Introduction
When the death of Joseph Stalin finally came, it was expected to shake the Soviet world to its foundations. Because Stalin had such an extraordinary ability for making people subservient to him, there was every hope that the machine that he created and held together with fear would break into pieces at his death. Following Stalin’s death in March, 1953, however, the Soviet bloc initially appeared to be stronger than ever. (Ironically, the Free World, which expected to gain so much from Stalin’s passing, seemed in contrast to be divided and demoralized.) Yet, beneath the outward harmony, divergent forces were at work. Beria’s execution in mid-1953 and Malenkov’s resignation from the Soviet Premiership in February, 1955, revealed underlying fissures.
Historically, tyrannies that so obviously depend on one personality and do not have legitimate means for transferring power are placed under severe strains when the dictator dies. Dictatorships operate on a very precarious internal balance of power in which personalities play a significant role. The inescapable necessity for transferring power to new hands presaged difficulties and uncertainties for the Soviet system. Nevertheless, within a few months after Stalin’s death, it was apparent that the take-over by the new regime had been smoothly executed.
Did this mean that the transfer of command from Stalin to some successor had been completely solved? Or, was it possible that there would yet be a severe power struggle within the Soviet hierarchy? We were not misled by the apparent harmony seeming to exist within the Soviet leadership group. Hitler’s regime in Germany gave the impression of being a closely knit cooperative team. Yet we know now that members of the group surrounding Hitler were bitterly hostile toward each other. History is strewn with unsuccessful efforts to replace a dictator with a committee. In view of the realities of the Soviet internal power organization, it is difficult to see how the collective arrangement can do more than postpone an attempt on the part of a single man to seize absolute power. Such an attempt on the part of a single man to seize absolute power could be caused by individual power drives or by irreconcilable differences on policy, or perhaps by disruptive forces lurking in relationships between the Soviet Military and the Political. Now that Malenkov has had his turn, the real question is whether Khrushchev, Zhukov, or anyone else will, in the long run, be able to fulfill the role of dictator which the Soviet system requires if the system is to maintain its characteristics.
The Army
The Soviet Union may be regarded as a mechanism balancing on four pulsating forces. The first is the Communist party, the second is the Secret Police, the third is the civil bureaucracy, and the fourth is the Red Army. The term “army,” when used, should be taken to mean Soviet military forces in general. It is now commonly believed that the Soviet military is a much more significant factor in internal Soviet policy than it was while Stalin was alive. But prior to discussing the military in relationship to the other power elements in Soviet society, let us briefly review the evolution of what might be called military-party relationships within the USSR.
Ever since a Red Army first existed, Communist leaders have been aware of its potential political significance. They came by this awareness naturally. The Communist doctrine of seizure of power, so boldly executed by Lenin in the 1917 Bolshevik insurrection, recognizes that armed forces are the final repository of state power. Communist leaders, who had studied military organization and tactics, personally directed the Bolshevik forces during the long and bloody civil war through which they finally consolidated their position as masters of the Russian people. When victory was finally achieved, they instituted measures designed to prevent the military tool which had put them in business from being turned against them.
The political reliability of the young Red Army was a major problem. The rank and file soldiers, inspired by skillful agitators, had a cause for which to fight. But professional military leaders—the term “officer” was banned in the Red forces in the early days—had little status and authority. Many of them had been inherited from the Czarist regime. The Soviets had need for their services even though by definition they were enemies of the proletariat class which the Communist regime claimed to represent. Such men could be used only if they were handled with special care.
The Institution of Political Commissars, created by the 5th Congress of the Soviets in July, 1918, was developed by the Communist party to solve this problem and to maintain its control of the armed forces. Political commissars, as agents of the Soviet Government, were charged with preventing the organization of centers of conspiracy within the armed forces. Together with the military technicians, they were to be responsible for ideological indoctrination, training, both political and military, and for protecting their units against infiltration by enemies of the regime. They were to direct all party activity in the army and to participate in officer assignments and promotions. They were empowered to help direct military operations. A commander’s orders only became official when they were countersigned by his political commissar. There was obviously a conflict between this institution and the principle of unity of command. The subsequent history of the Red Army is one of recurrent cycles regarding the role of the commissars. In periods of political insecurity, the Red Army fell under their complete domination.
By 1924 most of the unreliable Czarist officers had been eliminated. It became evident that commanders were becoming “yes men” to their commissars and were increasingly unable, for psychological reasons, to exercise real command. Consequently, the principle of unity of command was reinstituted in the Red Army. Yet neither then nor subsequently were the commissars completely eliminated. During the period which began in 1924 and ended with the purge in 1937, the military commissars became assistant commanders for political affairs while officers gained independence in making purely military decisions. Stalin felt free to give them this leeway since through the commissars and the secret police he was able to keep close tab on his officers.
While the true story of the great purge which struck Russia like a thunderbolt in 1937 may never be fully known, it is apparent that a conflict of some proportions had risen between certain of the Red Army leaders and Stalin. The party machinery for assuring loyalty of the officer corps had failed to function. There is good evidence that the purge actually began as a result of a German political warfare maneuver. The Nazis, through deception techniques, convinced the Czech foreign minister Benes of the existence of a conspiracy between the top group of the Army and the Nazis aimed at the overthrow of the regime. The Germans correctly anticipated that Benes would relay this information to Stalin. The German hope that this deception maneuver would result in major upheavals inside Russia was realized. The purge brought calamity to every walk of Soviet life. Some nine million people were arrested during its course. Major categories liquidated by Stalin in this period include almost all of the old Bolshevik leaders, with notable exception of Molotov, the high and middle levels of the Communist party, the top leadership of the Soviet Army, including a group of its highest ranking generals. The mutual fear and suspicion which followed in the wake of the purge paralyzed Army morale and discipline. Although the upheaval that resulted was far beyond any expectation the Germans may have had, looking at the matter in hindsight, the operation can only be regarded as boomeranging on its perpetrators. At least forty thousand field grade officers in the Red Army were liquidated as a result of the purge. Although their elimination originally resulted in chaos for the Red Army, it paved the way for the early rise to command levels of the young and vigorous Soviet leadership which eventually defeated the Germans.
In the two years of terror that accompanied the purge, the institution of commissars was restored in all its former power. Control of the army fell almost entirely into their hands. Political commissars were reinstalled in all units. Loyalty to the party became all important. During the purge period the number of Commissars was doubled even though their own ranks were also decimated. High military commanders were frequently rotated. In a few years Stalin changed the Chief of the Soviet Air Force five times. The only one who lasted any length of time terminated his career in prison. Subsequently, a number of special privileges were introduced into the armed forces to increase their loyalty. Various kinds of fringe benefits were bestowed. These were particularly important since in the Soviet system the indirect advantages of office are much more important than pay.
The Finnish War put the revived system of commissars to a test. The political personnel of the army apparently took responsibility for many military operations. The glaring deficiencies in the Soviet military set-up revealed by that war led to the decree abolishing the system of political commissars in the Soviet armed forces in the fall of 1940. Yet within less than a year the commissars were again reinstated following the Nazi attack on Russia. Because of the successful defenses of Leningrad and Moscow, Stalin felt free to revert to the previous system in which the military commissars again became political deputies. Through prolonged war experience, many of them became thoroughly trained in military matters. Zhdanov, for example, who was the military commander of Leningrad, had previously been a political commissar and returned to the political sphere after the war when he organized the Cominform. Malenkov and Bulganin also began their careers as political commissars. World War II indicated that the Politburo never was wholly successful in its methodical and systematized effort to make the Soviet Military politically reliable. Consequently, as soon as the war was over, Stalin took immediate steps to neutralize any possibility of his victorious generals becoming an active political force. High Soviet military commanders, like Zhukov, were kept from Soviet public life since they were regarded as too nationalistic and as politically unreliable. Simultaneously, Stalin did everything to maintain military loyalty through a skillful combination of pressures and inducements. He gave the armed forces a sense of prestige and well being; at the same time he blocked the army from participation in the life of the civilian community.
Power Blocs
Mention has been made of the four power blocs on which the Soviet regime rests. Although a personal dictator, Stalin had created a powerful disciplined organization in which the party and the police were the two all-pervasive forces. They penetrated both the military and the civilian bureaucracy as well as each other. At the very center of Soviet life lies a top group of high officials whose influence permeates out in every direction through layer after layer of Soviet society by virtue of the power mechanisms they control. Among these machines is the Communist party itself. The Communist party has no American political counterpart. It is an organizational device designed to win and hold political power for a minority group. The Communist party in Russia has always been composed of a very small percentage of the Russian people. In organizational structure, in methods of selection, training, and in advance to power within its ranks, the Communist party is more akin to a political army than to the democratic parliamentarian parties of the West. Initially it was the unquestionably dominant force inside the Soviet Union. Stalin used his position of Executive Secretary to the Communist party as the vantage point from which he established complete dictatorial control. Under Stalin’s long dictatorship, the party tended to become a bureaucratic apparatus which Stalin played up against the others in order to keep himself the supreme power. The party operated through a system of interlocking directors. High party officials who formed the Politburo were responsible for direction of specific ministries. Their personal influence came in time to overshadow the prestige of the party. The party had its committees and groups in every unit of the army as well as in the secret police and the bureaucracy. The political administration of the army was simultaneously responsible to the Ministry of the Armed Forces and the Military Department of the Party Central Committee. The percentages of party members in the Army were generally higher than in other segments of Soviet life, particularly at the higher echelons. The party can thus be visualized as a force both outside of and above the Army, operating on it through its own agencies and by virtue of the fact that high officers in the army were simultaneously included in its membership.
At the 19th Congress of the Communist party held in October, 1952, some important changes were made in party and state organization. The Politburo, the inner-governing group of the party, composed of the men who simultaneously ran the big state bureaucracies, was abolished. Its membership was merged into a newly created governing body of the Soviet State called the Presidium. (The Presidium, a much larger body then the Politburo, was cut down to comparable size after Stalin’s death by his successors the next March.) The abolition of the Party’s supreme, elite political organ while simultaneously providing the government with an inner cabinet, lowered the Party’s power and prestige relative to that of the State bureaucracy. This move was consistent with Stalin’s pattern of rule which was to reduce all power elements to an inferior and competitive level. Yet the party remains an important factor. According to both dogma and practice, it is the party which commands the machinery of government in the USSR. The party is the sole recruiting agency for all high Soviet offices. Although theoretically the party still rules everything, the party by itself is not a controlling agency. Rather, it is one of several dominated by the same bosses, and only when the Premier is, at the same time, the boss of the party does a de facto dictatorship exist in Russia.
The complications of the Soviet system of wheels within wheels becomes evident when the interrelationship between the party and the secret police is analyzed. Party units exist in every element of the secret police. These are matched by secret police cells which exist in every party organization. The impact of the secret police as a political force varies according to the status and hierarchical level of individuals in question. Under Stalin the secret police effort was greatest toward those at the very highest levels. Although there has been some diminishing of the secret police r61e since the execution of Beria, it is obvious that the primary purpose of the secret police remains the same, to protect the regime.
It had been a major function of the secret police under Stalin to watch closely over the army and to prevent it from becoming an active force in the political arena. Organs of security, the dread Special Branch, operated down to regimental level, completely independent of both the military chain of command and the political commissars. In order for Malenkov to make political use of the Soviet armed forces, the powers of the secret police over the armed forces had to be drastically reduced. While Beria ran them the secret police controlled a strong military force equipped with armored vehicles, tanks, and even airplanes. The M.V.D. was a state within a state, controlling its own territories and factories worked by penal labor. It maintained extensive dossiers on every single important Soviet leader. Its special tribunals could sentence an arrested person to death without trial. After the war there was an increase in the power of the Secret Police—as an instrument of rule. The M.V.D. became the custodian of the Russian atomic effort. Yet this powerful political army could and was rendered powerless once the combined forces of the army, party, and the bureaucracy were turned against it.
The Bureaucracy
In a society in which almost all political and economic decisions are rendered at the top, there is still need for a large number of intermediate bureaucrats on whose daily decisions the operation of Soviet society depends. They carry out the policy and by their management of elements of the bureaucracy wield considerable power in their own right. The state bureaucracy emerges more and more distinctly as a distinct class. These people have acquired a formalized position in the new Soviet state. They perform a variety of functions such as factory managers and the directors of State enterprises. They have achieved rewards, authority, and prestige. They carry heavy responsibility. They must make things work regardless of the arbitrary decisions of their superiors or the difficulties of obtaining resources which are not automatically provided in someone else’s plan. Failure to achieve production quotas can mean demotion or imprisonment for sabotage. Because their operations are important to both the party and the army, they may be in the position of being able to pressure for changes in the system. It is they who would suffer the most from the political anarchy resulting from any protracted struggle between the other three forces of the Soviet power complex. Consequently, they may be regarded as a moderating but not decisive influence in Soviet society today.
The Army
Compared with the other three bureaucratic elements, the Army is in a position to play the most decisive role in the event of a sustained conflict within the collective leadership group. The military possess the decisive instruments of force. Furthermore, the regime is dependent upon the Soviet military to prevent serious interference from abroad. For these reasons, every Soviet regime has sought to establish and maintain intimate control over the armed forces. The army played a key role in the liquidation of Beria. In order to dispose of Beria, Malenkov and the group he headed had to give the Soviet military a considerable say in their counsels. The developments which led to the ouster of Malenkov also involved some sort of a deal or understanding between Khrushchev and, if not the army as a whole, at least an important faction within the army ranks.
It would be unwise to ignore indications that the regime regards its armed forces as unreliable. Evidence from Soviet defectors tells of resentment in the Soviet Army and Air Force directed at the instruments of political control—the Party and the Secret Police. Yet in the Soviet forces there is no such a thing as a common “attitude” of resistance to political authority. Consequently, it is hard to see how military disaffection can find effective expression and leadership unless there is a breakdown in the system of control.
Despite certain features of the Soviet system designed to prevent opposition attitudes in the Soviet armed forces, the Soviet military is a potential reservoir of political unreliability. The practical requirements of military leadership, especially during the war, compelled the promotion of officers on merit rather than political conformity, probably to a larger degree than in any other part of the Soviet system. In addition, the Red Army, in the eyes of the Russian people, is the real savior of the homeland. It is the only one of the four power elements in the Soviet State which the people neither distrust nor fear.
The suppressive Soviet dictatorship creates many disaffected and disloyal elements, even in a privileged military. Political control of the military is not, therefore, merely a matter of detecting disloyalty. It seeks to prevent any joining of sufficient disloyal elements to make a real military threat to the regime. In short, the Soviet state offers no exception to the axiom that the armed forces are the ultimate key to the power and survival of any dictatorship. No lasting transfer of power can be made without their acquiescence. The special position of the Soviet military should now be visualized against the background of the existing control group.
Most experts had conceded prior to Stalin’s death that Malenkov, disposed but not completely eclipsed, was the strongest and most ambitious of all Stalin’s possible successors. He was drawn to Moscow at the age of 24 after working as a political commissar with the Red Army. His apparently planned elevation at the 19th Party Congress, which took place in the fall of 1952, was the occasion for the relative elevation of Malenkov. Still in his early 50’s, Malenkov made a universal impression of wanting power. He was able and experienced. He did not gain the top of the ladder without a considerable knowledge of high Soviet politics and problems of personal survival under the Soviet Regime. Yet, Malenkov was not surrounded by an entourage of young administrators of his own choice but rather by a group of his peers. It is almost unthinkable that Malenkov’s associates deferred to him in the way that they did to Stalin. Nye Bevan, leader of the left-wing of the British labor party, confirmed this in an interview following his August, 1954, visit to Moscow when he stated that “Malenkov was only head of the group which rules Russia.” This evaluation was borne out in the developments of February, 1955, when Malenkov was displaced by his peers and induced to make an abject confession of his incompetence. The rather pointedly decent manner in which Malenkov was disposed of plus his continued close association with the ruling group makes his future an object of interesting speculation.
There is little accurate information concerning Khrushchev. Now about sixty years of age, he has spent almost his entire life as a member of the party apparatus. He became the first post-revolution party member to reach the center of power when he was made a member of the Politburo in 1939. He was Malenkov’s subordinate when the latter was head of the Party organization. He is now presumed by many to be the real power in the Kremlin group. If the Secretary of the Central Committee begins operating in the same fashion as he did under the old Politburo, there will be an urgent need for a new estimate of Khrushchev. If this plodding, party worker gains even more prestige, such a development could also signal the return of the party to its position of dominance over the bureaucracy. It is unwise to think of Khrushchev as a potential Stalin. Most of the men Stalin permitted to live close to the throne were comparatively mediocre. Khrushchev’s real potential has yet to manifest itself.
Molotov has been a professional Communist since 1905. He early achieved the reputation of the impeccable, unimaginative Bolshevik bureaucrat. He was closest to being Stalin’s personal confidant. Since replacing Litvinov as Foreign Minister in 1939, Molotov has been given responsibility for a long succession of trouble-shooting jobs. Molotov has always placed the security of his personal position above either the ambition to be number one or his ideological conviction. Loyalty, industriousness, and an amazing memory made Molotov Stalin’s most obedient and reliable tool. Stalin, however, never made any effort to prepare Molotov as his future successor, despite the fact that he accorded him a unique degree of intimacy at the policy level.
The secondary figures in the Soviet hierarchy also know the dangerous game of higher Soviet politics. They know that peaceful retirement from power is impossible under the Soviet system. No high ranking Communist official has ever retired. He either dies from natural causes or is liquidated. Since this record is known to every top Soviet boss, the outcome of any continuation of the power struggle is to them a matter of life and death. Bulganin, the new Soviet Premier, was regarded as belonging to the second tier of the Communist bosses prior to his elevation as Premier. Never noted for taking strong positions on policy issues, he may be more of a front man than his predecessor. Now almost sixty, Bulganin was for many years the Minister of Defense, the Administrative Director of the Armed Forces. Bulganin, strictly a “political soldier,” replaced Voroshilov on the State Defense Committee in 1944 and is now unquestionably top civilian-military authority in the Presidium Politburo.
Within the purely military group, it is noticeable that Marshal Zhukov’s prestige increased considerably after Stalin’s death. The Soviet encyclopedic dictionary states that Zhukov was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in July, 1953. Zhukov’s selection for the Office of Minister of Defense, following the February shakeup, indicates that he possesses significant personal influence. It reveals also the direct involvement of the Soviet Red Army in Soviet internal politics.
Kaganovich, wartime minister of transport, is the only Jew surviving a position of power. He undoubtedly recognizes that widespread anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union precludes him from gaining more influence than he now possesses. He would consequently be very careful in joining any would- be-dictator’s bid made for complete power.
These are perhaps the best known Soviet figures. Beneath them is the relatively unknown group of men who associated on nominally equal terms with Stalin’s immediate subordinates during the brief period of the enlarged Presidium. One of the first Acts of the collective leadership group following Stalin’s death was to push these potential aspirants to power out of the inner circle through a drastic reduction in size of the Presidium. Perhaps from this group will emerge one day a man to wear the mantle of Lenin and Stalin.
It would be remiss not to mention the relationship of Red China’s Mao Tse-tung to the Soviet hierarchy. There is presently no one in the Soviet Union who has political and ideological prestige and authority comparable to Mao in Asia. He has great influence in the determination of bloc-policy in Asia. The new Moscow leadership gives every indication of dealing cautiously with Mao Tse-tung. It recognizes that any other course would result in serious strains on the Sino-Soviet alliance.
Soviet writers, for example, have only partially accepted the ideological claim, made in behalf of Mao, “that the path taken by the Chinese people in defeating imperialism ... is the path that must be taken by the peoples of the various colonial and semicolonial countries.” This outright ideological challenge may eventually prove a greater cause of internal trouble within the Soviet Bloc and its ruling group than any other visible source of friction. For the great power struggles of the Communist world have always arisen from or have been reflected in ideological disputes.
Post-Stalin Situation
The basic operational rule of the Communist system has always been the laying- down of the line by one powerful leader. The alternatives facing Stalin’s lieutenants if this rule was to continue were either an open struggle for power which would risk the continuity of the regime or the voluntary acceptance of rule by one person. Under Stalin, the men at the pinnacle of the Soviet system were under closer surveillance than anyone else. Consequently, any post-mortem struggle had to be organized on the spur of the moment and without advanced planning. It now appears, nevertheless, that a struggle for power between Malenkov and Beria aimed at establishing one-man control did occur but that it was successfully kept in bounds by Malenkov’s superior maneuvering.
Immediately after Stalin’s death a five-man inner cabinet was formed, Malenkov as premier and four “first deputy premiers,” Molotov, Bulganin, Beria, and Kaganovich. Stalin’s successors had a definite stake in collective leadership, for if one man gained control they faced possible liquidation. Beria formed an opposition group utilizing the tremendous organization and power of the secret police as his ace card. Malenkov, however, was better situated with respect to the other members of the collective because of reorganization of the top Soviet hierarchy which had taken place in the half-year preceding Stalin’s death. Malenkov had gained control over the Party apparatus as well as direction of other major elements of the bureaucracy.
It is interesting to observe, however, that immediately following Stalin’s death Malenkov’s post as Executive Secretary of the Communist party was given to Khrushchev. Khrushchev, who was regarded as number two man in the Soviet hierarchy, under Malenkov, was at that time distinctly in the second echelon. It is significant that the men closest to the throne did not wish to see Malenkov become both Premier and Executive Secretary—in fact, it almost seemed as if Malenkov was set up as a front man until the struggle for power could be resolved between the four basic power groups. At any rate, they did not bestow the garb of complete power on Malenkov however much they aided him in frustrating Beria’s endeavors to become top boss.
In the struggle that ensued between Beria and Malenkov, Malenkov used the Soviet armed forces and the Communist party first to isolate Beria, subsequently to neutralize the power of the Secret Police, and finally to liquidate Beria. Malenkov gained the support of the military by admitting Zhukov and other army men to significant positions in the Soviet hierarchy. The Army played the key role in Beria’s arrest and subsequent execution. At the same time, he won Khrushchev’s support through restoring to the office of Executive Secretary some of the power that position had attained under Stalin.
The post-Stalin struggle for power was reflected in the internal propaganda picture presented by the Soviet press for a few days after Stalin’s death. Malenkov was quickly extolled as a star of the first magnitude but almost immediately adulation of Malenkov ceased and stress was placed on the new and progressive principle of “collective leadership.” This theme was maintained with emphasis until Beria’s execution. Since then some of Malenkov’s initial luster was restored for a while but his role was clearly that of first among equals and not that of the all-dominant dictator. There were, in fact, indications that Khrushchev was approaching or may have been on a level with Malenkov for some months prior to the latter’s fall. The exact pattern by which Khrushchev arranged for Malenkov’s displacement is not yet clear. It seems evident, however, that Khrushchev carried on “rug pulling” operations in both the army, the party, and the secret police. He may have made promises and commitments to the army which will result in further ascendancy of the Soviet armed forces in terms of Russian domestic politics. There is evidence that he built up a new police mechanism over the top of the old MVD structure which also facilitated his plans. Finally, he used the post of Secretary of the Communist Party to remove Malenkov’s adherents from a number of key administrative positions. Khrushchev may have actually acquired sufficient power to displace Malenkov as long ago as late 1954 but waited until a meeting of the supreme Soviets prior to formalizing the situation.
The men who now rule the Soviet Union were Stalin’s immediate lieutenants. Several members of the Party Presidium, including Zhukov, appear to have some voice in determining policy and considerable responsibility for supervising administration. Perhaps the most significant change is that there is not one man in the Presidium who is in charge of the secret police. For policy direction, the secret police now report to a committee inside the Presidium and are under a director who is in charge only of their administration. The Communist party itself appears to be in a stronger position than it was in the last days of Stalin, despite the prestige granted to certain career officers since Stalin’s death. While there is no significant evidence of any relaxation of party controls over the armed forces, the influence exerted by Zhukov in both domestic and foreign affairs is increasingly evident.
No single person has yet emerged who has earned a position of dominant personal leadership within the Presidium. There is a possibility that the current balance among the members of the ruling group may last for some time. There will be a tendency among the secondary officials to promote the “collective system of leadership” in order to protect their own personal position. Yet, it remains to be seen whether the Soviet regime can maintain the integrity of its basic characteristics under a system of diluted political power at the top.
Impact on Policy
It is useful to consider the impact of possible differences among the principal rivals for Soviet power on the development of Soviet policy. While there is general agreement that the Soviets’ foreign policy is projected toward the attainment of long-range objectives, many of its historical actions appear to have been determined on a short-term basis in which the relation of the internal stability of the regime to a particular course of action was always a major consideration. The guns of World War II were scarcely cool when Stalin began talking, as of old, about the inevitability of “capitalist” wars. Stalin, in 1946, reemphasized the conventional Communist position that the world was divided into two camps. Stalin told the Soviet people that they were in danger of attack from their erstwhile allies. The basic Soviet aim was proclaimed to be to undermine the camp of Imperialists headed by the United States. Soon after becoming Premier, Malenkov endorsed this orthodox Stalinist line.
Collective leadership, however, had given Soviet foreign policy much greater flexibility under Malenkov than it had under Stalin. Stalin, as absolute dictator, was able to enforce a much “harder” foreign line than Malenkov could as first among equals. Despite Molotov’s provocative and threatening speech made on the occasion of. Malenkov’s resignation, as long as the Soviets are ruled by collective leadership they are not likely to pursue a foreign policy which would produce counter measures threatening the survival of the regime. However, some of the more subtle approaches pursued during the Malenkov period are likely to be dropped as long as Khrushchev remains a power.
Until the problem of the transfer of power is fully resolved, the new regime will be primarily concerned with the problems of control of the satellites, relations with Red China, the loyalty of the Army, and internal security. It is not likely to take actions which would lead to general war. Yet because it is less confident of its position, it may react with less poise to what it regards as external threats. Although adopting a more flexible style, the new regime has done nothing to indicate that it contemplates any fundamental changes of the long-range objectives of the Soviet Government. While hoping to avoid serious external difficulties, it will make every effort to present an appearance of cohesion and strength.
The successes the Communist Bloc has won since Stalin’s death have been more the result of Allied indecision rather than of daring Communist pressure. The incompatability of collective leadership with the Soviet system and the new relationship between China and Russia, because Mao now deals with lesser men than Stalin, make the present a conservative period in Soviet foreign policy. The collective regime lacks the ability to risk positive maneuvers since it does not possess Stalin’s immense prestige. Further, the military influence has been directed toward reducing the chances of a shooting war. The willingness of the Soviet bloc to accept a political settlement in Indochina less than the military situation might have justified can perhaps be explained in this manner. Until an ultimate transfer of power is accomplished, the collective leadership fears more than anything else positive moves on the part of the West aimed at retracting Soviet power.
Possible Conflicts
Further serious struggles within the Soviet collective leadership group will be manifest in conflicts over policy. Policy cleavages, in turn, will be expressed in ideological terms. From 1945 on there have developed divergences within the USSR with regard to the best method of exploiting the territorial gains and political successes obtained by the Soviet. These changes destroyed the old balance of power and made a change in Communist tactics an obvious necessity. As in every country during periods of international tension, there are partisan advocates of what might be called a war policy or a peace policy, a realistic group in contrast to an opportunist group. The fundamental question facing Soviet policy makers is the degree to which a major war should be risked in order to enlarge its power. After World War II, two different schools of Communist thought arose with regard to the best tactical method of bringing about world Communism. The realist school inside the Soviet Union may argue that all political means leading to final Communist victory have been exhausted. This factor justifies Soviet military action, especially since time may help the West to find a way out of its difficulties and to realize its potential strength. Essentially, the realists would argue that the final collapse of capitalism must be assisted by military action. The realists believe that war is inherently more dangerous to capitalism than to socialist Russia, which is, incidentally, the orthodox Communist line.
The opportunist group would espouse an opposite view. They would contend that the world crisis of capitalism is both imminent and inevitable. Time, therefore, in their view is on the Soviet side. The Soviet Bloc, therefore, should advance by exploiting the fear of war, blackmail, intrigue, subversion, and political action rather than by force of arms. If this group can avoid it, there is not likely to be any adventure that could be blown up into all out war.
Around basic policy issues such as these, serious division within the collective leadership group might become evident. But also within the totalitarian frame there are lesser tensions which trouble the regime although they do not endanger fundamentally its stability. Differences arise in the highest places as to which of those tensions should be treated first and as to the best ways of dealing with them. The degree to which consumer goods should be produced at the expense of war production is a pertinent example. This “guns vs. butter” issue was probably discussed during the February governmental crisis.
The factor which gives strongest weight to the possibility of splits among the Soviet bosses is the intense feeling of personal insecurity that necessarily accompanies the successful advance of a Soviet man into the innersanctum of Communist power. He can never relax his drive for power since only by gaining more power at the expense of others can he improve his personal security. The ultimate source of the regime’s insecurity, which enhances the sense of personal insecurity of its individual members, lies in the relationship of the top hierarchy to the people they rule. This relationship is such that it is impossible for the regime to relax significantly international tensions without undermining the political and psychological basis for the maintenance of its totalitarian controls.
In many respects, the Soviet hierarchy is more like an army of occupation than a domestically responsive government. The policy of basic hostility towards the West is a manifestation of the insecurity of the regime.
Among the forces which hold the Soviet system together are fear and suspicion of the outside world, Russian nationalism, pride in certain Soviet achievements, and an effective system of incentive rewards and compelling punishments. Yet the Soviet system has major vulnerabilities. At the very top of the structure there is the fear of personal failure and consequent liquidation. There is also evidence of the recognition by many Soviet citizens of the invalidity of the basic theory of the Communist regime. There is a psychological weakness of the Soviet leadership group resulting from the contrast between Soviet hopes and reality. The contrast between official fiction and unofficial reality is strikingly evident in two areas. One is in Soviet agriculture. The Soviet peasants are probably the most exploited group within the USSR outside of those in the prison camps. Despite all the efforts that have gone into forcing the collective farm system down the throats of the Russian peasant, they still desire to own the land they till. Further, the fact that millions of Soviet citizens are confined in slave labor camps and prisons creates another area of intense emotional resentment against the Soviet Regime. There is not a family inside Russia that has not, at one time or another, had members caught in the grips of the Soviet slave labor system. The significance of this potential reservoir of hatred and resentment was evident during the second World War when defection of whole units of the Red Army occurred.
Exploitation of Cleavages Within the Soviet Power Hierarchy
A split at the top of the Soviet pyramid, although sparked by individual insecurity drives would take place within the context of the tensions, fears, frustrations, and reactions of the entire Soviet population. Unless large groups of Soviet citizens would actively cooperate with any would-be aspirant to power, there is little chance that a fundamentally different government could be created in Russia. Lesser power struggles between the decision-makers could take place without the mass of the people being involved. Thus, Beria’s liquidation, although it had widespread public repercussions, was discreetly engineered within a very limited circle.
Cleavages at the top of the Soviet power structure, to be meaningful in terms of world politics, would have to involve the major elements of the Soviet Bloc, particularly the military establishment. A hypothetical cause of such a cleavage might be potential differences in policy advocated toward Communist China by various members among the leadership group. Such a rift in Russian Communist policy could cause internal struggles in Communist parties throughout the world. The relationship between the Soviet Union and China became a possible vulnerability after the victory of Mao Tse-tung’s Communist armies in China. Any increase of tension in this relationship would not only weaken the monolithic structure of the Soviet empire but, by imposing on Russia the need to make great efforts and sacrifices to keep China in line, would also weaken the Soviet Union and her satellites.
A rift between the Soviet military and political leaders is also conceivable. The fact that the Soviet military is one element capable of toppling the Soviet regime is known to its members. There is little question that the military’s position of psychological inferiority toward the party and perhaps to the secret police could represent a potential danger of great magnitude to the regime. The Red Army, as a whole, has old-fashioned nationalist sentiments. It fought for Russian soil and may well be disillusioned by and hostile toward post-war Communist expansion.
Whatever the root cause, the probability that there will be further struggles for power within the Soviet Bloc can be taken for granted. Given the nature of the Soviet system, most struggles would probably be resolved within the higher echelons of the bureaucracy and we would learn about them only after the fact. If in such a struggle, however, it became necessary for one of the rival groups to seek popular support in their efforts to defeat their rivals, then a real crisis situation would emerge. In such an event, the main instruments of bureaucratic power, the party, the police, the army, and the state administration, would likely become involved. If that took place, the struggle could fan out throughout the whole Soviet orbit.
Summary
The USSR is politically more vulnerable than before Stalin’s death. Although the post-Malenkov collective leadership group may appear to be functioning satisfactorily, the Soviet internal situation is not stagnant. New developments will take place. History encouragingly offers parallels in which revolutionary governments have been destroyed by the weapons which they created. Napoleon’s empire was undermined by the same spirit of nationalism and liberalism which the French had utilized as their weapon of conquest.
The emergence of the Red Army as a political force inside the USSR is a new situation. In the Soviet power complex, the Soviet military is now both a significant and conservative force. One of the concessions given the military by Malenkov in order to gain effective military support for the disposal of Beria was control over their own ammunition depots inside the Soviet Union. This major concession gives the Soviet military a real influence in Soviet internal affairs. We can be certain that a crisis involving the survival of the Soviet state would result if any would-be dictator attempted to rescind these concessions and put the military back in the same inferior position they occupied under Stalin.
In a totalitarian system, collective leadership at the top is an element of inherent instability. Despite the Western failure thus far to capitalize on it, the existence of collective leadership in the USSR can be reckoned as a basically favorable factor in Western calculations. The fact that Bulganin is probably acting as arbiter within the Presidium over the equal chiefs of the major instruments of Soviet power is a profound innovation for a totalitarian system in which one- man dictatorial rule seems essential.
Both the pressure of personal insecurity and the logic of the Communist system of organization will eventually generate explosions within the collective leadership group. The one alternative that might prevent this explosion would be effective insistence by the second and third level Soviet officials that collective leadership continue. Collective leadership was originally installed to squeeze these second-level officials from the inner circle of power. Consequently, a move to reconcentrate power in one man’s hands is a more likely development than for the extension of the collective leadership principle.
Since Stalin’s death, one possible successor, Beria, has been liquidated and Malenkov has been kicked down stairs. Factors which will urge others to seize the throne have been suppressed but not uprooted. Any serious effort that may be made in the future to establish one-man control within the USSR will be of advantage to the West. If any aspirant attempts to gain power without the backing of the Red Army, a catastrophic internal crisis would ensue. If on the other hand, the Red Army is itself a party to a coup, a conservative nationalistic regime would probably come into power. There is a better chance for the West to establish a modus vivendi with such a regime than with one dominated by political revolutionaries. At the same time, the emergence of an avowedly nationalist regime in Russia would bring to a head all of the ideologically submerged conflicts of nationalist interest which exist between China and the Soviet Union.
To sum up: we have had enough experience with the Soviet Union to know that its blustering threats as well as appeals for lessening the tensions are made, in part, to mask its internal difficulties, particularly the contradictions arising from the stresses of collective leadership. Given time and no outside interference, the leadership crisis within the USSR may be resolved and one-man dictatorial rule reestablished. The accession to power of another dictator in the mould of Stalin would be a disastrous blow to any hopes of a real settlement of the conflict between Communism and the Free World.
It remains to be seen whether the West will take advantage of the historical opportunity offered by the contradictions of Soviet leadership and the emergency of the Soviet military as a political entity or whether it will continue to permit the Soviets to take time out from the game while they are putting their own house in order.