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Japan’s fleet, unlike Russia’s, was the product of superior technological skill and training. At the outbreak of war Russia had her fleet split four ways; at Port Arthur and Vladivostok in the Pacific, another group in the Black Sea, and a sizeable force in the Baltic. The Czar’s navy appeared more formidable in statistical tables than it was to prove in action against Togo’s concentrated warships.
In early February, 1904, eager Japanese troops were marching to Yokohama, port of embarkation for Korea and Manchuria. Their navy’s objective was to protect the maritime lines of communication between the homeland and Asia, where Japan’s interests lay. Timely, efficient coordination was achieved in early naval and amphibious operations against Russia.
A taciturn, intelligent, determined officer, he commanded the Emperor’s expanding naval service which was to gain sushi ma one of the most convincing maritime victories since Trafalgar. Dedicated to his profession, he counseled neet readiness both in peace and in war. Born in 1847, a year earlier than Rozhdestvenski, Togo was to become a national hero and his opponent a tragic figure of naval failure.
(Top) Since all of Russia’s Far Eastern battleships were concentrated in this ha.rbor, a smashing blow would cripple this potential threat to Togo’s exposed left flank, covering vulnerable amphibious operations. See Map, page 558. (Center) Battleship Retvisan after torpedo damage suffered on February 8. After breaking off diplomatic relations, Japan launched opening attack and her destroyers caught the Port Arthur force in a condition of unreadiness. (Bottom) The Tsarevitch also was hit and put out of action for several weeks. However, the success of the automotive torpedo in this war was limited.
T
veLS<ial Russian warships within this harbor, Japan resorted to a venerable strategy. Filling old merchant sets with coal, stone, or concrete ballast, they sank them at the port’s entrance. But determined Russian re- tance and navigational difficulties made these attempts failures. By the summer of 1904, Japan abandoned block- DIP operations in favor of mine warfare.
Mine warfare reached a new peak in effectiveness in this war as both combatants achieved marked success in sam/1 a^siat>c waters. Russia lost Vice Admiral Stepan Makaroff when the Petropavlovsk hit an enemy mine and ank ott Port Arthur. Had he lived, Japan would have faced much more vigorous Russian naval activity in the
On August 10, 1904, the Russian battleships at Port Arthur tried to break through to freedom. Only the Tsarevitch, above, escaped, achieving internment sanctuary at nearby Kiaochow. The others returned to harbor and fell victim within five months to Japan’s land power.
After the action'on August 10 Russia’s eastern naval repair facilities creditably repaired this damaged battleship. When the Russians decided to maintain a fortress fleet at Port Arthur, they further increased Japan’s existing advantages of a concentrated navy, central position, and offensive objectives. On August 14 Russia’s three armored cruisers emerged from Vladivostok and were defeated. Japan’s navy within the space of four days had cleared both Asiatic flanks and won control over the maritime strategic center.
The battered town of Port Arthur and sunken warships proved the relentless power of Japanese land forces. Once "13-Meter Hill had been taken, Japanese military ordnance commanded the harbor and sank all but one of the Battleships. Only an unlikely, decisive victory by Rozhdestvenski could alter the balance of naval power.
Realizing that Rozhdestvenski was underway from the Baltic, Japan hastened to crush Port Arthur’s fleet and base while at the same time preserving Togo’s warship strength. Valuing battleships above army lives, Japan left 60,000 dead on the land slopes in a successful investment of this port, which surrendered on January 2, 1905.
The battleship Orel, after suffering heavy hull damage, surrendered to superior enemy forces during the action. The Russians fought gamely against insuperable odds and proved, as many had stated at the beginning of the cruise, that they would know how to die for their country. But the Japanese fought with equal gallantry and proved they were superior seamen in superior ships.
J^ith hull hits as indicated by crosses, this cruiser escaped to the Philippines and was interned there. In the Tsushima F] 1°n, “irty-four Russian warships either were sunk, captured, or interned. Japan not only had upset the Baltic the world balance of power as well. Prior to the war considerable professional opinion had predicted the utieat of Japan.
“Thhe-Start Togo had hoisted from the Mikasa his famous signal, in spirit reminiscent of Nelson>
nav 6 ns^.or ^ the Empire depends upon this battle.” As a result of his smashing triumph at Tsushima, Japan’s , y achieved a position of national prestige which bolstered long-term confidence in the invulnerability of their armed forces.
Left to right, Russia’s Witte and Rosen, President Roosevelt, and Japan’s Komura and Takahira. Roosevelt met with delegates of the two combatant nations aboard the Mayflower at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Despite Russia’s naval annihilation, the sea warfare had not been decisive, since the Czar’s soldiers still remained in the field, enjoying advantages in depth—as France earlier and Germany later realized. Japan in 1905 \was glad to negotiate, for continued fighting would further weaken her already strained resources.
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°urtesy Commander E. H. Clark, Jr„ USNR
THE PORTSMOUTH PEACE PLAQUE
momL°Kr ^oosevelt.was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his achievement. This tablet was erected at the Ports- Was i , ^ard in commemoration of the signing of peace. Metal from Japan, Russia, and the United States used m the memorial, symbolic of anticipated future friendship among these three great nations.
’nrtesy Commander E. H. Clark, Jr., USNR