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CADET GRAY. By Frederick P. Todd;
illustrated by Frederick T. Chapman.
New York: Sterling Publishing Co., 1955.
122 pages; illustrated in color and black
and white. $7.50.
Reviewed by General Mark W.
Clark, usa (Ret.)
(A West Pointer, Class of 1917, General Clark held top commands in Europe during World War II. Following the war he commanded U. S. Occupation Forces in A merica and later was Commander in Chief, U. S. and United Nations Forces, Far East. General Clark retired in 1953 and the following year became President of The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina.)
This is a handsomely conceived and executed story about the United States Military Academy cadets with special emphasis on the diverse uniforms they have worn since 1802. The title is uniquely appropriate, since it is taken from the song “Army Blue,” traditionally played at every West Point graduation and for the final dance at West Point hops.
The chorus is familiar to every man who ever marched on the Plain:
“Army Blue, Army Blue,
Hurrah for Army Blue We’ll bid farewell to Kaydet Gray, and don the Army Blue.”
I am one of the thousands who have sung “Army Blue.” My father marched in West Point’s Long Gray Line; I marched in it; my son marched in it. And if this were not enough, my daughter married another West
Pointer. From her heritage of Army life she chose, as one facet of her work as an artist, to create beautiful figurines which depict some of the uniforms which have been worn since George Washington’s time by the armies of the United States. I am proud to say that two of her figurines show West Point cadets in modern dress.
With this somewhat personal introduction, I am certain that all readers of the Proceedings will understand why I inspected this remarkably attractive book with great interest, more than ordinarily critical. I suppose that sharpshooters will come up, in time, with technical objections to Colonel Todd’s work, notwithstanding that he is probably the outstanding current authority on West Point dress from the start of the Military Academy. He is also a founder of The Company of Military Collectors and Historians and creator of the fine Military Gallery in the Museum of the City of New York.
Frankly, my pleasure in inspecting this book, overcame any sharply critical impulses. It is written carefully, and illustrated with precision by Mr. Chapman, one of our better known heraldic artists. West Point archives and class yearbooks since they first were published have been utilized in the illustrations. Many of the fascinating photographs of long-dead years have never before been published.
I think I can assure all West Point graduates that Cadet Gray will provide many hours of pleasure, for them particularly. For
the military historian, this is a book of considerable merit, since it is a sort of telescoped history of West Point, in addition to its accent on uniforms. For the casual reader, the appeal will be less pronounced, but I think any American, interested in the history of his country, will derive pleasure and profit from reading about the creation of West Point, and the reasons why its uniforms have sometimes undergone basic changes, while retaining always the significant hallmarks of officers-in-the-making.
Cadet Gray will be an excellent investment for any West Pointer, for nostalgic reasons, if nothing else.
THE CODE BREAKERS OF ROOM 40: The Story of Admiral Sir William R. Hall, R.N. By Admiral Sir William James, R.N.(Ret.) New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1956. 212 pages, illustrations, index. Reviewed by Captain Edward Macauley, usn (Ret.)
(Captain Macauley commanded the U. S. Stationnaire Scorpion in Turkish waters 1913-1915 during the 1st and 2nd Balkan Wars, and when Turkey entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers, saw Germany take over control of the Turkish Army and Navy. lie reported for duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington in
September, 1915, and was Assistant Director of the same from March 1916 to July 1918, and from then on, special duty abroad. At the end of World War I, he commanded the USS George Washington, which look President Wilson to and from the Peace Conference in Paris, and brought the King and Queen of the Belgians on their official visit to and from the United States in 1919. He retired to civil life in November, 1922, and throughout World War II was a member of the U. S. Maritime Commission and Deputy War Shipping Administrator in Washington, D.C.)
The primary title of this book might not impress the general reader in the United States for few Americans (except perhaps cryptographers) have knowledge of or interest in “Room 40” or its “Code Breakers.” But the sub-title of the book impressed me immediately. To my good fortune, I had known Admiral Sir William R. Hall, R.N., during the first World War and knew something of the magnificent and important work he and his Naval Intelligence Division of the British Admiralty had done.
This exciting book should remind its readers what we owe our British brothers; especially of our obligation to the British Navy, and British Naval Intelligence in particular, for the time and opportunity afforded the United States (nearly three years) to prepare for World War I while the British held the front lines against Germany on land and sea.
This book is a gracious and loyal tribute to an extraordinarily accomplished organizer, administrator, and leader of men, written by his devoted second in command who has served with him both at sea and on shore. It is both a eulogy and biography of genuine interest as a historical document written in clear and authoritative fashion.
One aspect of this book deals with the escape of the two German ships, Goeben and Breslau, to Constantinople in the opening days of World War I. My own actions and recollections may be of some interest.
On Tuesday, August 4, 1914, in Venice, I took passage on the Italian steamer Sicilia for Constantinople. Stopped to read a communique just posted saying that England had declared war on Germany.
The Sicilia was very crowded and dirty and filled with refugees bound for the Near East, attempting to reach their homes before war broke out. The conditions on board were indescribable—people sick and well, sleeping on deck and in the passageways. The ship swarmed with a conglomeration of nationalities, complexions and smells. Every inch of space seemed filled at Venice but when we touched at Brindisi, the Turkish consul came with two hundred subjects to be accommodated. The Captain said it was impossible but changed his mind when informed that these were reservists returning to the army, and if he refused them passage, then the Sicilia would not be allowed through the Dardanelles.
The two hundred Turkish subjects were Greeks, Russians, Armenians, and perhaps a few Turks. They huddled about the decks and slept anywhere and everywhere, even in the bath tubs. Reservations and privileges for the first class passengers were absolutely ignored. There was little differentiation for age or sex. Meals were snatched and sketchy. With a few other American men on board, I formed, as a precaution, a boats crew for one of the life boats, and with their families held an informal “abandon ship” drill. I had cruised in these waters and realized the dangers of navigation through the Greek, Islands and the Aegean Sea. They were badly lighted at night, and few would have been saved if that ship had gone down. That heterogeneous gang in the panic of a shipwreck would have killed most of us before the boats were even launched. However, we had fair weather, a brilliant moon, and good luck. That we could keep all the airports, windows, and doors open probably saved us from an epidemic.
On Friday afternoon when we had rounded Cape Matapan at the tip of the Peloponnesus, we heard distant gunfire. On the horizon ahead could be seen three vessels engaged in action. We had heard that the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau had slipped out of Messina while the whole British Mediterranean Fleet was watching for them. One lone British cruiser, HMS Gloucester, had followed and was exchanging shots with them at long range. She was in radio communication with the British Fleet and suddenly dropped back, while the German ships disappeared over the horizon. I was told later that Admiral Sir E. C. T. Trowbridge, Commander of the British Fleet in the Mediterranean, had declared during an investigation which he had requested, that he had received a radio in the secret Admiralty code issued only that week, instructing him to permit the Goeben and Breslau to pass. This instance of the extent and efficiency of the German spy system was probably as far-reaching in its effects as any that occurred during the war.
As the Gloucester dropped back, she passed close aboard and spoke us, and a cheer went up from our ship. Ahead of us was the S S General of the Hamburg-American Line. From then until our arrival at Constantinople she was in constant communication with the escaping ships. I believed then they were trying to make the Dardanelles and not the Adriatic. On our arrival in Constantinople I had reason to go to the British Embassy and there suggested the German ships were bound for the Dardanelles. I was greeted with courteous derision. “For,” said the Counselor of Embassy in charge, “if they did come in, under international law they must leave within twenty-four hours. Of course they will try for the Adriatic.”
It would have been better had he given me credence and remembered that the Turkish battleships, being built in England, had been confiscated by the British. For the following afternoon, August 11th, the Goeben and Breslau did come through the Dardanelles, and once they were in the Bosporus, Turkey was committed to the Central Powers. It was easy for the Germans to say to the Turks, “The selfish English keep the Turks’ own ships, but we, at this critical time, send them two of our best to replace them.” The Turks were loud in their praise of such generosity. The German officers and crews continued to man the ships, and for some weeks the German flag was flown. Then they put fezzes on the enlisted men, hoisted the Turkish flag, and steamed up the Bosporus to an anchorage in full view of the British summer Embassy so that its occupants could plainly hear the German National Air when played by the ships’ bands.
It was probably one of Germany’s greatest victories. It was certainly one of England’s greatest defeats and had far reaching and disastrous consequences for the cause of the Allies.
* * *
In attempting to review or discuss a book on World War I which so soundly and strongly stresses the importance of decyphering secret codes, it is appropriate to invite attention to the work done from 1914 on by our State Department and our Military Intelligence Division (MI-8), as recorded in another book The American Black Chamber by Herbert O. Yardley published in 1931.
From 1915 on, the Office of U. S. Naval Intelligence had been in close touch with British Naval Intelligence in London through Captain (later Commodore) Guy Gaunt, the British Naval Attache. He was Admiral Hall’s direct representative and cooperated with us splendidly. We exchanged information of value to each and to both of our countries. He had sources we did not have and could not hope to get. He kept us informed of reports he received from London. We in turn kept him informed of everything that came to our notice which might be of importance to his government or his chief, Admiral Hall.
As one of the many instances of the close cooperation between O. N. I., Commodore Gaunt, and the British Naval Intelligence, the following may be of interest to readers of The Code Breakers.
In 1917, Leon Trotsky was preparing to return from the United States to Russia. His passport application had been passed by Military Intelligence and the Department of Justice (Bureau of Investigation) but was held up by O.N.I. with an emphatic protest, based on the man’s record. Following our recommendation, the State Department declined to issue the passport. Outside influence was brought and the matter carried to the President. The State Department then approved the passport. I informed the British Naval Attache, Captain Guy Gaunt, and when the ship on which Trotsky sailed reached Halifax, Trotsky and his papers were removed from the vessel. Again pressure was exerted from London and from Washington, and Trotsky was allowed to proceed. The British did not wish to hold him when his release was recommended from high sources. Trotsky reached Russia shortly after Lenin’s return, to become a factor of prime importance in the Bolshevik Revolution, and hence in the withdrawal of Russian support from the Allies.
After the war William A. Pinkerton, at the annual convention of the International Association of Chiefs of Police at New Orleans, gave a talk on what he called “The Bolsheviki,” in which he said, “During the war, had there been a Secret Service for our Government such as I have outlined, Trotsky’s plotting and preparations in this country to overthrow the Kerensky Government in Russia would have been under such surveillance that they would not have been permitted to leave our shore unmolested. ...” Mr. Pinkerton, like many others, was plainly not aware of the extent of our Naval Intelligence Service, nor did he know, as we did, that one of the men most influential in getting Trotsky’s release and in expediting his return to Russia was a member of the Kerensky Government.
When I had the honor of meeting Admiral Hall in London in 1918 I was interested in comparing the Intelligence Division of the British Admiralty with our O.N.I. They had, or course, been doing active war intelligence work since before August 4, 1914, and we had much to learn from them.
Admiral Hall, the very able chief of the British Intelligence Division and the subject of this book, showed me how they kept score on their secret agents and sources of information. When a report came in, it and its source were carefully examined. If confirmed from an entirely separate source, the original source would be credited with a higher mark for authenticity and dependability. After an agent had worked for and under Admiral Hall for some time he knew the agent’s percentage of performance. He required the exact source of a report and paid little attention to those which were doubtful or unconfirmed. The British Admiralty was quieter and more dignified than our Navy Department. Four years of war h'ad taught them to move without fuss or excitement, and they never seemed hurried. Admiral Hall would not issue a report to the Admiralty until he was satisfied that it was from a responsible and accurate source. Reports not authenticated or supported were destined for the wastepaper basket.
Admiral James’ book is not only intensely interesting and exciting but very timely- Present world conditions and the aftermath of the cold war, whether it be an aftermath or a development, stresses the importance of knowing promptly what the other nations are planning or doing, as it affects us, our allies, and world conditions. Espionage and counterespionage are regrettably a necessary concomitant of intelligent and effective defense and attack, whether we like it or not.
It is not very long ago that espionage was thought un-American. Prior to our rupture with Mexico in 1916, the United States had not a single under-cover operative in that country. The Navy Department had no money then for such work, but the State Department did have a confidential fund which could be used. Authority was obtained to send an operative into Mexico, and he went in the guise of a German newspaper correspondent. We outfitted him with the necessary credentials and he did an excellent job.
The story of the Zimmermann telegram, as told by Admiral James, is enlightening. I do not recollect any doubt, on our part, of its authenticity. In the light of afterevents, the whole matter seems to have been well and fortunately handled. Had the United States been brought into World War I at a later date, the loss of life and treasure to all the Allies would have been much greater and the conditions of the Peace probably less favorable.
The Code Breakers will, I hope, be widely read and will renew the memories of accomplishment for some of us and of pride for those who are not old enough to have taken active part in it.
Anyone interested in the history of the World, or particularly the history of World War I, or in the necessity for close association and friendship between the two most powerful English-speaking Nations would do well to read this book.
RETURN TO POWER. By Alistair Horne.
New York: Praeger, 1956. 405 pages, illustrated, index. $6.00.
Reviewed by Rear Admiral Howard E. Orem, usn
{From June 1952 until April 1954, Admiral Orem was Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Germany, and is currently attached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
Too few authoritative accounts have been written of the West Germans’ fight for a way of life that is free, that provides economic prosperity. A way of life that has no room for slave camps, Buchenwalds, and brainwashing; where a man’s son has a right to grow up unafraid and in his native land. And the West German should well know what he doesn’t want after a dozen regimented years under Hitler followed by a decade as a citizen of a partitioned nation in the shadow of the hammer and sickle.
Alistair Horne’s Return to Power is an observant British reporter’s—London Daily Telegraph—on-the-scene report of the last four years of that decade. It includes an interesting summary of the “legislative difficulties of a legislature composed of legislators not accustomed to legislating.” It is a stem to stern narrative of the trials and triumphs of Chancellor Adenauer, “the great architect of postwar Germany.” And, interestingly, the author has not avoided setting forth his views when differences of opinions may be expected.
The Herr Blank (West German Defense Minister) concept of the new German “citi- zens-in-uniform” military establishment is far more removed from the former German principle of iron discipline and “theirs not to reason why” than the civilian control concept of some other Western powers differs from their previous practices. Having in mind the great striking power of the Wehr- macht in World War II, the author asks, will the Blank concept work? The answer is important and nato headquarters will be following developments closely for Western Germany now finds herself allied to the West and committed to build military forces which will provide the balance between East and West. The author dwells at some length on the July 20, 1944 attempt on Hitler’s life, its moral rightness or wrongness. I do not share his apparent concern as to the probable effects this attempt, or the war crimes trials, may have on the morale or loyalty of Herr Blank’s future forces. Not dealt with sufficiently in the report, and of more immediate importance to nato and the Western World, will be the action of the Bundestag on the conscription legislation currently under consideration. If favorable action is not forthcoming, and having in mind full employment resulting from her economic comeback combined with the current low*pay scale of the services, the re-
cruiting of a 500,000-man military establishment and the maintenance of a skilled core of professionals will be major difficulties in Herr Blank’s “sea of troubles.”
The author is obviously, and rightly, a great admirer of Chancellor Adenauer’s accomplishments. Churchill has called the Chancellor the “wisest German statesman since Bismarck.” Few heads of government have worked more consistently for European unity, and this while facing up to the sad legacy that Hitler’s “solution” of the Jewish problem had left on Western Germany and temporizing the strong influence of religious factions in German politics. The importance of these factors in the German political scene are informatively discussed in the book. In his final speech before the last elections Adenauer made this eloquent appeal: “The barriers must fall between the countries of Europe, and Europe must be united so that Western civilization can survive. There is no other way to ensure that our children shall have a brighter future and be spared the sufferings that our generation went through. It will be a long road, calling for unending patience and the overcoming of a world of prejudices.” Throughout the book the author sets forth in an interesting manner the patient, wise, and effective tactics and leadership of Adenauer in meeting the many problems, both internal and external, in the building of a new democracy.
The phenomenal economic recovery has been well named the German miracle or the transition from Morgenthau to Marshall. The author credits American aid as the primary reason for this comeback. While this may well be, other attributes of the Germans were essential. Not mentioned is the fact that other major European states have received as much or more U. S. assistance and have failed to register a corresponding economic expansion. Both on a national and an individual scale there is no satisfactory substitute for intelligent hard work. Few, if any, other nationals are more intimately acquainted with hard work, and few, if any, are more proud of the accomplishments therefrom, than are the Germans. Since the war these accomplishments have been brought about despite great difficulties. Eleven years ago one in every five houses in Western
Germany was totally destroyed and another one in five so badly damaged as to be uninhabitable. Eleven million refugees have been assimilated, yet today with their booming industry there is actually a manpower shortage in Western Germany. But the author does not relate these great accomplishments to other facts less complimentary. Today West Germany has about 10,000 men in uniform, not 500,000; she has refused to contribute more than 5.5% of her expanding gross national product to her own defense. Britain contributes 10.1% and the United States 11.6%, and, while operating with a budgetary surplus, Germany is receiving over §1 billion worth of arms from the United States as a gift. Possibly Professor Erhard’s February, 1955 comment, “We shall let the Americans pay,” is a national objective of some German officials.
A report on the new Germany, such as written by Alistair Horne, is a valuable contribution toward public enlightenment. In a world beset with all manner of troubles it highlights what can be done when determination and hard work, on a national scale, are maintained.
NAVAL WARFARE (NWP-10) Washington. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1955.
Reviewed by Commander S. A.
Bobczynski, usn
(Commander Bobczynski is attached to the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.)
From the Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, comes an interesting official publication. Non-registered and non-classified, for all the world to read, NWP-10 lays down in unmistakable terms the blue print by which the U. S. Navy serves the national aims of the United States. Selling no pie-in-the-sky, here is singleness of purpose based on knowledge of and skill in the application of sea power. Common sense rather than top-secret is the aspect from which the U. S. Navy is discussed, and logic rather than passion is its keynote.
Briefly but accurately Naval Warfare sketches out the place of the U. S. Navy in the scheme of things. Beginning with “National security is a primary concern of every nation,” it continues the delineation, “The responsibility for the security of a nation rests with its government, which in a representative form of government is responsible to the people for its actions.” With this generic background there follows logically some idea of WHAT and HOW of security. “The United States requires for its security a posture of military readiness which can be maintained continuously TO SUPPORT FOREIGN POLICY, TO DETER AGGRESSION, TO ENCOURAGE OTHER NATIONS TO MAINTAIN INDEPENDENT STATUS AND TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR RAPID MOBILIZATION SHOULD WAR PROVE UNAVOIDABLE.” The delineation moves swiftly and accurately to the proposition: “To ensure for the United States the power to maintain these capabilities without interruption, SEA POWER IS A BASIC REQUIREMENT.’”
NWP-10 expounds no theory of sea power, but rather does it collate some facts about sea power on which to establish the milieu of the U. S. Naval forces. With due regard for the other important factors of our nation’s total power one can appreciate the function of naval power and its application in the interest of national aims. Through sea power one sees the U. S. navy designed not as an infernal machine with the sole purpose of triggering or being triggered by the nuclear doom, but designed as a Waterbury-speed- gear kind of machine, controlled with superb fineness from zero load in peacetime, through the short-of-war ranges of the present time, to the maximum load of full scale war which we have come to call World War
m.
“Naval power is the capacity of naval forces to establish, maintain, and exploit control of the seas and to deny their use to the enemy IN FURTHERANCE OF NATIONAL POWER AND OBJECTIVES.” Far from naive concerning the possibilities of our nation’s becoming involved in a consternation of nuclear proportions, the U. S. Navy continues its efficient operation from day to day, and hour to hour, in furtherance of national policy and objectives. No more terrified by the concept of a one-shot-war, than it is humored by a mad dream of wiping out civilizations in the interest of “progress,” the U. S. Navy functions in the maintenance of an established law and order in the name of the leadership that has been thrust upon these United States by world events.
The position of leadership of the United States in the World today is merely implied; there is no attempt to argue why we must maintain that leadership, or even HOW we should maintain such leadership. Such restraint is understood when one reminds himself that these questions rightfully belong to echelons higher than the Navy; such questions belong to those who actually formulate the national objectives and provide for their implementation.
To some of us who have been subjected to a great many professional influences, there may be a lack of complete satisfaction with Naval Warfare for what it fails to do. It won’t, for instance, raise a penny of funds for naval forces, as it is hardly likely that a Congressman or Senator will ever read it. It can only be hoped that all naval officers will read it. With Naval Warfare as common ground for a point of departure, military strategists, naval planners, and statesmen can control the course of seapower with naval forces for the benefit of the United States and for the common good of all mankind, in our time and for so long as we will not relinquish our leadership either through default or defeat.
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