In a notable article entitled “Peripheral Strategy—Mahan’s Doctrine Today,” in the November, 1953, issue of the United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Captain John D. Hayes, U. S. Navy, states that, despite the fact that Mahan’s early historical works have had greater practical importance than any other historical writings in our literature, they are now ignored. Ascribing this trend away from Mahan to the airplane, the atomic bomb, and belligerent Communism, Captain Hayes makes a strong case for a restudy of Mahan’s doctrine as a basis for solving current problems. It is the purpose of this article to review the impact of Mahan’s doctrine upon air policy, suggest an analogy in the problem of controlling the so-called “absolute weapons,” and point the way to applying the processes of Mahan’s fundamental thinking to the problem of world peace.
On the fortieth anniversary of the inception of powered-flight, a banquet was staged in Washington, D.C. to honor the Wright brothers. Throughout the protracted program of eulogies by Armed Service and other government figures, Orville Wright, the guest of honor, sat obviously uncomfortable. When called upon to speak at the close of the ceremony, he failed to .respond to a rising ovation, but sat silently in his place.
Many of those present ascribed his reluctance to innate modesty, and this was doubtless partly responsible for his unusual conduct. Afterwards there were whisperings to the effect that he had expressed his decided disapproval of the uses to which the airplane was being put, but his biographer insists that this was not the case. In support of his position he quotes an earlier press release in which Mr. Wright had stated that, while he had no regrets over his own and his brother’s part in the development of the airplane, he did regret the uses to which it had been put. This latter statement generally reflected the sentiments of other aviation pioneers.
Whatever Orville Wright may have said on that occasion, his interview reflected the misgivings of early aeronautical pioneers. They had commenced their careers toward the close of the Victorian Era at a time when men still enjoyed freedom from world conflict under the protection of a benevolent seapower. They had therefore visualized their creation as an argosy of profitable trade rather than a flaming chariot of war. Disturbed by the uses to which it was being put, they were even then casting about in search of a firm basis for a more constructive role for the airplane. Curiously enough they found it made to order in the writings of Admiral Mahan.
“Mahan,” writes Captain Hayes, “proved with a noteworthy wealth of historical detail that an insular nation could impose its will upon an enemy without too great drain upon its resources—even in fact concurrent with an increase in its own prosperity.” This trenchant statement, expressing as it does the current objective of U. S. policy, gives force to his argument that Mahan’s doctrine warrants careful study today. “Mahan,” Captain Hayes continues, “saw the lesson for the United States in British history, and he spent the rest of his life promulgating a doctrine that guided American naval policy for the next fifty years.”
“The Mahan doctrine,” according to Captain Hayes, “is in essence that (1) the United States should be a world power; (2) control of the seas is necessary for world power status; and (3) the way to maintain such control is by a fleet of powerful warships.” Aeronautical pioneers, recognizing these principles, simply substituted the word “air” for “seas” in section (2) and the word “airships” for “warships” in section (3) to create the essence of an air doctrine promulgated nearly ten years ago at a meeting of the Board of Governors of the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America in Los Angeles. Before quoting their formal resolution, however, it should be pointed out that the word “airships” is more general than “warships” and that the aircraft industry resolution visualizes air commerce as the heart of airpower.
In a pamphlet entitled “Air Power,” described as “An estimate of American Aviation and a Recommendation for a Policy of American Air Power,” now out of print and exceedingly scarce, the industry proposal is set forth as follows:
“The Board of Governors of the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America, in order to ‘provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our posterity,’ and in order to ensure that the airplane which America created shall be used to maintain peace and secure the blessings of peace to mankind, does unanimously recommend the early formulation of an American Air Power Policy under the following guiding principles:
The United States should maintain an Air Power sufficient (in conjunction with other forces) not only to win this war but also to keep the peace:
1. By maintaining adequate Air Forces at such strength and in such state of readiness as to preclude a successful assault upon our country or its possessions;
2. By acquiring and maintaining air bases essential to our security and overseas trade;
3. By facilitating the orderly and economic expansion of domestic and international Air Transport and of private flying;
4.By preserving a strong aircraft manufacturing industry.
Despite strenuous efforts by the aircraft manufacturers to gain public support for the principles underlying their proposal, it went down to defeat before the doctrine enunciated by the Italian General Giulio Douhet in his book published in 1921 under the title “Command of the Air.” Some extracts from Douhet’s writings will serve to illustrate the fundamental contrast between the two concepts:
“Consequently I say: No aerial defense because it is practically useless; No auxiliary aviation because it is practically useless or superfluous. Instead a single Independent Air Force, to include all the aerial resources available to the nation, none excepted. This is my Thesis. . . . the fundamental principle of aerial warfare is this: to resign oneself to endure enemy aerial offensives in order to inflict the greatest possible offensives upon the enemy.” (The Italics are Douhet’s)
General Douhet first advanced his ideas as far back as 1909. The fact that they originated in the mind of a military officer of a continental landpower is significant. On the continent the inception of powered flight had fostered the idea that the airplane afforded a means of extending the influence of landpowers beyond their sea frontiers. That such powers had become restless under the restraints of British seapower is evident from the fact that the German Kaiser had even then begun the construction of his High Seas Fleet for the purpose of challenging the British Grand Fleet.
Curiously enough the teachings of Mahan had contributed to the Kaiser’s decision. A newspaper story was once circulated to the effect that President Theodore Roosevelt, a Mahan enthusiast had brought the Admiral’s writings to the Kaiser’s notice. The story went that the President, while a guest of the Kaiser, had reviewed from the back of a horse the great march past of German divisions. After expressing enthusiasm for the display of military might he had questioned its usefulness as long as the British fleet controlled the seas.
In the face of the threat of a rapidly expanding German Fleet, Britain failed to respond to the challenge. On the contrary, she abandoned her time honored policy of building two tons of battleship for every ton built by any possible enemies or combination thereof. In principle this meant turning away from the only proven guarantee of peace, overwhelmingly superior force in the hands of men of good will. This principle, long recognized as fundamental to the maintenance of law and order in the tiniest village, was a cornerstone of the Mahan doctrine. Its abandonment by Britain practically extended an invitation to war, one which the German Emperor accepted in August, 1914. The German Fuehrer accepted a similar invitation in 1939, and Premier Stalin followed suit in his time. Thus, after a century of relative security under the Mahan doctrine, the world witnessed a half century of continuous conflict under the gospel of Giulio Douhet.
For that gospel had its counterpart in unrestricted submarine warfare inaugurated after the German High Seas Fleet had failed to wrest control from the British Grand Fleet at Jutland. The German Kaiser well knew that submarine warfare against neutral as well as enemy shipping violated the spirit of International Law, specifically the covenant under which civilized nations had foresworn bombardment of undefended cities. His final decision to proceed with unrestricted submarine warfare shocked the civilized world and contributed to the entry of the United States into the First World War, and thus to Germany’s ultimate defeat.
American naval officers who served in the Sixth Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet in 1918 well recall the resentment aroused by this act of barbarism by Germany. It was even then recognized as a breakdown of International Law full of evil portents for the future. Those of us who participated in the ignominious surrender of the High Seas Fleet on November 21, 1918, well recall the words of Admiral Sir David Beatty, Commander in Chief, when he bade goodbye to us ten days later. “After the American Sixth Battle Squadron joined the Grand Fleet,” the Admiral remarked, “our prestige then stood so high that it alone was sufficient to force the enemy to surrender without striking a blow.” Here was an unforgettable illustration of the application of the Mahan doctrine, especially that fundamental precept that overwhelmingly superior force in the hands of free men is the key to peace.
Yet this lesson was almost immediately forgotten. We read in the Life and Letters of Earl Beatty the losing fight conducted by that heroic officer in the effort to save his country from the folly of disarmament. None realized better than did dedicated British naval officers the far-reaching significance of the breakdown of International Law. Meanwhile Douhet was deriding the concept of protecting civil institutions from unnecessary destruction as a “peculiar traditional notion” of the obsolete seapower doctrine. Other prophets took up the hue and cry. Scientific research, it was claimed, had rendered old principles obsolete. Thus International Law vanished into the limbo, and the doctrine of scorched earth regained the ascendency.
But the underlying morality of the prohibition against indiscriminate destruction of civil institutions is more than a “peculiar traditional notion” or a hangover from an obsolete religious dogma. The idea had its origin in the history of human experience during which the bankrupting capacity of scorched earth tactics had been repeatedly demonstrated. From the economic standpoint such tactics had always left the victor saddled with the task of rebuilding institutions he himself had wantonly battered down. From the military point of view, indiscriminate assault upon non-military objectives denied the principle of conservation of force. From the political standpoint such barbarism had always stimulated fanatical resistance and handicapped settlement through negotiation. Inclusion of the principle of limiting the impact of war upon civil establishments, a cornerstone of forgotten International Law, marked the high tide of western civilization.
Today the world stands naked before such products of scientific research as poison gas, lethal bacteria, and nuclear fission or fusion. These weapons are so destructive and so impossible to control that they can only be used in total war. Unless we can find a way to return to limited or controlled pressures as a means of settling disputes we may as well resign ourselves to the fact that the current conflict is so basic it can only be resolved by resort to total war. This reduces the problem to questions of how, when, and where.
In light of the American character, the likelihood of our taking such a decision is extremely remote. The alternative is to return to first principles in the hope of discovering some other way out. Theoretically it should be possible to govern the world through a sovereign body which makes International Law and maintains the military forces necessary to enforce it. In practice, however, sovereign nations remain loath to subject themselves to the will of others in matters possibly involving life or death to them. Being distrustful of their competitors they demand the right to veto decisions, especially where sanctions are involved. Such reservations tend to render the governing organization impotent to retaliate against aggression. Until this basic difficulty can be overcome, the necessary superior power must rest in a single nation or group of nations dedicated to support of the principle.
Such a situation prevailed during the Victorian Era when maritime trading nations joined hands to create a body of International Law designed to guarantee the right of innocent passage to all proceeding upon lawful occasions. Under their leadership piracy was driven from the high seas, and naval forces were deployed to keep the peace. The evolution was gradual, and the workings of the process were little understood until Mahan revealed them in his classic historical writings. Thus Mahan is not the author of a doctrine but the historian who recorded its principles. Thanks to him we are today confronted with a priceless opportunity to transform his penetrating theory into a working hypothesis for today’s situation.
Perhaps the initial step is for the United States to convene an international peace conference at The Hague for the purpose of revising international covenants to give effect to modern and even future technological developments. For example, the covenant under which civilized nations once outlawed bombardment of undefended cities could be extended to rule out lethal bacteria, poison gas, nuclear fission or fusion, and other weapons which unnecessarily hazard non-combatants. To crystallize the principle we might volunteer to join with others in a pledge to: refrain from the use of weapons which cannot be pin-pointed with accuracy upon previously defined military targets, to renounce their use except in reprisal against overt acts which threaten world peace, and to maintain our armed forces at such strength and in such state of readiness as to constitute a deterrent to any breach of the peace. To facilitate action on such a proposal we might make it clear that the alternative to the adoption of some such proposal is the resolution of the fundamental philosophical conflict between East and West by resort to arms.
It is important to note that the suggestion does not contemplate a disarmament conference. What it does contemplate is a revision of International Law to give recognition to the impact of scientific development, a strengthening of the courts of international justice charged with adjudicating the law, and provision for sufficient force to carry out the decisions of the court. Under the favorable climate induced by a reduction in tension, arms reduction could take place naturally, provided always then we and our allies were determined to continue to maintain military, economic, and political superiority on the side of international justice. In such an atmosphere the fundamental philosophic conflict between East and West might, in time, be resolved without resort to arms. In the meantime the West would depend upon the initiative inherent in the creative capacity of free intellects to resolve the issue in its favor.
All this would tend to reduce the burden upon world economy. Restoration of freedom to trade by land, sea, and air would swell world income. Renewed security, with its corresponding return of confidence, would lead to an orderly reduction of armed forces while still maintaining the margin of superiority essential to prevent overt acts. Moreover, real economy could be had through reorganization of the armed forces to accord with the doctrine.
Thus, instead of organizing armed forces on the basis of the weapons or vehicles they happen to use, each would be assigned a basic mission. Ground, sea, and air forces would be charged primarily with guaranteeing freedom of lawful commercial traffic, each in its own medium. To the end that each department might discharge its primary responsibility, it would be given full autonomy over the creation and procurement of its implements as well as the recruitment and training of its personnel. Since ground and seaborne forces need airplanes to discharge their responsibilities just as the air forces need other vehicles, each should develop and procure its own. The point here is that the airplane, like a truck or a vessel, is a vehicle rather than a weapon, whether it be employed as a chariot of war or an argosy of peace. It is only by prohibiting a monopoly of any implement by any agency that we can bring to bear the creative incentives of loyal interservice competition as the spur to technological leadership.
From such administrative organizations, each charged with training, recruitment, research development and procurement in its own medium, trained elements will be drawn and assigned to task forces dictated by military, economic, or political considerations. The requirements of these will in turn establish the over-all strength and state of readiness of the several departments, which will thus shake down upon the basis of their several capabilities rather than their skills in competing for appropriations. In time, fact rather than theory will control the cost of the over-all establishment.
In all this it must be borne in mind that the chief quality in which the airplane ex-cells is mobility. Air transportation, unlike rail, motor, or water transportation, is not confined to fixed rights of way on the surface but is infinitely flexible in three dimensions. It is this freedom which has given rise to the phenomenal development of air transportation in competition with well-established forms, even though air transportation is still in its infancy.
This freedom is a priceless asset because it permits concentration of forces without sacrificing flexibility in tactical and strategic deployment. If the need be for a show of force in a troubled area, a carrier task force affords an effective instrument. If the requirement is for concentration of a defensive screen to parry an offensive thrust, such a task force can be mobilized. If the need be for a long-range striking force supported by fighter or fighter-bomber escorts, the permanent disposition of forces can be such as to facilitate prompt organization of such a task force. In other words, our geographic position is such that by exploiting the inherent mobility of aircraft we can ease the overwhelming burdens incident to occupying distant and perhaps untenable bases. For neither ground, sea, or air forces are wholly “strategic.” Each comprises the total capacity of the nation to exploit its superiority to a maximum in the given medium. None should be granted vested interests; all should cooperate in the public interest. To this end the doctrine enunciated by Mahan is applicable in principle to the military, economic, and political forces of the nation.
Finally our traditions are based upon the principles which underlie the doctrine as written by Mahan. This is no antiquated idea founded on theory, but a set of principles based on human experience—changeless precepts which gave the world an era of relative security back in the days when the airplane was just a fantastic contraption and nuclear fission was quite unknown. And perhaps the greatest force of these principles rests in the intangibles. By placing ourselves squarely on the side of justice and right, we can confound our enemies, reassure and inspire our allies, and rally our own people under a banner worth fighting and dying for. Then, as Orville Wright pointed out, it will turn out well for the human race that someone learned how to start fires—after they are brought under human control.
Thus it appears that Mahan’s principles of war, revealed through his study of the influence of seapower upon history, are equally applicable on the land or in the air. Moreover his processes of fundamental analysis lend themselves to the solution of related problems in politics and economics. Such being the case, Mahan’s work deserves the thoughtful consideration of all who are concerned with national survival.