When World War I broke out, Germany had a powerful, well-trained navy, about two-thirds as strong as the British Navy. German ships fought well, the fleet suffered comparatively minor losses only, and yet it met a dismal end at Scapa Flow. When, in June, 1919, we scuttled our ships there, we understood but dimly that Anglo-American sea power had strangled continental Germany. In postwar years the German Navy, through intensive study, came to realize the reasons for its failure, but unfortunately, the knowledge gained by this analysis remained restricted to the navy. In 1939 Germany again went to war against a coalition possessing strong sea power, and again she suffered defeat, but a defeat far more disastrous than in World War I. Yet even nowadays, when her chancellor has drawn the conclusions from the disasters of the recent past, his attempts at coming to an understanding with a western world supported by the triphibian power of the United States of America are strenuously opposed by the continental mind, which is not able to grasp the full possibilities of the sea. This is hardly surprising in a country which has been the battle-ground of Europe for centuries. As a consequence, land-military considerations have always been predominant; even naval strategy has been greatly influenced by them.
Development of German Naval Strategy up to 1914
Towards the end of the 19th century when the German Navy was small and France the most likely opponent, strategic plans were bold and provided for a close cooperation with the army by operations such as a landing in Normandy or a blockade of Brest. In the years after 1900, no attempt seems to have been made to coordinate political, naval, and military thinking. Count Schlieffen, after the older Moltke the most famous Chief of the German General Staff, occupied himself with the problem of the British sea power and came to the conclusion that in the case of a rapid campaign into France the British fleet would not be dangerous for Germany. He was, however, fearful of its growing influence in a prolonged struggle. Confronted with a war on two fronts (France and Russia), all his plans aimed at quickly finishing off one of the adversaries. Shortly before his death in January, 1912, he said to some staff officers:
“Never forget: All Germany must throw itself at one adversary, at him who is the strongest, most dangerous, and most powerful. This can only be England-France.”
Schlieffen’s warning was not heeded, and naval strategic thinking followed other lines. During the large expansion of the German Navy after 1900, the rapid progress, tactical, and technical development absorbed the best brains of the navy to such an extent that the evolution of strategy lagged behind. A strong “High Seas Fleet” was built and brought to perfection in personnel and materiel but no strategic bases were secured on the high seas. The fleet trained almost exclusively in the southeast corner of the North Sea and the Baltic; ocean cruises were few and far between.
Strategy in 1914
Thus it happened that the German army and navy entered the war with diametrically opposite strategies. With a bold offensive based on the daring Schlieffen Plan, the army almost succeeded in crushing the French armies and the British Expeditionary Forces in a few weeks, an achievement which would have enabled German land forces to concentrate on the slower-moving Russians.
On the other hand, the plans of the navy were purely defensive. It was taken for granted that the British would have to attack or closely blockade the German naval forces acting as a strong “fleet in being.” It was hoped that a battle in the German Bight of the North Sea would cause the British far greater losses than the Germans owing to better material and training and nearness to German bases. This was to bring about a Kräfteausgleich, an equalization of forces, and would enable the German navy to undertake more aggressive operations at a later date.
In this planning the German Navy Staff did not take into account the fact that no vital British sea communications passed anywhere near Heligoland Bight, and that by inactively staying in the innermost corner of the North Sea, the German navy played into the hands of the enemy. The German armies lost the great gamble for the whole of France by a narrow margin. There is ample evidence that a thrust by the High Seas Fleet in the direction of the English Channel or the English east coast would have retarded the British military transports to France if that move had been made early in the war. In this way the German navy could have exercised influence upon the great land battles of France and might have turned the tables, besides drawing Britain’s Grand Fleet to the southern and perhaps southeastern North Sea, thereby bringing about a naval battle. True, the British were superior in capital ships, 24 to 16, but the German Fleet was tactically more flexible and better trained in night fighting.
The susceptibility of the British to that kind of threat was repeatedly shown later on. In the first two months of the war, however, not “all Germany” was thrown against France-England, because the High Seas Fleet waited in vain for the enemy to take the initiative. In this way a great chance was lost of eliminating France and of coming to grips with the Grand Fleet under favorable circumstances.
Groping for a new Strategy (October, 1914 to January, 1916)
When in the fall of 1914, the war in France bogged down in the trenches from Flanders to the Swiss frontier, the situation of Germany became precarious. The strength of the army was just sufficient to hold the extended fronts in the East and in the West, but it was doubtful if enough forces could be concentrated to put one of the adversaries out of action. The navy, by its very existence, safeguarded the western and central Baltic and the vital ore traffic from Sweden. It could, however, neither reopen the German trade routes to countries outside northern Europe nor cut off Great Britain from her overseas supplies. The few German cruisers outside home waters were hunted down in some months. Commerce raiders were quite successful later on, but did not constitute more than a nuisance to British communications at any time.
There remained the submarines, which had proved successful beyond expectation but which were greatly hampered when they had to use the normal methods of stopping and searching merchant ships. In 1915 an attempt was made at unrestricted submarine warfare. Although there were only a few boats, they were distinctly successful from the military point of view. The unrestricted tactics soon had to be abandoned, however, owing to political difficulties with the neutrals.
The Grand Fleet, by its distant blockade of the North Sea from Scapa Flow and Rosyth, with auxiliary cruisers patrolling the Iceland passages, was in an ideal position to intercept any German attempt to reach the Atlantic with surface vessels. Even if a task force should have succeeded in slipping through, its position was hopeless because it did not have a single base where it could coal. Consequently, there was no need for the British Fleet ever to come south for giving battle. Yet the next German step was an attempt to bring about just that.
Admiral Scheer’s Strategy (1916)
Admiral Scheer took over as Commander- in-Chief of the High Seas Fleet in January, 1916. His plan, which had been approved by the Supreme Command, was to draw the Grand Fleet in the direction of the German bases by bombarding English coastal towns and raids under coastal waters. To make up for the British superiority in numbers, he planned to operate only with a large number of submarines in the areas the British Fleet had to pass, and with airship reconnaissance to protect him against surprise encounters with superior forces. He was resolved to accept battle as soon as the circumstances were to his liking. He was convinced that the better gunnery and night training of his fleet would make up for inferior numbers.
There followed a period of great activity in the North Sea; the Grand Fleet actually took up the challenge and came south on several occasions. The two fleets were simultaneously at sea five times, from mid-March to mid-August, 1916, but chance prevented actual contact with the exception of the Battle of Jutland. This action was fought under less favorable circumstances than Scheer had planned for. Bad weather upset his timetable; he could start only when his submarines were about to leave their waiting positions; scouting by airships was ineffective owing to bad visibility; the night attack for which the German destroyers had trained for many years did not come off; and the German battle fleet had to hack its way through the British destroyer flotillas. Yet the battle proved Scheer’s point, for the Grand Fleet lost more ships and men than the Germans. There was, however, no strategical gain for the war against England. On the other hand, any British attempt at opening the Baltic for sending supplies to Russia was ruled out, and the Russian revolution and breakdown in 1917 was the consequence.
Submarine War (1917/18)
Since the war of attrition initiated by Scheer would take far too long for a Germany suffering heavily under the British blockade, unrestricted submarine war was the only means to get at the vital British sea communications. But too much time had already been lost; British losses mounting to a dangerous, but not to a mortal level, were offset by the United States entry into the war.
Owing to improved enemy mining, the German High Seas Fleet was now kept increasingly busy with holding channels open for the U-boats leaving and returning; although raids with light forces continued, the German battle fleet undertook only one more major operation. In April, 1918, it proceeded farther north than ever before (to the latitude of Bergen in western Norway) in order to intercept a convoy with its covering force (which might have been the U.S. Battle Squadron operating with the Grand Fleet). The timing was faulty, however; on a perfect day with unusual visibility, we sighted the snow-clad mountains of Norway, but not a single vessel. After a few months, at the end of October, 1918, rumors of preparations for an operation into the southwestern North Sea to support the heavily-pressed army in Flanders released the dark forces of mutiny and revolution. Scapa Flow saw the end of a fleet whose efforts had been frustrated by a mistaken strategical conception.
The Situation After 1920
Under the Versailles Treaty, Germany was allowed to keep in service six obsolete pre-Dreadnought battleships, six very light cruisers built around 1900, 24 old torpedo- boats, fully or partly coal-burning, a few minesweepers and tenders, but no submarines, no aircraft. Replacements were to have the following tonnage:
so-called BB’s |
10,000 standard tons |
CL’s |
6,000 standard tons |
12 DD’s |
800 standard tons |
12 torpedoboats |
200 standard tons |
This meant that the German Navy was a cripple at best. Moreover, funds were so low in the first years after the war that hardly any new construction could be undertaken, although all the vessels of the fleet were overripe for replacement.
The Treaty of Versailles probably created more problems than it solved, and one of those new problems was the Polish Corridor. The existence of that unnatural boundary meant that the day would come when Poland and Germany would have a showdown. French foreign policy supported Poland; both France and Russia opposed Germany; and by the mid-thirties any far-sighted student of European power politics would have foreseen a combination of Poland-France and Russia opposing Germany.
Evolution of Strategical Thought
Germany alone could not hope to defend herself against such a combination. Therefore, she had to look for allies; in order to make the idea of an alliance attractive to others, everything was done to bring the Armed Forces to a high pitch of efficiency in spite of the treaty limitations. Good leadership and good planning were considered paramount, and much was done by lectures, war games, and strategical maneuvers to foster these qualities and to keep the naval officers mentally alert.
A treatise written by Admiral Wegener on Naval Strategy during the World War was particularly suited to induce strategical thinking, and it was widely read and discussed. It gave an excellent picture of the mistakes and possibilities of the naval war; furthermore it pointed out the changes which the possession of bases in Denmark and Norway would have made for German naval operations. From that time on the German Navy was Norway-conscious (if that expression may be used) and fully realized the implications of that area being neutral, or in enemy, or in German hands.
Coastal Navy versus Sea-Going Navy
Nevertheless, there was some danger that owing to the smallness of the fleet, the lack of submarines and aircraft, battleships and carriers, the German Navy would relapse into purely coastal thinking. The critical time came when at last there was money to replace the venerable old battleships by ships of 10,000 tons. At first, the only practical solution seemed to be the construction of a kind of large monitor, slow, with heavy armor and 11-inch guns, to be used defensively in the German Bight and the Baltic entrances and perhaps offensively in Danzig Bight.
Against strong resistance, Admiral Zenker (at Jutland he was in command of BC Von der Tann; also Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, 1924-28) made the bold decision for an entirely new type, a diesel-driven vessel with a speed of 26 knots, six 11-inch guns, and light armor, well suited for the high seas, faster than almost any heavier ship in existence, more heavily armed than any faster vessel, with a cruising range vastly exceeding that of any cruiser or capital ship. These “pocket battleships,” officially called armored ships, were to be used in the Atlantic with the intention of compelling the French to employ the bulk of their fleet for escorting their merchant shipping. In this way, the German Navy Staff hoped to keep the route north of Scotland free for Germany’s own vital supplies.
In addition, these vessels fitted in with the idea of “Bündnisfähigkeit” appearing again and again in the reflections and memoranda of the period between the wars; that is, of making the German Fleet strong enough, in spite of all their restrictions, as to be a valuable contribution to any alliance that Germany might enter. The political situation might change quickly; therefore, it was the aim of the naval leaders to create a fleet as well balanced as circumstances would permit and not a fleet for a special emergency which might never arise.
The Attitude Towards Great Britain
One thing was clear to the German Navy all the time between the wars up to 1938: A conflict with Great Britain was ruled out. The 1914-18 war with Britain was considered by every naval officer a tragic mistake which should never be repeated lest the consequences become far more terrible to either side. Therefore, it was strictly forbidden to play with this kind of fire even in war games. The naval treaty, concluded with Great Britain in 1935, showed the same trend of thought. In naval circles, it was taken seriously and welcomed as a step towards a mutual understanding and regularizing relations. We did not in the least suspect how little Hitler intended to respect treaties. The acceptance of 35% of British overall strength seemed the best proof, particularly in the light of the geographical situation, that Germany did not harbor any aggressive intentions. The policy of building a well- balanced fleet was pursued, but submarine construction was not accelerated despite the treaty provision allowing Germany to construct 45% of the British strength in that arm, and after due notification, 100%.
The surface ships were of conventional types, the first battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau of 26,000 tons and with nine 11-inch guns, being smaller and more lightly armed than all their contemporaries. With a view to getting better cruising ranges, many officers would have liked diesel- driven BB’s and CA’s. Diesel engines for giving 20,000-ton ships a speed of 30 knots were in the experimental stage. Their adaptation, however, would have retarded the first BB’s by about a year. Therefore, the navy switched temporarily to superheated steam of very high pressure for BB’s, CA’s, and DD’s. The designers had been a bit too optimistic, and the new boilers and auxiliary engines caused considerable trouble at first. The range especially of the CA’s fell far short of expectations, which is probably the main reason for their indifferent performance in Atlantic warfare.
Hitler Sees War with Great Britain
At the end of May, 1938, in a discussion about the political situation, Hitler for the first time told Grand Admiral Raeder that he expected Great Britain to join Germany’s adversaries. He directed the Admiral to speed up the construction of the two BB’s (Tirpitz and Bismarck) under construction at that time, and to make preparations for quickly reaching submarine parity with Great Britain. But a committee for making recommendations for an increased shipbuilding program was not formed until September, 1938. Only then, steps for a reappraisal of the strategic situation were taken. They resulted in the Z-plan of spring 1939.
The Strategy of the Z-Plan
The strategical idea underlying the Z- plan was offensive to the utmost. The German Navy was to operate on the high seas against enemy shipping—including, probably, Britain. To compensate for the lack of bases, the new vessels were to have superior sea-keeping qualities. The enemy, furthermore, was to be compelled to disperse his own forces and so to lay himself open to attack. This was to be brought about in the following way:
Submarines and raider forces (consisting of CA’s, CL’s, and armored ships of the old and of an improved type; in a later plan replaced by battle cruisers) were to operate on the shipping routes singly or in small groups.
Two attack forces, each of three BB’s, one CV, with cruisers and DD’s, were to destroy enemy covering forces. The BB’s were to be of 50,000 to 54,000 tons, with eight 16-inch guns, exclusively diesel-powered, with a speed of 30 knots and a cruising range of 16,000 miles at 19 knots.
The design of the improved armored ships had a rather checkered history. At first, they were to be of 20,000 tons, diesel-powered, with a speed of at least 30 knots and a main battery of 12-inch guns. Then, a sanguine soul found out that with a propulsion two- thirds diesel, one-third steam, the vessels could be some thousand tons smaller and yet keep the same qualities. When this project was calculated seriously, it was found that the vessels would displace 26,000 tons at least. Then a gunnery enthusiast succeeded in persuading everybody concerned to give the vessels 15-inch guns, with the result that the final design just before the war was of 29,300 tons, with six 15-inch guns, mixed propulsion, a speed of 33.5 knots and a cruising range of 14,000 miles at 19 knots. They were now to be termed battlecruisers.
Of the 20,000-ton ships, six (later 12) appeared in the plans; of the BC’s only three. The former would appear to be more in accord with the overall strategical conception which would have put the British Fleet up against a formidable task. In the light of hindsight, the German attack forces were too weak in carriers; this defect might have been remedied with more experience. There is no doubt that good diesel-powered carriers could have been designed.
The Situation at the Outbreak of the War
When war came in September, 1939, most of the vessels for the aggressive strategy described above existed only on paper. Current construction had been speeded up to some extent, but on the whole, the German Navy had to face a situation which it considered politically disastrous and for which its strength was entirely inadequate, as the following list shows:
|
Great Britain |
France |
Germany |
BB |
15 |
7 |
2 |
CV |
6 |
1 |
0 |
CA and CL |
64 |
19 |
11 (incl. armored ships) |
DD |
183 |
72 |
34 |
SS |
57 |
78 |
57 (but only 22 ocean-going) |
Moreover, the British and French navies had far more vessels of all classes under construction than the Germans. Geographically, the situation was much the same as in 1914-18, only the development of aircraft made it easier for Great Britain to patrol the routes past Iceland to the Atlantic. On the other hand, Russia was a friendly neutral, and Japan was ready to give some support to German ships.
Strategy of Naval War Staff
It was not surprising that with such an inferiority and in such an unfavorable position the concept of attacking the British at sea was considered in some quarters as rather hopeless, and a strictly defensive attitude was advocated. In view of the experience of World War I, the Commander-in-Chief Navy and his advisers were absolutely positive about one thing: Whatever the odds might be, however difficult the situation, they had not the slightest intention of having their fleet milling around Heligoland and playing at “Fleet-in-Being” in a remote and strategically uninteresting corner of the North Sea.
They knew only too well how difficult it would be to secure command of the sea even temporarily with their meager forces, be it for safeguarding the German sea routes or for intercepting enemy shipping.
The protection of the German sea traffic had to be restricted to the Baltic and, rather insecurely, to the Skagerrak and Kattegat. Little anxiety was felt for the Baltic. Its entrances were secured by mines and nets at their southern exits. A British attack in force would be so costly in view of the German superiority in the air that it was considered as unlikely. The Polish Navy would be eliminated in a very short time. As to Norway, the situation was safe as long as she remained neutral. The ore traffic could use territorial waters inside the skerries almost down to the Skagerrak just as in time of peace. A strong mine barrage was laid in the first weeks of the war from the West Frisian Islands 150 miles due north. In this way, the exit from the German Bight was practically pushed up to the latitude of the Skaw, a measure which greatly improved the protection of vessels in that area.
Nothing could be done for merchant ships outside these extended home waters except to tell them to run for safety. Many made the attempt to return to Germany, and nearly a hundred vessels, half a million tons, reached German ports, many with valuable cargoes.
The total of the naval effort was to be concentrated upon the classical objective of denying the use of the sea routes to the enemy. Owing to the disparity of strength, it was out of the question to try to do this by a fleet action in the manner of Admiral Scheer in 1916. The only visible road to success lay in attacking enemy shipping and naval forces with every means available and at as many places as possible.
From the beginning of the war, U-boats operated at focal points around the British Islands; soon DD’s, aircraft, and U-Boats harassed the enemy by laying mines close to the British coasts; armored ships and later auxiliary cruisers, widely scattered in distant seas, attacked shipping and, at the same time, diverted British naval forces. Even the BB’s were committed in the Iceland passages and later in the Atlantic.
All these measures taken together were intended to bridge the gap until U-boats arrived in sufficient numbers to bring about a decision.
Criticism of the Strategy of Naval War Staff
This was a picture differing widely from World War I. It goes without saying that the German Naval War Staff fully realized the risks of this concept and the dangers it entailed. Criticism of its methods has not been lacking. Of course, it would have been almost a miracle if no mistakes had been made. So in spite of considerable success, the laying of magnetic mines was probably started too early, with insufficient numbers.
Not individual details but rather the overall naval strategy must be judged, and this can be done only by examining its success and the possibilities of any alternatives.
So far, only one possible alternative has been brought forward, i.e. keeping the fleet back, preparing for a landing in Britain, and executing it in the summer of 1940. Undoubtedly a successful landing in Britain shortly after Dunkirk would have ended the war.1 To carry it through, however, preparations would have had to start in the fall of 1939; large numbers of landing craft would have had to be designed and built; landing methods developed and practiced.
The U. S. Navy saw war with Japan coming earlier than the German Navy foresaw war with Britain. The U. S. Navy held its first landing exercise with anything more modern than ships’ boats in February and March, 1940, at Culebra. The German Navy, building up again after 1933, had so many problems on its hands that there was neither time nor money to develop landing vessels and methods. In the fall of 1939, when asked for an opinion on the probable outcome of the planned offensive in Belgium and France, the General Staff of the German Army told the navy that the army would consider itself lucky if it reached the Channel coast near Boulogne after six months of heavy fighting, if at all. Therefore, it would seem rather a tall order for the Naval War Staff to judge the land-military situation better than the Army, to abandon feasible operations in favor of a project which might never come off, and to concentrate the main effort of the naval building and training program on the same project.
Even if all this had been done, success remained uncertain as long as the British Fleet was intact and the German Air Force followed its own strategic conceptions.
Practical Execution of the Strategy of German Naval War Staff
Greater numbers of submarines could not come into service before 1941 because about two years were required to build them and train their crews. Incidentally, before the occupation of France, there was on hand only material for about 200 U-boats, although all naval construction had been stopped with the exception of small craft and of vessels nearing completion. Until the fall of 1941, all the other means of naval warfare had to be exploited to the utmost. This was done, under difficulties and setbacks.
The Deutschland-Lützow, the oldest armored ship, had much engine trouble and made only one cruise, rather unproductive, in the North-Atlantic. The Graf Spee was lost after the battle off the River Plate owing to an unlucky decision of her commanding officer. The Admiral Schzer was more successful, operating in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and causing much havoc to a Halifax convoy. Against the Deutschland and the Spee, the British Admiralty formed nine hunting groups of 23 CV’s, BB’s, and cruisers. In addition, three BB’s and two cruisers were detailed as escorts to important North Atlantic convoys. This clearly shows the indirect success of the German naval efforts in the field of surface raiders.
In 1940-41, the Hipper was fairly successful against another convoy, but she and Prinz Eugen were greatly hampered by their insufficient cruising range. The BB’s or (BC’s) Scharnhorst and Gneisenau attacked the northern blockade line in the late fall of 1939, sinking the British merchant cruiser Rawalpindi; during the Norwegian campaign, they surprised and sank the carrier Glorious and some transports and smaller craft. Early in 1941, they made a successful cruise in the North Atlantic, destroying a considerable number of merchant ships. During their career they met with every kind of grief in the shape of torpedoes, mines, bombs, and engine trouble; this kept them in the dockyard for long spells. The Bismarck operation in May, 1941, toward the end of the period when surface vessels could be employed, was daring and unlucky.
The ubiquitous auxiliary cruisers, ten in all, sailed all the oceans of the world, sank 850,000 tons of shipping, one CL, and one merchant cruiser, and sent a number of valuable prizes home, among them three whaling ships with enough oil for the entire German margarine ration for four months.
Taken all together, commerce warfare with surface ships netted far over one million tons, with the loss of one BB, one armored ship, and six auxiliary cruisers; furthermore it forced the British Fleet to widely disperse its forces.
In the first winter of the war, well executed sorties of DD’s and an auxiliary minelayer (speed seven knots) carried a considerable number of anchored and magnetic mines into the waters off the east coast of Britain. Their effect was increased by mines laid by aircraft and submarines at vital points around the British Islands. Although started with too few magnetic mines, this campaign had good initial success against warships and merchant ships. The British developed an effective sweep much more quickly than had been anticipated by the German experts, but Allied losses from mines remained rather high until 1944.
Results
In spite of initial checks and the small number of boats, submarines sank about five million tons of shipping in the first two years of the war, with a loss of 45 boats. During this same period 171 came into the service, more than half of this number in the last six months of the second year. The grand total of the warfare against enemy shipping in 1939 to 1941 was eight to nine million tons, about equal to half the British tonnage at the outbreak of war. In view of the numerical inferiority of the German Navy and considering that the German Air Force did very little to support the tonnage war, this result would seem to prove the correctness of the German naval strategy.
The German Air Force and the Naval War
Göring and the General Staff of the Air Force were convinced that they could subdue Great Britain in a few months by air power alone. As Goring said, “I’ll chase the British Fleet around the British Islands.” Although the fundamental operational orders for the Armed Forces for the western campaign (Weisung No. 6 für die Kriegführung, 9 Oct. 1939) expressively said, “ ... in the fight against England, the Air Force is to prepare attacking British sea commerce, war industry, and supply traffic going to France . . . ,” the Air Force did not think fit to attack British shipping or to support the submarine war by an effective air reconnaissance. After the defeat of France it made the attempt to bring Great Britain to her knees by attacking London. It failed conspicuously, but even after Operation Sea Lion (the landing in England) had been shelved, no action was taken against British sea communications. For some time, Goring even prohibited attacks on merchant ships. In January, 1941, Hitler came to the conclusion that the British morale could not be broken by this kind of warfare, and that the sea communications were Great Britain’s weakest point. He gave orders to support the submarine war, which was done by detailing 12 long-distance reconnaissance planes. From March to May, 1941, the Air Force attacked shipping and ports, sinking over 500,000 tons and putting a great many piers and shipyards out of action. British imports declined sharply; the situation became critical, but the German effort could not be sustained owing to the approaching Russian campaign.
According to a high German Air Force officer of naval extraction, the Air Force could have destroyed about 300,000 tons per month in 1940-41. This figure appears to be conservative considering the fact that nearly 200,000 tons per month were sunk in the spring of 1941 by a sadly depleted German Air Force. This means that at least two more million tons would have been destroyed, not to mention extensive damage to dockyards and harbor installations. Speculations on the consequences would probably lead too far; it is highly probable, however, that the North-African landing (November 1942), for example, could not have been carried out at that time but would have been postponed by at least half a year. In any case, the GAF attacked the RAF where it was strongest in every respect instead of forcing it to scatter for defending the long coasts and many ports of England. The attack on London is a repetition of the battle of Verdun in 1916—a strategy of taking the bull by the horns (if this can be termed strategy) with similar consequences.
The Navy in the Various Campaigns in the First Half of the War
All the time the German Naval War Staff tenaciously kept to the plan of operating against British sea communications. Therefore, it considered the Polish campaign as a sideshow only and ordered every single modern vessel to the North Sea as soon as Great Britain had declared war.
With Norway, it was a different tale, for in British hands it would have meant the end of any kind of offensive German naval strategy.2 With their Northern Barrage, the Americans had already shown in 1918 that it was possible to bottle up the North Sea. A repetition with improved mines and in Norwegian territorial waters would effectively block the road for German surface vessels as well as for submarines. Moreover, the airfields of southern Norway in British hands would constitute a direct threat to the German training areas in the Baltic, indispensable for the submarine war and thus far out of reach of the RAF. Finally, the suspension of the ore traffic from northern Sweden and Norway would cut down German steel production by one half.
To go into the details of the “Race for Norway” would digress too far. Naval War Staff would have preferred a neutral Norway, but once British intentions on Norwegian ports had been established beyond doubt, it did everything in its power to make the German occupation of Norway a success. The bulk of the navy was committed and submarine warfare was interrupted.
The operation was a full success; the British threats to the German offensive strategy, to the ore traffic, and to the training areas being completely removed. Losses (one CA, two CL’s, ten DD’s, plus some auxiliary vessels) were smaller than expected, although heavy enough for the small German fleet. Oceanic warfare was affected by torpedo damage to the two BC’s and one armored ship.
It has often been said that the losses of the Norway operation made the execution of Operation Sea Lion impossible. It seems rather improbable that the addition of the vessels lost and damaged could have turned the scales against the British Fleet. The fact remains that the Armed Forces were not prepared for a large landing operation when the unexpected success of the French Campaign gave them command of the French Channel coast. Admiral Raeder was the first to broach the subject to Hitler, mainly to point out its difficulties and to prevent being confronted with sudden decisions. He particularly emphasized the necessity of gaining control of the air. When the Air Force failed to do so the operation was abandoned. The submarine war was not affected by the naval preparations for Sea Lion.
The Mediterranean
The collapse of France and the entry of Italy into the war opened new strategic possibilities. There were, however, no plans for joint action in that theater; Hitler wanted to leave things entirely to his ally Mussolini, who singularly failed in exploiting the situation.
The lack of a German strategy for the Mediterranean and of staff preparations to utilize the victory over France for increasing the blows against Britain was a neglect worse than not preparing the landing in Britain right from the beginning of the war. A dominant position in the Mediterranean had always been an integral part of British politics; German talks with the Italians had been going on for years and should have resulted in outlining a plan for action.
In September, 1940, when the fate of Operation Sea Lion was still in the balance, Raeder had a long private talk with Hitler. The Admiral put great emphasis upon continuing the same grand strategy, i.e., concentrating every effort upon Great Britain as the main adversary. Very seriously, he tried to dissuade Hitler from the idea of attacking Soviet Russia. He proposed exploiting the Mediterranean situation to the point of completely excluding Great Britain from that sea. A combined Italo-German effort could take Malta and reach Suez, and wavering Spain would then be drawn into the Axis camp. In this way the fate of Gibraltar would be sealed. With the Mediterranean in their hands, the Axis powers would have command of the Near East, which move, Raeder hoped, would make war against Russia unnecessary. Besides, control of the Straits of Gibraltar would considerably improve the position for Atlantic warfare with submarines and surface vessels.
Hitler declared himself deeply impressed by these ideas, but he did not take them up nor did he change his Russian plans. Raeder was not supported by the Army, which held differing views on the Mediterranean. Colonel-General Haider, the Chief of the General Staff, considered all military action there as an “attempt to gain time,” not as a decisive step. The Air Force went its own way, as usual.
In the following years, Naval War Staff repeatedly applied for “finally settling the Mediterranean question.” In the fall of 1941, when the situation in North Africa became critical, Hitler himself gave orders for transferring 24 submarines and an Air Fleet to the Mediterranean, with the result that the situation improved greatly. But what would have ensured full success in 1940 was only a half-measure in 1941—42, and the Russian campaign made it impossible to take really decisive steps.
This was one of the few occasions when Hitler interfered with naval operations. To the formulation of German naval strategy he did not contribute a thing, nor did he succeed in coordinating the strategy of the three services, with the exception of the Norway campaign; and even this could not have been undertaken and carried through except by closest cooperation of the German Army, Navy, and Air Force.
The Russian Campaign
The result was that in the Russian campaign, the German Army and Air Force pursued an offensive strategy with the utmost vigor, whereas a reluctant navy followed a defensive concept and committed weak forces of small or auxiliary craft only in order not to detract from the attack on Great Britain. In this way, the divergence of strategy of 1914 was repeated to some degree. True, the Naval War Staff assessed the Russian performance at sea quite correctly as inferior, and hence planned boldly. Yet, if instead of daring minelaying raids and a few submarine and E-boat attacks, an energetic offensive against the Baltic Islands had been mounted or stronger forces (not directly needed for the U-boat war) had boldly pushed up the Gulf of Finland, there is no doubt that operations on land would have been favorably affected, with the probable result of an early capture of Leningrad, which would have then formed a first-class base for the offensive against Moscow.
The attack on Murmansk was undertaken as a pure land operation, and in South Russia the armies on the Black Sea hung back owing to the delay caused by the political setback in Yugoslavia. Evidently, the supreme command did not recognize the advantage of having undisputed command of the enclosed and marginal seas at least, when it could not hope to gain control of the oceans. Moreover, it underrated greatly the slow but immense pressure the great naval powers could bring to bear upon the small continent of Europe.
Peak and Failure of the Oceanic Campaign
After sinking the Bismarck the British fleet hunted and destroyed her supply ships, throwing out of gear the German supply organization on the Atlantic which so far had worked with little loss.3 In 1942 and 1943, the last auxiliary cruisers were either destroyed or had to turn back in the English Channel. They had done excellent work, but their time had passed. Commerce warfare with surface vessels was drawing to an end.
From 1941 on, submarines came into service in large numbers. They were essentially the same types that in the first years of the war had been so successful with their wolf pack tactics. Increasing enemy air activity drove them farther out to sea, and the lack of air reconnaissance made it difficult for them to find the convoys. The defense of the convoys was improving, too, and some of the most experienced commanders were lost, though U-boat losses were still low. In spite of these difficulties, they sank seven to eight million tons of enemy shipping in 1942 alone, but the average daily tonnage sunk per boat at sea was going down evenly and inexorably, and new merchant ship construction in Great Britain and especially in the United was going up.
The entrance of the United States into the war gave the U-boats a respite by offering lucrative targets along the east coast of North America. They made good use of the new opportunities, but this geographical extension could not solve the pressing problem of diminishing returns.
When the Japanese occupied Indonesia and their carriers raided the Indian Ocean, the German Naval War Staff anticipated a widening of the strategic field. All dreams of a closer cooperation had to be buried after Midway, however, and Germany was on her own again, Italy becoming more and more a liability.
Taking the BC’s Scharnhorst and Gneisenau back to Germany through the English Channel was tactically successful, but a tacit admission that it was no more possible to continue Atlantic warfare. The only theater where surface vessels still could operate was the Polar Sea. The Murmansk convoys here offered profitable targets. Luck seemed to be running out, however, and operations were made difficult by Hitler himself, who after the loss of the Bismarck demanded results without risks. In the first days of 1943, after an abortive attack on one of the convoys, he gave the order to decommission and scrap the remaining capital ships and cruisers as far as they were not needed for training purposes. Raeder handed in his resignation, which was accepted. Doenitz became his successor, and although he was a submariner first and foremost, he soon perceived what Hitler’s order would mean to the navy, and succeeded in persuading him to withdraw his order.
The Scharnhorst and Tirpitz were sent to northern Norway. Scharnhorst was destroyed when she unsuccessfully attacked a convoy, Tirpitz bombarded bases on Spitsbergen and was later sunk by bombs. The carrier Graf Zeppelin, which would have been very useful for the operations against the Murmansk convoys, was never commissioned because there was no naval air arm.
German Strategy Fails
In one year, from the fall of 1942 to the summer of 1943, the jerry-built structure of German grand strategy crashed about the ears of its architects in the battles of El Alamein, Stalingrad, and Tunisia; in the landings in North-Africa, in Sicily, and at Salerno; in the failure of the German Air Force; and in the complete breakdown of the submarine campaign. In May, 1943, nearly 40% of the U-boats operating at sea were lost, without any corresponding return in enemy tonnage sunk.
Still Anglo-American sea power was the most dangerous enemy. In Germany’s desperate situation the submarine was the only arm that gave some promise of becoming offensive again. But it had to be improved technically and to change its tactics to adapt itself to enemy tactical and technical progress.
The solution was found in a boat equipped with schnorkel against radar-location; in high underwater speed for gaining good attacking positions and evading pursuit; in excellent underwater location gear for firing torpedoes from a position under the convoy; and in self-aiming torpedoes. There is no doubt that these boats would have given new life to the strategy of attacking Allied sea communications. Only a few boats became operational, however, and although successful, they came too late.
So the war ended without any new naval strategy. The remnants of the fleet were employed in the Baltic with good success and little loss to support the desperately fighting army and to cover the evacuation of more than a million people fleeing from the Soviets. Western air attack took a heavy toll in the ports, however, and a few cruisers and DD’s were the only larger surface ships left at the end of the war.
Appraisal of German Naval Strategy
For a German naval officer, it is rather difficult to pass judgment on the success or failure of the strategy of the German Naval War Staff. Starting from the situation immediately after 1933 and with the knowledge of the actual course of the war, some critics have taken exception at the building policy of the navy, and at the lack of cooperation with the air force. The reasons for the building policy have been set forth above, and it is difficult to see how under the circumstances the navy could have foreseen that war would break out in September, 1939. As to the air force, Admiral Raeder over and over again put forward his well- founded claims to a naval air arm. In principle they were acknowledged, but in fact they were actually sabotaged by Goring. But this was realized too late.
For the lack of a timely preparation of the landing in England, which has also been criticized, the air force is to blame at least as much as the navy. It would have been quite a different tale if in 1940 three to four airborne divisions—instead of one—had been available.
If we start from the actual situation in September, 1939, I think, we shall find that the strategy of Naval War Staff was justified. In an almost hopeless situation, with a fleet outnumbered 1 to 10, it took the bold course of attacking enemy sea communications wherever possible—not because Admiral Raeder was overkeen for action or wanted to make a show, as has been averred sometimes, but because this was the best way to throw the weight of the navy into the balance when Germany had to fight for her life.
It would seem that in the first half of the war German naval strategy was more successful than could ever be expected. The decline of the surface ships had been anticipated in the strategic calculations, but the submarines arrived in time to keep the ball rolling. This initial success was obviously due to the correct evaluation and bold application of the experiences of World War I.
The U-boats were defeated not because naval strategy was unsound but because German countermeasures against the technical development of the Allies were taken later than circumstances warranted. In this way the German Navy failed in the second half of the war more than would actually have been necessary. Here, the fault would seem to lie less with the strategists than with the experts.
What decided Germany’s fate, and with it the ultimate outcome of naval strategy, was the lack of a genuine Armed Forces Command and the lack of an Armed Forces and national grand strategy.
1. See “Operation ‘Sea Lion’,’’ January, 1950, Proceedings.
2. See “The Invasion of Norway,” April, 1952, Proceedings.
3. See “Germany’s Secret Naval Supply Service,” October, 1953, Proceedings.