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Edited by Captain John S. Lewis, U. S. Navy United States................... 227
Data on the Forrestal—The U. S. Navy 1955-1975—Submarine Telephone Cable—Enlistment Crisis Faced by Air Force—U. S., Spanish Fleets To Join in Mediterranean Exercises—Mobile Atom Units Sped for “Brush Fire” Wars.
Foreign.................................................................................................... 233
' Training of Cadres in Soviet Navy—Sweden’s Rearming Cheers West —Tito Shuns Status of Buffer-Satellite
Briefs...................................................................................................... 238
I
UNITED STATES
DATA ON USS FORRESTAL (CVA-59) (Carrier Vessel Attack)
k
i
e
fe
Type of Carrier Length Overall
Length between Perpendiculars
Breadth at Main Deck
Extreme Breadth at Flight Deck
Depth at Centerline Flight Deck
Keel Laid
Christening
Delivery
Cost Including Ordnance
Number of Crew (including Air Group)
Speed
Horsepower
Standard Displacement
Structural Steel Required
Miles of J Inch Welding
Number of Pieces of Steel Used in Building
Number of Rivets Used
Number Car Loads of Material Used
Attack with Canted Deck 1036 Feet 990 Feet
129 Feet 4 Inches 252 Feet 97 Feet 4 Inches July 14, 1952 December 1954 Late in 1955 Over $200 Million 3500
Over 30 Knots Over 200,000 59,650 Tons 52,500 Tons 2400
265.000
200.000
1700
Capacity of Air Conditioning Number of Propellers Number of Rudders
Number Types of Steel Used in Construction Miles of Piping, about Miles of Electric Cable, about Number of Compartments and Spaces, over Pounds of Weld Metal Used Horsepower to Supply Electricity to City Number of Elevators (All Deck Edge) Number of Catapults (Steam)
Miles of Blueprints Issued
Number of Drawings Made
Number of Draftsmen Used at Shipyard
2 Empire State Buildings
4 (Two 4 Blade Two 5 Blade)
3 12 180 290 2000
2 Million 1,500,000 Persons
4 4
2100
13,500
700
The U. S. Navy 1955-1975
Ordnance, November-December, 1954.— The American public, in its understandable anxiety about national defenses against the atomic and other post-1945 weapons, may have forgotten that against either new or old weapons it will be necessary for the Navy to engage in a great deal of construction, with a viewT to large-scale launchings in 1958 and for a number of years thereafter.
That fact has not slipped the Navy’s mind, certainly, and something of what naval planners have been developing as a construction program was hinted this fall by ranking officials both of that service and of the Defense Department.
The program is directed primarily, of course, toward vessels and equipment for coping, offensively or defensively, with the conditions brought about by epochal inventions and improvements of the last decade and indicated for the next, but it is gratifying to see how smooth has been the evolutionary progress to date toward the coming objective.
The progress results from a prompt recognition, after the Bikini tests of 1946, of the facts there disclosed with regard to what we ourselves could do with the new weapon and with variants of it already projected and what must be rapidly done to counter such a weapon in enemy hands.
These factors applied to tactical doctrines, fleet dispositions, communications, supply at sea, shore bases, and, of course, to weapons planning, aircraft design, new-ship design, and (existing vessels being valuable and time an indispensable commodity) to design for essential conversions of existing hulls to new forms.
The problems faced must be recognized as greater, spatially, than the Navy ever before has faced. World War I confronted us with one mighty foe in, for the most part, one ocean; World War II with two foes in two oceans. But who can say what seas are not involved in our present planning? For, beyond taking care of itself, the United States is fully committed in writing “to defend 694,000,000 people and 21,500,000 square miles of land in 39 nations on 6 continents and across 3 oceans,” to quote from a congressional summary.
“In addition, we have mutual-security and mutual-defense-assistance agreements with twenty-five other nations. . . . No mention is made here of the unknown obligations under the charter of the United Nations.”
The combined effect of these international requirements, plus the post-1945 inventions and improvements, has been to require of the Navy many alterations in thinking as well as in material. The result, not fully recognized outside the Navy, has been a program pursued aggressively since 1948 by which time the lessons of Bikini, plus the observation of certain overseas trends, could form the basis for some extremely bold planning.
In 1950, under influence of the Korean war, it became possible to get some of the most urgent planning translated into appropriations.
* * *
A marked change lies ahead, due not alone to the demands of new weapons and their compelling effect on ship design but also to the sometimes forgotten fact that the best ship’s useful life is limited. We have come to think of a destroyer’s life as being fifteen years, a carrier’s as twenty. Now the great bulk of the present fleet, whether at sea or in mothballs, came off the ways in 1943 and 1944.
This means that destroyers on which we properly place our full reliance right now will begin obsolescing in 1958, and that, by the ordinary tests of time rather than of epochal new weapons, most of the existing fleet will have gravely deteriorated during the five years thereafter. Even if the atom were still inviolate we would need to start some large shipbuilding programs soon.
But the cracking of the atom and the utilization of atomic-fission by many nations, plus the astonishing advances in propulsion arts and electronics, add markedly to the need and at the same time dictate the manner in which the need is to be satisfied.
The broad necessity was stated publicly by Adm. Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, a few weeks ago in his reminder that our existing submarines (whose relative importance is growing enormously) are too largely of World War II design and construction, as are destroyers and escorts.
* * *
As to ship and aircraft construction alone, it is perhaps unnecessary to point out the gravity of the Navy’s needs. They are relative, as are all armament needs, being affected vitally by the armament posture of other nations—particularly Russia. With respect to naval construction Russia has had much the paradoxical yet enormous advantage which Nazi Germany possessed in the early ’thirties of having almost no old equipment. There is none, that is, upon which Russians may base a false reliance for security.
Russia, determined to attain sea power, could start practically from scratch (as Hitler did in ground and air and sea resources after the Versailles demobilization) and in similar manner has been able to build wholly for a new war.
* * *
When we think of what German science and technology did to implement the ferocious Hitler’s aggressive designs, it should make us aware that Russian aggressiveness, similarly assisted to an unknown extent since 1945, has large potency today.
The United States Navy’s problems, therefore, include the job of overcoming any complacency which the Nation may feel, based upon the grandeur of the Navy’s record in World War II and its excellent performance of the less exacting missions given it since 1945. Admiral Carney has issued his own warnings against complacency with the blunt assurance that such reasons as we had for it in 1945 are no longer valid; rather that now “the United States must address itself to developing and maintaining a secure edge in the maritime field.”
Praising the pioneering atomic-powered submarine Nautilus, he remarks that “many more Nautili must be added”—and more, for mighty as these swift and tireless newcomers promise to be, they will not perform all naval missions. Great emphasis is properly being given to our underseas-warfare resources, both in offensive and defensive measures, but not to the neglect of surface and above-surface requirements.
A word on this point is called for. Russia’s sudden acquisition, under the 1945 surrender terms, of a third of Germany’s finest seagoing submarines (plus the building yards and laboratories on the Baltic, plus their personnel, plus the designs for further improvements) focused world attention on the great addition to Russia’s high-seas strength.
That strength obviously has been markedly increased since then and, in Moscow’s inscrutable way of concealing certain resources while flaunting others, the evidence of naval prowess has been plentifully and purposely supplied. Thus, the new cruiser Sverdlov was sent to the international naval parade incidental to the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II and was exhibited with justifiable pride in a fine ship impressively handled.
Thus, too, this past year a Soviet task force was conspicuously sent into Swedish waters for international inspection. Thus, too, at the Moscow air show foreign military attaches among others were given ample opportunity to witness some extremely efficient new jets and some impressive skill in mass maneuver.
Russia’s arms, it must be remembered, are not totally related to their use in war; they (like Hitler’s prior to 1939) are also a peacetime manifestation of Russian might, extremely useful for propaganda.
But the naval aspects of all this force themselves to attention as helping to suggest a significant departure from Russian naval tradition. For decades (assisted no doubt by the disaster to two Russian battle fleets during the Russo-Japanese war of a half century ago) Russian naval power has been built up largely for coastal defense. Russian submarines were of the short-range coastal type and surface vessels generally the same.
We now observe in Russia’s new cruisers and supporting vessels and in her deep-sea submarines naval elements designed as oceanic commerce raiders, and possibly more. It would be foolish to miss the significance of this, as it must affect our own planning.
But it would be equally foolish to focus our attention only on these circumstances, and there is real danger that a part of American thinking has become obsessed with the submarine peril (which is real enough) to the exclusion of other circumstances which are just as real. There is special peril in the view (1) that our function is to match Russia type for type and ship for ship, and (2) that, because Russia is not engaged in any aircraft carrier construction which meets the eye, we can afford to hold down in that area. Both conclusions are unwarranted.
As our naval planners see it, our aim should be to keep our whole navy modern in all areas and to assure its adequacy in relation to all other parts of our national defense and to our international obligations. Russia’s strategic naval problem is not at all identical with ours, and the bearing of this fact on the carrier issue is clear.
The present article aims only at a reassuring look at what the Navy is doing and has been doing at increased pace these past six years to prepare for the give and take of a new-weapons war without losing any of its competence for the handling of such “conventional” needs as have been disclosed lately in the Far East.
This dual program has led to a steady conversion plan affecting scores of ships whose useful life has thereby been extended another ten years or more. It has led to new designs, some radical, for the creation of ship types as new as the weapons they are to employ or oppose—and these will come into being as the Congress approves recommendations.
It has led to new tactical doctrines and radically new fleet dispositions at sea. It has led most dramatically to new ideas in amphibious warfare as radical as the new ideas in purely land warfare which the Army now is engaged in implementing.
The best illustration of this last is perhaps the new type of vessel, the CVHA, or assault helicopter transport. The new weapons which the enemy must be expected to have undoubtedly make impossible such amphibious inshore operations as the Marines conducted triumphantly in World War II—with assault craft racing toward the beaches.
Yet the need for a great many troops and a great deal of equipment on an unorganized beach, and in a great hurry, is unaltered. The much-improved helicopter appears to provide one of the answers, and the Marines have quickly adapted their landing tactics to new needs and new facilities, such as the squad helicopter and now the assault transport for carrying a squadron of these new instruments of amphibious warfare.
The doctrine for defense against the new weapons is well advanced and under constant review. Also it is in continuous application, thanks to the Navy’s operational-readiness inspection (at least once a year for every active ship) by which there is a standard operating procedure for avoidance of damage, for maneuver of the ship, for swift cleansing after exposure to radioactivity, and for maximum protection of personnel. Ships and special equipment are designed with all these things in mind.
The new weapons themselves are installed as soon as possible. It is no secret that the Navy and Marine aircraft have atomic capability, and it is a reasonable assumption that, just as the Army artillery with its new 280-mm. gun can use the atomic shell, the Navy’s big guns have like capability.
There may be a temptation, in the light of this, to feel pretty complacent. That’s just what Admiral Carney warns against, and the terms of our requirements fully support his warning of a year ago that the Navy which first converts to atomic propulsion may hold the key to supremacy. A new ship of any size calls for three to four years of construction work, and it is most unlikely that an enemy will provide us with a 3- to 4-year advance statement of intentions.
Obsolescence factors considered, we can look forward to some large and serious planning in the naval program to be laid before the new Congress.
Submarine Telephone Cable
Mechanical Engineer, December, 1954.— The first submarine telephone cable between the United States and Europe is expected to be in commercial operation by late 1956, four top-ranking British and American communications experts announced in a paper presented before the 1954 fall meeting of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers, in Chicago, 111.
The new $35 million transatlantic telephone system will be by far the longest underseas voice cable in the world and the first laid at depths found in mid-ocean. It will supplement radio circuits now in use and will have three times the present circuit capacity.
* * *
The cable will be owned jointly by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, the Eastern Telephone and Telegraph Company, the British Post Office, and the Canadian Overseas Telecommunications Corporation.
2000 Nautical Miles Long
The transatlantic portion of the system to provide 36 high-grade telephone circuits between the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States, will be 2000 nautical miles in length. It will be laid in depths up to three miles on the ocean floor between Scotland and Newfoundland and each of the two cables will contain 52 submerged repeaters. The longest submarine telephone cable now in use is less than 200 miles long and no cable contains more than four repeaters.
The system will contain a group of telephone circuits between New York and London and another group between Montreal and London. At the gateway cities, the circuits will connect with the telephone systems of the respective countries.
Telephone conversations from the U.S. will be carried overland by a microwave radio-relay from Portland, Maine, to Nova Scotia where the radio-relay route will connect with a 300-mile submarine cable to Newfoundland. The transatlantic portion of the cable will stretch from Clarenville, Newfoundland, to Oban, Scotland. The transatlantic circuits will be taken from Oban to London by carrier cable with alternative routes via Glasgow or Inverness and Aberdeen. In London, it will be possible to connect any transatlantic circuit to any one of the existing submarine cable circuits to the continent of Europe.
Coaxial-Type Cable
The new transoceanic cable will be of the coaxial type consisting essentially of a copper tube, through the center of which runs a single copper conductor, properly insulated from the surrounding outer conductor. High- molecular-weight polyethylene is used for insulation.
The cables will be not quite two thirds of an inch in diameter at the outer conductor. They will be protected against the teredo worm, a marine borer, by wrappings of copper tape. Outside this will be wrappings of heavy jute, steel-armor wires for mechanical strength, and an outer wrapping of jute to prevent corrosion of the armor wires. The deep-sea sections will be about \\ in. in over-all diameter.
Repeaters, with their electron tubes and many other associated parts, appear simply as bulges in the cables. This will permit them to be fed smoothly around the drums and sheaves of the cable ship Monarch so that the cable and repeaters can be laid on the ocean floor as a continuous operation.
Each repeater, spaced about 40 miles apart, will consist essentially of a three-stage feedback amplifier, so that there will be more than 300 long-life electron tubes on the ocean floor with some 6000 other electrical components, all designed for reliable, trouble-free operation for 20 years or more.
Electron tubes and other components, constructed or selected for reliability in service, have been under life test since 1940.
Electrical power to operate the amplifiers will be fed to them over the central conductor of each cable from the terminal stations on shore. This will require more than 2000 volts at each end. The design of the terminal power plant will place special emphasis on current regulation, continuity of service, and protection against power surges.
A period of 12 days with continuously good weather conditions will be necessary to carry out the main laying operation. In the North Atlantic such conditions are unlikely except during the period mid-May to mid- September. One cable will be laid during the summer of 1955 and all cable-laying operations are scheduled to be completed in 1956
Enlistment Crisis Faced by Air Force
Washington Post and Times-Herald, December 12, 1954.—Air Secretary Harold E. Talbott will warn Congress in January that the present United States Air Force faces virtual dissolution in the next four years unless bold and effective steps are taken to make it more attractive to its fighting men than the lures of civilian life.
The threat to the Nation’s “principal deterrent” against atomic destruction by Russia is viewed as the most “critical” since the Air Force fell apart at the end of World War II.
Here are the grim facts faced by Talbott and his aides in trying to keep the air arm at the peak of readiness as the first line of defense against atomic attack on United States cities:
In the next 12 months, four-year enlistments end for 276,000 men out of a total Air Force strength of 840,000. Of these, 160,000 highly trained men are set to return to civilian life unless key problems of pay, housing and former “fringe” benefits taken away by Congress are restored.
The actual Air Force turnover next year may go as high as 50 percent due to additional factors such as the six-year enlistments.
In the next four years, the Air Force could lose by turnover as many as 740,000 men unless they can be persuaded to re-enlist.
This would leave the air arm only a “hard core” of 100,000 dedicated professional airmen to train a new Air Force “from scratch.”
The prospect of the tremendous turnover in trained Air Force personnel, which already has begun, results from the huge expansion that began with outbreak of the Korean conflict in June, 1950. Because the majority of enlistments are for four years, this the first year of the expansion “hump” for the Air Force.
U. S., Spanish Fleets to Join in Mediterranean Exercises
The New York Herald-Tribune, December 11, 1954.—The United States 6th Fleet has been ordered to hold joint maneuvers with the Spanish Fleet at every opportunity in an effort to develop joint communications and tactical systems, it was announced today.
The action was disclosed by Adm. Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, who returned this week from Spain. While there he conferred with Spanish officials and inspected Spanish naval facilities, to see how they fit into Western defense plans.
The United States and Spain reached an agreement more than a year ago under which Spain promised to make some of its naval and air bases available to the United States in return for American military and economic aid.
Adm. Carney, who said the Spanish displayed a “sincere desire” to co-operate in Western defense, said in a statement that “Spanish naval forces are in need of modernization and we can be of help to them in that respect.
“Meanwhile I feel, however, that much good will come of holding joint exercises with our 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean and various units of the Spanish Fleet,” he said.
“Starting now, we are going to carry on these exercises whenever opportunity permits in an effort to work out mutually compatible communications and tactical systems.”
Adm. Carney noted that Spain “obviously” would have a chance to “perform important maritime tasks in the event of trouble” since its coasts front strategically both on the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.
Mobile Atom Units Sped for “Brush Fire” Wars
The New York Herald-Tribune, December 16, 1954.—The United States is making important progress in its plan to create highly mobile tactical forces capable of putting out limited “brush fire” wars around the globe.
These tactical forces, like strategic ones having a “massive retaliation” role in the event of all-out enemy aggression, are being equipped with atomic weapons. They will consist of radically new military units and combat groups of the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps, organized so as to be readily deployable anywhere along the free world’s periphery.
Gets Higher Priority
Since the deepening of the crisis in IndoChina and other parts of Southeast Asia, moves to implement this nation’s rapidly evolving new tactical concepts have received increasingly higher priority. This definitely does not mean that the United States is abandoning or slighting in any way its primary dependence on long-range air power, combined with atomic and hydrogen bombs, to deter an aggressor.
It does indicate determination of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop “maximum mobility,” not only for total war but for situations cut from the Korean War pattern. These suddenly might confront the United States and its allies in the Tachen Islands, in Burma, Thailand or Indo-China, as well as other future trouble spots.
Right now the Tactical Air Command of -the Air Force, ... is working with all possible speed to perfect the formula for “a tactical atomic-air-power package.” It wants one that could be moved from the United States to wherever it might be needed on very short notice, arriving in Formosa or Indo-China in, say, thirty-six to forty-eight hours after an alarm.
The Basic “Package”
Although no final form has been decided upon, the basic “package” will probably consist of about sixteen atom-bomb-carrying fighter-bombers equipped for refueling in flight: a dozen or so similarly equipped “intruder” light bombers, capable of delivering “baby” atom bombs by day or night, and several supporting transport planes. . . . The Joint Chiefs now assume that tactical air power will be prepared to cooperate closely with the ground forces of any allied nations attacked, as well as with the special new mobile units being developed by the Army.
Exercises recently held by the Army indicate that its stream-lined “atomic war division”—if it keeps this basic higher formation designation—is likely to be a force of as few as 2000 to 3000 men.
Many Times the Firepower
But it will be able to deliver at least the equivalent and probably many times the firepower of the older, larger divisions, and to maneuver and deploy with air vehicles, including the big air transport, the helicopter and the convertiplane of the future. . . .
FOREIGN
Training of Cadres in Soviet Navy
La Revue Maritime, November, 1954.— More than in any other country, the training of cadres is a subject of close study in the Soviet navy. This training is technical and professional, to be sure, but in a special sense it is ideological. As the special group of citizens effecting the defense of the country, the Soviet armed forces are in reality forces of the Communist party identified with the nation. Hence the double training, professional and ideological, which must insure that there can never be a false note.
We propose to describe just how this training is carried out with the deck and engineering officers of the present-day navy which aspires to the position of “oceanic” navy described by Stalin in the thirties.
The naval schools are placed under the direction of Ministry of the Navy. This is in effect a direct authority which makes for relative autonomy of this branch of the armed forces and makes possible the use of certain persons who would have been too conspicuous in the fleet. The supreme command has, in fact, displayed great realism in seeking out the most experienced men who could organize instruction and tie up the new navy with the traditions of the past while working out a solid doctrine. Many of these instructors were former tsarist naval officers who were effectively integrated in the new training set up, even though they were completely out of touch with the new ideological requirements.
The training of Soviet officers is based on a simple principle: unified ideology, professional specialization. The result is a common mode of thought and expression though the areas of activity may be extremely diverse. It can be seen that the officer corps are steeped in Marxist-Leninist doctrine. On the other hand the officers of the line, engineers, coastal defense, and naval aviation are too specialized to allow any exchange of personnel from one corps to another. Unlike the French or American naval officer, the Soviet officer remains in his original branch and seeks his career in that specialty.
As if to stress this demarcation, the ranks in the various corps have separate denominations. Sea-going officers have the ranks usual in other navies, but other branches have ranks similar to those of army officers—• captain, major, colonel, etc. It can be seen that the spirit of corps is given free rein.
Entrance programs are of a generally low level. As an example, the program in mathematics and physics, consists of the theory of permutations, combinations, Newton’s binomial and elements of physics and nuclear chemistry. On the other hand, a rather interesting place is given to the history of science with the well-known element of propaganda or even chauvinism. It is expressly stated that candidates must demonstrate a knowledge of the role of Russian and Soviet genius in the development of science. The exclusive role of Lobatchevsky, Popov, Jhoukovsky, etc., stresses the nationalistic character of these programs.
In theory, all boys having the required age and education may take the entrance examinations to the naval schools. In practice, nearly all candidates come from the Nakhimov schools. These are elementary and secondary schools for the sons of naval officers. Having received basic naval training and military discipline from childhood, the Nakhimov graduates are naturally oriented toward the naval service. In the May Day parades the place of honor is given to these smart appearing youngsters and their opposite numbers of the army under the patronage of Souvorov.
To be sure, an occasional candidate from the worker or peasant classes is accepted. Indeed, the press makes a great fuss over these rare individuals. This does little to upset the virtual monopoly of Nakhimovtsi. The solidarity of these last in face of a few upstarts may well be imagined.
Once the boys have been admitted to a naval school, they are subjected to a stiff schedule of courses, the most intensive being those in party doctrine. The exaggerated place of such instruction can be found in no other country, but it is somewhat reminiscent of institutions where religious training is part of the curriculum: the star has taken the place of the cross.
There is little evidence that trainees are all enthusiastic about the courses of party exegesis, but this can hardly be taken as evidence of any strong opposition, since in schools the world over there is a tendency to discriminate against certain courses. If the complaints of political leaders echoed in the various publications are an indication, the naval cadets (Koursanti) do manifest a degree of apathy toward the constant haranguing of political officers.
Technical courses aim at perfectionism, and the Koursant must put out an effort at memorization that would stagger our western cadets. This phase is not peculiar to Soviet military establishments; it is found in both universities and secondary schools of the U.S.S.R. The mind is impregnated with a carefully worked out set of ideas and information, so that the subconscious responds automatically to a given word or concept.
Such a program makes for intensive study of detail in Rules of the Road, etc. The course should give lasting results and provide excellent naval specialists. However, this method seems to backfire when used with minds formed under other circumstances. Non-Soviet communists assigned to the Leningrad school after the war complained about the multitude of rules and regulations they had to commit to memory. They also found the interminable explanations a bore, since they could grasp an idea much more rapidly than the Soviet pupils.
Trainees who fail to measure up to standards are turned back to the fleet. Some classes have been reduced by 25% because of unsats. It should be pointed out that such eliminations occurred before the establishment of the large Nakhimov quotas.
As in all navies, officers will, as a rule, continue to improve themselves throughout their career. They will also have to keep up on Marxism-Leninism, and attend regular lectures on the subject. In addition to their specialties, they may follow courses at the military and naval academies, which correspond to our war colleges and post-graduate schools plus the compulsory study of Marxism-Leninism.
The most important naval school is the Frunze school located on the Neva in the old buildings of the Tsarist naval school (Kronstadt). This institution was originally founded in Moscow by Peter the Great as a school of mathematical and nautical sciences. It has been in Saint Petersburg, now Leningrad, since 1715. Thus the Soviet navy really has a wealth of naval traditions and was far from starting at scratch after the revolution.
The course lasts four years with a program limited by climatic conditions. The Neva and the Gulf of Finland are ice-bound during the long winter. Hence, the summer is devoted exclusively to practical exercises in windjammers and old transports, while the winter is spent in theoretical work and land drills.
There is no cruise to foreign ports. Except for brief visits within the limits of Swedish waters, they have no contact with foreign nationals, no first hand knowledge of any mentality other than that of their own compulsory norm.
This isolation marks the Soviet officer for life, and explains much of his behavior when he later meets officers from foreign navies. If we can speak of introverted societies as well as introverted individuals, the Soviet officer class will have all the marks of such a group.
The Frunze school is the institute for deck officers. The engineers are trained in the Dzerjhinsky school on the other bank of the Neva in Leningrad. Engineering officers and naval architects receive the same basic training and specialize later. Shore duty officers, i.e., coastal artillery, are prepared at the school in Riga, while special courses are given in Viborg for commandos. Finally, naval air officers are trained in four separate schools on Soviet territory.
Senior officers may be sent to the Academies, after they have proved their professional qualities and political reliability. The best known of these academies are the Voroshilov and Krilov Academies. The avowed policy at this level is to take the best elements of the past and integrate them with the present.
Other academies exist in great numbers. One may become a general officer in music, medicine, jurisprudence, supply. There is even a Lenin Academy for political officers of the highest level.
The end result of so much specialization and indoctrination is inevitably a certain watering-down of individual responsibility. Evidently, there must be a moment of decision when the order “15 degrees right” is given. However, there must always be the thought in the back of an officer’s mind— “What will they say when we get back to port?” With the Soviet Union facing the greatest maritime power in history, it is interesting to conjecture how far the forthcoming role of the Soviet fleet as an oceanic navy will itself change the character of these hitherto closed minds. The Marxist-Leninist training may have left a strong imprint on the mentality of these naval officers, but once they begin to operate on the far-flung seas of the world they will find that the sea itself is the strongest teacher of the naval officer.
Sweden's Rearming Cheers West
The New York Herald-Tribune, November 29, 1954.—The scope of the new ten- year defense modernization program just announced by Sweden, a nation whose military forces last took the field officially during the Napoleonic Wars, has startled Europe.
Sweden already has the third largest air force in Europe, after Great Britain and the Soviet Union, with approximately 1,500 jet planes. But major goals of the new defense program include an even larger jet force equipped with 1,000-mile-an-hour fighters and supersonic fighter-bombers, the development of tactical atom bombs, a network of guided missile batteries for anti-aircraft use and expansion of Swedish submarine and motor torpedo boat units.
Vast Underground Hangars
The program’s provisions include also the building of vast underground hangars, naval docks and tunnels, storage areas for fuel and ammunition and military workshops and living quarters in key areas.
Sweden’s first atomic reactor recently was completed and is functioning on the outskirts of Stockholm in an underground chamber hewn out of granite 100 feet below the surface. Many other facilities, including those for jet aircraft production, already are underground.
The Swedish Army will abolish its centuries-old cavalry arm entirely under the ten- year modernization program, and the size of army field forces will be reduced. At the same time, the Army’s over-all firepower is scheduled to be increased considerably by “tanks and other heavy arms,” and its mobility will be stepped up by motorization.
Ahead in Motorization
Sweden at present ranks first in Continental Europe in having the greatest number of automobiles per capita, and the familiarity of its citizens with motorized vehicles will be an aid to the program.
Although Sweden still remains aloof from direct participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its decision to modernize and expand its armed forces is giving considerable cheer to the United States and other Western planners of Europe’s defenses.
There no longer is any question that Sweden is overwhelmingly pro-Western in sentiment, despite its traditional neutrality. This is particularly marked at all levels of the Swedish Armed Forces, which have a large number of high-ranking officers who served as volunteers in Finland in 1939 when that small nation was invaded by Soviet Russia.
Gen. Swedlund Explains
Lt. Gen. Nils Swedlund, Commander in Chief of the Swedish Armed Forces, who not long ago was the object of bitter attacks by Sweden’s Communists for saying that the rapid fulfillment of the NATO defense programs in Norway and Denmark was to his nation’s “strong interest,” had some equally frank comments about the new ten-year plan.
“Our resources are not sufficient,” he said, “for us to ward off the attack of a major power without receiving supplies and eventually other support from the outside. Our strategy must aim at creating the necessary prerequisites for such aid.”
Full details of the new Swedish defense modernization program have come to light almost simultaneously with the Swedish government’s polite but clear rejection Nov. 19 of an invitation from the Soviet Union to attend a special European security conference.
“Peace Congress” Criticized
This disclosure coincides also with a chorus of unfavorable comment by influential Swedish newspapers on the latest so-called “Stockholm Peace Congress” just held here under the sponsorship of Communist-front groups from many nations constituting a “World Peace Council.”
“Dagens Nyheter,” the Swedish Liberal party organ, which has the largest daily newspaper circulation in Sweden, pointed out that the new ten-year defense program “was born in the shadow of an atomic cloud” emanating from Soviet Russia’s tests of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons. Of the so-called peace congress the paper remarked: “It is obvious who is the actual operator.”
Tito Shuns Status of Buffer-Satellite
Christian Science Monitor, December 6, 1954.—-Yugoslavia, currently being wooed by Moscow after many years of bitter denunciation by the Kremlin, has no intention of becoming a Soviet satellite state.
Nor does this country wish in any way to weaken the bonds which have developed with the West in recent years.
These points emerge from recent statements by Yugoslav leaders, and notably by President Tito himself.
Marshal Tito’s Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform—grouping of the Soviet Union and Communist states in Europe—in 1948. Throughout Stalin’s lifetime, the Soviet bloc states brought all kinds of pressure to bear on Yugoslavia.
Initiative with Moscow
Now the new initiative—for “normalization” of relations between the two countries has come from the new regime in Moscow.
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Marshal Tito in his latest foreign policy speech said that the initiative to wipe out the practical effects of Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform in 1948 had come from the Soviet Union, not Yugoslavia.
He welcomed this fact. At the same time he maintained that the restoration of good relations with the Soviet Union would not affect already good relations with western Europe and the United States.
But he complained there were still “evil intentioned” people in the West who hated socialism and who argued mischievously that Marshal Tito was going back to the Kremlin and therefore should not be given any more western aid.
Marshal Tito made these remarks at a time when vice-president Svetozar Vuk- manovich-Tempo was in Washington holding delicate talks on the future of American aid.
An “Unknown Quantity”
Yugoslav leaders have repeatedly stated their aim—good practical relations between the two governments on condition they are not forced again into the position of Soviet satellites and the Soviets do not start meddling again in Yugoslav internal affairs.
There is, however, one “unknown quantity” which foreign observers and perhaps even some Yugoslav leaders find almost impossible to estimate in importance.
That is, what ideological impact will increased friendliness between the Yugoslav and Soviet governments have on middle and lower-grade party officials taught before 1948 to idolize the Soviet Union; the effect on the party of “normalization,” as it is called here, was discussed by the party’s central committee under President Tito’s chairmanship Nov. 26. But the speeches made at the meeting, in contrast to the previous meeting in March, were kept secret.
The foreign observers could only say that so far there had been no signs of the emergence of any pro-Soviet faction within the Yugoslav Communist Party.
Butter State Role
A common view here—although that could only be conjecture—was that the Soviets as part of their new flexible policy did not want to entice Tito back into the fold.
Instead they might be aiming to make Yugoslavia a buffer state between the Soviet Communist world and the American “imperialistic bloc.”
Yugoslavia might be destined to play a buffer role similar to Germany and Finland in central and northern Europe, thus leaving the attention of Moscow and Peking freer to concentrate on the Far East.
A glance at what has been accomplished in Soviet-Yugoslav relations since Stalin’s passing in March, 1953, shows that much has been done although much also remains to be done.
The soviet bloc countries have resumed full diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. They used to maintain skeleton staffs in each other’s capitals under a junior charge d’affaires while Yugoslavia and Albania closed their legations altogether.
The Soviet Union started the normalization process by sending an ambassador there in the summer of 1953. The last was Poland whose ambassador has been appointed but has not yet arrived.
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The Cominform countries’ economic blockade has ended and trade, although only a trickle so far, has begun to flow. So far trade agreements have been concluded by the Yugoslav Chamber of Foreign Trade with Soviet bloc enterprises but negotiations were expected in coming months to conclude normal trade agreements between governments.
The Danube Commission, in which Yugoslavia used to be at loggerheads with the other five members, all from the Soviet bloc, now has a Yugoslav secretary and is able to concentrate on the technical improvements of navigation instead of political polemics.
The propaganda war has ended and anti- Tito newspapers run by Yugoslav emigres in eastern Europe have been suppressed.
One exception to this has been reported by radio Novi Sad in northern Yugoslavia which said its Hungarian language broadcasts for the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia were still being jammed.
Rail Link with Romania
Frontier incidents no longer occur. Yugoslavia and its Soviet bloc neighbors have established joint commissions to settle frontier problems as they arise.
Rail communications, although still infrequent, are being slowly expanded. This fall the first direct rail services with Romania were resumed.
The Soviet Union has offered to repatriate Yugoslav citizens detained since 1948. Some Yugoslav citizens from Hungary already have returned.
BRIEFS
Controllable-pitch Propeller for Liberty Ship
Marine Progress, November, 1954.— Award of a Contract to produce the largest controllable-pitch propeller ever designed for a U.S. oceangoing ship was announced Oct. 7 by Louis S. Rothschild, Maritime Administrator.
The 17-foot six-inch propeller is to be installed on a Liberty ship selected from the National Defense Reserve Fleet for the experimental installation of a gas turbine propulsion plant and will be constructed by the S. Morgan Smith Company, of York, Pa.
Use of a controllable-pitch propeller was decided upon by Maritime Administration ship construction experts as the most promising means of maneuvering and reversing the gas turbine ship. A controllable-pitch propeller provides a means of reversing the ship from full power ahead to full astern in a very short period of time, without changing the direction of rotation of the main engine. It also enables the gas turbine to operate at its most efficient point for all conditions of loading. To accomplish this, the propeller blades are rotated to the desired pitch by means of a servo motor located within a hollow lineshaft, the pitch setting can be made from the bridge or engine room.
First Air Force Overseas Television Station
Signal, November-December, 1954.— Completion of plans for the first Air Force overseas television station has been announced by Lt. Gen. Joseph Smith, Commander, Military Air Transport Service.
Lajes Field, Azores, has been chosen by MATS as the proving ground for Air Force television because of its isolated location. Official broadcasting on the 50-watt station began October 17.
The Azores television station will be the first of a series of similar TV operations to be set up by MATS in various parts of the world.
MATS television stations will relay both educational and informational material to troops, but they will also telecast kinescope recordings of the top stateside programs of the big four networks.
Navy Control of Far East Units Shifted
Washington Post and Times-Herald, December 2, 1954.—The Defense Department announced yesterday that major naval elements assigned to the Far East command during the Korean War have been returned to control of the Pacific Fleet commander.
A spokesman said the shift is purely an administrative one and does not affect the strength or deployment of the western Pacific naval forces, including the powerful Seventh Fleet. He likened it to the withdrawal of five Army divisions from Korea after the armistice.
The Far East command, under Gen. John E. Hull, was expanded at the start of the Korean War with units from the Pacific Fleet commanded by Admiral Felix B. Stump. Stump’s headquarters at Pearl Harbor also commands all United States forces in the Pacific.
A spokesman said that “barring a war” the Korean navy along with United States elements remaining in the Far East command are able to handle the current situation around the Korean Peninsula.
The seventh Fleet will continue its role of protecting Formosa, the Chinese Nationalist stronghold, against any invasion attempt by the Chinese Reds.
Navy to Get First ’Copter Transport
Navy Times, December 4, 1954.—The Navy’s first assault helicopter transport will be fashioned at the Naval Shipyard here from the “jeep” carrier Thetis Bay. Work is scheduled to start on the multi-million dollar conversion next April, according to 12th Naval District Headquarters. The ship is destined for use by the Marine Corps in amphibious landing operations.
The ship was towed here early this month from Seattle and will be transferred to the San Francisco Group of the Pacific Reserve Fleet.
Ever since her arrival naval architects and engineers have been drawing plans and specifications for the alterations. The changes will involve removal of conventional topside aircraft landing gear, replacing two small elevators with a single large one to handle heavier loads, and construction of additional quarters for greatly enlarged troop facilities.
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Thetis Bay is of the Casablanca class, displaces 10,400 tons fully loaded, is 512 feet long, 108 foot beam, draws 19 feet, and carries a wartime complement of more than 800 men. The class carries 30 airplanes and has a rated speed of 20 knots.
Famed Yacht is Doomed
New York Times December 7, 1954.— The old royal yacht Victoria and Albert, once a symbol of regal splendor, covered her last sea mile today. Her final port of destination was a cluttered ship breaker’s yard near.
Breakers will salvage what they can of the 5,500-ton vessel, built in 1897 and the pride of Queen Victoria. The Admiralty, which has been keeping the Victoria and Albert afloat for many years at Portsmouth, warned the breakers against letting souvenir hunters get any of the bits. But there is not much left, because the finest of the furnishings have been transferred to the new royal yacht, Britannia, and to Buckingham Palace.
The Victoria and Albert, which once could cover 2,500 miles at 14 knots, was dragged on her last voyage by two tugs through stormy weather.
France Launches Submarine
New York Herald-Tribune, December 12, 1954.—The first submarine built for the French navy since World War II was launched today. It is the forty-fifth warship to slide down French ways since 1945.
The vessel was named Narval, after the first French submarine, built in 1899. It displaces 1,200 tons on the surface and has an average speed of 16 knots.
The French Navy now has thirteen submarines, compared with 101 in 1940. Five other vessels of the Narval type are under construction, along with four submarines of
4.0 tons each.
Baltic Seen Girded by Red Missile Bases
Washington Post and Times-Herald, December 13, 1954/—A Swedish periodical today reported that Russia has constructed a string of 18 launching bases along the Baltic Sea coast from which a murderous barrage of guided missiles could be directed against the West.
Industria, a usually well-informed trade and industrial magazine, published a map showing the bases lying from the Estonian captial of Tallinn southward to Riga and Kaliningrad and northward to Porkkala, a naval base outside Helsinki that Finland was forced to lease to Russia after World War II.
Each of the bases, Industria said, could theoretically spew 800 robot-controlled flying bombs an hour westward over the Baltic. It said the bases meant that “within 10 minutes Stockholm could be laid under the fire of robot projectiles and robot-borne atomic bombs.”
The magazine said development of guided missiles has expanded to become “Russia’s fourth fighting service” and is handled by a special organization in Moscow.
“The Russians are now reported to be able to dispatch one robot rocket every 90 seconds from each firing platform,” Industria said.
Merchant Marine Tonnage
Rivista Marillima, November, 1954.'—The Soviet merchant marine is now estimated at
3.500.0 tons, including coastal traffic.
In this figure are included 900,000 tons of vessels lend-leased by the United States during the war, and 400,000 received from Germany as reparations. In addition, there is probably a large tonnage salvaged by raising vessels sunk in Soviet waters during the war.
The present five-year plan calls for a merchant tonnage of 4 million DW tons by 1955 and 5 million by 1960.