“Naval strategy has for its end to found, support, and increase as well in peace as in war the sea power of a country.” This broad definition of naval strategy enunciated by Admiral Mahan in his profound exposition, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, of necessity encompasses the paramount position played by a vigorous Merchant Marine. For, in answer to his rhetorical question, “Can this navy be had without restoring the merchant shipping?”, Admiral Mahan replied, “It is doubtful. History has proved that such a purely military sea power can be built up by a despot, as was done by Louis XIV; but though so fair seeming, experience showed that his navy was like a growth which having no root soon withers away.”
This incisive analysis, written some 65 years ago, becomes more compelling when viewed in the light of the logistical problems of World War III and the Korean conflict. For today, unlike the 19th Century, the material and equipment for modern warfare is not only far greater and far heavier, but it is mechanized. Armies and navies are more mobile. Consequently, the task of keeping them supplied is tremendous. Experts in supply tell us that it takes four tons of shipping to supply every soldier landing in a mechanized assault and an additional two tons to supply him each month. But even here these “careful estimates” are but guesses, since where that soldier lands is of prime importance in calculating the needed tonnage; and who can tell where our troops will be landing and fighting in World War III?
To the strain of supplying modern armies with the sinews of war we must add the problem of maintaining the morale of civilian allied populations by providing them with sufficient food and other necessities to human existence. Then, too, the danger from submarine warfare threatens to be far greater than the U-Boat campaign of World War II, which resulted in such alarming losses to Allied shipping. These difficulties constitute a Herculean task. Not to recognize them as such easily could spell disaster even for so great a nation as the United States.
Allied and neutral losses in 1941 (before the entry of the United States into World War II) were running at the rate of 500,000 tons per month; in 1942 (with the United States in the war) these losses were even higher—and sinkings of tankers along our eastern seaboard were taking place within eyesight of horrified watchers on New Jersey’s beaches. So serious had this become that ships were ordered to remain in port until assured by the Navy’s Eastern Sea Frontier that they might proceed with some degree of safety.
Final figures put the total number of American Merchant Ships (of over 1,000 gross tons) sunk in World War II at 733, or more than half of our pre-war merchant marine (we had a total of 1,397 ships in 1939, active and inactive). The toll of merchant marine personnel—seamen and officers—either dead or missing, was 5,638. An additional 581 were made prisoners of war. Throughout the first part of 1943, casualties among merchant seamen and officers were greater proportionately than in all the armed forces combined. There can never be an adequate record of the suffering—physical, mental, and emotional—undergone by those who lived through those never-ending “watches” accompanied by the constant fear of baptism by fire.
The cargoes carried by this huge but hastily-built fleet of freighters and tankers staggers the imagination even of Americans, accustomed as we are to astronomical figures —44,117,000 tons in 1942; 62,113,000 in 1943; 78,553,000 in 1944; and 83,469,000 in 1945 of dry cargo and bulk liquid shipments. To express it another way, 8,500 tons of cargo were delivered every hour of every day and night during the last year of the war. Petroleum and its products accounted for 35,109,145 tons, or 99 per cent of the total of bulk liquid shipments.
Our main concern should be the adequacy of our American flag tanker fleet to bring oil to the places where it is needed when it is needed—to our fighting ships at sea, to our land-based and carrier-based planes, to our tanks, trucks, and jeeps, and to our factories —so that they in turn may provide the material, the food, and the clothing for the armed forces. For even as any army travels on its belly, a whole nation, yes, even a civilization, will survive or perish in direct proportion to an adequate oil supply in time of war.
A recent work, entitled The Middle East, Problem Area in World Politics, expresses the same idea as follows:
“In the contemporary world oil is power. It is power in time of peace to develop and maintain great industrial establishments and systems of transportation. In time of war it is power to expand industry, to carry the industrial output to strategic or tactical destinations, and to energize nations in combat in innumerable ways. ... It is believed by the architects of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that the defense of Europe is vital to the survival of the free world in the struggle with Communist totalitarianism. A cornerstone of their planning, consequently, is the assumption that upon adequate rearmament and further recovery from the effects of the Second World War, Western Europe can be defended successfully in case of a Third World War. This leads inevitably to the conclusion with reference to military security alone that oil supplies for the upbuilding and defense of free Europe may not be much less important than oil for the United States as champion of the free world.”
That the part played by the American Merchant Marine in World War II was recognized and appreciated in full measure is made abundantly clear from the letter written by Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, to Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator on November 2, 1945.
“During the past three and a half years, the Navy has been dependent upon the Merchant Marine to supply our far-flung fleet and bases. Without this support, the Navy could not have accomplished its mission. Consequently, it is fitting that the Merchant Marine share in our success as it shared in our trials. The Merchant Marine is a strong bulwark of national defense in peace and war, and a buttress to a sound national economy. A large Merchant Marine is not only an important national resource; it is, in being, an integral part of the country’s armed might during lime of crisis. During World War II, this precept has been proven. As the Merchant Marine returns to its peacetime pursuits, I take pleasure in expressing the Navy’s heartfelt thanks to you and through you to the officers and men of the Merchant Marine for their magnificent support during World War IT. All hands can feel a pride of accomplishment in a job well done. We wish the Merchant Marine every success during the years ahead and sincerely hope that it remains strong and continues as a vital and integral part of our national economy and defense.”
If the need for an adequate Merchant Marine is so clear and so imperative, why, asks the man in the street, were we caught short in World War I and World War II? And why, he wonders, in the light of the present cold war, the greater threat to our national security, and the obvious need for newer and faster ships, have we (1) allowed our fleet to dwindle, (2) ignored a so-called “flight from the flag,” and (3) economized in matters affecting the construction and operation of our merchant fleet, particularly when it is an open secret that when and if war comes we won’t have the “advance notice” that was so helpful in World War I and World War II.
The answer perhaps lies in the fact that the Merchant Marine is a business at least in peacetime. The ordinary problems are how to compete and make a profit in an industry that is plagued with labor disturbances (mostly among the longshore group), that finds competition from other means of transportation (rail, trucks, and pipelines), that is caught in a web of federal regulatory agencies, and that is fair game for the politician who controls the piers. Extraordinary problems, in addition to the normal ones of business enterprise, stem from engaging in foreign trade.
The matter of discrimination as practiced by foreign countries’ governments and how it affected American flagships was the subject of a hearing held before a Sub-Committee on Merchant Marine and Maritime matters of the Committee of Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United States Senate, 82nd Congress.
In the title of the hearing, the following words were used: “To discuss the question of discriminatory acts of foreign countries affecting our Merchant Marine.” A long list of rules, regulations and practices of various foreign countries, including Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Uruguay, Canada, France, Italy, South Africa, Spain, Egypt, Turkey, Portuguese East Africa, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Kenya Colony, British East Africa, was compiled. Testimony was taken from officials of steamship companies and government personnel, including representatives of the State Department.
Of course, all businessmen and citizens of any country look to their government to “protect them” from all manner of competition from foreign sources and it is understandable, therefore, that shipping interests should seek to protect whatever share of the international business they already had, and even to add to this. The State Department, on the other hand, has the problem of trying to represent the United States as a whole in all matters affecting relations with foreign countries, and it always must be careful not to be accused of serving some special interest group.
Senator Magnuson, who has been active in matters affecting the American Merchant Marine as a Senator from a coastal state, namely, the State of Washington, observed at the time that, “The question of Maritime and shipping has never received in the State Department the priority it has deserved in these negotiations.”
Perhaps, however, in times like these when the international balance seems to be so delicate and when the position of the U. S. as a world leader is so pronounced, the State Department must, of necessity, weigh carefully all considerations before it suggests to any nation that it change its rules, regulations, or practices where these affect the U. S. Merchant Marine, tariffs, or any other economic or political situation.
Further in the course of these hearings, Mr. A. C. Cocke, Vice President of Lykes Brothers Steamship Company, New Orleans, stated, “Over the years, Lykes has endeavored to maintain regular service to the Scandinavian countries of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. While we appreciate these countries are very maritime-minded, we do think American-flag vessels should participate in the traffic to and from these nations. During the days of ECA we were able to maintain fairly regular service to Norway and to a lesser degree to Denmark, due to the ECA program which called for participation by American-flag vessels in the traffic so financed. There is very little ECA- financed cargo to Sweden, hence our sailings to that country, even during the ECA program, have been few and far between. Since ECA aid has diminished and in most instances ceased altogether, we have not been able to secure cargo to these countries due to the fact that practically every pound of cargo either Government or commercial, is instructed to their national-flag vessels.”
In connection with Mr. Cocke’s testimony, it should be emphasized that in many countries, particularly Scandinavian countries, a manufacturer, let us say, of a certain product which is to be sold in foreign countries is also a large stockholder in a shipping company. Obviously when his product is being shipped to the country in which it is to be sold, he will instruct that that product be shipped in vessels in which he also has a financial interest. This, of course, cannot be a matter for diplomatic action since it is a decision of a private shipper.
It might be pointed out that recently in Congress an attempt was made to scuttle the “50-50 Law.” This law requires that at least half of American aid cargoes be shipped in American flag vessels. Those who showed the greatest interest in removing this protective legislation were foreign shipping interests. They were unsuccessful when the House of Representatives crushed the repeal effort by a vote of 181 to 51.
The whole problem of flag discrimination is so intricate that it defies description, particularly as regards ways and means whereby flag discrimination is accomplished. In regard to the philosophy of flag discrimination, there is no quarrel with any country that has good and sufficient reason favoring the developing of its own Merchant Marine.
And we have no quarrel with nations that seek to benefit their own people, except that in the over-all economic sense excessive economic nationalism acts as a barrier to trade. Any form of monopoly is theoretically wrong in that it finally results in higher prices or poorer products, or both.
However, we operate in a world of people, and people do not act strictly along economic lines in a world-wide sense. Rather, they follow those economic and national policies which benefit them at a particular moment. Even as a protectionist in tariff has on occasion many valid arguments, so those nations that have in the past aided, or presently are aiding, their own citizens in the development of a merchant marine, argue that their intentions are good and that it is necessary to provide this assistance for their own political protection as well as for economic reasons.
Perhaps the only alternative to nations that follow discriminatory practices in favor of their own citizens, as far as the development of a merchant marine is concerned, is for us to do the same. This may have the effect of bringing these nations to their senses and causing them to enter into treaties or other arrangements with the United States to eliminate these practices. This may seem a little harsh to some, but again it should be emphasized that discrimination in favor of one’s own citizens, particularly in the matter of a merchant marine, has been going on from the time of the Phoenicians and undoubtedly will continue.
In earlier centuries, Spain, Portugal, France, and particularly England, built their merchant marines on the basis of navigation acts which severely restricted the employment of foreign-flag vessels in carrying products to and from their colonies, as well as other countries. And it must be admitted that if you look at the size of the merchant marines built by these nations, those policies apparently paid off. It was only after England had secured the lion’s share of shipping and her manufacturers were in such a position as to be able to sell to the world without fear of competition that she espoused the principle of free trade and by 1849 had repealed all of her Navigation Acts.
It might also be of interest to point out that in our own nation, when we were struggling for survival, our very first Congress in 1789 passed legislation that favored the use of American-flag vessels in bringing products to the United States, and as a result our merchant marine grew rapidly. Again, after the War of 1812, legislation was passed in favor of carrying goods in American-flag vessels, and again our merchant marine prospered.
It is true that the growth of a merchant marine cannot be ascribed completely to favorable legislation, but in all countries where there has been such favorable legislation, it can be established that the merchant marines of those particular countries have been made more competitive vis-d-vis other nations.
During the 81st Congress a list of types of governmental aid was compiled and submitted to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, in hearings on various bills to amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. These types of governmental aid are listed on pages 14, 15 and 16 of those hearings and were compiled by Mr. Hobart S. Perry, Chief of Foreign Economics Branch of the United States Maritime Commission. The group headings alone will be sufficient to stimulate interest in this matter. Here are some of them:
1. Construction and repair aids.
2. Aids resulting in low operating cost:
a. Navigation bounties.
b. Admiralty subsidies.
c. Payment of wages and bounties to crews.
e. Mail subsidies.
f. Tax exemptions.
3. Aids tending to development and stabilization of national shipping:
a. Government ownership or partnership.
b. Partial government stock ownership with private operation.
c. Operating loans.
d. Insurance of vessels by Government.
e. Rate stabilization.
f. Encouragement of agreements eliminating competition.
g. Protection of shipping by treaties.
4. Discouragement of foreign shipping:
a. Action against foreign shipping rings, conferences, and rebate systems.
b. Taxation of foreign shipping at special rates.
c. Discriminating duties or regulations:
(1) Tariff:
(a) Higher duties on goods carried in foreign vessels.
(b) Higher duties on goods carried in vessels of third countries.
(c) Regulations making shipment by foreign vessels more difficult.
(d) Regulations tending to divert traffic to ports served by national lines.
d. Discriminating quarantine or berthing regulations and practices.
e. Charges higher for arrivals or departures from and to certain areas, or discriminating in favor of vessels loaded in certain manner.
f. Taxation of cargo, with later reimbursement to national vessels.
g. Loss of export bounties for products shipped in foreign vessels.
h. Reservation of the colonial trade.
i. Restriction of imports or exports of certain commodities to national ships.
j. Use of ports open for foreign trade to national vessels only.
k. Requirements that foreign companies keep separate books in the local language of all business done. Harassing business regulations.
l. Manipulation of regulations or dues to favor certain countries.
5. Use of Government regulations and treaties to direct business.
a. Encouragement of the use of national vessels by trade agreements, quotas, and barter arrangements for sale:
(1) Guarantee that fixed minimum percent ages of tonnage will move by national vessels, when government sale or barter is undertaken.
b. Exchange control and quota or monopoly regulations allowing pressure to be put on merchants to route cargo by national vessels.
6. Other direct Government aids:
a. Restrictions on operation of vessels having lower wage or manning scales, etc., than do national ships.
b. Actions penalizing foreign subsidized vessels.
7. Indirect, semiprivate, and clandestine aids:
a. Currency manipulation directed toward the gaining of competitive advantage.
b. Fostering of “ship by national vessels” propaganda. “Inspired” attacks on foreign shipping as unsafe, as unfair, as predatory, etc.
c. Clandestine action directed against foreign merchant marines, such as bribery of officials, sabotage, lawsuits, etc.
While it is true, not all of these types of government aid are employed to interfere substantially with American-flag ships in foreign trade, nevertheless, cumulatively these various kinds of government aid by foreign nations can and do operate to the disadvantage of American-flag ships.
Despite the natural resistance to Government interference in a nation identified to a large degree with the promotion of individual enterprise and the spirit of freedom, the perennial question that must be answered in respect to the health of the American Merchant Marine involves of necessity some action by the National Government. This industry is not purely domestic but international in the widest sense of that term. Recognized as it is today more than ever before as a fourth arm of our defense, it is incumbent upon our Government to “face up” to the realities of this American Merchant Marine which needs all the special medicines, plus the constant care, that a very sick and important patient needs.
Although the U. S. merchant marine in times of peace is a private business venture, its “feast or famine” aspect has made “ship shares” particularly unattractive in the market place. Today when there are so many growth industries and so many others which are mature and continue to give promise of an adequate return to investors year in and year out, there is no outstanding reason to cause the average investor to put his savings into a shipping company. And this despite the fact that the record of earnings since 1937 has been quite impressive.
In a special study entitled, “American Merchant Marine And The Federal Tax Policy,” prepared by the Secretary of Commerce and submitted to President Truman on October 30, 1952, it was stated:
“It might be reasonably assumed that this greatly improved showing of the shipping industry reflected in the statistical records of the listed companies and available to the entire financial community would have changed and improved the attitude of that community toward investment in the industry. Unfortunately this does not appear to have happened to any appreciable extent. There has in fact been virtually no new venture capital attracted to the industry since 1938. In the case of at least two of the companies blocks of their stock have been offered publicly, but these have not been in substantial amounts at any one time and did not bring new capital into the respective companies but merely involved a change of ownership from individual large holders to a considerable number of small holders. Furthermore, none of these offerings was received with any great enthusiasm by investors—certainly not sufficiently to encourage these or other companies to raise additional capital by sale of new common stock through the investment market.”
One of the most serious blows to the American Merchant Marine has been the drastic decline in coastwise shipping that has taken place within the past ten years, much of which was due to World War II with its attendant losses. Railroads and trucking service were quick to move into the vacuum created by the wartime diversion of coastwise and intercoastal fleets from regular operations to war service.
Finally, the margin in operating cost formerly enjoyed by waterborne commerce practically disappeared during these years due to the spiraling cost of ship operations.
A glance at some figures with respect to this important segment of our American Merchant Marine tells the story better than words. In 1937 there was a total of 404 dry cargo ships of nearly two and three-quarters million deadweight tons in active service in the coastwise and intercoastal trade. As of October 30, 1952, in the report of Secretary of Commerce to the President, only 99 ships of less than one million deadweight tons were so employed.
Prior to World War II there were 33 combination ships in operation in these trades. Today there are none. Although tankers continue to enjoy a reasonable share of the transportation of petroleum and petroleum products coastwise and intercoastal, even in this area pipelines have kept tanker fleets from expanding.
Of course, it should be pointed out that the modern post-war supertanker is faster and a lot larger than either the pre-war tanker or the war-built T-2 tanker. Unfortunately, however, this post-war supertanker is to be found more in foreign merchant marines than in the American Merchant Marine. According to figures prepared by the Maritime Administration as of December 31, 1951, American flag tankers privately owned and including those on order or under construction were divided as follows:
77% were war-built
11% were pre-war
12% were post-war
Foreign-flag tonnage, on the other hand, showed the following groupings:
20% were war-built
21% were pre-war
59% were post-war
Another problem, and one of considerable importance in respect to, the effectiveness of the tanker fleet, is that of “Block obsolescence.” Most of our tankers are of the T-2 variety, which did a commendable job during World War II. But these are now more than ten years old and their life expectancy is figured somewhere from 16 to 18 years— which means they have less than six to eight years of useful life left.
A tanker program of “trade-in and build” recently was approved by Congress based on recommendations of the Department of Commerce. How quickly this program will be implemented by the actual construction of any new tankers in accordance with the provisions of this program, is difficult to say.
In the meantime, according to an article entitled, “Tanker Building Outpaces Increase in Need,” which appeared in the December, 1953, issue of the Oil & Gas Journal, worldwide construction of tankers, either building or on order as of October 1st, 1953, indicated that 650 tankers were being built or on order for some 13 nations. Of these 650 tankers only 36 were being built in American shipyards, which practically means that this would be the number that will be added to the American flag tanker fleet.
The Maritime Administration in its summary of vessels considered available to the United States as of December 31, 1952, included in the total number 137 tankers and 45 freighters of approximating three million deadweight tons registered under foreign flags. These ships, it is argued, are controlled by United States citizens, although they are registered under the flags of Panama, Honduras, Liberia, and Venezuela.
This has been permitted by the Maritime Administration on the theory that they are in excess of requirements for normal United States flag business, and if not permitted to operate under foreign flags they lie idle; but that by permitting this transfer, the vessels are able to compete with other foreign flags and yet are deemed to be available under mobilization conditions.
These governments, namely Panama, Honduras, Liberia, and Venezuela, it is argued, are friendly to the United States and therefore there need be no fear regarding these vessels being made available to us in case of a national emergency. Some, however, have questioned whether or not there is not a strong element of risk involved, particularly since the seamen who man these ships are of varying nationalities, and there is no reason to believe their loyalty in case of another world conflict would be to the United States.
In the beginning of World War II a somewhat similar condition existed with respect to the Panamanian Fleet of the Standard Oil Company (NJ). The licensed officers on these vessels were German. The vessels were ordered to American ports, and the Germans were replaced with Americans. However, this was in 1939 and 1940, and the United States was not at war until the end of 1941. Furthermore, most of the Germans were long service employees of the Standard Oil Company (NJ) and therefore had a certain loyalty to the Company. In any event, had that transfer been attempted after Pearl Harbor, even though the vessels were under a so-called friendly flag, it is questionable whether these German officers would have taken their ships to American ports in order that these vessels might be made “available” to the American Merchant Marine.
There are many variables involved should the United States try to take over for its own use in time of war a foreign-flag fleet employing nationals from all over the world. The success of the Norwegian fleet in escaping the Germans is a classic example of what can be done by courageous and capable seamen when they determine to slip out of the clutches of one country and make themselves available to the nation or nations of their choice in a world conflict. What happened recently when the crew of the Finnish tanker Aruba refused to continue the voyage to Red China is a more current case. But again, where would be the sympathies of foreign crews on Panamanian or Liberian ships, should a world conflict break out tomorrow?
All one has to do is to note the control exercised by the Communist Party in the various labor federations throughout the world to find the answer. Seamen’s groups are particularly vulnerable, both in regard to the pious promises of “pie-in-the-sky,” and the iron discipline which Communists practice on shipboard. At the moment, it is true, the situation seems safe. However, it would be a lot safer if these vessels definitely were under the American flag.
In April of 1954, the Office of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation and the Maritime Administration prepared “A Review of Maritime Subsidy Policy In Light of Present National Requirements for a Merchant Marine and a Ship Building Industry.” This review replete with charts and statistics, totalling more than 150 pages, is a detailed analysis of conditions as they existed as of December 31, 1952. Among other things it estimates a minimum nucleus active fleet ready to meet initial (first ninety days) military and civilian mobilization needs based upon plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Based upon these estimates and the analysis of the existing United States Merchant Fleet and World Trade Conditions, certain conclusions and recommendations are submitted. Some nineteen conclusions art arrived at and two sets of recommendations are made. The first set of recommendations contains nine specific items which would require legislative action. The second set of recommendations contains ten items that require administrative action.
Three of the conclusions are of particular interest.
First, that a construction program of sixty ocean-going vessels a year is necessary to maintain the American shipbuilding industry at sufficient strength to provide a nucleus of shipyard manpower capable of expanding to meet estimated mobilization requirements.
Second, that national defense on the basis of current planning requires an active merchant fleet in peacetime of about the size of that in operation on December 31, 1952.
Third, that the replacement of the ships in the active fleet as of December 1, 1952, as they become twenty years old, will be beyond the capacity of existing United States shipyards and the financial resources of American shipowners, since about 80% of that fleet will be due for replacement within the three-year period—1963 through 1965—and present aids are insufficient to induce private operators to replace a substantial number of ships in the next ten years.
Despite the surveys, the reviews, and the recommendations made by organizations, both government and non-government, the stark fact remains that the American Merchant Marine continues to dwindle and that awful day of block obsolescence is drawing nearer and nearer.
Even since the latest review entitled “Maritime Subsidy Policy” which used a cutoff date for its figures of December, 31, 1952, there has been a further erosion of this “fourth arm of defense.” Whereas on December 31, 1952, there were 1,264 merchant ships owned by private operators in active service, in June of 1954 there were but 1,229; and in November of 1954 there were 1,181; as of July 1, 1955 the number had declined to 1,042. True there were, as of this date, an additional 121 government-owned vessels in active service and a reserve fleet of 2,162 vessels. Practically all of the reserve fleet is made up of freighters; but whether the reserve fleet be made up of freighters or tankers, the stark fact is that these vessels are old and are gradually rotting away.
In short, we are slowly but surely reaching the “waterline”—if we haven’t reached it already—and no amount of “analysis” will make a war-built tanker be anything but a war-built tanker, and since we do not possess an Aladdin’s lamp to wish ourselves the security that an adequate merchant marine will give us, there must be a bold program of replacement of this war-built tonnage brought into being at once by whatever legislation is necessary, and if an economy- minded Congress and Administration consider the price too high, they might look into the possibilities of a suggestion recently made by associations representing licensed and unlicensed personnel in the tanker fleets of several of the major oil companies. Their suggestions were to require by law that seventy-five per cent of all petroleum and petroleum products imported by vessel to the United States be carried in American-flag ships.
A recent survey prepared by the American Merchant Marine institute indicates a steady decline in United States flag participation, both in exports and imports of petroleum and petroleum products. The figures prepared by the Research Section of the American Merchant Marine Institute are as follows:
|
Exports |
Imports |
||
Year |
Tons |
% U.S. Flag |
Tons |
% U.S. Flag |
1938 |
1.8 |
14 |
.8 |
53 |
1946 |
.8 |
38 |
1.8 |
76 |
1947 |
.8 |
29 |
2.0 |
75 |
1948 |
.6 |
25 |
2.3 |
76 |
1949 |
.5 |
35 |
2.8 |
71 |
1950 |
.4 |
42 |
3.7 |
55 |
1951 |
.7 |
24 |
3.8 |
50 |
1952 |
.7 |
19 |
4.2 |
40 |
1953 |
.7 |
17 |
4.6 |
35 |
1954 |
.6 |
14 |
4.7 |
31 |
Jan. 1955* |
.8 |
10 |
5.7 |
22 |
Feb. 1955* |
.8 |
7 |
5.5 |
21 |
This inability to participate in the bringing of petroleum from such areas as Saudi Arabia and Venezuela to the United States in American-flag vessels and the consequent loss of jobs to American seamen has stimulated a great deal of discussion on the subject of the “Flight from the Fleet” and undoubtedly promoted the protective measures suggested by the seagoing personnel of these American-flag tankers.
A bright spot in this otherwise bleak outlook, is to be found in the quality of personnel available to man this American-flag fleet. Recent studies indicated that at least as far as some of the tanker fleets are concerned, there never was a time when they enjoyed the advantage of such experienced and well trained personnel, both licensed and unlicensed. A majority of the unlicensed seamen in some of the oil company tanker fleets average three years of continuous service in the one company; licensed officers in these same oil company tanker fleets are averaging between seven and ten years service with one company. A large oil company did not have a single permanent chief mate with less than fifteen years service in that company as an officer.
The development of this type of personnel, however, was no accident. It was the result of a planned and agreed upon joint employer- employee program of encouraging continuous service by the granting of adequate extra compensation for such service.
It should be stressed again however, that no matter how experienced the crews now are, an insufficient number of them—due to the decline of our American flag fleet—will cause this necessary human reservoir of trained personnel to disappear into thin air. The long, laborious job of recruitment and manning will then have to begin all over again, and those who have gone through at least one experience of starting practically from scratch have in the back of their minds the constant fear—“Will we have the time?”
In conclusion, the clear statement made by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on March 4th, 1935, when he sent to Congress his message on the Merchant Marine, should be read again and again as these prophetic words which prepared us in part for the part played by the Merchant Marine in World War II are at least equally true today.
“I present to the Congress the question of whether or not the United States should have an adequate Merchant Marine. To me there are three reasons for answering this question in the affirmative. The first is that in time of peace subsidies granted by other nations, shipping combines, and other restrictive or rebating methods may well be used to the detriment of American shippers. The maintenance of fair competition alone calls for American-flag ships of sufficient tonnage to carry a reasonable portion of our foreign commerce. Second, in the event of a major war in which the United States is not involved, our commerce, in the absence of an adequate American Merchant Marine, might find itself seriously crippled because of its inability to secure bottoms for neutral peaceful foreign trade. Third, in the event of war in which the United States itself might be engaged, American-flag ships are obviously needed not only for naval auxiliaries but also for the maintenance of reasonable and necessary commercial intercourse with other nations. We should remember lessons learned in the last war.”
* “The opinions or assertions in this article are the private ones of the writer and are not to be construed as official or as reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the U. S. Naval Institute.”