This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Lieutenant James C. Sheppard, USN.—- In the April Proceedings you requested information as to “Trainbusters.” The USS Lafiey (DD-724) under the command of Commander H. J. Conger, usn, was one of these ships.
The period from 29 April to 28 May 1952 the Lafey was assigned as a Unit of Bombardment and Blockade Group operating inside Wonsan Harbor and also acting as Flagship for the Commander East Coast Blockade and Patrol Group (ctg 95.2— Captain W. S. Whiteside, usn, comdesron 26).
On several occasions during this period the Lafey took Communist trains under fire but with unconclusive results until on an afternoon shortly before leaving Wonsan the complete destruction of a train was accomplished.
During the late afternoon of either 25, 26, or 27 May 1952 a train was spotted several miles north of Wonsan moving south along the coast towards the city. The Lafey immediately took it under fire with the two 5"/38 guns of Mount 52 and succeeded in cutting the tracks fore and aft of the train thus preventing its escape. The engine was then blown up and by use of six 5-inch gun salvos each car of the some dozen tank cars was destroyed. The cargo in these cars was some highly inflammable liquid which ignited and burned throughout the night. This fire attracted many Air Force night snooper
aircraft from all over Korea.
The destruction of this train gave much satisfaction to the crew of the Lafey and was a fitting climax to our 28 day stay in Wonsan in which we expended 5657 rounds of five-inch ammunition with gratifying results.
The Ship’s Bell
(Editor’s Note: The following letter was written by Captain Parke H. Brady, USN, and was brought to the Institute’s attention by Lieutenant L. M. Pearson, usn. It is published by permission of the author.)
Commander Destroyer Squadron ELEVEN Care of Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California PHB:rt
FCDD11/J15-1 8 Aug 1955
From: Commander Destroyer Squadron ELEVEN
To: Destroyer Squadron ELEVEN Subj: The Significance of the Ship’s Bell
1. A ship’s bell is a traditional piece of equipment which dates back to the earliest sailing days. It serves several purposes, all of which were important to men who sailed in ships then, and should be important to the twentieth century sailor today. For one thing, it serves a very simple but useful purpose in that it tells all hands who can hear it what time it is. For years and years it was used as the signal for lookouts to report their lights. This made sense, and still does. For another thing, and especially during the long night watches at sea, it kept the watch informed of the passage of time. And, finally, to a sailor just about to fall asleep after a long trick at the wheel or elsewhere, the sound of that bell told him far better than any words that there was someone up on the bridge who was keeping a bright lookout, who was alert to prevent sudden danger from engulfing the ship and the human beings who slept peacefully in her. This, in itself, was reassuring and, somehow, comforting, and possibly may have made sleep come easier to many men.
2.Why do we discard such a fine, seamanlike tradition as the making of ship’s bells? Why do we throw into the limbo of outmoded fashion any of our fine traditions which we have inherited over the years from fine sailormen? Let one tradition go by the board, and it becomes easier to discard the next one. We of the Navy cannot afford to throw away traditions which have come down to us from a long line of fighting forebears. We need traditions. We need to keep them alive and glowing in our hearts and in our minds. We need all of the Navy’s fine, cherished traditions to give us that extra spark which someday we may have to use in action against the enemy. These very traditions, if respected and followed and cultivated, will give us a definite advantage over any adversary we may have to face. Traditions go hand-in-hand with pride; pride in one’s self, in one’s ship, in our Navy. From my observations during the past 6 weeks I have to confess that we could use a little more of this precious commodity which cannot be bought and paid for, but which grows naturally in the hearts of men who are properly led. The making of ship’s bells, although not as important as many others, is definitely a fine tradition. I do not want it discarded. For one reason or another we have already discarded too many of our fine customs and traditions. I intend to restore some of them, no matter how difficult it may be.
3. The valid reasons for not making bells in war-time no longer obtain.
4. I desire that all ships in this Squadron have a proper bell, properly located, and that bells be made in accordance with the customs and traditions of the U. S. Naval Service.
“It’s Everybody’s Business”
(See page 1189, November, 1955 Proceedings)
Captain W. J. Davis, U. S. Marine Corps.—Cdr. Bitting’s November ’55 article on “It’s Everybody’s Business” said that the Navy, as a whole, has good morale, but is sadly lacking in another, seemingly unattached, essential known as “esprit de corps.”
Initially, Commander Bitting put forth a good case for increasing the “esprit de corps” of the entire Navy, and then stated, in regard to the return of ships’ names on the uniform: “Replacing ships’ names with the drab ‘U. S. Navy’ eliminated even this small method of identification.” A most amazing statement by one who speaks of desiring a rise in the esprit of a unit, yet claims that its own title is “drab”! Then: “On shore a de- stroyerman has no means of identifying himself from a battleship, cruiser, or shore station sailor.” In building up the esprit of the Navy as a whole, do we need to differentiate between its various units?
Why do I ask? Because, said the author, we of the Corps have this esprit, yet he would have the Navy do just the opposite of what we do to achieve the very same end! For example, we no longer authorize shoulder patches for Marines in any of our three FMF divisions or wings, or for those on sea duty. Why? Because we don’t want to dilute their esprit for the Corps as a whole by adding unit impedimenta to what we consider to be an already adequate uniform! Except for our Naval Aviators, you can’t tell whether any Marine, officer or enlisted, is serving in the FMF; the Marine Barracks, Podunk; or the MarDet, USS Big or Little Ship. Who really cares what type of duty he is now performing? The main thing, to us, is that he is a Marine, and as such, is expected to produce just as much in one billet as in any other.
You can’t build up the esprit of the U.S. Navy by setting up increased allegiance to a DD Navy, a BB Navy, or any other Navy! Until the author’s own terms, . . . “their own unit,” means the U.S. Navy, you just cannot have this overall esprit.
Also, the plan for a permanent overseas fleet or squadron, manned by volunteers, and the statement that “foreign duty would again be a reward instead of a punishment” are slightly fantastic! Does he foresee a fleet of single (or divorced) men overseas and married men Stateside? That would be the net result if such a plan were actually put into effect, because one thing which keeps down even more wifely gripes about overseas tours (without them) is the belief that all hands now have an equal chance for both choice and not-so-choice overseas duty.
However, there aren’t too many wives in this country who would permit their husbands to volunteer “if those single-man volunteers can go in place of you!” That’s just the trouble with such a plan; it would make still two more Navies: the Overseas Navy and the Stateside Navy.
Yes, when you consider the basic fundamentals of morale and esprit, we professional military men do not differ very much from anyone else; we believe in the finest of all, the Golden Rule. However, in the military we must go one step further: we must do as we want these others to do; then, if they don’t “get the call,” we must personally and immediately square them away!
Thus, let us take his plan for a “well-conceived, well-thought-out instruction” (in Naval history, tradition, and institutions) and put it into rapid practise, and just as rapidly take his ideas on additional devices, insignia, and foreign tours and deep-six them as soon as possible!
Let us remember, then, that nothing we might say will change the basic concept that the Navy has carried, and rightly so, for quite some time: any act of omission or commission on any Navy ship or station still remains the responsibility of one man alone, the Skipper, the Old Man, the Commander who is duty-bound to mould the individual units of the Navy into one cohesive unit. Therefore, if we can get every Commanding
Officer to see the “big picture,” and he, in turn, can pass that down through his subordinate leaders to the “little picture” level of his seamen, then, and only then, will we be on our way!
Yes, Commander, “it’s everybody’s business, BUT . . . !”
The Role of Pilots
(See page 1279, November, 1955 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander R. W. Belt, USN.—Captain Graham’s article on “Pilots” is a worthy effort to correct the wide misconception (not amongst ship captains) that pilots serve no useful purpose.
However, I feel that Captain Graham should have emphasized the really essential service a pilot contributes to a visiting ship in a strange port. That consists of smoothly handling the tugs so that the ship is moored with the expenditure of a minimum amount of time and effort—and no damage!
The pilot, “armed with his wealth of local knowledge about his port that no master could possibly acquire without spending years within the confines of that one port,” is highly helpful to a master entering a strange port. But I believe that the pilot is truly needed for his skill in handling the local tugs required to assist a large ship to moor in a crowded berthing area typical of most busy ports. During the mooring evolution contrary winds and tides force the fate of the ship to rest in the hands of the tugs. At that point most masters are happy to stand back and allow the pilot to supervise the tugs. The pilot knows the tug boat skippers and the local languages—verbal, sign, and whistles.
★