One of the curious aspects of the sea is that organized sea power had been maintained in some degree for about 4,000 years before man made a determined effort to inquire into its governing principles and to analyze its influence on geopolitics and history. Although our knowledge is fragmentary, we know that the Cretans exploited the peoples who lived on the shores of the Aegean Sea in the area that is now Greece and Turkey. We know that the Phoenicians were practitioners of what they called “Thalassocracy” which was taken from the two Greek words thalassa meaning sea, and kratein meaning to rule. We know that the Greeks, despite the brief reign of the Persians, maintained sea supremacy during the Golden Age of Athens. We know that Roman sea power forced Hannibal to move overland across the Alps and brought about the ultimate defeat of Carthage. We know that Venice succeeded Constantinople as the great sea power of its era. Then came the Portuguese, the Spaniards, the French, the Dutch, the British, and latterly the Americans, one of whom, Alfred Thayer Mahan, was the first to discern the pattern of sea power’s historic influences.
Mahan’s efforts had much to do with bringing our country out of a period of maritime lethargy, and it was the result of his focusing the attention of his countrymen on the elements of sea power that aroused our national interest in the re-birth of a navy. He was largely responsible for bringing our people to the realization that their own geography, trading interests, national aspirations, and political character left them no alternative but to assume a strong maritime posture. At no point in Mahan’s many volumes did he infer that sea power was the only military power, or that it was a sufficient force unto itself. In fact, he prophesied that as the wilderness gave way to civilization and as means of communications multiplied, all of the operations of war would become facilitated, more rapid, and more extensive. He thought that the most obvious light in which the sea presented itself was as a great highway available to those who had the wit to utilize it. Furthermore, Mahan always hailed the advent of a new weapon seeing it as a tool rather than as the herald of a new principle. It was his adherence to principles, and his ability to prevent his thinking from being obscured by the limitations of the weapons he knew, which made so much of his writings applicable even with the change of weapons and weapons- systems that were to come.
The addition of two new dimensions—air and sub-surface—have not really affected the soundness of Mahan’s conclusions. For example, he pointed out that the basis for any military strategy is formed by a nation’s geographical circumstances, its natural resources, its population, the character and aspirations of its people.
Nations have often been classified as either adhering to a maritime strategy or to a continental strategy. Let us examine if any nation with a so-called continental strategy has ever achieved true and enduring greatness. Such was not the case with Napoleon’s French Empire nor was it true of Hitler’s Germany. Nor is there an instance in history where a major nation that was strong at sea has been defeated by a continental strategy. Of this, more later, but let us turn first to a consideration of Russia.
Because of the tremendous strength generated by Russia on the land, she heretofore has been considered as a continental power. At first glance, the precedents of history might not seem to apply to Russia; yet, it is undoubtedly possible for Russia to overcome any of her continental neighbors; and her greatest adversary is a maritime power—so that things boil down in their final appraisal to a continental power being restrained by her own maritime inadequacies.
In a sense, World War II changed the detail if not the composition of the strategic picture, for a new dimension—the air element—had grown to maturity and was a powerful factor in the projection of military power. With such major contributions being made in a new dimension (the air), it was probably only natural for many analysts to conclude that a new and separate element of power, namely air power, had joined the strategic team. Air power was likened unto sea power. There was even a certain amount of plagiarizing of Mahan in developing thoughts and principles governing this new element. Extremists saw this new element of strength as replacing sea power and land power. And yet, we might reasonably ask if the elements of air power were not in fact components or projections of military strength at sea and on the land. For invariably, the projection, the maintenance, the protection, and the supply of air striking power rests on the platform or springboard of either the land or the sea. So it is with all the creatures of flight—animate or inanimate— which are affected by the laws of gravitation. Air power habitually rests upon the land or the sea and must return to either the land or the sea upon completion of its mission. Much of its power must be devoted to support of the fundamental missions of controlling the sea and chosen areas on the surface of the earth. The new air element is not a thing sufficient unto itself, but rather it is one of several potent elements integrated with this thing we call military power, which is a synthesis of many elements and components.
As magnificent an epic as the coming of air power was, I could never understand how it bred such a curious assortment of philosophies concerning the future of sea power; such shibboleths as naval forces becoming obsolete overnight, ships being bombed into quick submission, sea-based gun mounts incapable of dueling against shore batteries and land fortifications, merchantmen being swept from the seas. It was almost as though the oceans covering three-fourths of the world’s surface had evaporated and no longer existed either as a highway or a barrier. All such slogans, of course, were to be erased in the bitterly-fought campaigns of World War II. Surface ships fought hotly-contested gun duels all the way from Cherbourg to the shores of Japan and fought them in Korea. Amphibious operations continued to grow in importance, magnitude, and complexity. Sea- air forces by effectively combining those basic principles of mobility, surprise, and concentration were able to gain' air control against land-based air and they were able to penetrate land-based defenses.
The story of sea power in World War II is graphically illustrated by considering Germany’s position after she had swept across the Low Countries and France. At this point she held a preponderance of ground strength; she had control of the air, and yet the twenty miles of English Channel proved to be an insurmountable barrier. The Allies, on the other hand, kept the continent under fairly effective blockade, retained control of the seas, and when they had made the necessary preparations, crossed the thousands of miles of oceans to land at places and times of their own choosing. They possessed the maritime capabilities to bring much needed supplies to England and Russia, to run the Axis submarine gantlet around Africa and bring sufficient military tools to Montgomery so that he could overcome Rommel in the desert war. This same sea control enabled the Allies to invade North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, and finally to crack the Channel coastline itself. Sea power provided the fuel and explosives for the crushing bomber offensive that contributed so much to the destruction of Germany’s military and industrial might and final liberation.
Our own ability to utilize the sea extended the fist of air power and land power to the chin of the enemy.
On the Pacific side of World War II, Japan employed the principle of surprise and battered our forces at Pearl Harbor. She was able to capture Singapore, the East Indies, the Philippines, the Solomons, and she presented a grave threat to Australia’s security. In sharp contrast, when she had been stripped of her sea power, she was unable to render assistance at her very doorstep— Okinawa. As long as Japan had the edge in sea power, our scope of operations was necessarily limited; and as we cut down their margin of supremacy, our forces were able to move more freely. Although sea-air power proved to be a very persuasive weapons- system, it was by no means sufficient in itself to win either for the Japanese or for the United States. We needed all of the forces, land, air, and sea, all of the knowledge, all of the tools and weapons-systems available to us to successfully complete our march across the Pacific. A blend of pilots and submariners, of merchant men and bazooka carriers—yes, and hand grenadiers—and backer-uppers on the home front—enabled us to win. It was the sum total of our industrial might, our carrier operations, our amphibious follow-ups, our bomber offensive, our anti-submarine patrols, and our hand-to- hand combat. Above all else, the teamwork of all hands, the joint and combined skill of all the Allies, won for us the military victory in World War II.
I should point out, however, that it was sea power that permitted the multiple use of these same forces, that permitted a relatively small number of troops in the Pacific to defeat a numerically superior force, for the Japanese surrendered with armies still intact, unbeaten, and, in fact, some of them untested.
When the Japanese lost freedom of sea movement and their troops were cut off, not only were they incapable of bringing these forces to oppose us but they had the additional problem of trying to keep them alive until they could bring them into action. Literally thousands of Japanese soldiers were left to wither on the vine, helpless in the Southwest Pacific, in the Central Pacific, in the East Indies, and in China, without ever having the opportunity to bring their bayonets to bear.
The Japanese were not able to retain control of the sea for their own use nor long deny its use to our Allied Forces who opposed them. When they lost their ability to transport their troops, they might as well have lost the troops themselves.
I would ask the reader not to be impatient with the calculated emphasis being given to certain past events—I realize our grave preoccupation today is with the future—perhaps with the future of our country. But, in order to plan for the future, it is imperative that every drop of profit for the future be wrung from the past to the end that our thinking for the future not discard anything of continuing merit.
Following the surrender ceremonies in Tokyo Bay, we in the Navy reappraised the world situation. We had swept our adversaries from the sea. Both quantitatively and qualitatively, our country was a sea power unequalled in the pages of world history. We could transport, land, and sustain armies at any point on the globe. We could build and support air bases as needed: and in addition, we owned numerous sea airfields of a self- sustaining and mobile character. We could assure freedom of sea movement, both to ourselves and to our friends and our allies; conversely, we could restrict the seas’ usage if our national interests so dictated. In short, virtually all of the blue chips of maritime power were in our hands.
As we studied the lessons of recent history, we continued to keep a weather eye on the future horizon—researching advanced types of weapons, guided missiles, improved aircraft, nuclear power, and many other possibilities which seemed to bear on the safety of our country’s future. That period from 1945 to 1950 can be considered from the Navy’s point of view as an era of research, analysis, exploration, and development.
Then Korea came along. From the maritime standpoint we must approach this military contest with great discrimination, because the entire Korean War was full of anomalies—strategic, political, and tactical. Perhaps we should call Korea “an abnormal war.” None of the services was ever permitted to develop its full potential because of the artificialities that were introduced into the planning. Perhaps the gravest lesson that we can derive from the Korean War is the fact that limited peripheral wars remain a distinct possibility, and our military planning and posture must never be so geared to any single concept as to preclude our ability to deal with any “Korea” that may confront us in the future. As far as the Navy is concerned, any conclusions we come to must be carefully arrived at, indeed, because we were never faced with serious maritime opposition. And yet, that fact in itself was of vast significance, for, without a mastery of the surrounding seas, the Allied position in Korea would have been virtually hopeless.
But what of the immediate future and the days beyond?
The strategy of the Free Nations during this cold war has been, is, and will continue to be inextricably tied to the continued freedom of movement on the. sea and in the air. A moment’s reflection will authenticate this statement. Sea and air control of the Atlantic was the very basis for the formation of the North Atlantic Community. Twice within a generation the Atlantic Ocean and adjacent land areas had proven inseparably related as causes of war and as factors in war’s outcome. Control of the Atlantic seaways and airways was an elemental consideration in the projection and sustaining of military power in Europe, in the building and supporting of overseas bases and Allied war industries, in the exchange of raw materials and finished products; in short, the Atlantic Ocean was, and is, the key to the economic and political survival of the Atlantic Community. Such a coalition as NATO could not have been contemplated without the capability for bridging the Atlantic Ocean areas and controlling them.
Similarly, as pointed out earlier, in South Europe, from the times of the Cretans, the Mediterranean Sea had provided the key to the fortunes of those countries surrounding it. It was only natural that both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean would become the catalysts for concerted political and economic and military action.
Nor could the recently signed Manila Pact have realistic meaning without sea and air arteries to sustain the peoples’ determination. None of the multilateral and bilateral agreements in the Pacific would be realistic without support from the three-dimensional sea. Nor could the Chinese Nationalists maintain their government in Formosa; nor could the industry of Japan remain a bulwark in the free world; nor could South Korea exist at all without a free opportunity to utilize the sea.
But there are even more tangible manifestations of the influence of sea power on current history. I refer to the billions and billions of American dollars being poured into foreign countries to develop their resources—in the Belgian Congo, for instance, and in South America. All these investments testify to our national faith in sea power, as do our overseas air bases and army installations, and the billions we have placed in the hands of our allies in the form of military and economic assistance.
How many of us have ever stopped ,to realize that every U. S. airfield on foreign soil is a vote of confidence in our Navy’s ability to supply and support that airfield, to provide a measure of security to the ally where the field is located, to bring raw materials from overseas so that our aircraft industries can supply that field with planes, to provide friendly seas over which to fly free of radar detection and interception by seaborne enemy weapons? How many of us realize that our nation—160 million strong— is committed in varying measure to the assistance of some 64 nations of the world, spanning six continents and three oceans, and constituting about 54 per cent of the world’s population?
But there are even more tangible manifestations of local reference, U. S. foreign trade, for instance. Both exports and imports have more than doubled since pre- World War II days. Here at home, U. S. Steel recently decided to build a half-billion dollar plant on the upper Delaware because of its direct accessibility to the ocean highways. Implicit in U. S. Steel’s decision was our ability to control the sea, for the ore to be processed by this plant had to be safely transported across the open sea from South American ports. Plans are afoot to deepen the Delaware River channel so that commerce can be expanded for this industrial area. Without control of the sea, these plans would have little meaning; with it, the plans are sound and reasonable.
Again, I point to the recently approved plans for the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway as an indication of both Canadian and United States interest in extending the ocean highways to the heart of the North American continent. This seaway will provide an alternate route for low-cost, mass- movement of raw materials. It will provide access to additional shipbuilding and ship repair facilities and will constitute a strengthening of our overall national security. I point these things up to demonstrate the faith that our private citizens have in the future use of sea communications.
What has been said up to now is safely applicable to the cold war conditions under which we live, but what of the possibilities of a general war in which the kick-off might be an atomic exchange?
This is a contingency that concerns all who think and all who must concern themselves with military matters, with problems of mobilization, in the civil defense of our own country, and with respect to the aspects of those factors relating to our allies.
But recognizing the importance of this contingency does not mean that any other contingency is properly to be ignored. Unless we are prepared to say that the war will all be over in a fortnight, we must have the wherewithal to continue the fight to that point where we will be able to control the enemy’s governmental processes—the ultimate objective of a war.
This means that our nation must be able to weather the first shock, powerfully retaliate, and still have what it takes to continue the fight. Nor does the sea play an unimportant part in this philosophy, and, if we were to lose control of the sea, it will be just that much easier for the enemy to win.
If Russia ever gained control of the seas, NATO and Europe would collapse immediately.
Now, let us take a look at the picture from the Soviet’s viewpoint. In studying the Soviet expansionist movement, a significant pattern and, if you will, a weakness becomes discernible in their master plan. All of their territorial acquisitions have depended on ground communications. In the Baltic and the Balkans, in China, North Korea, North Vietnam, all are tied together with a network of road and rail. On the other hand, their lack of maritime preeminence was a factor in Greece and Turkey’s joining NATO. This was, perhaps, the most significant Soviet setback during the entire cold war period. With one diplomatic stroke, the tip of the Allies’ sword was brought to the Soviet’s belly. Only Allied control of the Atlantic and Mediterranean seaways made it politically feasible for such distant countries to join the Atlantic Community.
Soviet efforts in Guatemala were a blue- water failure. It is noteworthy that not one single conquest has been made in the whole of Africa, or in the entire Western Hemisphere, or in any part of the Far East which is separated from the Asiatic mainland by blue water. Thus, when considered in this light, the current maritime aspirations of the Soviet Union becomes less of a mystery than a testimonial of their high regard for this facet of military power. It is rather apparent, if they are to succeed, that the Red Tide of expansion must become soluble in blue water. From recent Soviet acts it would appear that they think they have discovered this great weakness of theirs and at the same time are proceeding with what they think is the proper solution.
In connection with the above, did it ever occur to you how many of the world’s major cities lie on or very near the coastline? Cities like Casablanca, Cairo, and Cape Town; Caracas, Rio de Janeiro, and Buenos Aires; Calcutta and Bombay, Sydney and Melbourne, Manila, Tokyo, and London all lie exposed to attack from the sea. And the cities of United States are no exception. Within a hundred miles of our coastline perimeter lie more than half of our major cities. Some 6,000 miles of coastal frontiers lie exposed to attack from the sea either by surface ships, submarines, aircraft, guided missiles, or combinations thereof.
Is it any wonder that the Soviet Union has determined that its major stumbling block has been its sea impotency? Is it any wonder that she is determined to gain maritime preeminence, building all types of surface ships, more cruisers than all the NATO nations combined, more submarines than the rest of the world put together? Is it any wonder that she is practicing amphibious landings and dovetailing her air effort with surface units? Is it any wonder that the Soviet Union is proving extremely sensitive when these facts are brought to the attention of the free world? Recently the Soviet press has taken violent exception to our analysis of their maritime aspirations and intentions. This is in sharp contrast to their reaction with regard to our mention of their land and air capabilities.
Now the task that the Soviet Union has set out to accomplish in the maritime field is not an unambitious one. She must realize that quantitatively she can not soon surpass the total active and reserve fleets of the United States and the fleets of our Allies, although I am sure that she also realizes that it is the ready ships and not the reserve which will pose her initial obstacle. Possibly the Soviet Union is pursuing some technological advantage even though it might only be temporary, for use in a limited area, for a limited time, for a specific purpose, to gain control of particular geographical areas. And, if we have been able to come up with new maritime inventions, ship-borne guided missiles, supersonic jets, atomic propulsion, atomic explosives, does it not seem feasible that the Soviets, combined with what technical brains they brought out of Germany, would be developing new weapons of sea warfare that would challenge the best brains we have at every level, both scientific and operational?
To summarize the maritime situation from the Soviet’s viewpoint, it is quite apparent that they have every intention of competing for mastery of the seas—at least in the areas they consider important to the fulfillment of Soviet aspirations. And for us to supinely permit this to happen would be the greatest blunder the United States could ever commit.
I have said that we must be prepared for the atomic-weapons contingency and the hydrogen-bomb contingency. It may be, however, that even the Soviets will conclude that the use of the hydrogen bomb with its incalculable risks of hydrogen retaliation would not be a profitable venture. They may conclude, for reasons of their own, not to use it. They may devise nibbling methods in such a way that the use of atomic weapons would not be invoked. Should this happen, and should we be caught without sufficient strength in the so-called field of conventional weapons and techniques, the futility of our position becomes readily apparent.
Now, for a brief look to the future with respect to the position of sea power. If the great, major, all-out show-down is forced upon us, there will be need for the unified effort of every man, woman, and child in the United States and of our allies, so that we can weather the shock, avert defeat, and struggle through to the most favorable conclusion that would be possible in such an Armageddon. There is the obvious necessity for guarding against surprise attack, as well as any treachery and subversion' in whatever form they may appear. Implicit in the possibility of nuclear exchanges is the necessity for dispersion both for defensive and offensive purposes. Naturally, this is applicable to military forces to be projected from the land as well as the sea. Not one single advantage must ever be conceded to our potential enemy. Certainly, to gratuitously relinquish our power on the seas makes no sense whatever.
As to the navy that we will need to do our part in the overall task. I see a fleet which is capable of delivering a crushing blow to the enemy, which is capable of blunting and parrying the blows he aims via the sea at our forces, our territory, and our allies; a fleet capable of handling all of the fighting tasks incident to gaining and maintaining sure control of the essential sea areas and routes; a fleet which can do the maritime job called for by the army and air force, taking them over and supplying them; naval forces which can perform the seaward extension tasks required by the air force for continental defense— these forces to be as modern as science and industry can make them with their weapons and techniques appropriately geared to those of the sister services to the end that the absolute maximum of America’s military power is generated.
If it is atomic war they want, we in the Navy are prepared to make our contribution; and we will also be ready to perform the one- thousand-and-one non-atomic tasks that are involved in this very complicated business of exercising sea power.
When the historians of the future write of the little wars, they will still be concluding, without superiority at sea, the United States could have done nothing about it. If the historians of the future ever have the tragic task of writing the story of World War III, I am confident that they will then add another favorable endorsement to Mahan’s conclusions.
