“WHAT ARE 3,000 NAVY MEN DOING IN NAPLES, ITALY?”
This question, in the big block letters of banner headlines, appeared in newspapers throughout the United States in the spring of 1953. Coming at a time when both the government and the military were exploring every possibility to achieve significant reductions in military spending, it seemed to be the discovery of a shocking waste of the taxpayer’s money.
The article pointed out that while the United States Navy maintained extensive sea operations in the Mediterranean area with the Sixth Fleet, such activities were without dependence upon any shore-based facilities in the area. Yet there had been observed what seemed to be an unusual number of men in the uniform of the U. S. Navy on the streets of Naples at a time when the fleet was not visiting that port. Questioning, it had been learned that some 3,000 men of the Navy were stationed in Naples, with their families. (There are also men and officers of the Army, Air Force, and Marines stationed there.) This, indeed, must be extravagance!
Less than a week after this “exposé” appeared, I received orders which, in effect, made me the 3,001 member of the U. S. Navy in Naples, Italy. Now this problem was concerning me on a much more personal level, and I began to wonder more vigorously about this apparent waste of men and money.
My assignment was to the Staff, Commander in Chief, Southern Forces Europe (CINCSOUTH), a unit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Before departing from the States I was able to learn very little that was specific about duty at this international command. But after only a brief period with the staff in Naples I realized the folly of budget-minded economizers who look to NATO as a sound source for reducing expenditures. For it is units of NATO that are developing the kind of international cooperation which is so very vital a deterrent to the expansion of the world’s tensions.
CINCSOUTH in Naples has representatives of six of the fourteen NATO nations. Serving together are officers and men (in NATO commands, rather than the term “enlisted men,” the title “other ranks” is used) from the United States, Italy, England, France, Turkey, and Greece.
The North Atlantic Treaty establishes for them as their first objective the determination of member governments
“ ... to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”
Just like any peacetime military organization, it might be thought that the present and immediate goal of NATO is training- developing the skills, preparing the plans, exploring the techniques, and investigating the problems of military operation. But added to the complexity of effectively employing the various types of military units of one country, NATO of course has the additional problems of integrating the various forces of different countries. The superficial aspects of these problems are being solved: the caliber of weapons, the procedures for communications, the tables of organizations, the systems of logistics, and such.
It is with a much greater and more fundamental problem that I am here concerned.
The success or failure of the most diminutive Navy vessel, the most limited Air Force flight, or the smallest Army or Marine patrol, is dependent upon understanding. Above and beyond the spoken order, the written instruction, or the indoctrinated reaction, every single man in a military unit, in order to insure achievement of the objective, must understand the people with whom he operates. It is a far bigger kind of understanding than merely recognizing the meaning of a given signal, knowing how to act in specific situations, or realizing the dependence of others upon each individual. It is an understanding of the characteristics, backgrounds, customs and traditions, abilities and limitations, and even the hopes and dreams and fears of the people with whom you work and live.
Incidents illustrating the need for understanding by Americans stationed abroad occur every day in Naples. The collecting of cigarette butts discarded by Americans at the entrance to headquarter offices, exchange buildings, and apartment houses is a big and serious business for elderly and often crippled Italian men and women. The tobacco is carefully salvaged and resold in the market squares. It is a depressing sight to see American servicemen make a game of intentionally throwing cigarettes into remote corners and then laughing and joking as the natives squirm to retrieve them.
Belligerent driving of the larger American cars, challenging the small Italian autos at an intersection, defiantly blowing the horn at pedestrians creates an indelible impression of barbarian U. S. behavior.
Overtly ridiculing the continual and traditional singing of the Neapolitan, ignoring such continental customs as tipping even though there is a “service charge,” and the overbearing treatment of Italians when employed as personal servants leaves a vivid picture of American mores.
Examples such as these are practically innumerable. But I can hear the seasoned world-traveler and the servicemen experienced in overseas assignments lightly dismiss such events as merely typical of incidents that occur all over the world, in countless variations, throughout the years. True as that summation is, it does not make such actions acceptable.
And, this time there is a significant difference as Americans take up their stations around the world. In Naples, as in other cities in which NATO forces are based, U. S. personnel are present as part of a team. Not as conquerors of an occupation, not as protectors from an advancing army, not as deterrents against a potential enemy—all in the interest of but one individual nation. Rather, we are now serving as members of an international military organization. Our actions, our words, our deeds reflect the character of America and measure the success of NATO.
As members serving in an international military organization—to be distinguished from the usual service of Americans on foreign soil as members of American military organizations—additional and unique problems arise—problems which demand even greater understanding on the part of the U. S. serviceman.
In Naples, a yeoman first class of the United States Navy works in the same office, doing very nearly the same work, as an equivalently-rated man from the Greek Army. Both are superior men in their assigned duties. The U. S. sailor speaks English and a little Italian. The Greek soldier speaks English, Italian, Greek, and Turkish. The U. S. sailor receives approximately $375 per month. The Greek soldier receives about $21 per month. For these two men to work together on similar jobs in the same office for such varied pay requires a high order of understanding. It is impossible for them to associate socially, even though this would be one of the very best ways of developing international understanding.
Usually, the mid-morning and mid-afternoon refresher breaks finds U. S. personnel in the international snack-bar enjoying coffee and doughnuts. The men from some of the other countries join their American friends occasionally, but they usually have only a glass of water.
There are frequent officer-courier trips to cities all over Europe. Actual transportation expenses are paid from NATO funds. Any per diem is paid from the regular funds of an officer’s own country, in the amount that the officer would normally receive for such duty in his own forces. Thus, a U. S. officer receives his nine dollars per day when on official trips, while, for example, the Turkish officer with whom he may be traveling receives no additional pay, since his country regards such trips as merely part of regular assignments. Here it takes supreme understanding as the two officers travel together, select a hotel, and consider a menu.
The contrast of manners in the NATO Officers’ Club between the flamboyant U. S. officers and the courtly officers from other countries leaves a profound imprint on the minds of our brothers-in-arms, and the critical eyes of the Italian waiters record the events for later review by their fellow Neapolitans.
Transportation is a difficult problem for men of other countries assigned to midwatches at the Naples headquarters. Most American personnel have their own car, or belong to a car-pool. Men from other countries very rarely own a car. Many public transportation facilities stop operating early in the evening. I have seen Italian soldiers arrive two and three hours early for a mid- night-to-eight watch, having come on the last public bus for the night. I have seen others arrive in a poor condition to stand an alert watch, having hiked three or more miles from their home to their duty station.
While there were great extremes during World War II in the technical development of the military units of various countries which are now NATO members, Italy was certainly considered to have a modern fighting force. Yet even for the Italians some of our operations today are extremely difficult to master. Communications, for example, includes involved networks, complex: procedures, and detailed techniques difficult, for the Italian—just like the men of most other countries—to grasp. Training is slow and laborious, and further complicated by language barriers. (English is the language most used by NATO in Naples, with Italian the second most used, although English and French are the official languages of NATO). Anxious to do a good job, the men of other countries often fail because their eagerness to succeed leads them to attempt duties beyond their knowledge and makes them reluctant to ask questions or to turn the job over to someone else. Too often the result is that, lacking in understanding, U. S. personnel usurp ever-expanding responsibilities and heavier workloads. This gets the job done— gets the messages delivered—but does nothing toward developing the international operation.
Possibly it is inevitable, but some officers and men who are grossly unsuited for assignments requiring that they work with men from other countries do get detailed to NATO commands. I think of the officer who was of exceptional ability in his highly technical specialty, whose duty it was to supervise an operational unit as well as to train officers from other countries in the techniques of his unit. This U. S. officer was extremely tactless and forward in expressing and demonstrating his contempt for all but Americans. Intelligent and responsible officers from other countries thus learned very little about the unit, and very much about this particular American’s “democratic” open-mindedness. Following the natural tendency to generalize about all Americans based upon the behavior of one, the resulting damage to NATO efforts by this one example of lack of understanding is beyond calculation.
Examples such as these well establish the need for understanding. But there are sources other than personal observation which emphasize the urgency for action.
Last year a small, paper-bound book was published in Naples, entitled, Letters To My Cousin Pasquale. It was written by a 32- year old Neapolitan who had lived in the United States for three years and who is now the foremost teacher of the Italian language to Americans stationed in Naples. The purpose of the book is stated in these words:
“Here Americans will read what their Italian hosts really think of them; they will learn how to create a good impression, and how to overcome some common misunderstandings.”
The implications in the wording of such an introduction are apparent. Then comes 160 pages of what some Americans stationed in Naples considered to be presumptuous and flippant reprimanding for their behavior. Yet the author of the book is learned and he is serious—but he also happens to be a keen and feeling observer. He records and comments on other incidents similar to those in this paper, and then writes in the last chapter:
“It is easy to understand that you Americans are surprised and shocked at many things that you observe here in Italy, because we have an old proverb that says: ‘The well-fed man cannot believe the hungry one.’ I mean to say that many ugly things would not exist if Italy had, I don’t say the riches of the United States, but even a small part of them.
“The difference in wealth leads to a different way of thinking. The individual born in a rich country feels he has a right to certain comforts that another in a poor country regards only as a luxury of the privileged few.”
When Americans work and live with Americans—or, for that matter, when men of any country work and live with the men of their own country—they had have years of intimate experiences which make understanding native and unconscious. But for men of different countries to work together productively and to live together concordantly, such understanding must be developed.
An international organization such as NATO has several different levels of operation, including ones that can be called diplomatic, political, command, policy, and the working level. Such levels are not strictly separable with different men handling different problems at different levels. Neither are these levels independent. The man at the working level who develops a new procedure for handling a message, for example, might very well be creating a proposal that requires acceptance on the policy level, implementation on the command level, and possibly even negotiation on the diplomatic level.
Through every one of these levels, permeating every action, there is no more basic requirement for success than understanding. While it would be invalid to proclaim that any one level is more important than another, it is true that if understanding does not exist on the working level, success at the other levels is almost completely nullified.
It is on the working level—-with the men who type the documents, distribute the mail, operate the communications, drive the vehicles, guard the security—that the unnumbered little jobs are performed which ultimately determine the success of the big operation. It is the officers and men of the working level, whose actions reveal their degree of understanding of their co-workers from other countries, who hold in their hands the success or failure of NATO.
No American in another country is beyond the evaluating eyes of the people of that country. And just like Americans, people the world around generalize their concepts of our entire country from the impressions created by a few. In Naples, U. S. service personnel driving American cars that appear twice as large as Italian cars, enjoying exclusive shopping at their own commissary and exchanges, requiring housing comparable to that of the richest of Europeans, patronizing the most exclusive shops, restaurants, hotels and clubs, dressing with fashion and variety unknown to the average Italian, create the impression of rich, snooty, unapproachable bonvivants. The lowest rated man and the most senior ranked officer are continually being appraised by the indigenous people.
President Eisenhower has expressed this problem:
“Americans are considered immature diplomatically, impulsive, too proud of their strength, ready to fight, wanting war.
“He [the American] is considered rude, even his deportment is not admired because of unfortunate incidents on the part of individuals. These friendships I speak of, my friends, are so vital to us that no American, no matter how exalted or how lowly may be his station, can afford to ignore them.
“Each of us, whether bearing a commission from his government or traveling by himself for pleasure or for business, is a representative of the United States of America, and he must try to portray America as he believes it to be.”
So, understanding is needed. How is it to be developed? How are the men and officers of the United States Armed Forces serving with international commands to develop an understanding of the people of the country in which they serve?
Establish a “School for Understanding.”
Teach the men of the services, and the officers too, the characteristics of the people of the country in which they are about to spend two or more years. Require them to learn a basic vocabulary for conversation. Guide them to appreciate the differences and the similarities between life in the new country and their life at home. Expose them to the cultures, mores, experiences, businesses, religions, history, and the thinking of the country. Give American servicemen the opportunity to be really effective ambassadors of goodwill.
Let us consider how such a course of study might be organized.
When any member of our military arrives in a city in another country for duty, he should be required to enroll in a special school, administered by U. S. personnel, but staffed primarily by people of the country, and having an educational objective which might be stated as:
“To develop an understanding of the people of the country in which you are now serving, in order to help you to work effectively with the military and to live harmoniously with the civilians.”
Consider some of the ramifications of such a school.
First, an established degree of proficiency in the basic conversational language of the country should be required.
NATO commands have recognized the desirability of Americans learning the language of the country in which they are serving. In Naples, for example, language classes are conducted frequently and time off from duties is granted for attendance at those classes scheduled during working hours. But enrollment is not mandatory. Most men begin their tour of duty eager to learn the language, but as they become more valuable in their assigned duties it becomes a greater hardship to take the time for classes.
Frequent presentations by guest speakers who are prominent in local affairs would not only serve the educational objective but also build cooperation between the men and the officers, the command, and the community.
The value of field trips, organized as a part of an official course, is in the unique opportunity to bring the serviceman to the key centers of the area’s characteristics. There is no better way to learn of the social, cultural, industrial, educational, and governmental aspects of a community, and such knowledge is vital to understanding the people.
Motion pictures should be viewed. U. S. productions designed to acquaint Americans with the country should be shown, together with similar films produced by the country itself to educate its own people about Americans. Representative entertainment films, radio and television programs, magazines and newspapers of the country should be examined in translation.
A course of study such as this would do much toward developing an understanding of the people of the various nations with whom we have joined in mutual interests. Such understanding will serve NATO objectives, as well as those of the United States.
Lack of understanding is the fundamental problem of NATO commands, and education is the solution of that problem.
On December 14, 1951, Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN, then CINCSOUTH, raised the official flag of the Allied Forces Southern Europe at his headquarters in Naples. The gold and carmine flag bears the symbol of the “Lion of St. Mark”—a traditional view of a lion holding a sword in one forepaw and an open book representing the Bible and labelled “peace.” This same insignia is also worn by every man and officer in the command as a shoulder patch or as a medal on the breast pocket. At the flag-raising ceremony Admiral Carney spoke of the appropriateness of the insignia, saying:
“We here of Allied Forces, Southern Europe also offer the book of peace. But we have power and will use force to insure that that peace is preserved.
“The Lion of St. Mark will signify to all that we are ready to carry out the principle of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Let us hope that we will be further united under the Allied Forces Southern Europe insignia, for only through teamwork will we be able to carry out our assigned tasks.”
That teamwork demands understanding— an understanding of the peoples with whom we must work and live. Such understanding comes through education.
I think that the case of the Italian bread summarizes most accurately the development of understanding by an American in another country, confronting that which is different, reacting with undesirable behavior, seeking a solution—and then education takes effect and the problem is solved.
Almost everyone stationed in Naples spends weeks solving the problem of trying to get a suitable American type of bread. The commissary frequently displays and even asks for a vote on the product of some new baker who believes his version is what these Americans desire. It’s terrible! Friends make progress reports to each other as their local bakery shop attempts to produce an American loaf of bread. None are satisfactory. You shop all over the city in tiny bakeries with large signs proclaiming “REAL AMERICAN BREAD FOR SALE.” It’s worse than terrible! Every Neapolitan version is too hard or too soft, too dry or too damp, overcooked or doughy, crumbles, breaks, and molds. You begin to make disparaging remarks to the bakers, you complain to your maid, you let your Italian friends know that they just can’t do anything right—not even a simple thing like baking bread!
Finally—and for most Americans this revelation somehow always seems to occur just about the fourth month of duty in Naples—you suddenly realize it is a futile search. You’ll never find good American bread in Naples. So, one day, just for a change, you try a loaf of Italian bread. And then comes the dawn—education has acted— and you make a discovery, just as though you were the very first person to ever make this discovery. The Italians make very, very good Italian bread! With a little ingenuity you can use it almost like American bread- even for sandwiches, too. And buying Italian bread in an old-fashioned, hole-in-the-wall, but a spotlessly clean Italian bakery shop makes you feel so very continental and so much at home in the country!
Directed and organized education is all that is needed to help Americans to understand the people of the countries around the world in which they must serve. But the education must be specifically planned, not the trial-and-error method used for finding bread in Italy.
And a little more education may even reduce the number of scare headlines such as the one questioning the assignment of Navy personnel to Naples, Italy.