Back in 1951 it looked like “old times” again when many of the once familiar Fletcher Class destroyers began to reappear at naval bases all over the world. These ships were, of course, only some of the hundreds of ships of all types that emerged from the Navy’s “mothball fleets” after the outbreak of Korean hostilities. Such vessels have since seen duty with every fleet and task force; their jobs done, some are now returning to reserve status. Not all of the recommissioned ships, however, went back to sea under the Stars and Stripes. Some of them now owe quite different allegiances: to La Marine Française, to A Marinha Brasileira, and to many other navies of the Free World.
On February 21, 1952, at Green Cove Springs, Fla., three destroyer escorts came out of mothballs and were transferred to La Armada del Peru—the Navy of the Republic of Peru. Two years later, an American Officer of the Deck in San Diego Harbor might have been informed by his Quartermaster that “The three DEs entering port seem to be flying the Peruvian ensign, sir.” It is doubtful that the OOD gave much further thought to the fact after he had returned honors. He had probably already seen many other ships of U.S. design flying foreign ensigns in ports all over the world. He may have seen an active little Colombian frigate operating in Wonsan Harbor, or the ex-U.S.S. Belleau Wood off the Indochinese coast.
Undeservedly little attention has been given to the transfers of World War II ships to our present-day allies. There is, however, a story behind these ships, and behind the story lies a better understanding of current U.S. global strategy.
The Story of the Three DE’s
Bangust (DE-739), Waterman (DE-740), and Weaver (DE-741) were three just such ships. First commissioned in the final months of 1943, all three saw extensive service in the Pacific, participating in most of the major invasions of 1944 and 1945. Bangust was credited with the kill of the Japanese submarine RO-111 near Roi Atoll in June, 1944. Waterman and Weaver were both present in Tokyo Bay for the surrender ceremonies. Altogether, these three ships earned 28 battle stars and steamed over 350,000 miles while advancing from Kwajalein to Tokyo Bay.
After the end of the war, the three DE’s followed hundreds of their sisters into the Reserve Fleets. One by one, the three went into indefinite retirement at Green Cove Springs, and, for five years, Bangust, Waterman, and Weaver came to life again only at an occasional reunion dinner.
Meanwhile, however, the 81st Congress authorized the sale of certain decommissioned ships to navies of our allies in furtherance of this government’s policy of mutual assistance. Bangust, Waterman, and Weaver were sold to the Peruvian government for approximately $1,300,000 each and arrangements were made for Peruvian naval personnel to recommission the ships in this country. In October, 1951, the majority of the recommissioning crews disembarked at Jacksonville from the transport Rimac. These crews had a dual task ahead of them before they could return to Peru. First, it was necessary to restore the ships to operational status and, second, the crews had to be trained in the specific operation and maintenance of the unfamiliar equipment aboard each ship. Accordingly, while part of each crew worked at de-mothballing, the remainder attended various service schools. Some went to CIC School in Boston, others to Damage Control School in Philadelphia, and still others found themselves studying with Uruguayan, Venezuelan, and Brazilian students at the Key West Sonar School.
During this recommissioning period, one of the major problems, of course, was the language barrier. Fortunately, most of the ships’ officers understood English, but on board the DE’s even the label plates had to be translated into Spanish.
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To effect the formal transfer of the ships and to commemorate the occasion, which was scheduled in honor of Washington’s Birthday, an impressive ceremony was held at Green Cove Springs. The attending dignitaries included Sr. Fernando Berkemeyer, the Peruvian Ambassador, and Mr. Robert J. Dorr of our State Department. On February 21, 1952, Bangust, Waterman, and Weaver officially became Castilla, Aguirre, and Rodriguez, thus exchanging the names of one set of heroes for another.
Two months later, sea trials were completed and the new division of DEs began its first voyage in many years, now under the command of Captain Luis E. Llosa, Peruvian Navy. The first stop was Norfolk, where ammunition was loaded, and several weeks were spent with the Underway Training Unit. The division then took departure for Peru and in two weeks, having transited the Panama Canal, arrived at Callao—principal naval base of Peru and port of the capital city of Lima.
History Is Repeated
Eighty-two years earlier, another group of warships arrived at Callao following their purchase from the United States. But the characters of the two events are as different as the times in which each took place.
The Peruvian government, in 1869, purchased from the United States two ironclad monitors. These ships, however, had been designed for Mississippi River duty, and in order to make the long trip to Peru it was necessary to purchase three additional ships with which to tow and provision the monitors. The complete homeward trip involved the near circumnavigation of the South American continent and required fifteen arduous months. But at the end of this voyage the weary crews’ reception was not altogether a happy one. It appears that they had labored so hard in bringing home something of a “white elephant” that hardly met their navy’s current needs.
Today, transfers of our ships and equipment are vastly different affairs. Whereas in 1869 the United States was settling down to its period of most determined isolation, present day America is cast in an entirely novel role in world affairs. For the first time, the United States is actively recruiting allies. Furthermore, billions of dollars are being spent to equip and strengthen these allies in the formation of the first great Coalition for Peace. One of these allies is the Republic of Peru.
The Navy of Peru
The Navy of Peru traces its history back to 1821 when, under the aegis of the renowned liberator San Martin, Peru began its struggle for independence from Spain. Geography dictated the service of this navy during the following century and consequently its activities were primarily concerned with the neighboring republics—and especially with that of Chile.
For decades the balance of power in South America passed back and forth between Peru and Chile, punctuated by several intense wars. The War of 1879 produced a sea encounter, the Battle of Angamos, which is matched by few others for its heroism and which provides the Peruvian Navy with its most important traditions.
At Angamos, the Peruvian monitor Huascar found itself isolated and surrounded by six Chilean warships. Rather than capitulate, Admiral don Miguel Grau elected to force the issue and in a valiant but impossible struggle lost both his life and his ship but gained for his country and his service a worldwide recognition. Eulogies of Admiral Grau appeared as far away as in the London Times and, today, October 8th is commemorated by a proud Peruvian people as their Navy Day.
Further impetus was given the Peruvian Navy by the nation’s most illustrious president—don Ramón Castilla. Under President Castilla’s two regimes between 1845 and 1862, Peru ascended to undisputed primacy in Latin America, and it was for him that Bangust was renamed. The year 1954 has been dedicated in Peru to the memory of Marshall Castilla and especially in recognition of his proclamation freeing the slaves of Peru nine years before our own Emancipation Proclamation.
The Peruvian Navy Today
Today, the Peruvian Navy reflects the results of several decades of modernization. In 1929, the American Naval Mission in Lima assumed the position held for many years by the French Mission as leading adviser to the Peruvian Navy. Since that time, the organization of the Peruvian fleet has very closely followed that of the United States Navy, and closer liaison has been developed between the two services.
Two fleets comprise the Peruvian Navy. One, the Fuerza Fluvial, or River Force, is based several hundred miles inland at Iquitos. This fleet of fourteen gunboats conducts its main operations exclusively on the Amazon River and its Peruvian tributaries. In order to reach the open sea, these vessels must navigate the entire length of the Amazon and emerge 2,300 miles to the East in the Atlantic! This very trip is occasionally made by ships of the Fuerza Fluvial which then make good-will visits to ports such as Rio de Janeiro and Montevideo.
The second and, of course, major fleet is known as the Escuadra del Pacifico—The Pacific Squadron. This fleet is composed of two six-inch gun cruisers, four destroyer-types, three frigates, six submarines, and various auxiliaries. The majority of these ships was built in the United States and others in Great Britain, and although the Vickers-built cruisers date back to 1907, new construction is concentrating on the fleet’s primary mission of submarine defense. Two of Peru’s six submarines were completed in mid-1954 at the Electric Boat Company in Groton, Conn. The specifications of these boats are restricted, but their short length (240 feet) gives rise to speculation as to their possible use in anti-submarine warfare.
The Peruvian Naval Academy
The naval base of Callao is also the site of the Escuela Naval— the Peruvian Naval Academy. The Escuela Naval also dates its origin back to the War of Independence in 1821 and is thus even older than our Naval Academy. The Peruvian “Brigade of Midshipmen” numbers about 140 cadets who are selected from annual nationwide competitions to attend the five-year course of instruction. In addition, there is another competition each year among the three top-ranking men of the first-year class for nomination to attend the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis. Qualification is entirely governed by the results of a rigorous set of examinations prepared and graded by the U.S. Navy. Following graduation from Annapolis, the Peruvian exchange students generally spend one year in commissioned status aboard U.S. Navy ships before returning to careers in their own navy. Since 1940, when this exchange program began, eight Peruvian midshipmen have graduated from our Naval Academy and at the present time three others are enrolled as midshipmen.
Some of the traditions and organization of the Escuela Naval parallel those of our own Naval Academy. During the first year, however, one is an aspirante, but afterwards he is known as a cadete. The summer cruise is also an old custom. Since Peru is in a southern latitude this usually takes place during our winter months. Several recent cruises of the Escuela Naval have featured visits to California ports and the cruise ships in 1954 included the three destroyer escorts Castilla, Aguirre, and Rodriguez, commanded by Rear Admiral Guillermo Tirado, now Chief of Staff of the Peruvian Navy.
Position in Global Strategy
Any discussion of the Peruvian Navy’s strategic role in hemispheric defense must necessarily also consider the neighboring fleets of Chile and Colombia. Geography and the limited sizes of these three fleets dictate that, in the event of a global conflict, their operations must be coordinated in order best to serve the defensive requirements of the western coast of South America. A second fact—the Soviet underwater fleet—indicates that the primary function of these navies would be submarine defense.
A nation’s navy has the primary responsibility for the defense of its coastline and of its seaborne commerce. In the event of a global war, the navies of Peru, Chile, and Colombia will have two additional missions: (1) assistance in the defense of the Panama Canal and (2) the protection of valuable international convoys traveling between North and South American ports.
The defense of the Panama Canal is a logical mission for these three fleets not only because of their adjacence to the Canal but also because of their dependence upon it. The three fleets, composed primarily of destroyer types, are very appropriately constituted and based in order to participate in the Canal’s defense. The deployment of these units as barriers in the Canal’s approaches could profitably relieve United States ships for more distant duty where they could more readily be supplied than ships of other navies by the large and experienced American logistical force. At the same time, these Latin American units would never be far removed from their own homelands whose familiar and extensive coastlines may at any time come under enemy attack.
Complementary to this first mission is that of convoying the many strategic cargoes that will be essential to the industrial plants of the Free World. The west coast of South America is a major supplier of such requisites as copper, silver, vanadium, and nitrates. Some of these cargoes will travel from ports such as Valparaiso and Callao through the Panama Canal to Atlantic ports. Others will sail directly to United States Pacific coast ports. In either case, the distances at sea are great. Valparaiso is 2,600 miles from Panama; Callao, 4,000 miles distant from San Francisco. Should these routes be left unprotected during wartime, an enemy submarine commander would certainly find excellent hunting grounds.
The problems of convoying, in this instance, revolve around three factors: (1) the distances between ports, (2) the limited ranges of escorts, and (3) the diversity of the fleets employed. The system of relieving escorts in mid-ocean used by the British and U.S. navies during World War II may be well suited to the tactics of convoy work along South America’s west coast. The three most significant distances—Valparaiso-Callao, 1,300 miles; Callao-Guayaquil, 700 miles; and Guayaquil-Panama, 800 miles—are individually well within the ranges of destroyer types. Also, each of these stages roughly covers the littoral of each of the three nations whose fleets are involved.
Such are the general strategic assignments that will probably devolve upon the fleets of Peru, Chile, and Colombia in the event of global war. These assignments indicate that the specific present needs are for (1) the furthering of ASW preparedness, (2) the development of familiarity with the waters in which hostile operations may be expected, and (3) the promotion of closer liaison among the three fleets and with that of the United States.
Conclusions
One of the most important objectives of the United States today is to prevent itself from becoming isolated in a hostile world. Even the greatest navy requires allies without whom it cannot adequately discharge its worldwide responsibilities. It logically follows, therefore, that Americans should feel a vital interest in the allies they do have—in the backgrounds of these allies, in their capabilities, and in the strategic roles they each play.
As we have seen, the Navy of Peru has a tradition of more than a century of service. But the people of Peru, themselves, can boast of a much longer historic tradition with the sea. Four hundred years ago, intrepid Spanish conquistadores in wooden galleons crossed one uncharted ocean and discovered a second ocean on their way to replacing one empire in Peru with another. And today, the descendants of these seafarers sail a proud fleet of steel ships in a navy that represents greater security for the Western World
Graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1947, Lieutenant Ferris saw subsequent service in auxiliaries and in U.S.S. Mindoro. Following his recall to active duty as Navigator of U.S.S. Van Valkenburgh he made many friends among officers of the Peruvian, Uruguayan, and Venezuelan navies who were studying at Key West. He has done post-graduate work in Political Science at Columbia University and at the University of Mexico.
Lieutenant Ferris wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness for assistance to Teniente Segundo Jorge Portella Roca, Peruvian Navy. Lieutenant Portella, a graduate of the Peruvian Naval Academy in 1950, served in pre-commissioning assignments in both England and the United States, and prior to entering the Submarine School at Callao, Peru, was ASW Officer aboard the Peruvian ship Aguirre.
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COMMAND DECISION
Contributed by H. SEWARD LEWIS
Few things can be as exasperating to an OTC as the antics—real, imaginary or affected—of a merchant ship convoy. With reckless disregard of both possible and existing dangers merchant ships have been known to smoke, lag behind, stray out of position, even dismantle propulsion machinery without previous warning or permission from the escort commander.
Just what caused the #23 position Liberty ship in Captain Smith’s convoy to request a reduction in speed has been forgotten, but in the memory of those who heard Captain Smith’s radio conversation with the merchant skipper, the solution will live forever.
We had been under Japanese air attack intermittently day and night for two days. As we came under the carrier planes’ protective umbrella just south of Mindoro in the Philippines, the skipper of #23 Liberty ship came up on the voice radio with a request that the convoy reduce speed, or that the escort commander assign a destroyer for protection as the Liberty dropped out of formation.
Captain Smith denied both requests. The merchant skipper reported that unless his request was granted he would be forced to proceed to the nearest safe friendly anchorage. He seemed to be completely unaware that the distant mountains concealed a very active Japanese air field.
“Permission granted,” was Captain Smith’s reply.
“Please furnish escort. Local charts not on board,” the merchant skipper pleaded.
“No escort available. No charts necessary. Take bearing on burning ship hull down on starboard bow and proceed independently,” Captain Smith advised, and without further ado, the ailing Liberty steamed off alone.
Two days later, we were dumbfounded to see her back in the convoy and frequently leading the faster units.
(The Proceedings will pay $5.00 for each anecdote submitted to, and printed in, the Proceedings.)