When George Washington was appointed “General and Commander in Chief of the United Colonies” on June 15, 1775, there was no American navy. His commission said nothing about sea fighting or sea forces. He soon discerned the need for a navy, however, and created one in a novel and ingenious manner.
On July 3, 1775, General Artemas Ward turned his command over to Washington at Cambridge, just outside of Boston. The task before Washington was a tremendous one. His was an army in name only—an undisciplined mob of 14,500 unruly rebels who were rather ragged soldiers but good bushfighters. The same independent spirit that had led the colonists to resist and attack England’s battle-tested armies was a seemingly insurmountable handicap to the building of an efficient, unified force. The Continental soldier just didn’t go for discipline. He was a volunteer and had signed up for a definite period of enlistment. He had a habit of slapping his officers on the back, of going home for spring sowing or fall harvesting, of sleeping on duty. But given a musket, a knife, and trees, he was deadly. On April 20, 1775, Lord Percy, commander of the “flying column” that had relieved the hard- pressed British detachment under Smith and Pitcairn retreating through Lexington, gave an unofficial account of the retreat. “The country militia,” he wrote, “like a moving circle surrounded and followed us wherever we went—the Rebels attacked in a very scattered, irregular manner, but with perseverance and resolution, nor did they ever dare to form into any regular body. Indeed, they knew too well what was proper, to do so.”
“Whoever looks upon them as an irregular mob,” he continued, “will find himself much mistaken. They have men amongst them who know very well what they are about, having been employed as Rangers against the Indians and Canadians, and this country being so much covered with wood, and hilly, is very advantageous for their method.”
Why had the Minuteman left his home and fields and rushed to Concord to meet the British, to fire “the shot heard ’round the world”? Sixty-seven years after the battle, a young man interviewed Levi Preston, a survivor. “Why did you go?” he asked him. “My histories tell me that you men took up arms against ‘intolerable oppressions.’ What were they?”
The old man drew himself up and coolly repeated, “Oppressions? I didn’t feel them.” “What! Were you not oppressed by the Stamp Act?”
“I never saw one of those stamps—I am certain I never paid a penny for one of them.”
“Well, what about the tea tax?”
“Tea tax! I never drank a drop of the stuff; the boys threw it all overboard.” “Then I suppose you had been reading Harrington or Sidney and Locke about the eternal principles of liberty.”
“Never heard of them. We read only the Bible, Watt’s Psalms and Hymms, and the Almanack.”
“Well, then, what was the matter? And what did you mean in going to the fight?” “Young man, what we meant in going for those redcoats was—we always had governed ourselves, and we always meant to. They didn’t mean we should.”
Not yet twenty miles on his way to Boston, Washington met a courier bringing news of the Battle of Bunker Hill, then six days old. The colonists had lost 495 men, including thirty prisoners; the British had lost 1,054. After that battle, the British did not again attack American troops in entrenched lines. It had taught them to respect the American marksman in a prepared position. The British were astonished by the American’s skill with a spade and his ability to build field fortifications almost overnight.
Washington found his army enclosing Boston on a ten-mile front, in trenches and redoubts. Lack of powder and weapons was the greatest obstacle to offensive action. There was enough powder to supply 25 rounds per man and one day’s artillery fire, while the British carried sixty rounds each and had large reserves. It is said that when Washington was told that a large “reserve” of powder was actually nothing but black sand, he was silent for an hour. Though the British were cut off from the other colonies by Washington’s army on the land side, they were receiving provisions and military supplies by sea without interruption. Washington soon saw the need to prevent these supplies from reaching the enemy. In August, 1775, he corresponded with the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts concerning the possibility of fitting out armed ships to capture British transports, first, to deny the supplies to the British, and, more important, to supply his own impoverished army. There were no immediate results.
The first official suggestion of a Continental navy came from the Assembly of Rhode Island. On August 26, 1775, the Assembly declared “that the building and equipping of an American fleet, as soon as possible, would greatly and essentially conduce to the preservation of the lives, liberty, and property of the good people of these colonies”; it instructed its delegates to the Continental Congress “to use their whole influence at the ensuing congress for building at the Continental expense a fleet of sufficient force for the protection of these colonies.” The delegates presented their instructions to Congress on October 3, 1775, but no definite action was taken. However, the resourceful Washington was already improvising a fleet in an unusual way.
Many of the soldiers in Washington’s army were fishermen and sailors, more at home at sea than ashore. A regiment commanded by Colonel (later General) John Glover of Marblehead, the famed “Amphibious Regiment,” later became noted for ferrying the Continental army across the East River to New York after the Battle of Long Island, and across the Delaware before the Battle of Trenton. At the suggestion of Colonel Glover and Captain John Manley, also of Marblehead, Washington, acting under his general authority as Commander in Chief of the Continental Forces, gave army commissions to commanders of ships and manned them with detachments from his army as crews. He instructed Glover to charter vessels at Continental expense and to fit and arm them against British supply ships.
The first of these was the fishing schooner Hannah, owned by Glover and fitted out at Beverly, Massachusetts. Although he lived in nearby Marblehead, Colonel Glover had moved his fishing business to Beverly a year earlier because it was a better port. Glover was reimbursed for the expense of fitting out the Hannah by the army paymaster under a warrant issued by Washington. Captain Nicholson Broughton of Marblehead was named to command the Hannah. Washington’s orders to Broughton dated September 2, 1775, read in part:
“TO CAPTAIN NICHOLSON BROUGHTON:
1. You being appointed a Captain in the army of the United Colonies of North America, are hereby directed to take command of a detachment of said army, and proceed on board the schooner Hannah, at Beverly, lately fitted out and equipped with arms, ammunition, and provisions at the continental expense.
2. You are to proceed as Commander of said schooner, immediately on a cruise against such vessels as may be found on the high seas or elsewhere, bound inwards and outwards, to or from Boston, in the service of the Ministerial army, and to take and seize all such vessels, laden with soldiers, arms, ammunition, or provisions, for or from said army, or which you shall have good reason to suspect are in such service.”
In addition, Captain Broughton’s orders stated that prizes were to be sent into “the safest and nearest Port to this camp” (Cambridge); prisoners were to be humanely treated, allowed to retain their private property, and sent to headquarters under a guard furnished by the Continental officer stationed at the port; the distribution of prize money was prescribed; armed vessels of the enemy were to be avoided, the sole purpose of the mission being the interception of supplies; a system of signals was to be established for communicating with other vessels to be sent out. In the concluding instructions Broughton was advised “to be extremely careful and frugal of your ammunition; by no means to waste any of it in salutes, or any purpose but what is absolutely necessary.”
The Hannah sailed from Beverly on September 5, 1775. On September 7, Broughton put into Gloucester and made the following report: “I sailed from Beverly last Tuesday at ten o’clock, with a fair wind; proceeded on my cruise. On the same day about five o’clock, saw two ships of war; they gave me chase. I made back towards Cape Ann, but did not go in. Next morning I saw a ship under my lee quarter; she giving me chase, I ran into Cape Ann harbour. I went out again that night about sunset and stood to the southward. Next morning saw a ship under my lee quarter, I perceived her to be a large ship. I tacked and stood back for the land; soon after I put about and stood towards her again and found her to be a ship of no force. I came up with her, hailed, and asked where she came from; was answered from Piscataqua, and bound to Boston. I told him he must bear away and go into Cape Ann; but being very loth, I told him if he did not I should fire on her. On that she bore away and I have brought her safe into Cape Ann harbour and have delivered the ship and prisoners into the hands and care of the Committee. of Safety for this Town of Gloucester, and have desired them to send the prisoners under proper guard to your Excellency for further orders.”
The vessel captured was the Unity, loaded with naval stores and lumber. She was the first vessel captured by a Continental warship. The significant fact in the commissioning of the Hannah is that it was not a single, isolated incident. Before the end of the year 1775, seven other vessels were fitted out by Washington and manned with officers and men from his army. This was unlike anything that had been done before. Vessels had been armed against the British by authorization from a colony or town, and many had letters-of-marque and mixed privateering with commerce, but the Hannah was the first vessel regularly commissioned by authority derived from the United Colonies of North America and given a definite mission. For many years both Beverly and Marblehead have claimed to be the “Birthplace of the American Navy.” The dispute between the two stems from the fact that, although the Hannah was converted from a fishing schooner to a warship and commissioned at Beverly, and first sailed on her mission from that town, she was a Marblehead vessel, commanded by a Marblehead captain, with a crew comprised mainly of Marblehead men.
The Hannah did not remain in service long. She was too slow, so another schooner was hired in her place. Early in October, Washington instructed Colonel Glover to obtain two more vessels in Salem or Newburyport and to fit them out as soon as he could. Meanwhile Congress had received information that two brigs had sailed from England with military supplies and were bound for Quebec. On October 5, Congress debated the advisability of intercepting the two transports. There was a strong but minority opposition which felt that it was folly to send out ships to meet the overwhelming naval force of England. Finally the matter was referred to a committee consisting of John Adams of Massachusetts, John Langdon of New Hampshire, and Silas Deane of Connecticut. The committee instructed Washington to fit out two Massachusetts ships to intercept the British transports and to request the cooperation of the governors of Connecticut and Rhode Island. Governor Cooke of Rhode Island was not able to help; one of the Rhode Island ships was unfit for service and the other, the sloop Katy, had been sent to Bermuda at Washington’s request in search of powder. Although British laws forbade trade between Bermuda and the rebellious Colonies, the people of Bermuda were sympathetic with the American cause and disregarded the laws. Connecticut also being unable to help, Washington therefore selected the two schooners recently obtained by Glover for the expedition to the Gulf of St. Lawrence. These were the Lynch and the Franklin. The Lynch was commanded by Captain Broughton who was also placed in charge of the expedition; Captain John Selman of Marblehead commanded the Franklin. Their instructions were to intercept the “two north country brigantines of no force” and to also “seize and take other transports laden with men, ammunition, clothing, or other stores for the use of the Ministerial Army or Navy in America.” If they found that they had missed the brigs they were to cruise off the mouth of the St. Lawrence as long as weather permitted and attempt to seize all vessels in the service of the British. Canadian vessels, not in the British service, were to be unmolested. The Lynch and the Franklin sailed from Marblehead October 21, 1775.
By the end of October, four additional vessels were ready for service: the schooners Lee and Warren at Salem and Marblehead, and the brigantine Washington and the schooner Harrison at Plymouth. The Lee, commanded by Captain Manley of Marblehead, and the Harrison commanded by Captain Coit of Connecticut, sailed October 29. The other two vessels were at sea early in November. Each vessel was hired at the same terms, four shillings per month.
Captains Broughton and Selman in the Lynch and Franklin arrived on station early in November. They made some unauthorized captures of a few small vessels which were later released. On November 17 they appeared at Charlottetown, capital of the Island of St. John’s (now Prince Edward Island). Believing that preparations were being made here to assist in the defense of Quebec, Broughton and Selman felt they “should do essential service by breaking up a nest of recruits intended to be sent out against Montgomery, who commanded our forces in Quebeck.” They exceeded their authority, however, seizing both public and private property and bringing back as prisoners, three prominent citizens, including the acting governor. Upon arrival at Cambridge, the prisoners were promptly released and their property restored by Washington. Broughton and Selman were severely reprimanded by Washington, who was disappointed and displeased with the results of the operation. Judging from his letters, Washington was displeased with most of his naval commanders, with the notable exception of Captain Manley. Manley’s vessel, the Lee, was a 72-ton schooner with four 4-pounders and ten swivels, and manned by fifty soldiers from Glover’s regiment. About the middle of November, 1775, a British frigate arrived at Boston with another vessel under convoy. A third vessel, known to have set out with them, had not yet arrived. Receiving this information from headquarters, Manley, who was then at Beverly, put to sea in search of the missing vessel. On November 29 he located and captured it without resistance. The prize was a valuable one: the brigantine Nancy with 2,000 muskets, 30,000 round shot, 100,000 flints, several barrels of powder, and a 2,700- pound 13-inch brass mortar which was set up at Cambridge to assist in the siege of Boston. If Washington had sent Congress an order for supplies, he could not have made out a list more completely filling his needs than did the Nancy’s cargo. “We must be thankful,” he wrote, “for this instance of Divine favour; for nothing surely ever came more apropos.” The capture of the Nancy did much for American morale. “We must succeed—Providence is with us,” wrote John Adams. The Lee flew the pine tree flag; it was the first naval victory in which the British flag was struck to American colors. On January 1, 1776, Washington appointed Manley commodore of his fleet; he hoisted his flag aboard the schooner Hancock, which had recently joined the fleet. Under Manley, Washington’s fleet took many prizes, furnishing the besieging American army with much needed war material.
As the winter of 1775—1776 wore on, Washington was being severely criticized for his long delay in attacking Boston. But he loved the town and wanted to spare it if he could. General Howe, in command of the British troops, had fortified every important point except, by some incredible oversight, Dorchester Heights. When Washington, camped in Cambridge, saw what Howe had not seen—that this unique position commanded both town and harbor—he knew that his opportunity lay right here. But he was without adequate cannon or siege guns. The year before, the Continental troops had taken cannon at Ticonderoga, and now Washington sent young Henry Knox, later General Knox, to bring the captured cannon to Boston. Knox brought them through blizzards and drifting snow to Cambridge.
On the night of March 4, 1776, Washington sent 2,000 men to fortify Dorchester Heights. All through the night the Americans cannonaded from Roxbury to drown out the noise of pick and hammer and the clatter of wagons dragging siege guns up the hill. Unwittingly, Howe accommodated by replying with his great-guns.
At daybreak, the British general was astonished to find that Washington could destroy every British ship in the harbor. He swore to storm the Heights, but his men remembered the costly victory at Bunker Hill, and the memory left them spiritless. Desperately Howe sent Lord Percy with 3,000 men to dislodge the Americans. But a severe storm swept the Bay and made an attack impossible. By the time it was over, the Americans were so strongly entrenched that it would have been suicidal folly to attack them.
Then Howe and Washington made an agreement. Howe was to evacuate and Washington was to refrain from using his guns. On March 17, 1776, seventy-eight vessels with nearly 9,000 of Howe’s army and more than 900 refugees set sail for Halifax. The British burnt or blew up their harbor defenses and tried to destroy or spike their cannon, or threw them into the sea. In their great haste, they left behind 250 cannon of various calibers and great quantities of ammunition. Since news of Howe’s departure did not reach England for several weeks, British vessels were still being sent to Boston to supply the British army. They sailed innocently into the harbor and were promptly captured. The Americans rebuilt the old harbor defenses and built new ones. Thanks to these, Boston was the only important American port that was not taken or burnt by the British during the rest of the war.
The capture of Boston sent a thrill of joy all over the new country. Washington had cleared New England of the enemy. He had maintained his army for six months without powder and had practically disbanded one army and recruited another within musket shot of twenty British regiments.
Meanwhile the success of “Washington’s Fleet” had stimulated Congressional action. The Naval Committee that had instructed Washington to intercept the two brigs bound for Quebec voted, on October 13, 1775, nearly six weeks after the Hannah sailed on her mission, to fit out two vessels, one of them to carry ten guns. Another committee of three was appointed to look into the expense. On October 30, 1775, an important date in naval history, Congress resolved to arm the second of the vessels already authorized with fourteen guns and to authorize two more vessels, of as much as twenty and 36 guns respectively, “for the protection and defence of the United Colonies.” At the same time, a committee of seven was formed by adding four members to those already appointed. This committee, known as the Naval Committee, was the first executive body for the management of naval affairs. Besides Adams, Deane and Langdon, it consisted of another New Englander, Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island, and three Southerners, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, Joseph Hewes of North Carolina, and Christopher Gadsen of South Carolina.
In November and December, 1775, Congress enacted much legislation recommended by the Naval Committee for the organization of the navy. On November 10, the Marine Corps was established. On November 25, captures of British ships of war, transports, and supply vessels were authorized. Several of the colonies were advised to set up prize courts; the distribution of the shares of the prizes was prescribed. If the vessel making the capture were a privateer, all the proceeds went to the owners and captors. If the captor were a Continental or colony vessel, two-thirds of the value of the prize went to the government if the prize were a transport or supply vessel, one-half to the government if the prize were a warship, the captors receiving the rest. “Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies” were adopted November 28. These were framed by John Adams and based largely on British regulations.
In November, too, the Naval Committee purchased four merchant vessels, two ships and two brigs, for conversion to men-of-war, under the provisions of the October 13 and October 30 resolutions. The committee named the two ships Alfred and Columbus, in honor of the founder of the English navy and the discoverer of America, and the two brigs Cabot and Andrew Doria, in honor of the discoverer of Canada and a famed Genoese admiral.
On December 11, a committee of twelve was appointed to determine how the colonies could best raise and support a navy. It brought in its report on December 13. After the report was read and debated it was agreed “That five ships of 32 guns, five of 28 guns, three of 24 guns, making in the whole thirteen, can be fitted for sea probably by the last of March next, viz: in New Hampshire one, in Massachusetts Bay two, in Connecticut one, in Rhode Island two, in New York two, in Pennsylvania four, and in Maryland one. That the cost of these ships so fitted will not be more than 66,666 2/3 dollars.” These thirteen ships were: 32-gun Raleigh, built at Portsmouth, New Hampshire; 32-gun Hancock, Salisbury, Mass.; 24-gun Boston, Newburyport, Mass.; 32- gun Warren, and 28-gun Providence, at Providence; 28-gun Trumbull, at Chatham, Connecticut; 28-gun Montgomery, and 24- gun Congress, at Poughkeepsie, N.Y.; 32-gun Randolph, 32-gun Washington, 28-gun Effingham, and 24-gun Delaware, at or near Philadelphia; and 28-gun Virginia, at Baltimore.
Ships alone do not make a navy. On November 2, 1775, the Naval Committee was empowered by Congress to “agree with officers and seamen as are proper to man and command” the ships they were fitting out. Esek Hopkins, an old sea captain of Providence and a brother of Stephen Hopkins of the Naval Committee, was appointed commander in chief of the fleet.
On December 14, 1775, a committee of thirteen, called the Marine Committee, was chosen by ballot to supervise the construction of the thirteen frigates authorized. Of these thirteen men, ten had been on the committee of twelve which recommended building the frigates, and five had been members of the original seven-man Naval Committee. The Marine Committee consisted of one representative from each colony and was the second executive body for the administration of naval affairs. The Naval Committee continued to be responsible for fitting out the small fleet of four ships placed under command of Commodore Hopkins and for preparing it for an expedition then being planned. Early in 1776, its task completed, the Naval Committee ceased to exist. By the end of 1775, a Continental Navy had begun to be organized.
After the evacuation of Boston, Washington’s fleet came under the orders of General Artemas Ward. Captain Manley was appointed to command one of the thirteen frigates authorized by Congress in December, 1775. The vessels of Washington’s fleet continued to operate in Massachusetts Bay all through 1776 and rendered valuable service. Early in 1777 the fleet was broken up by order of the Marine Committee. The ships were disposed of as they were placed out of commission and some of the officers absorbed in the Continental Navy.
The status of the vessels in Washington’s fleet has been reported by some naval historians as “State Cruisers,” and by others as “privateers.” They were neither; they were fitted out and commissioned by Washington under his authority as General and Commander in Chief of the Continental Forces, in connection with the siege of Boston, solely to intercept supplies going to the British army occupying the town. They were chartered at Continental expense, but their captains were captains in the army of the United Colonies and their crews were soldiers from the army who still received their pay from the army paymaster. The vessels were under Washington’s control as leader of the siege of Boston. Although some members of the Continental Congress, John Adams especially, saw the need of a naval force from the beginning of the Revolution, it took about eight months to officially form and establish a Continental Navy. Delegates from the primarily agricultural Southern colonies were, at first, opposed to any form of maritime warfare on the part of the Continental forces. The action of Washington in creating a navy, to meet an immediate necessity, without previous authority from Congress, is one of the best illustrations of the exercise of war powers of the Commander in Chief of the Land and Naval Forces.
It is likely that the successes of his little fleet, and also its shortcomings, prompted Congress to act more quickly and effectively. Since the Hannah was the first vessel commissioned under the authority of the United Colonies and given a definite mission against the enemy, it is proper to call its sailing on September 5, 1775, the “Birth of the American Navy.”