Reserves—What Kind?

The question of greatest concern to the American people as a whole today is the problem of future survival and the wisest use of the resources that will ensure it. Distasteful though it may be, we have patient enemies that threaten our existence with a vague threat of attack that is unpredictable as to time, place, or-manner of execution. Our future existence depends upon the means for defense that we hold ready. The solution is not an easy one, for it is complicated with the emergence of new and terrible weapons of destruction.

History has seen a succession of dreaded weapons—from Greek fire to the atomic bomb—yet in the past when both parties employed the latest new weapon, man proved to be the ultimate and deciding factor. Recent events indicate that our government has decided that, even in the atomic era, man is still our most valuable military asset. We are committed to the position that our future existence will depend upon our ability to resist aggression with a combination of men and weapons. Our future is inextricably linked not only to an adequate stockpile of the materials of warfare, but also to a sufficient supply of manpower to make and wield these weapons.

While it would be foolhardy to predict the manner in which any future conflict may develop, available evidence indicates a critical need for trained forces in readiness. Current defense planning acknowledges a requirement for swift retaliation and puts great emphasis upon maintenance of strong ready forces. For the first time in our history we are living in a semi-armed camp, maintaining armed forces of unprecedented peacetime strength. Large as these forces are, they are only tokens of the armed might required for all-out war.

Our regular armed forces represent only the “cutting edge” of the total forces required in a major war, so there is a definite need for a reserve of military manpower, set aside for speedy augmentation of these regulars. The complexity of modern weapons demands that the portion of our manpower set aside for military augmentation be highly trained and readily available.

Today, with military security depending upon our sum total of standing forces and reserve potential, it is alarming to find that our national reserve potential is hollow and that interest is dwindling. In June, 1954 only 695,000 Ready Reservists out of a total of 2.2 million were participating in training programs. This situation led Secretary Wilson to say that the military reserve situation “would be a scandal and very disturbing to the American people if we got into a war right now.”¹ It is safe to say that large portions of our military reserve are really “ghost forces” which exist as meaningless name lists and obsolete addresses.

Lest we slight the outstanding and well-organized small Reserve groups that do exist, it is only fair to point out that the degree of Reserve readiness varies within the Armed Services. Nevertheless, the good groups are in the minority and serve primarily as examples of the organization and state of training that our entire Reserve organization should have.

Reports from the Office of Defense Mobilization,² the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Sub-Committee,³ and the National Security Training Commission⁴ all warn us that our national security depends upon a speedy resolution of the Reserve “mess” and provision for an adequate military reserve to serve as a mobilization backstop for our regular forces. President Eisenhower indicated concern last August when he told the American Legion that a Number 1 item which his administration would submit to the next session of Congress would be legislation to establish “an adequate Reserve.” His January 13th message to the 84th Congress outlined his recommendations in this regard.

The primary survival problem facing America in 1955 is this: What kind and how many Reserves are needed for real security?

From time to time in the past seven years a variety of studies and opinions on this question has appeared in the public press. The great majority of these reports can be separated into one of two popular concepts. The first holds that in a democracy the youth of the country should share equally in the burden of the defense of their country. The opposing concept holds that while equity is desirable, the over-riding requirement for an adequate reserve force is its contribution to military objectives.

Perhaps the most substantial support for the uniform treatment concept resulted from our experience in the Korean War. Almost one million reservists were required for expansion of our standing forces. Of this group some 600,000 were veterans of prior service, many of whom came to active duty reluctantly and at great personal hardship. But for this regrettable experience, it is doubtful that the equity concept would receive serious consideration at all. In some ways, however, the Korean recalls performed a national service. Weaknesses in our military system were uncovered. The most apparent change that it brought about is the decision to maintain large standing forces for an indefinite period of time. Then too, it uncovered some inadequacy and unfairness of our existing Reserve system.

Last August the Department of Defense announced a policy to maintain the standing forces at about three million men.⁵ To meet the manpower needed for this force the Army has to rely primarily upon inductees while the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps are able to obtain sufficient recruits. Each service has its own attractions, its own organization, tradition and mission. Each maintains and trains its own reserve components. With four services, four separate missions and organizations, it will be no small problem for Congress to fashion legislation satisfactory to all interested parties.

The reserve problem we must solve is not a neat isolated puzzle. It goes beyond the equality-non-equality argument and encompasses the very mission of our entire military strength and our policy on how and when it is to be used. Furthermore, we can’t continue piecemeal planning from year to year; the time has come to think in terms of decades, and to consider our continued strength over a period of years.

The question of security cannot be debated clearly in a vacuum of misconceptions of the true function of a military reserve. In the past we have misconceived the choice between preparedness and unpreparedness as the choice between large standing forces or practically none at all. Fortunately our enemies allowed us two years grace for military and industrial build up in 1914 and 1939. It would be wishful thinking to expect another enemy to be so considerate. We have already made the decision that we must be prepared for emergencies for a long time to come. To do so at an acceptable cost requires strong active forces and a reserve force that can be thrown into the breach in the early months of hostilities. Therefore, the mission of the reserve is to meet, in an emergency, the expanded needs for military manpower while new sources of trained personnel are being established.

The problem’s solution rests in the determination of the kind and number of men to have in the active and reserve forces respectively. Theoretically, as one increases, the other could decrease in size. Actually, the two elements must be considered independently as well as together. It is only to a limited degree that one force can be substituted for the other. Whether the standing forces remain large or are reduced, it would be imprudent and costly to maintain a greater number of reservists in training than we could possibly hope to use in the early months of mobilization.

While the number of regulars and reservists required for security will vary with international conditions, the kind of men we want in each force is a more stable factor. The size of a military force is a temporary consideration but quality is not. We must be careful to see that the quality, or combat effectiveness, of each force is preserved. Of the two, our regulars are more important for the immediate safety of the country, hence new reserve forces must never be created at the expense of the standing forces. “Expense” as used here is all inclusive, standing not only for dollars, but also for efficiency, morale, and stability. We must not create an atmosphere that encourages service in a reserve force to an extent that service in the standing forces appears unattractive by comparison.

Let us consider, for a moment, the nature of our regular services and the kind of men that each needs. While the Army has a high proportion of men on a 2-year contract the highly mechanized Air Force and Navy cannot train and obtain useful service from the technicians they require with men who enlist for only 2 years. These two services have no significant need for “semi-skilled” men on a short enlistment. The Navy is even more unique in its personnel requirement in that combatant ships at sea have to exist as communities in day-to-day operations. The cooks, carpenters, food handlers, yeomen, and clerks must perform routine administrative jobs until the battle alarm sounds. Then every man has a battle station and must sink or swim according to the skill with which the ship fights. There is no “rear echelon” on a combat ship.

The enlisted strength and stability of the Air Force and Navy rests upon their supply of long-term enlistees—the men who later provide the “hard core” of professionals. Tied with these long enlistments are such vital considerations as overseas deployment, mobility of forces, technical proficiency, high morale, and combat efficiency. To these must be added the item of economy. Because of overlap in training and transportation time it takes roughly 2 ¼ two-year men to equal one four-year man’s contribution. At a cost of approximately $3,200 to train a recruit, over a period of years the use of four-year men saves billions.

While discussing quality, we should not overlook our reserve forces. Obviously, if the men in it will be expected to perform military service on short notice, they should be fairly young and reasonably fit. They should be trained—or experienced—so that no great delay is involved when they are ordered to active duty. We found in World War II that at times the requirements of industry or agriculture for specialists were more important to the defense effort than military service of these individuals. For example, in 1943 we released men from military service to relieve bottlenecks in the machine tool industry, in hard rock mining, and in harvesting of crops. In order to avoid a repetition of these past mistakes, we should provide means whereby our reservists can be preliminarily screened to determine if their skills are more important to industry or the community. This screening would serve a double purpose—it would also increase the readiness and availability of Reserve units.

When discussing manpower problems in relative terms, it is easy to forget that we are talking about people—individuals who may be your own son or the neighbor’s boy next door. The source of the regular and reserve forces are these young men who make up what statisticians call “the manpower pool.” This pool, in military parlance, is composed of young men at an eligible age for military service. It is fluid, having a steady input as young men reach their 18th birthday, and a steady output as men are called for military service or as they pass beyond the upper age limit. About 25% of the men in the pool are either rejected or exempted from military service. Others can delay their liability for service under the present deferment provisions which make special considerations for students and some essential workers.

The available pool of manpower is influenced by many variables. World tensions, the size of the Armed Forces, enlistments and reenlistment rate, level of employment in civilian life, mental and physical standards for rejection, deferment and exemption policies—and many other contingencies—all exert an influence. Manpower projections, therefore, are highly contingent and are directly related to the size of the regular armed forces. The Office of Defense Mobilization projections show a need for about 2.7 million men during fiscal years 55-60 to meet the needs of an armed force of 3 million men. By 1960, this will leave about 1 million men in the pool who will not have been called for active military service.

Under present law, all young men who are inducted or who volunteer for active service, incur a total obligation of 8 year’s service-— this can be a combination of active and reserve service. In other words, it can be 2 years of active duty followed by 6 years reserve service, or 4 years active duty and 4 years reserve service, etc. This means that the portion of the 2.7 million men to be called by 1960 who do not choose a service career will be the main source of our reserve strength upon their release from active duty. These conditions present two enigmas: What should be done with the 1 million men who will not have to serve and who have no reserve obligation for recall in another partial, Korea-type mobilization; and what should be done to make “reserve service” for the others actually mean something?

Legislation intended to correct present Reserve deficiencies has been submitted to the 84th Congress. At least three proposals are being given serious consideration. The best method of evaluating these proposals is to judge them against the questions raised in the early part of this discussion, namely:

(1) What kind and how many Reservists will the program produce?

(2) How will these Reserves be procured?

(3) Will this Reserve procurement adversely affect the Active Forces?

It is in this type of judgment that we meet headlong with the advocates of universal programs, for these programs put the Active Forces in a precarious position. Procurement methods in UMT plans offer young men between 17-19 a tempting avenue for fulfilling their military obligation—a short training course in lieu of active duty. In all probability this would reduce voluntary recruiting. In Fiscal Year 1954, over 66% of all volunteer enlistees were under nineteen. A serious drop in recruiting could force all services to take some inductees. This would result in severe damage to the combat effectiveness of the Navy and Air Force who depend upon four year enlistments.

The universal or equity concept fails in another analysis, for complete equity is impossible. While we may train thousands of young men just to show that we are democratic, we can not call all of them in an emergency just to be democratic. Inequities will always occur whenever citizen soldiers are called to arms in limited numbers. This would happen, of course, if we ever chose again to fight a limited war at a limited level of effort as we did in Korea. Under a partial mobilization, with a small expansion of the Armed Forces, it is inevitable that some Reservists will be called and some will not.

As pointed out earlier, the main reason for serious consideration of the equity concept was our wholesale recall of Reservists for the Korean emergency. The primary purpose of the UMT-type proposals is to prevent a similar recurrence by replacing veteran Reservists with Trainee Reservists.

However, it is quite possible that repetition of Korean inequities could be avoided even without a new Reserve program.

To begin with, we are not in the same position of military weakness that prevailed in 1950. As long as we maintain our present forces anywhere near their current strength there should be no necessity for hasty recall of Reserves. Strong as we are today, we should be able to approach new limited emergencies with a sense of calm reasoning, and not frantic expansion. This is one of the rewards of maintaining adequate regular forces. Our reserves tan, and should be, primarily designed for full mobilization.

This leads to an inevitable conclusion. If evaluation of the universal type programs shows them to be undesirable, what will be acceptable? Simply this—any sound proposal that will produce the Reserve Forces needed in the early months of a mobilization—without harming the Active Forces. Other refinements such as continuous screening and measures to enforce training participation would make it even more effective. If we can get this kind of program established we will have answered the question “Reserves—What Kind?” and we will have the right to feel more secure in the years to come. If we can not, it would be better to let current legislation stand and have the services strive for Reserve improvement by internal administrative measures.