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Mr. J. A. Lukacs.—I am obliged to endeavor correcting the impression left to your readers from the article about the aerial observations of Professor Lowe during the first part of the Civil War, written by Lt.-Col. H. S. Mazet, USMC. Colonel Mazet claims that the aerial feats of Professor Lowe “blazed a trail for their country.” It was a very curious trail. It led to nowhere, because the observations of the venerable Professor proved worthless in the long run, though sensational in the short run. There was the famous episode of the “Quaker Guns,” recorded by many military historians of the 1861-62 campaigns. In the autumn of 1861, after the miserable patrolling that followed Manassas, Professor Lowe noticed, and reported breathlessly formidable Southern artillery emplacements trained upon Alexandria and, perhaps even further. Somewhat later these great installations were “overrun,” and it was found that the “siege guns” were simply wooden logs, resting on embankments “constructed” by witty Southerners in order to fool the balloon Professor and his believers. In this they were quite successful.
The balloon episode is significant for two reasons. It was the first proof of the Principle that because one can see more from the air, this does not mean necessarily that one will see better from the air, a principle that aerial reconnaissance was to learn, Painfully, over and over again during the conflicts of this century. It was also part and parcel of our amateurish penchant for dazzling technical devices in time of war, a penchant that resulted in Professor Lowe’s balloons at a time when Pinkerton’s detectives were given the task to organize intelligence for the North. I think that Colonel Mazet may have overlooked these circumstances. Otherwise he would not rue the “considerable pressure” that, in 1863, finally led to the decision to do away with the “Aeronautics Corps.” It was a rather wise decision.
Leadership Among Junior Naval Officers
(See page 688, December, 1953, and page 1296, June, 1954, Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander J. L. Boyes, U. S. Navy.—-I view with increasing concern the repeated implications that a weakness in our Navy is the lack of leadership displayed by our junior officers. Two articles in the Proceedings of late tell of the decreased authority of chief petty officers and further rationalize that junior officers are in part to blame.
It appears that since the end of World War II an odd philosophy of finding fault has been developed and that as a result of this philosophy numerous articles have been written pointing the finger of recrimination at senior officers, junior officers, and petty officers. Occasionally, as if to prove by example, statements are made as to the high quality of leadership that existed in the services prior to World War II, contrasted to the mediocrity of our leadership today. I wonder about such erudite statements of this nature, for to accept them per se implies that these pre-World War II sires failed genetically to pass their leadership attributes to their young. To make-out the junior officer as the “GOAT” for the supposed lackings in the system today is most irresponsible and reflects on their progenitors.
The continuous harping about lost prestige, authority, and responsibility connotes a certain lack of courage and high leadership qualities in those that decry so vociferously. When a person notes that he is by-passed in the chain of command perhaps the person concerned either was not dependable, forceful or of sufficient courage to express his rights and responsibilities in the “CHAIN” or to ensure respect by example.
While the junior officer may be the middle link that holds the chain together, do not the top and bottom links hold fast the ship and anchor? Personally I greatly admire our junior officers. I know with proper guidance that they, as the heart of our Navy, do a wonderful job.
Would it not be more beneficial to our service for us to be more aware of our own responsibilities, up and down, in order that the young and inexperienced might profit! It might be well for all servicemen to dust off and review ‘Naval Leadership,’ and act accordingly in lieu of writing or speaking so much.
Officer Promotion
(See page 637, June, and page 761, July, 1954, Proceedings)
Commander W. A. Burgett, U. S. Navy. —The fine explanation of the present officer promotion system given by Commanders Wheeler and Kinney and published in the June and July, 1954, Naval Institute Proceedings is very informative. The officer promotion system is working well now because the large number of reserve and USN(T) officers on duty has absorbed most of the forced attrition. The system will damage officer morale tremendously and make the naval officer career even less attractive when the full force of the attrition planned in the promotion law of 1947 is felt by the regular officer.
It is time now to revise that system so that the traditional opportunity to continue on duty until eligible for retirement is extended to all officers who are fully qualified.
The following plan is designed to please the taxpayer (represented by Congress) by obtaining the maximum service of qualified personnel; to please the naval administration by maintaining the grade distribution and flow rate; to please the general public and the enlisted personnel by providing more opportunity for enlisted personnel to become commissioned officers; to please career officers by ensuring that all those fully qualified will remain on duty until eligible for retirement; and to minimize the harmful effects of forced attrition.
The plan requires the termination of the present warrant and limited duty officer categories and the creation of new warrant and limited duty categories. The new warrant would be a rank to which enlisted men in pay grade 6 or higher would be appointed. They would serve in this new warrant rank four years, corresponding to the commissioned officers four years of college, and be selected for ensign in the new limited duty category. About fifty percent of the ensigns in the Navy would be in this category. The ex-warrant would serve three years as Ensign (LDO) and three years as lieutenant (jg) (LDO) before appearing again for selection. At this point all lieutenant (jg)’s of limited and unlimited category in the promotion zone would be considered, those not qualified for promotion eliminated as at present and all those fully qualified for promotion selected and certified as eligible for promotion. After this selection is completed the required forced attrition would be computed and the number of officers who could not be promoted determined. The oldest officers in the combined grouping would then be notified of their ineligibility for promotion because of forced attrition. All officers who passed through the enlisted, warrant, and commissioned cycle would be guaranteed continuance on active duty until they had completed twenty years total service and would become eligible for retirement so that they would lose none of the security they had as petty officers. These officers will average nine years enlisted service, four years warrant service, and six years of commissioned service; therefore they could be retired very soon after such necessity is determined.
The same procedure would apply in the next selection from lieutenant to lieutenant-commander, and age would continue as the criteria for retirement of fully qualified personnel released because of forced attrition.
In higher grades the currently-used system of selecting the best qualified would continue.
This system would please the taxpayers as the maximum feasible service would be obtained from those trained at government expense. It would improve career officer morale by ensuring the fully qualified officer that he would not be arbitrarily eliminated for reasons beyond his control. It would be a big boost to public relations both within and outside the Navy as it increases the opportunities for enlisted personnel to earn a commission. It would satisfy the naval administration needs for eliminating unqualified officers and for maintaining the desired grade distribution and flow rate.
This longer period of apprenticeship would produce better limited duty officers—officers who would be qualified to perform more varied duties than the present LDO, and would be superior to the USN(T) officer who proved so capable during the war and post-war period.
The Loss of an American Q-Ship in World War II
(See page 533, May, 1953, Proceedings)
Captain John W. McElroy, U. S. Naval Reserve.—Lieutenant Smith’s interesting article on Q-ships brings to mind this tale of the sinking of an American Q-ship in World War II.
Volume I, page 283, of the History of Naval Operations in World War II briefly recounts the loss of the mystery ship U.S.S. Alik in these words:
“ . . . All three mystery ships, having the appearance of regularly commissioned armed vessels, sailed from New England ports on 23 March 1942. Once at sea they put on their various disguises, broke out false papers and painted new names, except that Eagle reverted ostensibly to her original character as trawler Wave.
Four days out, when cruising about 300 miles east of Norfolk, Atik (Lieutenant Commander Harry L. Hicks) was sunk in a battle with a U-boat. The weather was tempestuous, no trace of the ship was found, and neither Asterion who heard her distress signal a hundred miles away, nor any rescue vessel, encountered a single survivor. About ten days later Berlin triumphantly broadcasted that a Q-ship had been sent to the bottom by a U-boat “after a bitter battle with torpedoes and gunfire.” That is all we know about the fate of U.S.S. Atik and her complement. She went down fighting, and they gave all they had. . . .”
The mystery is solved by recent translation of extracts from the log of German submarine U-123. At 1703 on 26 March 1942, the U-123 sighted a 10 knot “merchant” ship smoking on the horizon on a steady course and closed for a surface attack. After sunset their target suddenly started steering zig-zag courses and some suspicion was aroused but soon allayed when her silhouette showed no armament. As soon as torpedoed on the portside forward, she apparently lost headway and broadcast an SOS with her original merchant ship radio call letters and position. As the submarine maneuvered to cross under her stern, the unsuspecting U- boat crew on deck watched the Atik’s “panic party” take to the boats. Suddenly the U- boat skipper noticed that the merchantman had also picked up steerage way and was coming around fast with hard right rudder. When the sub’s bearing was broad on her starboard beam, false bulwarks and painted tarpaulins dropped down, and the A tik opened fire with her 4-inch and 50-caliber machine gun batteries at 500 yards range. With bullets whistling around their heads and no chance to man their own guns, the tricked U- boat skipper ordered right full rudder, rang up flank speed, and the racing diesels made a lucky smoke screen as she hauled away out of range. Meanwhile depth charges thrown by the Atik Y-guns exploded so close aboard they feared to dive until the hull had been examined for leaks. None of the Atik’s four- inch shells hit, but a 50 caliber slug fatally wounded a German midshipman on the deck of the submarine. Two hours later the U-123 made a more cautious approach by periscope in moonlight and torpedoed the disabled Atik squarely in the engine room. When last seen the ship was down by the head and sinking fast. Heavy sub surface detonations followed, and neither survivors nor wreckage were found.
A Footnote to History
AdmiralH. E. Yarnell, USN (Retired). —During the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, the U.S.S. Oregon, under the command of Captain George F. F. Wilde, USN, ran aground during a fog in the Miaotao group of Islands west of Chefoo, on her way to Taku.
A Chinese cruiser, the Haichi, commanded by Captain Sah Chenping, which was in one of the secluded anchorages of the Islands, came and offered assistance.
The U.S.S. Yorktown, Commander E. D. Taussig, USN, was sent from Taku to help in the salvage, and shortly after her arrival a Russian cruiser also anchored nearby.
The Russian Commander called on Captain Wilde and, in the course of the conversation, stated that he was going to take over the Haichi. Prior to this time a number of Chinese torpedo boats, gunboats, and other vessels had been captured by the British, French, Russians, and Japanese as prizes of war. The Haichi would have been a rich haul, as she was a fast, new cruiser of about 4,000 tons.
Captain Wilde excused himself, left the cabin and sent a signal to the U.S.S. Yorktown to send a boarding party on board the Haichi immediately and hoist the American flag. He then returned to the cabin and engaged the Russian until he was informed that our flag was flying at the masthead of the Chinese cruiser. When told by Captain Wilde what had happened and that the Haichi was under American protection, the enraged Russian returned to his ship and sailed for Port Arthur.
The officer in charge of the boarding party was Ensign Arthur MacArthur who remained on the Haichi until the Oregon was refloated several days later. He then hauled down the flag, returned to the Yorktown, and Captain Sah sailed for parts unknown. His ship was never captured by any of the Allied nations.
Captain Sah was born at Foochow in 1858 and was graduated from the Naval Academy at Foochow and later from the Greenwich Naval College in England. He held many important positions, was Admiral of the Imperial Fleet in 1900, and was Minister of the Navy and concurrently acting Prime Minister in 1919-20.
After his retirement he returned to his native city where he interested himself in relief and charity work.
On the outbreak of the war with Japan in 1937, he went on a pilgrimage to Malaya and Java to raise funds for the Nationalist Government, and was living in Chungking in 1942.
The Admiral well deserves the title that has been given him: The Grand Old Man of China. He died two years ago at the age of ninety-four.
This event of 1900 is an interesting commentary on the traditional friendship which existed between the U. S. Navy and the preCommunist government of China.
The Caine Mutiny—Lessons in Leadership
Lieutenant Ray S. Ewing (SC), USN.— Although The Caine Mutiny will never be listed as a Navy textbook, it does seem certain that in the years to come it will continue to teach important lessons in leadership to many young officers.
Once denounced by many officers as an unwarranted, even scurrilous indictment of the Navy’s officer corps, this book is still being widely read in the Navy. It seems destined to have a permanent and important place in that body of good fiction which has grown up about the Navy and which never seems to grow old, though ships, equipment, techniques, and leaders supersede each other time and yet time again. The enormous public appeal of this book, an appeal which has carried it through numerous printed editions and movie, radio, and playhouse versions, lies in the fact that it so skillfully reveals the reactions of real people under great stress. As a portrayal of the hidden emotions and the latent weaknesses of military personnel under the combined pressures of wartime operations and poor leadership, this book contains important lessons that we can ill afford to ignore.
It is doubtful if any officer can read Caine Mutiny without making some comparisons between Herman Wouk’s characters and some of his own associates. While the foibles and frailties of Queeg, Keefer, Maryk, and others may seem to be over-drawn as related to their real-life counterparts as we know them; still, there can be no doubt but that these portraits so skillfully drawn by the author are prototypes. They are real people whom we all know, and the situations are ones to which we have all at some time been exposed. Who has not within two or three tours of duty encountered most if not all of the types of officers here so vividly described? Or has not witnessed a “tempest in the wardroom pantry”? While full-blown Queegs are certainly of infrequent occurrence in real life, some Willies, Keefers, and other Caine types can be readily identified in the wardroom of practically every ship of the Navy. Queegs to fully fit the author’s specifications are rare, yet certain of Captain Queeg’s less endearing attributes are, unfortunately, not so uncommon. Some of the weak points in Queeg’s psychological make-up and professional character are common to all of us.
Any officer reading this book is certain to engage in some degree of introspection and soul-searching to see if, in spite of precept and training, he is given to the use of mannerisms, attitudes, or policies which could result in lowered morale and efficiency in his command or organization. He will ask himself if he is unwittingly and unnecessarily causing frustration in individuals or groups of subordinate personnel, or generating resentment and lowered respect toward constituted authority and the necessary regulations of the service.
The main points in the characterization of Queeg in this novel read like a check-off list of don’ts for the Naval Officer. Change the “don’ts” to “do” and ask yourself:
Do I give unnecessary orders?
Do I give impractical or unenforceable orders?
Do I refuse or unduly restrict powers of discretion to my subordinates?
Do I ever act unfairly or permit prejudice in judging others?
Do I by speech or manner criticize my superiors?
Do I have objectionable mannerisms or attitudes incompatible with my status as an officer?
Do I lack courtesy and consideration in dealing with subordinates?
Do I get rattled when the pressure is on?
A final good question for all of us may well be:
“To what degree am I a Queeg?”
More on “How the Panay Was Sunk”
(See page 587, June, 1953, and page 573, May,
1954 Proceedings)
Commander Masatake Okumiya, Former Imperial Japanese Navy.—I wish to write once more about the Panay incident. I have read Captain Jarrell’s article with great interest, but have found therein one mistake and some misunderstandings.
Captain Jarrell wrote as follows: “At the time she was attacked Panay was anchored off Gross Island, 24 miles upstream from Nankin, not four miles as Commander Okumiya’s article implies.” This is not correct. I did not write in my previous article that her position was “four miles” from any place when she was attacked, but instead showed the position in the diagram (page 591, June, 1953, Proceedings) which indicated that her position was about 24 miles from Nanking.
Captain Jarrell also wrote as follows: “Twenty-one hours passed before any word was received regarding the fate of the ship. ... If the Japanese attack on the Panay was anything but premeditated, they were surprisingly slow in admitting their mistake.” This is a key point of the incident. Actually, this shows clearly that every Japanese naval officer concerned was unaware that the targets of our navy planes on December 12 were the Panay and other American vessels.
There is one further point that I wish to emphasize; the Army had no authority to issue orders to the Navy. Even if the Army had wished Navy planes to bomb certain targets, choice of Navy targets was a free action of the Navy commanders. The Army could give only information, not orders.
I am very happy for the opportunity to remove these misunderstandings and to increase mutual understanding between our two countries.