets of defense weapons in the process of being manufactured, and to obtain data on the best method for sabotaging the various productive facilities.
Obtaining the industrial secrets of American business is a profitable espionage field for a nation such as the USSR which is impoverished in entrepreneurship. Also infiltration into the labor unions would place traitors in an excellent position to disrupt production by fomenting strikes.
Prior to July, 1955, the political situation was fairly well stabilized in most sections of the world. In the Far East, aggression had been halted, at least temporarily. In South Viet Nam, Premier Diem was rapidly getting both the militant religious sects and the Communists under control.
In the Middle East, the rugged, individualistic Arabs were not amenable to the Communist ideology. To be sure there was trouble in Kenya, and in North Africa there was a major uprising against the French. But on the whole, from the Kremlin viewpoint, the situation was entirely too stable. Possibly the objective of the peace offensive was to camouflage preparations for a new outbreak of trouble, events which have occurred in the Middle East strongly suggest this.
The Marxist theories hold that capitalism is inherently subject to alternate cycles of prosperity and depression, and that these cycles constitute a strain on society. There is a certain amount of truth to this, but we now know that economic controls, within the scope of a free society, can serve to lessen the cyclical strain to a point where the fabric of social structure remains undamaged. However, no fluctuation introduced by economic factors alone can possibly duplicate the strain that is inherent in a conversion of the economy from war to peace or peace to war.
The United States and the other free nations of the earth are presently devoting far more of their productive effort to matching Soviet armaments than any of them like. All democratic nations would prefer to convert their economies to peaceful ends. If the free nations could be tricked into making this conversion, without waiting for tangible proof that we were not engaging in a unilateral disarmament operation, the Soviet Union would be in a position to force us through a complete war-peace-war cycle by threatening violence as soon as our conversion had proceeded far enough to entail major economic dislocations.
Had we shown signs of converting our armament industry to the manufacture of consumer goods, Mr. Molotov would not have revealed the mailed fist until rearmament would have become a costly and disheartening affair. Then we would have received the news in the form of an aggression or an ultimatum, which would require rearmament with full wartime speed.
Fortunately the trick did not work. Had it done so, the United States would have gone through all the economic strain of a major depression in a very short period of time. The adverse psychological effects would have been heightened by the rapidity of the changes, and would indeed have tended to induce that frustration and apathy which the Communists consider to be so favorable to their subversive purposes.
For a generation or more the economy of the USSR has been on a wartime footing. During this period a large share of the national productive effort has been devoted to armaments. Since a nation can consume only what it produces, this has resulted in restricting the goods available for all other purposes including maintenance of productive facilities, construction of new facilities, and civilian use. A halt in the armaments race would mean that machinery could be repaired or replaced, new facilities constructed, and would permit a large increase in consumer goods.
Many wishful thinkers in the free nations believed that this was the Soviet motive behind the bid to end the cold war. It is a logical explanation as to why the Communists might desire peace, and it carries implications highly encouraging to the peaceful aspirations of the free world. It would, for example, mean that at long last the Kremlin was beginning to place some emphasis on individuals and their needs. It might indicate that dissatisfaction with an inadequate standard of living had aroused public resentment to the point where it was exercising an influence on Soviet foreign relations.
Unfortunately, the short life of the “Spirit of Geneva” indicates that this was not a Soviet objective. Obviously this maneuver was not made in response to internal pressure generated by popular dissatisfaction. And if repair or replacement of facilities played any part in the Russian motivation, a re-evaluation must have indicated that the condition of the national productive plant had not deteriorated as much as originally estimated.
The reasons suggested above for the “Spirit of Geneva” or a future Soviet peace offensive deal with purposes conducive to success in their struggle for world power. However, under either of two conditions, they might seek a permanent peace. The first of these would be a desire for competitive coexistence, the second, the abandonment of the Marxist goal of world domination. The former, whether advanced sincerely or as a cover for further treachery, will most probably be their announced explanation for any further peaceful overture.
The Japanese leaders, during certain phases of World War II, based their military plans upon their public claims of American losses. It is always possible that the Communist dictators, like the Japanese, will believe their own propaganda. They may become convinced that theirs is indeed a superior economic and social system, and now, after thirty-eight years of development, it has reached a state where it can compete in comity with the free systems of the West, proving its superiority by generating a higher standard of living for a happier people. Holding such a conviction, they would seek peace and trade with the free world in order to demonstrate this superiority.
However, the Communist leaders are ruthless, cynical, and shrewd. It seems improbable that they would embark on competitive coexistence without gathering statistics and examining the facts, a procedure which would hardly leave doubt as to the comparative economic efficiency of the two systems. After such a statistical analysis, a desire for competitive coexistence could not be advanced by them in good faith as a reason for seeking permanent peace. Nevertheless, it will probably be the explanation offered. Undoubtedly there are many reasons why this should be true, but three principal ones are readily apparent.
First, the Red dictatorship knows that the Western leaders believe in the economic superiority of democracy and that competition with Communism would expose the latter’s deficiencies and ultimately lead to the generation of discontent in the USSR and eventually to destruction of the dictatorship by rebellion. The Reds therefore expect that, under the influence of their desires, Western leaders will welcome and be inclined to accept a bid for competitive coexistence.
Second, the explanation itself has a certain amount of propaganda value. It would supply superficial evidence of faith, on the part of the Red leaders, in their system; it would encourage their propagandists to proclaim that the ultimate goal of Communism is not to be achieved by war or subversion but by force of example.
Third, it is the only logical reason which can be advanced for them to be willing to enter into peaceful relations with the rest of the world without publicly abandoning their announced goal of achieving a Communist world state.
The United States and its allies would welcome competitive coexistence as a condition for permanent peace. To allow the Communist and the free enterprise systems to compete in the world market, with the prize of survival going to the one which best fulfilled its function of providing for the welfare of the people would mean victory without atomic war, and the advocates of our system could confidently look forward to achieving a peaceful and free world within a generation.
The second condition under which the Communists might seek permanent peace and the only condition under which the free world can reasonably expect peaceful overtures to be other than camouflage to mask some sinister purpose is the abandonment of the Communist goal of world control. So long as that ambition remains, any talk of peace, even competitive coexistence, must be regarded as a tactic in the struggle for power. Until there is tangible evidence that the millennium has arrived, it will remain an act of grossest stupidity for the lamb to voluntarily lie down with the lion.
The leadership of the Communist state is a despotism. World history proves that the maintenance of power is the prime objective of every dictatorship, hence to determine whether any probability exists that either competitive coexistence or abandonment of the Marxist goal will be acceptable to the Soviet leaders it is only necessary to determine if either will help them maintain power.
Past events have proven that hitherto the Communists have had no real will to peace. The development of such a will would require a change in their ideological goals and in the basic political, economic, and social situation which caused them to adopt the policy of aggression in the first place.
In discussing a change in ideological goals, it must be realized that Communism is basically a religion, or at least is strongly analogous to one. As in all religions, its devotees are anxious to propagate the faith. Its missionaries are sent forth unto all the world. Like religions, it must have fixed precepts, lest these missionaries, through their various interpretations, introduce a multiplicity of heresies which will cause the movement to lose its force and be broken up into numerous schisms.
These fixed precepts are supplied by the writings of the prophet and high priests of Communism, Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Their works establish the beliefs and objectives of the religion; they also outline step by step the exact procedure by which these goals are to be attained; they chart a proposed course to a Communist world state. As Hitler explained away the aggressive designs so clearly described in Mein Kampf, just so do the Communists attempt to delude us into believing that basic Communist doctrine does not mean what it says.
It does mean what it says. Communist plans are written out for anyone to read. All of their leading doctrinaires are emphatic in their statements that basic antipathies exist and necessarily must exist between the Communist and the free ideologies, and that there can he no lasting peace until the Communist revolution has come to every nation of the earth. Thus the achievement of world domination is a basic tenet of Communism. They have not abandoned it. They have not even claimed to have abandoned it.
Now, in the light of the fixed principle that a dictatorship will not voluntarily abrogate its power, let us examine the Communist situation and see if that has changed. Let us see if it is possible for them, either to abandon the goal of world domination, or to trust the attainment of that goal to the arbitrament of competition in the international market place. The discussion of both questions requires an interpretation of the influence of the competitive philosophies upon their people.
Governments do not operate in the vacuum of theory. In attempting to determine the value of democracy or Communism to the societies they serve—or oppress—realism will be lost unless the considerations deal with their effects upon man as he really is. A brief consideration of the characteristics of man and what influences motivate him is therefore necessary.
Man is the product of his hereditary instincts as acted upon by the world surrounding him. In the aboriginal state, where the instincts were developed, man was avaricious and greedy. He was sparing of his energy except when serving the race-survival needs of self-preservation or procreation, but in these pursuits he was willing to make unlimited effort. As Durant so succinctly puts it, “He had to be pugnacious, ever ready to fight for food or mate.” Advantageous as these primitive “virtues” may have been for insuring race survival in the prehistoric epoch, violence and rape are not socially acceptable today. To again quote Durant: “Ethically every civilization is a balance and tension between the jungle instincts of men and the inhibitions of a moral code.”
The test of a society then may properly be defined as the manner in which it has solved the problem of orienting the driving force of these primitive instincts with the necessities of social organization. If a society can align this drive with its needs rather than act as a purely repressive force, it is obvious that the society will be better and more willingly served by man as an individual; and the society, which is man in the aggregate, will fare better as a whole. Let us compare the competitive ideologies on this basis.
Democracy allows the individual as much freedom as he can exercise without interfering with the rights of others. There are certain restrictions on complete freedom which are necessitated by the conditions of civilization. Embezzlement and robbery interfere with the rights of others and must be curbed. But in the main, under a democracy, the line of endeavor which man will follow and the energy with which he will pursue his chosen course are squarely up to him. The philosophy of democracy holds that the welfare of the state is best promoted by allowing each individual to promote his own welfare. In fundamental theory then, democracy is as completely aligned with the drive of primitive instincts as it is possible under the conditions of organized society. Even those restrictions which are necessary to prevent the freedom of one man from becoming the oppression of another are imposed by laws which the individual, through his representative, helps to make. Generally speaking, man is aware of the need for the laws which restrict him; under democracy he is justly entitled to feel that he is partly responsible for their enactment. In other words, obedience to law is constructively voluntary, and hence offers no reasonable grounds for resentment.
The contrary is true in any dictatorship. Man does not have complete freedom commensurate with the rights of others, and is not entitled to feel that restrictions placed upon him, even necessary ones, are of his own choosing. In the days before the concept of democracy was evolved, man was inclined to accept this condition philosophically and was not stirred to rebellion unless his monarch were particularly cruel or oppressive. But with the demonstration of the practicability of a system where there was no oppression, man’s instinct for individualistic action asserted itself, and the repressions of tyranny became a source of dissatisfaction. It is no wonder that dictators have always hated democracies.
In addition to this misalignment with the nature of man which is present in any dictatorship, a Communist state does further violence to man’s inherent instincts. If we consider the struggle to achieve an acceptable standard of living as a sublimation of the primitive struggle to survive, it becomes readily apparent that man’s basic instincts are deeply involved with the type of work in which he engages. So long as increasing output improves his survival chances by bringing increasing reward, primitive drive urges him to further effort. However, when increasing output fails to produce commensurate reward, the motivating force of primitive drive is lost. In the Communist state a bureaucracy determines the type of work which each individual will perform and also establishes minimum output quotas which he must meet. Regardless of output, his reward is that minimum quantum of the national produce which the bureaucracy has determined to be necessary to sustain him. Thus there is no direct relationship between energy expenditure and survival reward, a condition which does violence to man’s fundamental instincts, and is apt to result in his expending the minimum amount of energy which will get by his overseer. This social condition is both detrimental to efficiency and productive of discontent.
The Communistic and the free enterprise systems are engaged in a struggle to produce a better standard of living. Defeat in this race means discontent and eventual rebellion; the prize of victory will be the survival of the system. Even without competitive co-existence, under the conditions of cold war, this competition in living standards has been going on. News of the internal conditions of each nation, despite artificial restriction, is gradually being disseminated throughout the others. Authentic news that the standard of living in the Communist lands is materially higher than in ours would come as a shock to the average American and would cause him to question the economic superiority of democracy. The same thing is true in Russia. Ivan the peasant is slowly learning that the conditions under which he lives would be intolerable in a free country, and the knowledge is generating cynicism about the blessings of Communism.
This situation causes grave concern to the dictatorship. Indeed, they have found the lack of reward-motivation to be so detrimental to efficiency that, in the interest of improving their competitive position in the race to produce a higher living standard, it has been found necessary to change the slogan “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” to read “From each according to his ability to each according to his work.” This is a fundamental change in the Communist religion no less startling than would be a change in the Golden Rule of the religion of Christ to read “Do unto others before others do unto you.”
The Soviet leadership explains that this basic change in ideology is only a measure of expediency, made necessary because man has not yet attained the social consciousness necessary to the operation of a pure Communist system. They promise that the pure ideology will be reinstituted as soon as the Communist revolution has come to the whole world. Presumably when the dictatorship is no longer under the necessity of competing with freedom, the living standard will be allowed to fall. If the reversion to pure ideology is to await a change in the social consciousness of man, it will have to await the process of evolution and will probably occur contemporaneously with the fulfillment of the Marxian promise that the state will wither away, possibly in a hundred thousand years.
This change in the Communist ideological slogan is encouraging. It is a move in the right direction and is more in accord with democratic theory than with Communistic, for the idea of making reward commensurate with effort is introduced. However, it does not completely bring the influence exerted upon the individual by the state into alignment with his instinctive driving force. He still is not free to choose or change his line of endeavor. Under the new slogan man’s instinctive resentment against the state will be greater against a Communist dictatorship than against any other kind of tyranny.
Thus, basic conflicts with the nature of man are inherent in the Communist ideology. They cause the system to be repugnant to him when he is confronted with the example of free nations, and they render the state incapable of competing evenly with the democracies in producing a high standard of living.
During the early days of the Revolution, this competitive inadequacy was unimportant because the competition was not with the democracies but with the memory of the old Czarist regime. The new dictatorship easily excelled the woefully inefficient Czarist bureaucracy and achieved prestige as a result of improvements in production. The people had no standard of comparison except with another and less efficient tyranny.
During the past thirty-eight years the dictatorship has introduced many industrial ideas borrowed from the West. These improvements have raised the productive output many fold, and would have served to create public good will had the possibility been properly exploited. However, it was not, due to the preoccupation of the leaders with creating a military machine capable of conquering the world. The increased industrial output which could have resulted in a marked rise in the living standard went instead into armaments. It is as true in a Communist economy as in any other that every tank, airplane, gun, and shell comes directly from the living standard of the people.
During the Communists’ regime in Russia, Western productivity has not remained stationary. Despite the percentage-wise Soviet industrial improvement, the gap in productivity has progressively widened. A half generation ago, the American workman produced three and one half times as much as the Russian. Today, he produces four times as much; tomorrow, with the increasing introduction of automation into American industry the discrepancy in productivity will be even greater.
Increasing American output has enabled the creation of the most efficient military force in world history and simultaneously a tremendous upsurge in the standard of living. By reason of the materially larger proportion of the Russian national produce which is devoted to armaments, the disparity of living standards is even greater than the disparity in production.
To recapitulate briefly, dictatorship naturally produces discontent when the example of free men is available to enslaved peoples. This condition is even more pronounced in a Communist dictatorship because it does more violence to man’s primitive instincts. Changes in Soviet ideology have helped but not eradicated this latter difficulty. In the early stages the Communist dictatorship was in competition with the memory of an inefficient Czarist regime; however, today it is competing with an efficient democracy in a race to produce a higher standard of living. It is slowly dropping further behind in this race.
This situation has already produced discontent and will produce more until disruptive rebellious pressures are generated. From the Soviet point of view the solution is the destruction of the example (i.e. the free world) which is producing the discontent. That was the situation before “The Spirit of Geneva” was born, and it remains the situation today. There is no change in Soviet ideology. There is no change in the Soviet situation. There is no change in Soviet goals.
Now, while the world is in the “shock” of its rude awakening from the Geneva dream, is the time to fix the condition under which co-existence peace is possible. That condition is the permanent abandonment of the Soviet goal of world conquest.
If, for any reason, whether strained economy, internal dissension, or belief in their own propaganda about the superiority of Communism, they wish peace, the West is logically entitled to ask for evidence that they have abandoned the principle of achieving world domination by force. Here are some actions which would tend to reassure the West:
Free the citizens of other nations who are held in slave labor camps, offer public apology for this crime against civilization, and make such restitution as may be possible to these poor victims or to their families. This would not necessarily prove peaceful intentions, but it would indicate an altered appraisal of human values and would be a reassuring factor to the rest of the world.
Effect a unilateral reduction in the size of their armed forces-in-being down to the size of the forces of the free nations. The remaining force would be adequate for their defense if they are actually afraid that the West would attack them, which is extremely doubtful. It would, however, be inadequate for offense because the superior efficiency of the democratic forces would give them initial battlefield superiority, and the industrial capacity of the free nations would insure the maintenance of this superiority throughout a war.
Convert a large proportion of the arms industrial facilities to the production of consumers goods. Coincidentally, this action would result in a tremendous upsurge in the living standards which would serve to allay popular discontent within the Soviet Union for some time to come.
Cease to support subversive elements and movements within other nations. These subversive organizations have a single declared purpose—to communize the states wherein they operate. They form a “Fifth Column,” a dagger pointed at the heart. This course would be entirely consistent with abandonment of the goal of world conquest and would be one of the best evidences of a desire to live in harmony with the free world which the USSR could offer.
Withdraw their opposition to and assist in the reunification of Germany, Korea, and Viet Nam. Left to themselves, with external pressures removed, there is little question that these nations will choose to be free. Allowing this would therefore entail the loss of territory by Communism, a process entirely inconsistent with continued ambitions for expansion.
Free the satellite states both politically and economically from Russian control. This would not necessarily require that the satellites convert to democracy; Yugoslavia furnishes an example of a Communistic nation which lives in comity with the free nations of the world.
Disseminate throughout the Soviet Empire a public announcement that the particular tenet of Marx, and Lenin, relative to the necessity for Communism to achieve world domination is an error. This would be extremely embarrassing for them, because it would, in effect, be casting doubt upon the “divine inspiration” of the prophets, and would thereby cause the whole philosophy to be questioned. Nevertheless, it is requisite if the West is to have confidence in them.
The best guarantee of peaceful intentions that the USSR could give would be the abolition of dictatorship and the establishing of democracy, with a constitution, a legislative branch truly elected by the whole people to make the laws, an executive branch also freely elected to enforce them, and an effective judiciary to interpret them. This would lead to immediate and permanent peace.
The life span of the “Spirit of Geneva” was less than four months. It was born at the Summit conference in July and died during the November meeting of foreign ministers. In retrospect, it is interesting to speculate as to whether the Soviet Union ever had any intention of effecting a permanent end to the Cold War. We have discussed what the Reds could do to assure peace; now let us examine what they did do.
They took the stand that the reunification of Germany could proceed only along lines which would inevitably result in its communization. They ceased even to pay lip service to the principle of free elections.
They demanded the dissolution of NATO, an organization created purely to defend against their aggression, as condition precedent to any discussion of arms reduction.
They contined support of subversive elements in the nations with whom they purported to be seeking friendly relations.
In Viet Nam, in violation of the Treaty of Geneva, they have vigorously prosecuted efforts at subversive penetration of the free South. In Laos, they have engaged in armed intervention.
In Kenya, “General Russia” and “General China” have led raids of pillage and murder against whites and loyal natives. While the sobriquets chosen for themselves by the Mau Mau leaders are superficially indicative, it cannot definitely be established that the movement is Communist-led and inspired. However, it cannot be doubted that it has their full sympathy and support.
In North Africa the French are facing a situation which also has all the indications of being a nationalistic movement sponsored and inspired by the foremost expansionistic nation of our times.
The Soviets have sent agents into Afghanistan to foment strife between that nation and Pakistan. They have furnished equipment and technicians to give the Afghans the potential for attack.
They have sought to break down the traditional friendships between the United States and the nations of the Middle East. The Arabs are not inclined to Communism as an ideology, but neither are they receptive to dependency on any of the great western nations. The continuous propaganda line that the United States is the world’s leading advocate of colonialism, combined with our support of some aspects of the colonial policies of our allies, has had an effect. Also, American support of Israel, to whom the Arab states are unanimously hostile, has resulted in the creation of some Arab resentment. Probably the Russians have little hope of communizing the Arabs for the present, but seek to create strife, in the belief that unrest and anti-Americanism are favorable conditions for progress in the intermediate future.
They have sought to promote trouble in the Middle East by producing an imbalance of power. Not only have they furnished arms to Egypt, they have also offered them to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Lebanon. It is possible that the false peace was a cover for this penetration and for the creation of strife in an area from which they had previously been excluded.
One disheartening fact about the situation is that no one appears to have noticed that Soviet internal propaganda does not conceal the fact that the goal of world conquest had not been abandoned, and hence that the Geneva agreement was purely a tactical maneuver. Said Vice Premier Lazar Kaganovich in a speech commemorating the 38th anniversary of the October Revolution, “Under the banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, we have triumphed and will continue to triumph to full victory under Communism.”
The United States and its allies now possess weapons capable of destroying the world. Presumably the Communists also have them. As individuals, the members of the dictatorship cannot possibly desire this destruction. So long as the West maintains its military potential the Kremlin faces a dilemma. If it attacks, the dictators as individuals will be destroyed along with most of the civilized world. If it does not attack, internal dissatisfaction generated by the inadequacies of Communism will eventually lead to the overthrow of the dictatorship by rebellion.
This dilemma might be avoided by a change in the economic philosophy to restore individual motivation, leaving only those problems which are necessarily inherent in any tyranny existing side by side with free nations. The revised ideological slogan is a step in this direction; but only complete abandonment of the Communist philosophy could satisfactorily accomplish it. This cannot be done because the dictators hold their power by virtue of their positions as the high priests of the neo-Communist religion. To denounce that religion would be to brand themselves as liars and cheats in the eyes of their subjects, and thus to strike a mortal blow at the very foundation of their power.
Eventually the oppressed people will learn the truth. Communism is an anachronistic system; ages ago it was tried and found wanting. It requires a dictatorship in order to operate without producing chaos. It is an abomination to man’s instincts. It is ineffective in promoting the public welfare. When these truths are learned, no power can save the tyrants from the wrath of their dupes.
The character of the Communist leaders and the nature of the philosophy they preach indicate that they may attempt to escape from the dilemma by seeking a way to attack without risking destruction for themselves. If the free nations could be tricked by a phony peace offensive into a position where they can be destroyed, it would be an ideal solution. Viewed in this light, who can doubt the character of “The Spirit of Geneva”? And viewed in this light, the rapidity with which Mr. Molotov reassumed the cold war attitude must be construed as a confession of Communist defeat.
We must not be so naive as to assume that there will be no more attempts at deceit. Limited aggressions, carefully calculated to remain just short of justification for Western retaliation, will continue. The provocation of trouble within nations and between nations will continue. The aggressions and provocations will be intended not only to achieve limited objectives having intrinsic value to the Communist cause, but also to make the West more receptive to their next siren song of peace.
It is always possible that the leadership will fall into the hands of men of goodwill who sincerely believe that their religion is superior to the religion of Christ. If this should ever be the case, they would be anxious to submit the decision as to the superiority of the economic systems encompassed within the two philosophies to the arbitrament of competition in the world market place. The way must be kept open for them to do so; for if they do, we have won without war. On the other hand, we must remember that the proposition made to us will be phrased exactly the same whether they sincerely desire competitive coexistence or whether it is another phony peace offer designed to maneuver us into a defenseless position. The determination as to which type of peace is being offered to us cannot rest on Communist words; it must be predicated soley on the evidence of Communist actions.
No one is more interested in the momentous issue of world peace or atomic war than the officers of the American military services. No group holds a greater responsibility for determining whether it shall be peace or war. For they have the responsibility of maintaining the efficiency of the military force of the West, the instrument which deters the Kremlin from aggression, and hence is the lever which eventually must force Communism into a competition which will destroy it. Any peaceful move which logically meets the criteria of legitimacy must be supported. Any maneuver designed to result in a relative reduction of Western power must be detected and denounced. Every Communist proposal and action must be searchingly examined. Now as never before in history, “eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.”