This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Lieutenant P. W. Rairden, Jr., U.S.N.— ^very experienced mine warfare officer must lave read this article with pleasure. We, who ave been involved with the sweeps in Korea ar>d elsewhere, have long been preaching the growing importance of mine warfare.
The article, however, does contain one small error which will cause howls of anguish ((r°m veterans of Mine Squadron Three. The work horses of the mine fleet” were the Wooden hulled AMS type sweepers and the MSB’s. The AM types were not the effective sweepers. They were too big; their magnetic, acoustic and pressure signatures were too great. While the losses of USS Pirate and USS Pledge at Wonsan on 12 October 1950, sPot-lighted their participation in that operation, AM’s did not carry the load that the smaller AMS’s did. The new construction AM’s are a different story, but they have not yet been tried in action.
The French Navy under Steam
(See page 793, July, 1954, Proceedings)
Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, U. S. Navy (Ret.)—One interesting fact about the French Navy in the nineteenth century, at least for Americans, was omitted from this article. That was the purchase and incorporation into the French Navy of the Dunderberg, the largest ironclad warship designed and built in a Northern shipyard during the Civil War. This unique ship, together with the double-turreted monitor Onondaga, was purchased in July 1867 and, under the significantly American name Rochambeau, took part in the Franco- Prussian War and remained a part of the French Navy for many years.
The Dunderberg, described as an “oceangoing iron-clad frigate ram” was a radical departure from Ericsson’s turret monitor type. She had features more like the Merri- mac and New Ironsides. She was 380 feet long, had 72-foot beam and a displacement of 7,000 tons. The two cylinders of her engine were 100 inches in diameter and had 45-inch strokes. The engine developed 5,000 horsepower to drive the ship at 13 knots. Like the monitors, this ship had a wooden hull, but her timbers were extra heavy to support the enormous fifty-foot ram. She had such features of modern construction as double bottoms and transverse longitudinal bulkheads to the main deck. Engine and boiler spaces were enclosed in watertight compartments. She was designed for ten guns mounted in a large casemate on the main deck. In the French Navy the crew numbered five hundred.
Construction of the Dunberberg was slow due to these advanced and unusual features. Laid down in 1862, she was launched in July 1865, and her trials were not completed until 1867. By this time the U. S. Navy did not want her, and she was restored to the builder. Several countries, including Chile, Peru, and Prussia, immediately made offers to purchase. Not to be outdone by Bismarck, the French Emperor, Napoleon III, directed his consul general in New York to procure the vessel which was done, and the Dunderberg sailed for Le Havre in July 1867. The Monitor went sometime later.
Our Navy’s Future
Commander William J. Ruhe, U.S.N.— “We don’t think there is any future for the Navy—so we might as well pull clear now.”
Young officers frequently give this reason in their exit interviews when they resign from the service. It shows, apparently, that a vacuum of information on the future mission of the Navy exists. Yet it is fundamental that if the men of the Navy are to continue their inspired work, they must believe that what they are doing, today, is contributing towards a vital role in future warfare—not towards a lost cause.
Secretary Smith’s article on the “Mobile Sea Base Systems in Nuclear Warfare,” however, goes a long way towards providing an answer to the strongly asserted insistence that . . . “the mission of the Navy is even greater in the atomic age” . . . (from the speech by Secretary Thomas at the launching of the Forrestal). Evidently more visionary interpretations like Secretary Smith’s are, and will be, necessary to convince our young officers of their assured future.
The explanation of the “Mobile Sea Base in Nuclear Warfare” helps answer, “Why spend hundreds of millions of the taxpayer’s dollars on giant carriers.” Little material, to date, has appeared, to justify the Navy’s stand in demanding that more giant carriers be built. “They ought to know what they are doing, because they’ve been in business for a long time” is the sort of blind faith that has sustained our loyal pro-Navy civilian population who have wondered about the often termed “undue extravagance” in building these carriers.
The carrier striking force, as envisioned, might, however, be far stronger if it substituted battleships for the guided missile cruisers and high speed supply ships. (This, from a noncontemporary of the old battleship exponents.) It is fundamentally a problem of logistics. Battleships would provide their own logistic supply of rockets, guided missiles, shells and fuel and be self sustaining during the entire thirty days of war operations, pictured as necessary. They would answer the dual role of being extremely effective in a non-atomic war, or limited action, and would have better all-round characteristics of sea-worthiness. Battleships could also sustain far greater damage from enemy counter-blows. Considering their advantages, the battleships should be moving out of the moth ball fleet—not into it. .
If it is felt that the intercontinental, geographic-seeking atomic missiles, V2 variety, are a real threat, then any air base, fixed as to geographic location, is a dead duck. But, a “mobile base” is literally immune to this type of weapon. In addition, the carrier striking force provides an expanding and contracting fluid defense more difficult to penetrate.
Of course, this concept of the carrier striking force appears to be only an interim measure—to those who are submarine minded. Nuclear-powered submarines of high submerged speed should be able to provide the necessary air protection for a high speed surface carrier, through use of guided missiles. (In time the carrier also would have to submerge.) Logistically, they’d require only a resupply of missiles—■ from nuclear submarine supply ships. The submarine is far safer from atomic attack. It can use the ocean as a cushion from blast in in any direction, and is far more difficult to detect and to home on.
There are so many advantages gained by going beneath the surface of the water that it might be safe to predict that the Navy, will, in time, be converted mainly to sub- mersibles.
It’s purely a matter of density of mediums.
It’s like hunting buffalo out on a prairie, compared to hunting cotton-tails in a briar patch. The prairie is a wide open space where nothing can really hide. Detection and destruction by high powered weapons can be effected from a great distance. If the buffalo charged the hunters in vast numbers they might destroy the hunters by overwhelming them. But, in a short time they would become extinct because they are at such a disadvantage. A briar patch (the ocean) is another thing. You can be a few feet from a cotton-tail and never know he’s there. And as to shooting a cotton-tail who’s dived into a briar patch, well—most hunters give up at that point. But, supposing the cotton-tail could toss a bomb out at the hunter? How many hunters would even get close to the briar patch?
. . . “As a matter of- fact, the advent of the atom, the jet, and the missile have increased, not decreased the importance of sea power” . . . (from the speech by Secretary Thomas at the Forrestal’s launching). There certainly is no denying this if we
think in terms of a Navy fully utilizing the Protection offered by going beneath the seas.
Quo Vadis Nauticus?
(See pages 637 and 761, June and July, 1954, Proceedings)
Captain John B. Taylor, USN—A ^ent issue of Fortune discusses the question:
How much is an executive worth?” While no single simple answer is proposed, it ap- j)ears that promotion, pay and fringe bene- lls are sometimes viewed as interrelated components of a single problem. Supply and c emand is a factor, likewise diminishing
returns.
The promotion of career officers in the t'avy has been lucidly explained by Commanders Wheeler and Kinney in eight housand words, but pay and fringe benefits "ere not discussed. Is it possible to divorce Promotion from compensation? Is there any correlation between promotion of executives tft business and promotion of Naval Officers? Hoes the system described in the Proceed- !Ngs accomplish its stated objectives? Is it responsive to supply and demand? To diminishing returns? Is it analogous to the selection and promotion of executives in business? Could the Navy use business methods to advantage in this area? Would business assume that vice-presidents are beyond lhe scope of a plan which might be appropriate for categories larger in numbers but lesser in responsibilities? Would such an assumption apply to flag officers?
Suppose that all of the officers and warrant officers below flag rank were equally divided among four grades, and all of the enlisted Persons equally divided among four other Shades, a total of eight; the lowest jf\, the highest #8. Why should there be fewer grades? Why should we abandon pyramidal distribution? Are promotion systems in business simpler than ours? If so, is there a reason for this? Does the complexity of our promotion system serve a useful purpose? Does it enhance management? Or is it a fringe benefit in disguise? Does the complexity of emoluments nullify frequent promotion as reward, incentive or motivation? Are authority and responsibility really inherent in the signal number? Or are they peculiar to the position which the individual occupies? Would a simpler promotion system cope with supply and demand? With diminishing returns?
Suppose that stipends were derived from two sources: wages (earned) and allowances (unearned). Suppose that wages were the sum of two factors: responsibility and retainer. The responsibility factor would be for active service actually performed, the grade number times $50 (or a reasonable figure) per month. Special incentives such as hazard or bonus would be added. The retainer factor would be the same for everyone on active duty, fleet reserve or retired list: the number of months creditable active service actually completed times $2 (or a reasonable figure) per month, adjusted annually for changes in the purchasing power of the dollar. Since allowances are not wages they would not be charged to the wages account. They would be adjusted for cost of living, but not for rank. Travel, dislocation, ration, housing, clothing and other allowances would be current local average costs from authoritative sources (Department of Agriculture, Labor, or other). If allowances are in lieu of services in kind, they will provide the stipulated service (neither more nor less) at the time and place it is due.
Significant changes have occurred in recent years in the personnel management patterns of business and government. Without abandoning tested procedures which have been steadily improved over the years, the Armed Forces might examine critically, evaluate and perhaps test some of the newer practices employed in business. It may be that the need for personnel stability in business is analogous to the Navy’s need in this area; it may be that factors which induce personnel stability in business could be employed to advantage in the Navy.
★